Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Armstrong, D. Lewis Vs Armstrong, D. V 353
"New Work for a Theory of Universals" (Armstrong 1983)(1): Universals/Armstrong: Armstrong's theory of universals is supposed to be the solution for the problem of the One and the Many >Universals/Armstrong, >Universals/Lewis.
LewisVsArmstrong: but it allows for either nominalist solutions or for no solution of any kind.
---
Schwarz I 71
Combinatorialism/Armstrong: combinatorialism merely consists of several fundamental properties for which - contrary to colours - any combination should be possible (1986(2), §7). LewisVs: 1986a(3), 86, HellerVs (1998)(4): it is unclear whether this is actually possible. LewisVsArmstrong: as such the problem is not solved, it only allows different interpretations of the descriptions: when does a set of sentences represent the fact that there are donkeys if there is no mention of donkeys? It does represent this fact if the sentences imply the existence of donkeys (1986e(5), 150-157).
Problem: modality is required.
VsVs: it could be stated that the relationship between the distribution of fundamental properties and of all other truths is analytic, and can be characterized without requiring primitive modal vocabulary. (2002b(6), Heller 1996, see below Chapter 11, LewisVs: 1992a(8), 209).
Schwarz I 118
Laws of Nature/LoN/DretskeVsLewis/TooleyVsLewis/ArmstrongVsLewis: there is something missing in Lewis’ laws of nature: for Lewis, laws of nature are simple regularities. But they should be more than that. Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, therefore properties. Since regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with precisely the same local events can nicely differ in their laws of nature. For one world, it may be a regularity, for the other, a relation of universals.
Relation of universals: is the foundation for everything and cannot be analyzed. To state that there is a relation between F's and G's because all F's are G's is not enough. This would be the regularity theory.
SchwarzVs: this leads to problems with not instantiated universals (Mellor 1980(9), §6).
laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong/LewisVsTooley/LewisVsDretske: if laws of nature express fundamental relations between universals which are logically independent from observable regularities why do we assume that physics will tell us something about laws of nature?
Schwarz I 119
What is the use of universals? Physicists only want to observe regularities. And what is then the relation between universals and regularities? Additional explanations will then be needed! How could a rule-maker exclude that N(F,G) is valid, but some F's are nevertheless not G's. It is not resolved by giving a name to the "rule-maker" like Armstrong does with the term "necessitation". laws of Nature/LewisVsArmstrong: better: regularities which are justified because of a primitive relation between universals. It is a relationship which also exists in possible worlds in which laws of nature are not valid. It is rather more obscure, but at least not a miracle anymore that all F's are G's if a law of nature demands it.
Schwarz I 124
Probability/LewisVsArmstrong: VsFundamental probability property: fundamental properties cannot fulfill the role which we attribute to probability.
Schwarz I 139
Cause/causation/Armstrong: absence is not a real cause. LewisVsArmstrong: yes, it is. However, it is so common that is it ignored. Problem: numerous absences in vacuum.
Schwarz I 140
Solution/Lewis: absences are absolutely nothing, there is nothing. Problem: if absence is only an empty space-time region, why would oxygen - and not nitrogen- only exist because of absence? Solution/Lewis: "influence", small increase of probability.
Schwarz I 141
Counterfactual dependence as well between the how, when and where of the event.
Schwarz I 231
Def Principle of truth-maker/to make truth/Armstrong/Martin/Schwarz: all truths must be based on the ontology. Strong form: for each truth, there is something that makes it true. Its existence necessarily implies the truth. LewisVsArmstrong: that is too strong, e.g. the example "no unicorns exist" is true, not because there is something specific, but because unicorns really do not exist (1992a(8), 204, 2001b(10), 611f).
Truthmaker: a truthmaker would be an object here which only exists in worlds in which there are no unicorns. Problem: why is it not possible for this object to also exist in worlds in which there are unicorns? Answer: such an object would be a contradiction to the principle of recombination.
SchwarzVsLewis: but this is not true: the truth-maker for "no unicorns exist" could be an object which essentially lives in a possible world without unicorns. However, the object could very well have duplicates in the possible worlds with unicorns. The counterpart relation is not a relation of intrinsic resemblance.
To make truth/predicate/Armstrong/Schwarz: (Armstrong 1997(11), 205f): if object A has the property F, an object must exist which implies the existence of this fact.
LewisVsArmstrong: why can this object not exist, although A is not F (1998b)(12)?. If A is F in one world, but it is not so in the other world, why is it always necessary to have something that exists in one possible world, but is missing in the other world. Two possible worlds are only different on the grounds of the characteristics the objects have in their worlds.
((s) So different characteristics in an area that remains constant).
Characteristics/truth-maker/Lewis: a truth-maker is not needed for something that has a (basic) characteristic: the sentence "A is F" is true because A has the characteristic F. That is all (1998b(12), 219).
Def principle of truth-maker/LewisVsArmstrong/Schwarz: only the following will then remain: truth supervenes upon the things that exist, and upon perfect natural characteristics which it chooses to instantiate (1992a(8), 207, 1994a(13), 225, Bigelow 1988(14), §25).
Whenever two possibilities are different from each other, there are either different objects in them or these objects have different fundamental characteristics (1992a(8), 206, 2001b(10), §4).
Schwarz I 232
N.B.: if there are possibilities that are qualitatively indistinguishable, but numerically different (which Lewis neither states nor denies, 1986e(5), 224), the principle must be limited to qualitative truths or characteristics (1992a(8), 206f). If there are none, simplification is possible: no other two possibilities are exactly the same regarding which objects exist as well as the fundamental characteristics are instantiated. ((s) If the distribution of fundamental characteristics sets everything, then the objects are set as well. As such, the possible worlds are only different regarding their characteristics, but these are naturally set.) Schwarz: this can be amplified.


1. D. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2. D. M. Armstrong [1986]: “The Nature of Possibility”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 16: 575–594.
3. D. Lewis [1986a]: “Against Structural Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46.
4. Mark Heller [1998]: “Property Counterparts in Ersatz Worlds”. Journal of Philosophy, 95: 293–316.
5. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell.
6. D. Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97.
7. Mark Heller [1996]: “Ersatz Worlds and Ontological Disagreement”. Acta Analytica, 40:35–44.
8.D. Lewis [1992a]: “Critical Notice of Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. In [Lewis 1999a] als “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility”.
9. David H. Mellor [1980]: “Necessities and universals in natural laws”. In David H. Mellor (Hg.) Science, belief and behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
10. D. Lewis [2001b]: “Truthmaking and Difference-Making”. Noˆus, 35: 602–615.
11. D. M. [1997]: A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. D. Lewis [1998b]: “A World of Truthmakers?” Times Literary Supplement , 4950: 30.
13. D. Lewis [1994a]: “Humean Supervenience Debugged”. Mind, 103: 473–490.
14. John Bigelow [1988]: The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist’s Philosophy of Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Hume, D. Armstrong Vs Hume, D. Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?.
And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress).
This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real).

Arm II (b) 46
Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type.
II (b) 47
Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro).
But that’s not the whole truth!.
Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound.
If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course.
But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!.

Place II 64
Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional.
Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity).
Place II 65
Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Humean Supervenience Verschiedene Vs Humean Supervenience Schwarz I 114
Vs Humean Supervenienz/HS/VsLewis/Schwarz: more serious: considerations to show that nomological and counterfactual truths do not supervene on the distribution of local properties. Suppose there is a basic law of nature, according to which when X and Y particles meet, there is always a Z particle. Purely by chance, however, X and Y particles never meet.
The world w1, in which this law of nature exists, would then look exactly like the world w2, in which it does not exist. Both worlds agree in the distribution of local properties. But they differ in their laws of nature and above all in their counterfactual truths. (In w1 a collision would produce a particle). (Tooley 1977(1), 669 671, 2003,§4,Armstrong(2) 1983, §5.4, Carroll(3) 1994,§3.1)


1. Michael Tooley [1977]: “The Nature of laws”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4: 667–698
2. David. M. Armstrong [1983]: What is a law of Nature?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
3. John Carroll [1994]: laws of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press





Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Plato Armstrong Vs Plato Arm III 90
ArmstrongVsTichy: it seems clear that laws, although they are states of affairs and real, are abstractions. That means they cannot exist independently of other things. Universal: cannot consist only of laws and nothing else. ArmstrongVsPlato: Universals are abstractions. But not in the sense of Quine and many North American philosophers:
III 91
Abstract/Quine: calls Platonic universals "abstract". (In a different sense than Armstrong’s universals as abstractions). Abstraction/Armstrong: a relation between abstractions is itself an abstraction.
Arm III 126
Universals/ArmstrongVsPlato: contingent, just like particulars! That means they do not exist precisely uninstantiated. Therefore, it does not seem plausible at all that if a non-existent U came to existence (Tooley), it would have a certain relation to others or, according to the law of excluded third, would not have. Conclusion: Tooleys ingenious examples do not prevent us from understanding uninstantiated laws as disguised counterfactual conditionals, whose truth or falsity depends entirely on the actual, i.e. on instantiated laws (higher level!). The "law" which is assumed to apply thereafter may never apply. Nevertheless, it may be specified.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Regularity Theory Armstrong Vs Regularity Theory Arm III 13
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) extensional problems: A) Humean Regularity: there seem to be some that are not laws of nature. (H.R. = Humean regularity). That means being an H.R. is not sufficient for being a law of nature (LoN). B) LoN: there might be some that do not universally apply in time and space. There are also laws of probability. Neither of these two would be Humean regularities (H.R.). That means being an H.R. is not necessary for being an LoN. 2) "intensional" problems: Assuming there is a H.R. to which an LoN, corresponds, and the content of this regularity is the same as that of the law. Even then, there are reasons to assume that the law and the regularity are not identical.
Arm III 25
TooleyVsArmstrong: (see below): laws of nature which essentially involve individual things must be admitted as logically possible. Then it must be allowed that laws change from one cosmic epoch to the next. TooleyVsRegularity theory: for them it is a problem that only a narrow conceptual gap separates the cosmic epochs (i.e. H.R.) from just very widely extended regularities which are not cosmic anymore. Assuming there were no cosmic regularities (reg.), but extended ones would indeed exist, then it is logically compatible with all our observations. VsRegularity theory: how can it describe the situation in a way that there are a) no laws but extensive regularities? or b) that there are laws, but they do not have cosmic reach? The latter is more in line with the spirit of reg.th. III 27 VsReg. th.: it cannot assert that every local reg. is a law. III 52 ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: makes induction irrational.
Arm III 159
ArmstrongVsIdealism: being forced to assume an unspecified absolute because of the requirement of the necessity of existence. There are no principles of deduction from the absolute downwards. There has never been a serious deduction of this kind.
Explanation/Armstrong: if the explanation has to stop shortly before coming to the absolute, then idealism must accept contingency. At what point should we accept contingency?
ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: it gives up too soon.
Universals theory: can the atomic bonds of universals be explained that we have assumed to be molecular uniformities?
Necessity/Armstrong: can only ever be asserted, it cannot be demonstrated or even be made plausible.
Arm III 53
Induction/ArmstrongVsRegularity theory: 1) Induction is rational. We use it to cope with lives. The conclusion is formally invalid and it is extremely difficult to formalize it. HumeVsInduction: with his skepticism of induction he has questioned a cornerstone of our life. (Much worse than skepticism when it comes to God).
Moore: defended induction because of the common sense. Armstrong pro.
III 54
The best thing the skepticsVsInduction can hope is playing off some of our best justified (inductively gained) everyday certainties. VsVs: it is a coherent system that our everyday certainties (beliefs) form a coherent system. Application to itself.
Hume: the doubt of this involves a quantum of mauvaise foi. (Armstrong ditto).
He is only a skeptic during his studies and rejects the skepticism in everyday life.
VsReg th: it is therefore a serious accusation against a philosophical theory, if it is obliged to skepticism VsInduction.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Tooley, M. Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. III 104
Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory.
III 105
ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction.
VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?.
Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow.
Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative.
Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?.
And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress).
One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Tooley, M. Lewis Vs Tooley, M. Schwarz I 119
Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987(1), 2003(2)). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility.
Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. Possible worlds cannot simply be missing.
laws of nature/LewisVsArmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it.


1. Michael Tooley [1987]: Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press
2. Michael Tooley [2003]: “Causation and Supervenience”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003]

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Natural laws Armstrong, D.M. Lewis V XII
Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN/Lewis: I contradict the "non-Humean lawmakers" (e.g. Armstrong): they cannot carry out their own project. Def laws of Nature/Armstrong: thesis N is a "lawmaker relation", then it is a contingent fact, and one that does not supervene on the AvQ, which universals are in this relation N. But it is nevertheless somehow necessary that if N(F,G) there must be a regularity, that all F"s are G"s.
Lewis/Schw I 118
Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: laws of nature are based on fundamental relations between universals, i.e. properties. Because regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds can differ well in their laws of nature with the same local events: what is a mere regularity here may be a "universals" relationship there. Universals-Relationship: is fundamental and unanalyzable. It is not enough to say that there is a relationship between Fs and Gs because all Fs are Gs. That would be the regularity theory.
Schurz I 239
Law of Nature/Armstrong: Thesis: are implication relations between universals. Therefore no reference to individuals. (1983, Armstrong, Maxwell conditioning/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979))

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Natural laws Drestke, F. Lewis/ Schw I 118
Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong-Theory: Thesis: Natural laws are based on fundamental relations between universals, i.e. properties. Because regularities are logically independent from local events, possible worlds with the same local events can differ well in their natural laws: what is a mere regularity here may be a universal relationship there. Universal Relationship: is fundamental and unanalyzable. It is not sufficient to say that there is a relationship between Fs and Gs, because all Fs are Gs. That would be the regularity theory.