Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Darwin, Ch. | Verschiedene Vs Darwin, Ch. | Gould II 101 CuvierVsEvolution: he concluded from his principle of interaction that evolution had to be excluded. II 136 VavilovVsDarwin: variation does not take place in all directions, but arranged in classes of chemistry and crystallography, which are analogous. Vavilov has underemphasized the creative role of the environment. II 328 The opponents of Darwin always bring the same litany: Darwin must have been wrong - the order cannot arise by chance (e.g. KoestlerVsDarwin). Pinker I 403 Mortimer AdlerVsDarwinism: (Philosopher) 1940: Evolution could not have taken place, because there was also no three-and-a-half-sided triangle. Darwin: It is quite possible that intermediate forms have occurred in the past. Natural Species/Darwin: is not an ideal type, but a population. Vollmer I 260 Selection/Vollmer: there is no serious argument that the selection principle is circular. VsDarwinism/Tautology: the argument against Darwinism that it is tautological is misguided: "Survival of the survivor": VollmerVsVs: Fitness is not determined by the Survival of the individual, but by reproductive success, more food, more living space, more partners, more offspring, etc. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Pi I St. Pinker How the Mind Works, New York 1997 German Edition: Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Evolution Theory | Verschiedene Vs Evolution Theory | Vollmer I 258 VsEvolution: the theory of evolution is circular: you can only "unroll" things that are already there. VollmerVsVs: the meaning of a term is never determined by etymology, but by definition, use, context. The term does not have the meaning that the Romans gave it when they coined it. >Change of concept. I 276 VsEvolution Theory: "Every adaptation requires a recognition of that to which it is to be adapted. Then the recognition of fitting is a circle." VollmerVsVs: it is not true at all that every adjustment requires recognition. VsEvolution Theory: not predictable VollmerVsVsVs: there is no compelling reason at all to use forecasting capability as a benchmark for the science of a theory. Vollmer: The goal of science is not prognoses, but explanations! I 277 VsEvolution Theory: "It is not falsifiable". For example, if one finds life on Mars, it is explained in evolutionary theory, if none is found, its absence or disappearance is also explained in evolutionary theory. (PopperVsEvolution Theory!) (s)Vs: For example, the not-being-damaged of a fallen cup can also be explained with the help of physics.) I 278 VsEvolution Theory: from the existence of characteristics one can only conclude that they allow and possibly enable life, but not that they promote it! Therefore, one cannot necessarily accept adaptation! (Roth, 1984). Especially one cannot claim that our previous Survival proves the correctness of our view of the world! I 279 VollmerVsVsVs: that there are selection-neutral and even survival-damaging characteristics makes it probably an empirical question whether functionality is present in individual cases, but does not impair the fertility of that panselection maxim. The question "What for?" is always allowed in biology, even if it does not always find an answer. I 279 VsEvolution Theory: 1. The transfer of selection theory to the development of cognitive abilities can only succeed if there is objective truth and if knowledge is more useful than error. (Simmel, 1895). 2. Moreover, cognitive fits could also come about other than through self-adaptation, for example by the environment changing and itself adapting (by chance). 3. Correct mapping of the outside world obviously does not play a role in selection! Because there are so many species with "worse knowledge": plants are not "falsified" by the eye, the primordial eye not by the eagle eye, etc. I 282 VsEvolution Theory: can success guarantee truth? Truth/Simmel: actually goes the way of equating success with probation and probation with truth. >Pragmatism. Evolutionary EpistemologyVsSimmel: it does not adopt this pragmatic approach. It makes a strict distinction between truth definition and truth criterion. Truth/Vollmer: Success is neither necessary nor sufficient, but is always indicative. Fitting can be determined without any recourse to selection or Evolution. I 284 But one can also proceed the other way round: one finds that the contribution of the subject to knowledge is at least partly genetically determined. (Interaction). I 285 Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Nozick, R. | Nagel Vs Nozick, R. | I 196 Robert Nozick: Thesis: Evolution theoretical explanation of human reason. (Naturalistic epistemology). Proposes a reversal of the Kantian dependency on the facts of reason. "Reason is a dependent variable which is shaped by the facts. Reason gives information about reality, because reality shapes reason, and because it selects what appears as "obvious"." "The Evolution theoretical explanation itself is something where we get by leveraging reason to support the Evolution theory. I 197 Therefore, this interpretation does not belong to the initial philosophy, but to our current scientific opinion." NagelVsNozick: that is no guarantee that the thing is true at all, or necessary. There could also have been a different adaptation to Evolution. Nor is it a justification of reason. I.e. the whole thing is not circular. I 199 NagelVsNozick: I must be able to believe that the evolutionary explanation is consistent with the proposition that I act upon the rules of logic, because they are right and not only because I'm biologically programmed to this behavior. (Also applies to mathematics). I 200 The only form that can really assume rational thinking is to understand the validity of arguments based on what they say! I 201 This is not to deny the importance of our thinking for survival. (Although there are a lot of species that have lived on happily without this capability). VsRealism/Ethics/Nihilism: nihilism tries to portray it as a discovery that there are no objective values. Then all positive value statements must be false. Only of people in the world it could be said that it is anything of importance to them. III 64 NagelVsNihilism/Ethics: that is tempting from the objective point of view, but it is a misconception to presuppose that objective judgments can only be made from a distant point of view. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Vollmer, G. | Verschiedene Vs Vollmer, G. | Putnam I 196 Causality/Charles FriedVsVollmer: can easily be considered a physical relationship! For example, "act, smash, move" are causal verbs. (impulse transmission). Fried: Once you have made this mistake, it is easy to believe that functional properties would simply be higher-level physical states. (Putnam self-criticism: I believed this myself earlier) And then to think, reference (and pretty much anything at all) could be a functional property and thus physical. Vollmer I 275 VsEvolutionary Epistemology/EE: Adaptation is reciprocal. It is precisely the selection advantage of the human to be able to radically reshape his environment (in relation to his needs). Thus the constructive moment is excluded in the evolutionary epistemology. VollmerVsVs: the Evolutionary epistemology has been developed by biologists who are well aware of the interaction of adaptation. However, the dynamic of the process does not affect the applicability of the concept of adaptation at all. (DennettvsAdaption, GouldVsAdaption). I 290 DretskeVsEvolutionary Epistemology: has very little to offer. (1971, 585) PutnamVsEvolutionary Epistemology: may not be scientifically wrong, but does not answer a single philosophical question! (1982a,6) I 292 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: some of its representatives already see a "knowledge-gathering process" in the entire biological evolution. Or one speaks of a molecule "recognizing" another molecule. I 293 VollmerVsVs: no critic defines "knowledge", only Löw: this includes subjectivity (which he does not define either). Information/Löw: Information always exists only for one subject. Vollmer pro, but perhaps too dogmatic. I 298 Truth/Success/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: when the correctness of experience is inferred from evolutionary success: 1. facts are confused with norms (quid juris, quid facti) 2. the problem of knowledge is reduced to its genetic context and thus 3. the question of the validity of a statement ist trivialized. This is a genetic fallacy. VollmerVsVs: it is true that factual and normative questions are considered inseparable here, but it does not mean that they are confused! The Evolutionary epistemology does not conclude from Survival the correctness of a world view! Rather vice versa: in general, a better understanding of the external world structures points to a Survival advantage. Under competition then mostly the better world view prevails. I 300 Validity/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: The evolutionary epistemology does not solve the validity problem. Validity is central to knowledge, but not possible without reflection. Validity/Vollmer: what validity is, is seen very differently. Lotze: Validity Puntel: Discursive redeemability Gethmann: Ability to consent Generally necessary: a valid statement must be syntactically correct, logically consistent, semantically flawless, intersubjectively understandable, discursive, intersubjectively verifiable, compatible with accepted statements, etc. Sufficient: here one must distinguish between conditional (hypothetical) and unconditional (categorical) validity. Conditional validity: has a statement if another statement must be assumed as valid to prove its validity, otherwise unconditional validity. Vollmer: the claim of unconditional validity has never been honoured. (> Final statement). We must content ourselves with conditions for relative validity. I 309 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: if epistemology is empirical, it becomes circular. I 310 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: it is not the task of epistemology to provide absolute justifications for knowledge and truth claims. One can, however, ask under which conditions certain factual knowledge would be possible, and to these questions it can also give reasonable answers. Epistemology/Vollmer: Tasks: Explication of concepts and knowledge Investigation of our cognitive abilities, comparison of different cognitive systems. Differentiation of subjective and objective structures, descriptive and normative statements, factual and conventional elements. Illumination of the conditions for cognition. Demonstration of cognitive boundaries. I 315 Causality/VsEvolutionary Epistemology: after the evolutionary epistemology, causality plays a threefold role: 1. order form of nature 2. thinking category 3. this category of thinking is the result of selection. Therefore, causality generates causality via causality. a) Through the multiple meaning of "causality" the principle of methodical order is violated. (Gerhardt, 1983,67 69,75). b) If causality is a category of thought, it cannot at the same time be a product of experience. For this it would have to be inductive or abstract like any experience. Thus, such event sequences must first of all have been recognized as causal. (Lütterfelds, 1982, 113,6). I 316 VollmerVsVs: the ambiguity is admissible, but easy to eliminate. Solution: instead, one can say that causality as a real category generates causality as a form of thinking via a causally effective selection. This is then not a life-worldly experience. I 318 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: says nothing new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of Kant's interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical psychic "organization". Vollmer I 313 Reason/BaumgartnerVsVollmer: cannot come out of himself. It is absolute in this sense and cannot be deceived. Reason/ZimmerliVsVollmer: the eye can see itself through apparatuses. But seeing can never see it, because it always does seeing. "Mental uncertainty relation". Explanation/HayekVsVollmer: no system can explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Hövelmann: in principle the ability to speak cannot be cheated on. VollmerVsVs: these authors do not explain "reason" etc. at all. Exception: I 323 Def Explanation/Hayek: requires classification. A system that is to classify objects according to n properties must be able to create and distinguish at least 2 exp n different classes. Therefore, the classifying system must be much more complex. However, no system can surpass itself in complexity and therefore cannot explain itself. I 314 Back-Reference/Vollmer: of course self-knowledge and self-declaration cannot impart secure or complete knowledge. But many "good circles" are quite consistent and informative. Example: "Good circles": |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evolut. Epistemology | Vollmer, G. | I 37 Evolutionary Epistemology/EE/Vollmer: Thesis: our epistemological apparatus is a result of biological evolution. The agreement with real structures ("finished world"?) enables survival. However, the adaptation of an organism is never ideal, nor does it have to be. I 271 VsEvolutionary Epistemology: does not say anything new at all! Already Spencer was refuted. Haeckel already uses the term "biological epistemology". The thesis of the mind as an organ function is reminiscent of the Kant interpretation by Helmholtz and F.A. Lange: "The a priori as a physical-psychic organization". |
|
| |||