Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Goodman, N. Putnam Vs Goodman, N. III 145
Putnam: where do these worlds even come from? PutnamVsGoodman: this is a form of realism that is no less extreme than that of Hegel or Fichte!
III 146
Goodman/Putnam: the limits of natural species are in some ways arbitrary, albeit less than in artificial species. (III 268, water always contains H4O2, H6O3, etc.). Not every glowing gas cloud is deemed star. Some stars do not shine. Is it not ourselves that by the inclusion and exclusion attribute all these different objects to a category? In this respect it has been us ourselves who has made them stars. PutnamVsGoodman: Now Goodman makes a daring extrapolation: then there should not be anything that we have not made to what it is.
III 147
If we want to beat Goodman in his own chosen sport by trying to nominate a "substance independent of consciousness", we obviously get into great difficulties. But we can mitigate Goodman: There is actually a fundamental difference between such expressions as "constellation" and "Ursa Major" on the one hand and an expression like "Star" on the other.
The extension of the term "Ursa Major" is determined by a language convention. A typical proper noun when learning. Which stars belong to it we learn by finding out what is called the "Ursa Major".
III 148
That it includes all these stars, I would not call "analytical", because if one disappeared, we undoubtedly still spoke of Ursa Major and would say it no longer encompasses as many stars as previously.
Which stars are Ursa Major is a question that does not concern the astrophysicist, but the ethnologist or the linguist.
The word "star" (as opposed to the term "Ursa Major") is an extension that can not be determined by specifying a list!
No single object belongs to an extension by the very fact that it is called a star.
In this regard, the term "constellation" lies somewhere in the middle between "Ursa Major" and "star". If we find out that all the stars are giant dummies, we would say: "actually there are no stars", but not "actually, it's not Ursa Major." Would we no longer view it as a constellation? That's not certain!
III 149
Goodman: asks: can you name anything that we did not create ourselves? PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius itself. We have not even made it a star! We have brought about the term star, and it applies to Sirius.
Our concept of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, our language practice making him a bachelor!
Objectivity/Putnam: We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true.

III 154
Incompatibility/change of meaning/change of concept/change of theory/language/theories: (Goodman and Davidson find them so exciting): point, line, border etc. are used differently throughout the versions. Ex "points are converging sets of concentric spheres". Incompatible with the sentence: "Points are not sets, but individuals". Putnam: But that would be too easy! Goodman concludes, either there is no world or we lived in more than one.
Davidson: the actually acknowledged phenomenon of equivalent descriptions would somehow hold a logical contradiction.
PutnamVsGoodman, PutnamVsDavidson: we should simply drop the thought that the sentences discussed above maintained their so-called "meaning" when we pass from one version to another.
III 157
Goodman: Challenge: "all right, then please describe this reality as it is, independent of these modes of expression." PutnamVsGoodman: but why would you assume that it is possible to describe the reality independent of our descriptions anyway? Why should that lead to the assumption that there is nothing but the descriptions? Finally, also according to our own descriptions it applies that the word "quark" is something completely different than a quark.

I (k) 257
Ontology/Goodman/Putnam: in a sense, there is nothing we have not created! One can even conceive of elementary particles as dependent on our spirit.
Putnam: it is really difficult to find any stuff "independent of spirit"!
PutnamVsGoodman: in fact there is a difference between constellations and stars: the extension of "Big Dipper" is determined by linguistic convention. One can learn what stars are in the group, if one learns the meaning of the expression. A typical proper noun.
It is not analytical that the Big Dipper includes the stars.
Ex If one of the stars should disappear, we would still speak of the constellation.
We would say: the Big Dipper no longer includes as many stars as previously, just like someone losing hair, yet the person remains the same.
Ex if a new star appeared, we would not automatically include it in the constellation!
Which stars belong to the constellation is a question for anthropologists or linguists, not for the astrophysicists.
I (k) 257/258
The expression "star" in contrast to the expression "Big Dipper" is an extension which can not be defined by a list. No object is the extension of "star" because it is called a star. Ex Someone who believes that Sirius is a giant light bulb, would thus not demonstrate not knowing how to use the expression "star"!
Conversely, someone who doubts that this constellation is the Big Dipper the fact shows not knowing how to use the expression "Big Dipper"!
Ex If aliens have replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper with giant light bulbs, we would say: "That aren't really stars", but not "This is not really the Big Dipper".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Kant Leibniz Vs Kant Frege III 31
Numbers/LeibnizVsKant: Has claimed the provability of the numerical formulas. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4. Assuming that 4 indicates 3 ​​and 1, one can prove it, in a way:
  Definitions:
1st 1 and 1 are 2,
2nd 2 and 1 are 3
3rd 3 and 1 are 4
  Axiom: If a similar number is inserted, the equation remains.
  Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4
  So by axiom: 2 + 2 = 4


Leibniz I 83
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: Does not take part in the radical philosophy of subject. Like Spinoza prior to him and Hegel after him, he wanted to find a not subjective reason of being which can be expressed in truths of reason [vérités de raison] since Descartes' indispensable reflection on the subject. For this, two principles are sufficient.
1. Principle of contradiction
2. Principle of sufficient reason (can be traced back to the principle of contradiction).
Additionally,since the principle of identity is perceived through the sensory perception, we can ascribe reason -which is presupposed in our thought (the logicality of reason)- to the principles of the objects themselves (so their ontic reality).
as panlogically as Hegel's system.
I 84
In the universe and its parts, logic is existing and embodied like this. Metaphysics/Logic/Leibniz: This is why all relationships between realities - phenomenal as well as metaphysical ones- can be expressed in a logical form.
Ultimate Justification/LeibnizVsKant: The world does not seem logical because the subject understands it in the logical form of his/her thought; rather, the logical form of thought is imperative because the world shows itself as being logically created.
Leibniz: The world, however, does not show itself as world but as an additive series, i.e. an aggregate.
I 128
Phenomenon/LeibnizVsKant: Kant's idea that it is separated from the being is not to be applied! Rather, the "mundus intelligibilis" forms the basis for the "mundus sensibilis". The latter is also not a duplication but a "translation".
The phenomenal is the substantial itself but with the conditions of the imagination, for which spaciality and temporality are essential.
In-itself [Ansich]/Appearance/Leibniz/Josef König: For Leibniz, its relation is dialectical. It corresponds in turn exactly to the schema of the "Übergreifendes Allgemeines":
The in-itself [Ansich] is a category of itself (!), of the in-itself and its opposite, of the appearance. ((s) > „The overarching generality“, >Paradoxes).
I 129
The fact that the appearance is always the appearance of a in-itself (which is the sense of the word) is not meant by it. KantVsLeibniz: Because the appearance could then still differ from the object, for which it is its appearance, and as such knowledge of the object would not be possible. (This is Kant's view of the relationship.)
LeibnizVsKant: Insists that the appearance is the same as the in-itself which shows itself in the appearance.
The world does so in the perception. As such, the world reproduces itself in two ways.
1. as a whole but each time under another perspective
2. the world appears spatially as the disunion of different Substances,
3. the world appears temporally as succession of different perceptions.
The system of perceptions is "well-founded" ["wohl begründet"] because it actually is the self-restricting activity of the initial force of the in-itself.
The difference between the in-itself and appearance is the difference of the in-itself itself! This is the totality and the principle of its difference.
I 130
This is why the appearance is not unreal in comparison to the in-itself, but a sort of identical form, and as such quite real. Phenomenology/Leibniz: The way in which what needs to be expressed is comprised in the expressed. Everything that is expressed is a phenomenon.It is well-founded because the in-itself, by expressing itself, is the phenomenon. The in-itself is also identical to the phenomenon, and
constitutes the latter implicitly [Ansichseiendes].
The phenomenon is not reality's opposite (Vs Kant), but actually its specific being which is currently creating its universal representation.
This is why all perceptions in each Substance need to correspond to each other.

I 133
Motion/Leibniz: Something takes the place of something else.
I 134
The "space" [Raum] is everything that encompasses all these places. For this, there is also no need to accept an "absolute reality" of the space. Space/Time/LeibnizVsKant: The epitome of possible relationships, not as forms of intuition, but as real ontological structures of the materially implicit relationships.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993
Kant Hegel Vs Kant Leibniz I 32
Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought.
Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified.
HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of Substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history.
---
Rorty II 153
HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible.
Rorty VI 195
HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism.
VI 203
HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. ---
Vollmer I 220
Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress.
This is approximately:
SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular.
HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water.
Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson".

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988
Leibniz, G.W. Kant Vs Leibniz, G.W. Descartes I 139
Descartes/Holz: Hegel pro: Move back of thinking from the world to God himself. God is ambiguous according to him. Spinoza: continues radically Descartes but drops the Substance of the manifold. Leibniz: comes back to pluralism (dialectic unity/plurality) - KantVsLeibniz: Only "logic of illusion": (per Descartes, but mediated by Hume’s skepticism) Hegel: ties back to Leibniz’s dialectic.

Descartes I 142
KantVsLeibniz: This is only a "logic of illusion".
Kant I 34
Critique of Pure Reason: VsLeibniz, VsWolff: Against "school philosophy". Starting point: Freedom notion of academic philosophy: contradiction: freedom (as soul and God) ought to be unthinkable, although they were made ​​the subject of metaphysical teachings.
I 85
Room/Leibniz: (according to Kant): Is only by virtue of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counterexample: Mismatch between left and right hands or mirror image. An inversion will not restore the identity.
Strawson V 227
Body/idealism/realism/Kant: we do not have an external scale or an external system, in which concepts, we can give an esoteric (obvious for the initiated) meaning of the question if such objects really exist.
V 228
KantVsLeibniz: Vs pre-established harmony: we have no knowledge of the "real causes" of our perceptions. But we need it in order to decide whether those objects, which create our perceptions, really exist.
V 228
Terms/sense principle/Kant: Only when concepts are applied to objects of possible experience they really hold a meaning.
V 229
Due to the transcendental idealism we are now, however, obligated to create the objects,which exist in themselves, independently in the design of objects in general obligation objects as they exist in themselves, independently of our perception. But:
V 230
KantVsMetaphysics/KantVsLeibniz: these alleged truths about objects independent of time and space. ("intelligible" objects). Kant: that is only consistent with the assumption that one speaks not of objects themselves, but of concepts.
I 234
Justification/Vollmer: is not even necessary. What should make us look for a justification? Kant/early/precritical: Newton’s theory cannot be proven logically. The KantVsLeibniz and KantVsWolff had realized this. But Newton’s theory can also not be empirically verified. This, Kant had learned from Hume. This is then in contradiction to the assumed "absolute truth" and "logical provability" of Newtonian theory.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993
Spinoza, B. Hegel Vs Spinoza, B. Leibniz I 31
Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: who starts from the thinking requirement of substantial unity of the world and the experience requirement of the qualitative diversity of beings (the manifold), can comprehend this manifold only as manifestations or aspects of a substance in which "all which was thought to be true, has gone down." However, with this the the actual condition of thinking, the distinctiveness of thought content, is exposed!Leibniz saw the danger.
---
I 32
Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in unity". If the deduction was only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), that would be the self-destruction of the world in thinking.
Kant: draws the consequence to establish the unity of the world in the priority of thought. The unit is then justified only transcendentally or subjectively idealistic.
HegelVsKant: attempts to renew the metaphysics of Substance that would justify the unity of being in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute spirit in world history.

Rorty II 112
Truth/HegelVsSpinoza/Rorty: relinquishes the belief of Spinoza, that we recognize the truth when we see it. Truth/Spinoza: Thesis: W. we recognize when we see it.

Lei II
G. W. Leibniz
Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000