Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kauffman, St. | Verschiedene Vs Kauffman, St. | Kauffman I 94 Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: we want to determine the conditions under which the same molecules act as catalysts and products at the same time. We know that proteins and RNA molecules play this role. In addition, all types of organic molecules can be substrates and products of reactions, while at the same time being catalysts for other reactions. Now we need to know which molecules catalyse which reactions. We only have assumptions here. Vs: but you have to know about it to be sure that a molecule system contains an autocatalytic formation. If the general conditions were slightly different, there would be no life. I 97 KauffmanVsVs: Thesis: perhaps these details of chemistry do not play a role at all! The legality of life lies on an even deeper level. This emergence is directly rooted in mathematics itself. Kauffman I 104 VsKauffman: it could be argued that what is true for As and Bs is not considered necessary for atoms and molecules. Problem: to produce large polymers energy is required because the thermodynamics favors their splitting into smaller groups. E.g. peptide bond. (100 amino acids) during the bond, a water molecule is released, vice versa consumed during the splitting. Thus, water itself is product of the reaction. (Water > Life). In a normal aqueous environment the ratio of split to bound amino acid pairs is about 10 : 1. I 105 For tri or tetrapeptides, the ratio increases to 100 : 1 or 1000 : 1. Rule: If the length of a polymer increases by one amino acid, its equilibrium concentration decreases by a factor of 10 in relation to the free amino acids. How can high concentrations of such molecules be achieved against this trend? Life/Catalysis/Kauffman: there are at least three basic mechanisms: 1. Reactions can be limited to surfaces instead of taking place in a volume. This favors the formation of larger molecules, because the speed of the reaction depends on how fast the partners meet each other. 2. Dehydration. if the water molecules are removed, the reaction is slower. I 108 Life/Kauffman: Thesis: Simple systems do not achieve catalytic isolation. Life came into being in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
Kau II Stuart Kauffman At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization and Complexity New York 1995 Kauffman I St. Kauffman At Home in the Universe, New York 1995 German Edition: Der Öltropfen im Wasser. Chaos, Komplexität, Selbstorganisation in Natur und Gesellschaft München 1998 |
| Quantum Mechanics | Einstein Vs Quantum Mechanics | Esfeld I 256 Incompleteness/Quantum Mechanics/QM/EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics: For example, suppose two electrons are emitted from one source and move away with opposite spin in opposite directions. Overall state: singlet state. Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen/EPR: if the result of a measurement of the location or momentum of one system is given, then we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the same observables of the other system. (without intervention) I 257 Consequence: the quantum mechanics is incomplete. There is therefore an element of reality that corresponds to this physical quantity regardless of whether the second measurement is actually performed. This exists before the first measurement. The quantum mechanics is incomplete because it makes everything dependent on the measurement and therefore does not recognize this element. To justify this one needs the two principles of separability and local effect. Local Effect: to exclude that there is an interaction between the measurement on the first system and the reality on the second system. Separability: to exclude that the determination of the local properties depends on something other than the state the system is in. Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics: further conclusion: quantum Systems simultaneously have a definite numerical value of two or more incompatible observables. I 258 For example, an experimenter only decides clearly after the emission which observable he wants to measure. Separability and local effect imply that this decision is irrelevant. Nevertheless, once the decision has been made, we can predict the value of the corresponding observable for the other system. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: therefore the two Systems must have a definite value of all observables between which the experimenter can choose. Einstein did not consider this conclusion to be self-evident because it is based on the assumption of separability and the local effect. I 271/272 Metaphysics/Science/Esfeld: Separability and local effect are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are a precise formulation of assumptions that are at the center of our everyday view of nature. I 271/272 The question of whether quantum mechanics is complete also seems to be a metaphysical question. It depends on whether we underline separability and local effect as the foundation of science. Bell's inequality/Bell/Esfeld: Bell has eliminated the seemingly clear distinction between physics and metaphysics! Metaphysics: Einstein's realism shows that metaphysics has predictable consequences that can be tested. "Experimental Metaphysics"/Shimony: (Ferdinand Gonseth, 1948, Michele Besso, 1948): are similar to Quine's position: rejection of the separation between mathematics, science, and philosophy. Every element of our knowledge can be subject to revision. I 273 Thesis: metaphysical questions cannot be decided by experiments! On the contrary: EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics must be understood in the sense of the Quine-Duhem-Thesis: no separation between metaphysics and physics in quantum mechanics. For example, Bell's experiments can be seen as a test of two hypotheses, namely the conjunction of parameter independence and result independence. But the point is: what you think is what the Bell experiments confirm or disprove depends on what background assumptions you base yourself on. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 216 Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics/EPRVsQM/Genz: incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics: Spin has an element of reality. Since quantum mechanics can only consider one of these elements of reality, it is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument/Version Bohm: For example, a part of it rests in the laboratory and decays in a time interval into an electron and a positron. (There is no such thing, but it does not matter). (In the real experiment (Aspect) photons were assumed). If Gretel detects the electron, she can be sure that Hänsel has the positron. From a quantum mechanical point of view, the particle pair is a single system. VIII 216 The angular momentum of the particle decaying in its resting system is zero, since the conservation law applies to the angular momentum, it is also zero for the decay products. If, however, only the spins of the particles contribute to their total angular momentum, the law of conservation becomes a conservation law for the sum of the spins. Consequently, the two spins remain coupled. But now the coupling of the spins to the total spin zero guarantees more: that the sum of the settings of the spins in any direction is zero. If the total spin were not zero, it could be that it is zero in x direction, but not in y direction. VIII 217 Example Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm: Problem: Gretel can align her star Gerlach apparatus as she wants. The alignment of the device determines which component of the spin of the entering particle should have a "sharp" value with spin 1/2. Hänsel and Gretel choose directions for x or y (perpendicular to the direction of propagation z). Since the two particles fly apart, the chirality is different! Both now want to measure "transversal" spins perpendicular to the extension. VIII 218 Gretel: measures in x direction plus or minus. If she turns the apparatus by 90°, she measures in y direction, again plus or minus. N.B.: Hänsel always measures the opposite. If Gretel has the apparatus in the same direction as Hänsel, she measures the opposite of his spin. If she now turns it in y direction, she has to measure the opposite again, even if Hänsel has not turned his apparatus. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: now claim that Gretel can use it to determine Hänsel's spin in both the x and y directions without disturbing Hänsel's positron in any way. Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: actually it is not the case according to quantum mechanics. Before the measurement it is pointless to speak of a state at all. VIII 219 Bertlmann's Socks/Genz: are not particularly exciting. Corresponds to the "glove correlation": if I find one, I know that I have lost the other. VIII 220 Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: also the spin operators of the positron do not exchange with each other, but a statement about the "sum" is valid: σxσy - σyσx = 2iσz. Translated into the formalism of quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen is that the state | > of the positron must be both an eigenstate of σx and of σy for certain eigenvalues mx and my. But the quantum mechanics does not know such a state! Unlike the product of operators, the product of eigenvalues is independent of the order! 0 = (mxmy - mymx) | ψ > = (σxσy - σyσx) | ψ > = 2iσz | ψ >, so that | ψ > of σz would have to be destroyed (σy | ψ > = 0). But because σz, just like σx, and σy can have only 1 and -1 but not 0 as eigenvalue, there can be no such state! But the contradiction is one between the formalism of quantum mechanics and the demands of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and none with experimentally verifiable statements. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stroud Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 183 Internal/external/Carnap/StroudVsQuine: in Carnap's distinction there must be something else. The fact that it can be answered as an internal question but not as an (identical) external one shows that the two must not be confused. Language/Carnap/Stroud: therefore Carnap distinguishes different "languages" or "Systems". These answer only internal questions. Expressiveness: that a "philosophical" (external) question is then meaningless is not only due to the terminology. I 184 The terminology is always meaningful. For example, within mathematics, "There are numbers" makes sense. I 223 Knowledge/Skepticism/Quine: if all knowledge is put to the test at the same time, no part of it can be invoked. ((s) > Example "Everything he said is true"). Empiricism/knowledge/solution/Quine: this is the reason why knowledge must be justified on the basis of sensory experience. Psychology/knowledge/explanation/justification/Quine: a surrender of epistemology to psychology leads to circularity. ((s) Because psychology itself goes beyond the mere detection of stimuli). StroudVsQuine/StroudVsNaturalised Epistemology: is also a surrender of epistemology to psychology. And thus just as circulatory! Epistemology/Stroud: can it be that the traditional epistemology has been refuted, but not Quine's naturalized epistemology itself? Is the solution the relation between the two? Quine: sometimes suggests that the two points of view (NaturalizedVsTraditional Epistemology) differ: the "doctrinal" question should be put aside as false hope. Consciousness/knowledge/tradition/knowledge theory/justification/Stroud: the traditional epistemology insists on the isolation of certain objects of consciousness in order to identify undoubted information. Consciousness/QuineVsTradition: we can bypass the question of consciousness and simply try to explain, I 224 how our rich output arises from the events that occur on our sensory surface (nerve endings). N.B.: this can be approached scientifically. Then one can distinguish two types of events in the observable physical world, and that is the scientific goal. StroudVsQuine: it looks like Quine just changed the subject. Skepticism then still threatens. And Quine does not want that. "Liberated epistemology" (roots of reference, 3): is not the same as empirical psychology, it is rather an "enlightened persistence" (enlightened) of the traditional epistemic problem. Empiricism/knowledge/justification/reason/circle/Quine: (see above) Tradition: our knowledge cannot be empirically justified, otherwise it is circular. QuineVsTradition: this fear of circularity is unnecessary logical shyness. "Enlightenment/"liberated" epistemology/Quine: the insight into the fact that skepticism arises from science itself. And to fight it, we are entitled to bring in scientific knowledge. QuineVsTradition: did not recognize the strength of its position at all. I 225 Knowledge/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: Traditional epistemology has not recognized that the challenge of knowledge originated from knowledge itself. Thesis: the doubts about its reliability have always been scientific doubts. Consciousness/Quine: the confusion was based on the concentration on consciousness. Introspection/Tradition: thought that facts about our "lean" input would be brought to light through introspection. QuineVsIntrospection: the reasons for finding the input lean come from science. I 227 Deception/Skepticism/QuineVsTradition: the concept of illusion itself is based on science, because the quality of deception simply consists in deviating from external scientific reality. (Quine, Roots of reference, RR 3) Illusions exist only relative to a previously accepted assumption of real bodies. Given/QuineVsSellars/Stroud: this may be the reason to assume a non-binding given. (SellarsVsQuine). QuineVsDescartes/Stroud: N.B.: then it might seem impossible to invoke the possibility of deception because some knowledge of external reality is necessary to understand the concept of illusion! Stroud: we have dealt with arguments of this form before (see above >Distortion of meaning). Violation of the necessary conditions for the use of certain terms. Quine/Stroud: it could now be answered analogously to StroudVsAustin, MooreVsAustin, but Quine does not make these errors. Language/Skepticism/Quine/Stroud: his approach to language (QuineVsAnalyticity, QuineVsSynonymy) leaves him no possibility to invoke what lies within the meaning of a particular term. StroudVsQuine: but if he thinks that the scientific origins do not lead to skepticism, why does he think that because the "skeptical doubts are scientific doubts" I 228 the epistemologist is "clearly" entitled to use empirical science? The question is made even more difficult by Quine's explicit denial that: Skepticism/Quine: I'm not saying he leaves the question unanswered, he is right to use science to reject science. I am simply saying that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts. TraditionVsQuine/Stroud: this is important for the defense of the traditional epistemologist: if it is not a logical mistake to refute doubts from science itself, so that in the end there is certainty, then what is the crucial logical point that he has missed? StroudVsQuine: if his "only point" is that skeptical doubts are scientific doubts, then epistemology becomes part of science. SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: but the skeptic could answer with a "reductio ad absurdum", and then epistemology would no longer be part of science: "Reductio ad absurdum"/SkepticismVsQuine/Stroud: either a) Science is true and gives us knowledge, or b) It is not true and gives us no knowledge. Nothing we believe about the outer world is knowledge. I 230 Moore/Stroud: Moore should not be slandered either. According to Kant and Carnap, what he says is completely legitimate. Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: N.B.: the results of an independent scientific study would be in the same boat as e.g. Moore's hands. They would be "scientific" versions of Moore's argument with the common sense. Philosophy/Science/Quine: both merge continuously. Stroud: Descartes and other traditional philosophers could agree with that. StroudVsQuine: Problem: then maybe we have no scientific knowledge at all. We have no more reason to believe in it than we do not believe in it. No scientific investigation could provide clarity here. I 231 Nor would any challenge be conceivable "from the inside". So skepticism would follow. I 233 Skepticism/StroudVsQuine: but whether it is correct or not is not something that will be decided by future experience or experiments! If the epistemological question is correctly asked - as Quine asks it - then we already know how future experience will be! We will always be confronted with the question of the surplus of our rich output over lean input. Certainly, if we are confronted today with an experience that undermines our belief, skepticism will be justified today. But: N.B.: the same was already justified in 1630! I 234 Naturalism/StroudVsQuine: will not be enough if skepticism argues with the reductio ad absurdum. We just have to rebuild the ship on the high seas. The traditional epistemologist can saw (identify!) the piece out of the ship that represents the lean input. I 240 Knowledge/StroudVsQuine: even if I blamed the "meager" input for accepting a "projection," that would not be an explanation of his knowledge or true belief. I 245 Knowledge/knowledge theory/explanation/projection/StroudVsQuine: assuming that I assume with Quine that all my beliefs are just "overflowing output from lean input" (i.e. projection), that doesn't mean that I cannot think I have true beliefs, in the sense that there's nothing to stop my beliefs from being true. Problem: even if they were all true, I would not be in a position to explain, or even understand, how a knowledge theory should explain and understand them. I cannot explain how my true belief contributes to knowledge. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Various Authors | Waismann Vs Various Authors | Waismann I 53 Axioms/Tradition: according to the older view, the axioms describe facts that can be found directly in the intuition. They deal with "ideal" points, straight lines, etc. Accordingly, Euclid begins: "A (Def) point is what has no parts" but has been a stone of contention since time immemorial, because it is extremely dark. Example: a pain has also no parts. VsEuclid: even if the definition would be flawless, it would have little value for his own system. Not a single piece of evidence depends on this explanation. New: in modern mathematics one came to the insight that geometric sentences can be transferred to a completely different field. For example, all propositions that deal with the straight lines of our space can be interpreted in such a way that they deal with the points of a four-dimensional space. The two Systems of thought are completely isomorphic. So the sensual appearance plays no role at all for the validity of the sentences. One consciously renounces to say what a straight line is. |
Waismann I F. Waismann Einführung in das mathematische Denken Darmstadt 1996 Waismann II F. Waismann Logik, Sprache, Philosophie Stuttgart 1976 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Formalism | Thiel I 20 Formalism: the "linguistic turn" in mathematics. It is asked what is the subject of the work of the mathematician. Rules for actions. Symbols are replaced by others. Here, the formalist does not ask for the "meaning". Mathematics: Science of formalisms or formal systems (Bernays). In addition to this "theoretical calculus variant" of the formalism, there is the "theoretical structure"-variant. (Hilbert) Various formal system can be interpreted as valid by exactly the same mathematical domains. We can call this the "Description" by the formal Systems. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
|
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Life | Kauffman, St. | I 77 Life / Kauffman: life is not in the magic power of the matrices replication, but is based on a deeper logic. I 97 KauffmanVsVs: maybe the details of this chemistry do not matter. The law of life is on an even deeper level. This emergence is rooted directly in mathematics itself I 108 Life / Kauffman: simple systems do not achieve catalytic seclusion. Life originated in one piece and not in successive steps, and it has retained this holistic character to this day. |
|
| |||