Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 39 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| A priori | Kripke | I 46 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: Goldbach's conjecture will turn out to be true or false but then by necessity. I 75f A priori/not necessary: e.g. determining the reference of the term "one meter"/stadard meter: it is possible to know a priori that the length of this stick is one meter, and this would not be seen as a necessary truth. I 127 Difference: a priori/necessary: Kripke: one could empirically discover the essence (e.g. water = H20). >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity de re, >standard meter, >Necessity a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| A priori | Logic Texts | Read III 140 f Apriori/Read: e.g., original meter: at least at one time, a meter was defined by reference to this original meter. Therefore, we could know a priori that the original meter was one meter long. Nonetheless, it could have been longer or shorter. "The original meter is a meter long" is only contingently true, but a priori recognizable. The separation between the necessary and the a priori: surprising consequence: every a priori statement is equivalent with a contingent statement! Proof: III 142: equal truth values provide equivalence) Read: ambiguous: a priori statements can all be contingent or necessary! >necessary a posteriori. Distinction with a rigid designator for truth value: not "the truth value of A" but "the actual truth value of A". - Truth is not a property. >Rigidity. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Causal Relation | Armstrong | Martin II 134 Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure. II (d) 154 Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change). Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke. Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated. II (d) 155 Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Causal Relation | Place | Martin II 134 Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure. Armstrong II (d) 154 Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change). Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke. Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated. Armstrong II (d) 155 Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Centered Worlds | Chalmers | I 133 Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world. ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness. Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Contingency | Kripke | Stalnaker I 188 Contingent a priori/Kripke/Stalnaker: Evans: e.g. the inventor of the zipper (whoever he/she is) is assumed to be called Julius (by stipulation) - then the statement "Julius invented the zipper" can be known a priori. Reference/meaning/important argument: because the description was rather used to determine the reference than to give the meaning, the fact that Julius invented the zipper is a contingent fact. >Necessary/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Conventions | Putnam | V 124 Heat/molecular movement/identity/Putnam: the identity of heat with molecular motion is conventional - only naive physics denies this. Cf. >necessary a posteriori, > necessary identity. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Description-Dependence | Kripke | I 50 Necessary/description dependent/Ryle: description decides whether a property is necessary or contingent. (Kripke: but not all are accidental properties, some are essential.) >Properties/Kripke, >Essence/Kripke, >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary/Kripke, >Essentialism/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Descriptions | Kripke | I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name. --- III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Dispositions | Rorty | Frank I 594 Disposition/realism/RortyVsArmstrong: the realistic conception of dispositions implies that physicalism must be true. - Then physicalism would be no empirical scientific truth (or theory) anymore. >Physicalism, >Realism. Frank I 595 Phenomenology/disposition/Armstrong: the phenomenalist, unlike the realist, cannot explain dispositions ((s) otherwise circular, because dispositions can also only be described) - He cannot explain why >counterfactual conditionals are true. >Phenomenalism. Richard Rorty (I970b). Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 --- Rorty I 115 Disposition/RortyVsRyle: 1) no necessary (conceptual, linguistic) connection between sensation and disposition as between heat and redness. >Sensation, >Necessity, >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Rorty: nevertheless, behaviorism is on the track of something right - it makes clear that the question "mental or not mental" becomes pointless. I 119 Dosposition/SellarsVsRyle/RortyVsRyle: his mistake was: proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states shows that there are no internal states in reality - (f.o.th.) - Wittgenstein: (PU § 308) the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things and leave their nature open. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Intensions | Stalnaker | I 16 Def C-intension/Jackson: a c-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. ((s) This is where the semantics in possible world x causes the content c to be expressed, which is perhaps different from what can be meant by it in another possible world), i.e. it is relative to possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity. Def A-intension/Jackson: the A-intension is solely determined by the idea of propositino ((s) what is meant?) (regardless of possible worlds). Then there is a difference between modal and epistemic distinctions. There are no propositions that are both necessary and a posterori, and no propositions that are both contingent and a priori - but statements! Def necessary a posteriori statement: a necessary a posteriori statement is one with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. >Necessity a posteriori. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is, on the other hand, one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional sentence intension/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional sentence intension is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. Def A-intensions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/Stalnaker: A intensions function with one argument and one centered world - their value is a truth value. Def C-intension/secondary intension/secondary sentence intension/Stalnaker: C-intensions function with one argument and one possible world - their value is a truth value. Cf. >Twodimensional semantics. I 208 Two-dimensional intension/thought/non-rigid/content/Stalnaker: the two-dimensional intension for thoughts defines a non-rigid description of a proposition: the secondary intension is the reference of this description. >Thoughts, >Rigidity. Secondary proposition/Stalnaker: the secondary proposition is not the content of the thoughts of the speaker, but is determined by the content, as a function of the facts. >Content/Stalnaker, >Facts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Meaning | Kripke | I 144 Properties: these necessary properties of gold (periodic table, element instead of mixture, use) are certainly not part of the meaning of the word "gold" and were not recognized a priori. Meaning is not derived from properties. >a priori, >a posteriori, >Properties/Kripke. I 144 Necessary properties do not need to belong to the meaning! (The periodic table was discovered later). Scholarly findings do not change the meaning. >Discoveries. I 158 Meaning: meaning is analytical (necessary). New discoveries do not change the meaning, they are part of it from the outset. But: the estuary does not belong to the meaning of Dartmouth. --- Stalnaker I 246 Kripke/Stephen Yablo/Stalnaker: a "prime example of Kripkeanism" is that there are two kinds of meaning for "water": a) a reference-defining definition in terms of the manifest properties with which we pick out water. I 247 But that does not mean that b) the facts on which we agree when it comes to water, which are implicit in the meaning of the word "water" or that we know a priori that water has the properties that we use to scoop it. Cf. >Twin earth. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Microstructure | Armstrong | Place I 29 Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers. Place I 30 The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional. Place I 29 Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions. II (b) 39 Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori. Place II 58 Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure. Place II 60 Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties. Place II 62 PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Microstructure | Place | Place I 29 Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers. Place I 30 The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional. Place I 29 Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions. Armstrong II (b) 39 Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori. Place II 58 Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure. Place II 60 Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties. Place II 62 PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Necessity | Armstrong | III 77 Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity. III 96 Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory. Necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness. III 163 Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds. Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity) III 166 Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope). III 164 ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals. Place II 59 Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not. Place II 59 Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change. II (c) 95 Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial). Martin II 135 Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Necessity | Evans | Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: e.g. "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. in relation to the actual world (the world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980). It may turn out that the reference is different. (i.e. that it was different all the time). Definition "deep need"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary, > secondary intension/Chalmers). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Necessity | Kripke | I 116 Necessary/not a priori: e.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: it will turn out with necessity. >Goldbach's conjecture, >necessary a posteriori. I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him. Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat = molecular motion - but this has no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory, >Pain/Kripke. I 116 Def necessity/Kripke: identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly constitute necessity. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water. >Rigidity/Kripke. Frank I 121f Necessary/Kripke: compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions are necessary, e.g. that pain simply feels like pain. Contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way. E.g. that heat feels to us as it feels. Tradition: a brain condition could also occur without pain. I 122 Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: the type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental. The brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. Kripke I 144 Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (The periodic table was discovered later). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties. >Meaning/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke. --- Stalnaker I 188 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains). Statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79". >Morning star/evening star, >Natural kinds/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Lewis | IV 37 Causally necessary/Lewis: is a sentence if it is true in all possible worlds in which the same laws of nature apply. --- Schwarz I 156 Necessary a posteriori: "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because first of all you have to find out that the material that fills our streams and lakes is H2O.- necessary: in all possible worlds the substance that fills our streams is H2O - Discovery is contingent (chemical, not modal) - therefore, the H2O truths imply a priori the water truths. --- Rorty II 123 LewisVsWittgenstein: distinctions between essence and accidence or between necessity and contingency are an artificial product that changes with the description. --- Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessary/Schwarz: e.g. the sentence "Everything is the way it really is" necessarily implies all truths, but only for the actual world - >Quidditism, >Panpsychism. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Necessity | Logic Texts | Read III 67 Necessity: the classical criterion of logical concluding does not mention necessity! >Conclusion. III 140 Necessity a posteriori (empirical): Kripke: believes in the necessity of the origin. - E.g., Margret Thatcher could not have been Stalin's daughter. Naturally the KGB could reveal a gigantic conspiracy that the baby had been foisted at the time. - But this is an epistemic possibility - metaphysical, there is no possibility. >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Necessity a posteriori. III 141 Necessary/a priori/Kripke/Read: the separation between the necessary and the apriori: surprising consequence: every statement a priori is equivalent to a contingent statement. >Contingency. Distinction with a rigid designator for the truth value: not "the truth value of A" but "the actual truth value of A"- truth is not a property. >Truth, >Rigidity. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Necessity | Putnam | Kripke I 141 Necessity/needed/Putnam: "cats are animals" is less necessary than "bachelors are unmarried". --- Putnam V 72 Metaphysically Necessary/Kripke: Putnam: it is "metaphysically necessary" that water is H20, but that is explained by earthly chemistry and earthly facts about speaker intentions regarding reference. When describing a hypothetical liquid which is not H20 and merely resembles water, one does not describe any possible worlds, in which H2O is not water. V 274 Metaphysically Necessary/heat/Kripke/Putnam: possible Worlds, where heat does not corresponds with molecular motion, are possible. Language: but then we say that there is a different mechanism that triggers heat sensation. Identity/heat/molecular motion/Kripke: the identity is necessary, but not a priori. The statement is empirical, but necessary. >Necessary a posteriori. Molecular motion is an essential property of the temperature. KripkeVsMoore: then equating goodness with utility maximization cannot only be contingently wrong. KripkeVsNon-Cognitivism: from the fact that the words are not synonymous, one cannot conclude that the characteristics are not identical. >Non-cognitivism, >Synonymy. V 279 Pro Moore: Moore was right that our concepts of natural science are more neutral as opposed to ethical ones. VsMoore: but that does not mean that the good did not exist. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Necessity | Stalnaker | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: necessity is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It results from optional descriptive semantics that happens to characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference. StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics. They are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all. >Representation, >Mental states. I 53 Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds. >Necessity/Lewis. In order to know that it is true, i.e. that the real world is within this set. For this, you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. necessary truth is not made true by the facts. >Facts, >Truthmakers, >Actual world/Lewis. I 64 Metaphysical necessity/metaphysical possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify with them. The modal operators are then just the quantifiers. >Metaphysical possibility. Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one has to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be. >Understanding, >Situations. I 189 Necessary a posteriori/contingent a priori/Stalnaker: assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent. >Reference/Stalnaker. Contingent: both are contingent because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. necessary: both are necessary because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains. >Proper names, >Rigidity, >Descriptions, >Contingency. I 201 Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual. >de dicto, >Necessity/Kripke, >Necessity/Quine, >de re. Quine: one must always be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori. Thereby, the separatation epistemic/metaphysical arose. >Epistemic/ontologic, >Metaphysics. I 202 Def nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x): nomologically necessary means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x ((s) relative to possible world x). Natural Laws/laws of nature/LoN/Stalnaker: thesis: laws of nature are contingent. They do not apply to possible worlds. >Natural laws, >Possible worlds. Some authors: laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. Logic/Stalnaker/(s): logic cannot show what is metaphysically possible. I 204 Necessity/conceptual/metaphysics/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. >Concepts, >Possibility. Possibilities: possibilities would be the same, even if we had never thought of them. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conceptually possible: simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine are conceptually possible. >Metaphysical possibility. I 205 Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character stems from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition. >Intensions/Stalnaker. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Chalmers | Schwarz I 27 Definition strong necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: In addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: For example, Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999(2)). Schwarz I 208 A posteriori/Necessity/Lewis/Schwarz: here the secondary truth conditions are generally fulfilled, but not the primary ones! The first circumstance makes the sentences necessary - secondary truths reflect the behavior in modal embeddings - the second makes them a posteriori. But not because primary conditions of truth would be determined by embedding in epistemic operators (as in (Chalmers, 2003)(3)), but because, according to our language conventions, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" may not always be expressed, but only when certain conditions are available about which we must first inform ourselves. 1. [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. In [van Inwagen 2001] 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46 3. [2003]: “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Manuskript. Online verf¨ugbar unter http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html --- Schwarz I 209 E.g. if the astronomers announce tomorrow that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star, then they have real news, but they do not violate our language conventions. This has something to do with Lewis' description theory of the reference. --- Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979 (1)): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: E..g "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. related to the actual world (The world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980 (2)). It may turn out that the reference is different. (I.e., that it was different all the time). Definition "deep necessity"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary,> Intensions/Chalmers). I 13 Strong metaphysical necessity/Chalmers: would be one that assumes that it would be metaphysically impossible for a world to be identical with ours in regard to the physical facts, but not for all positive facts. I 137 This is stronger than Kripke's metaphysical necessity, which we may call weak metaphysical necessity. Conceivability/Chalmers: then worlds are conceivable that are not possible at all. Strong metaphysical necessity goes beyond the limitations we have described as "wrongly described worlds". Then "Zombie world" could correctly describe a world that we imagine, even with regard to a secondary intension. It is only the case that such a world would not be metaphysically possible. 1. Vs: there is no reason to believe that there is such a modality of metaphysical necessity. There are no analogies to this of how they are provided by examples such as water/H2O or Hesperus/Phosphorus, since they require only one possible world. a posteriori Information: always affects only our own world! This can help to locate our world in the space of possible worlds. 2. Vs: If we allow this kind of metaphysical necessity, we open the door for further ad hoc modalities. I 138 Zombie World: someone who believes that a zombie world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, cannot answer the key question: Why could not God have created a Zombie world? If he had created it, it would still be metaphysically impossible. This is too arbitrary. 1. G. Evans, Reference and contingency. The Monist 62, 1979: pp. 161-89. 2. M. K. Davies and I. L. Humberstone, Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 38, 1980: pp. 1-30. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Necessity | Jackson | Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Sidelle | Stalnaker I 201/2 Necessity/Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: one can still assume that necessity has its root in the language. - Solution: two-dimensional semantics: shares e.g. necessary a posteriori on in necessary truth that is a priori knowable (through conceptual analysis) and a part which is only a posteriori knowable. Metaphysical necessity/all authors: is in any case no special kind of necessity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Place | Armstrong III 77 Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity. Armstrong III 96 Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory. Necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness. Armstrong III 163 Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds. Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity) Armstrong III 166 Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope). Armstrong III 164 ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals. Place II 59 Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not. Place II 59 Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change. Armstrong II (c) 95 Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial). Martin II 135 Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Necessity de re | Armstrong | Place II 59 Necessity de re/Kripke/Place/Armstrong: a posteriori, de re logically necessary: what is true in all poss. worlds - Armstrong ditto. Conceptualism/Place: the only kind of de re which it accepts: causal necessity - that something is contingently dependent on something. - It means that the relation is causal or not causal. >Conceptualism, >de re, >de dicto. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Pain | Chalmers | I 17 Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person (>Qualia/Chalmers). Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain! I 18 Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger. I 19 Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior. Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360). I 146f Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O: Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery. I 147 ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. I 148 Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world. I 149 Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing. ChalmersVsKripke: 1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity. 3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain". 4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (> cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established. 1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642. 2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76 3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80 4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Possible Worlds | Kripke | I 51f The expressions "winners" and "losers" do not refer to the same objects in all possible worlds. >Rigidity. I 51 Proper names are rigid designators: Nixon is Nixon in all possible worlds, but he is not the winner of the election in all the possible worlds (descriptions are non-rigid designators). >Names/Kripke. I 54 Possible worlds are no foreign countries. A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate it with. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 55 Possible world/Lewis: possible worlds are counterparts, not the same people. Kripke: then it is not about identification but about similarity relation. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 90/91 We do not demand that the objects must exist in all possible worlds of course. Possible world/counterparts: strict identity: are molecules. Counterparts: are for example, tables (not identity of qualities, but of individual objects). Counterpart/Lewis: representatives of the theories that a possible world is only given qualitatively to us ("counterpart theory", David Lewis) argue that Aristotle and his counterparts "in other possible worlds" are "to be identified" with those things that Aristotle resembles most in his most important characteristics. I 123 ff Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that would be used by people in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but situation possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Nonexistence. I 143 Epistems: epistems are a different concept of possibility than in logic. The designation is done by us. >Naming/Kripke. --- Berka I 161 Def normal world/Kripke: a normal world is a maximum consistent set of sentences in which at least one statement is necessary. Def non-normal world/Kripke: in non-normal worlds each sentence of the type LB is false. Berka I 179 Definition possible world/Kripke: old: (1959)(1) a world is possible with the complete attribution of truth value, i.e. it is impossible to find two possible worlds in which each atomic formula is attributed to the same truth value (absolute concept of the possible world). New definition: (1963)(2): a world is possible in relation to another world (relatively possible world) Hughes/Cresswell: > accessibility relation. Reflexive accessibility: each possible world is in itself, i.e. that each statement that is true in H is also possible in H. Definition necessary: a formula A in H if it is true in every (possible) world accessible from H. Definition possible: dual to this: if A is possible in H1, iff a world H2 exists, which is possible in relation to H1, and true in A. Transitivity: H2RH3: any formula that is true in H3 is possible in H2. Problem: for traceability to H1 we need a reduction axiom: "what is possibly possible is possible" - you can also set the equivalence relation as accessibility relation. --- Hughes/Cresswell I 243 Non-normal world/possible world/Kripke: non-normal worlds are worlds in which each statement is possible without exception, i.e. including those of the form p. ~p rating: like in normal worlds (p ~ p.) Never 1 - but for modal formulas V (Ma) is always 1 in non-normal worlds, and hence V(La) is always 0, i.e. there are no necessary statements in non-normal worlds. this n-n world is at least accessible for a normal world, but no world is accessible to a n-n world - not even for these themselves. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true, e.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz: they it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analog: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. 1) S.A. Kripke (1959): "A completeness theorem in modal logic", in: The journal of symbolic logic 24 (1), pp. 1-14. 2) S.A. Kripke (1962): The Undecidability of Monadic Modal Quantification Theory, in: Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, Vol. 8, pp. 113-116. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Privileged Access | Rorty | I 119f Dosposition / SellarsVsRyle / RortyVsRyle: Ryle's error was: to assume that a proof of a "necessary connection" between dispositions and internal states showed that there were no internal states in reality. >Sensation, >Necessity, cf. >Necessity a posteriori, cf. >Feature (of a concept). Wittgenstein (PI § 308), the whole problem stems from the fact that we talk about things, and leave open what their nature is. >Incorrigibility, >First Person, >Introspection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Punishment | Social Psychology | Parisi I 139 Punishment/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the absence of compelling evidence to prove guilt, juries sometimes use the fact of the defendant's prior criminal record as a reason to convict (T. Eisenberg and Hans, 2009(1)). This is especially true when Parisi I 140 the prior crimes are similar to the current accusation (Greene and Dodge, 1995(2); Lloyd-Bostock, 2000(3); Wissler and Saks, 1985(4)). Perception: When perceiving persons, we immediately decide whether their intentions toward us are good, and how competent they are to carry out their intentions (Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick, 2007)(5). We also use that information to make decisions about how blameworthy an actor is. Inferences about character drive judgments of responsibility, blame, and even causation (Alicke, 1992(6), 2000(7); Alicke and Yurak 1995(8). Nadler, 2012(9); Nadler and McDonnell, 2012(10)). Personality traits: Bad motives are one source of inferring bad character, but they are not necessary. Even mildly negative personality traits spur inferences about character that influence blame judgments. For example, a woman who carelessly fails to supervise her unruly dogs is blamed more for an ensuing death if she is asocial and has an unhealthy lifestyle, compared to if she is highly social and has a healthy lifestyle (Nadler and McDonnell, 2012)(10). Victims: The moral character of victims can also influence blame judgments. Harm to innocent victims induces more blame than harm to dangerous criminals, or victims perceived as tainted in other ways. Thus, for example, a person who shoots a stranger in his house is blamed more when the victim turns out to be his daughter's boyfriend than when the victim is a burglar, even when holding constant the shooter's perceptions of danger (Alicke, Davis, and Pezzo, 1994)(11). Moral character: A woman's allegedly questionable moral character (e.g. drinking, drug use, premarital sex, respectability) disadvantages her throughout the justice process and leads to more victim blaming as well as lighter punishment (Burt and Albin, 1981(12); C. Jones and Aronson, 1973(13)). If they question a woman's moral character, prosecutors are less likely to file charges in the first place (Spohn et al., 2001)(14). Additionally, convictions are less likely and sentences are shorter when a woman's sexual history is mentioned, even if she is relatively inexperienced (L'Armand and Pepiton, 1982)(15). >Apologies/Social Psychology, >Attractiveness/Social Psychology, >Retribution/deterrence/Social Psychology. Parisi I 141 Rules/social status: Expressive theories of punishment posit that punishment communicates rules and social norms (Duff, 2011(16); Durkheim, 2014(17)), and sends a message to victims, offenders, and third parties alike, which announces and corrects the wrong that was committed. Thus, criminal punishment involving identifiable victims can function as a device that communicates how valued and respected the victim is (Hampton, 1988(18); 1994(19)). Punishment can serve to reset the status quo by expressing that the victim is valuable enough to justify the spending of resources to detect, prosecute, and punish the offender who has harmed her (Bilz, 2014). Bilz (2014) has shown experimentally that both victims and third parties perceive punishment as raising the victim's social standing, and failure to punish as lowering it. 1. Eisenberg, T. and V. Hans (2009). "Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes." Cornell Law Review 94: 1353. 2. Greene, E. and M. Dodge (1995). "The Influence of Prior Record Evidence on Juror Decision Making." Law and Human Behavior doi:10.1007/BF01499073. 3. Lloyd-Bostock, S. (2000). " The Effects on Juries of Hearing about the Defendant's Previous Criminal Record: A Simulation Study." Criminal Law Review 1:734-755. 4. Wissler, R. L. and M. J. Saks (1985). "On the Ineffcacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 9(1): 37-48. doi:10.1007/BF01044288. 5. Fiske, S. T., A. J. C. Cuddy, and P. Glick (2007). "Universal Dimensions of Social Cognition: Warmth and Competence." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1 1 (2):77—83. doi:16/ j.tics.2006.11.005. 6. Alicke, M. D. (1992). "Culpable Causation." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63(3): 368-378. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.63.3.368. 7. Alicke, M. D. (2000). "Culpable Control and the Psychology Of Blame." Psychological Bulletin 126(4): 556-574. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.556. 8. Alicke, M. D. and T. J. Yurak (1995). "Perpetrator Personality and Judgments of Acquaintance Rape“.Journal of Applied Social Psychology 25(21):1900-1921. 9. Nadler, J. (2012). "Blaming as a Social Process: The Influence of Character and Moral Emo- tion on Blame." Law and Contemporary Problems 75: 1. 10. Nadler, J. and M.-H. McDonnell (2012). "Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of Blame." Cornell Law Review 97:255. 11. Alicke, M. D., T. L. Davis, and M. V. Pezzo (1994). "a posteriori Adjustment of A Priori Decision Criteria." Social Cognition 12(4):281-308. 12. Burt, M. R. and R. S. Albin (1981). "Rape Myths, Rape Definitions, and Probability of Conviction.“ Journal of Applied Social Psychology 11(3):212-230. 13. Jones, C. and E. Aronson (1973). "Attribution of Fault to a Rape Victim as a Function of Respectability of the Victim." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 26(3): 415-419. doi:10.1037/h0034463. 14. Spohn, C., D. Beichner, E. D. Frenzel, and D. Holleran (2001). Prosecutors' Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases: A Multi-Site Study, Final Report (No. 197048). National Institute of Justice. 15. L'Armand, K. and A. Pepitone (1982). "Judgments of Rape A Study of Victim-Rapist Relationship and Victim Sexual History." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 8(1): 134-139. doi:10.1177/014616728281021. 16. Duff, A. (2011). "Retrieving Retributivism," in M. D. White, ed., Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy, 3-24. New York: Oxford University Press. 17. Durkheim, E. (2014). The Division of Labor in society. New York: Simon and Schuster. 18. Hampton, Jean (1988). "Punishment as Defeat," in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, eds., Forgiveness and Mercy, 124—132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge. 19. Hampton, Jean (1994). "Retribution and the Liberal State." J. Contemp. Legal Issues 5: 117. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
| Syntheticity | Putnam | I (a) 40 Synthetic/identity/Putnam: temperature is the same quantity as molecular kinetic energy - synthetic identity. >Identity, >necessary a posteriori, >Analyticity. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Terminology | Stalnaker | Schwarz I 30 Def Perdurantism/Schwarz: thesis: timely extended things are usually composed of temporal parts. Schwarz I 31 Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (VsPerdurantism): thesis: things are completely (not only partially) present at any time at which they exist (like Aristotelian universals). Perdurantism: perdurantism can perceive objects as four-dimensional, extended both in time and space. Endurantism: endurantism can also assume that objects have temporal parts, e.g. a football game. Stalnaker I 135f Vague Identity/Stalnaker: e.g. there are two fish restaurants Bookbinder's - only one can be identical with the original one. Endurantism: problem: B0: (the original one) is then an ambiguous name. Perdurantism: here perdurantism is unique. Stalnaker I 81 Def Individualbegriff/Stalnaker: The individual concept is a function of possible worlds on individuals. Stalnaker I 91 Def weak supervenience/Stalnaker: Weak supervenience is found within a possible world. Strong Supervenience/Stalnaker: strong supervenience is found within one or in several. Global Supervenience/Stalnaker: Global supervenience is when any two possible worlds that are B indistinguishable are also A indistinguishable. Global Supervenience: Global supervenience must be improved. So it is not even sufficient for weak supervenience. I 124 Def Identity/Possible World Relative/Stalnaker: identity is always the binary relation whose extension in any possible world w is the set of pairs such that d is in the domain of w. I 267 Def minimal subject/terminology/Stalnaker: a minimal subject is Ex anything that is a representative, something that receives, stores, or transmits information. I 192 Def kontingent a priori/zwei-dimensionale Semantik/Stalnaker: Kontingent a priori ist eine Aussage mit einer kontingenten sekundären Intension, aber einer notwendigen primären. Def notwendig a posteriori: umgekehrt: Notwendig a posteriori sind notwendige sekundäre Intensionen, kontingente primäre. Pointe: Keine Proposition ist selbst kontingent a priori oder notwendig a posteriori. Es gibt nur verschiedene Weisen, in denen notwendige und kontingente Propositionen mit Aussagen assoziiert sind. Def Charakter/Kaplan: Charakter ist gleich Bedeutung. Er ist die Funktion von möglichen (Gebrauchs-) Kontexten auf Referenten. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way of explaining one part of speech by another. ((s) According to Lewis and Stalnaker, this is the only way). I 9 Def Property/Stalnaker: (a) thin/sparse definition: a trait is a way individuals can be grouped. b) richer definition/Stalnaker: (more robust): A trait is something upon which (in relation to which) individuals are grouped. I 103 Def Fundamental property/Stalnaker: a fundamental property must provide for distinctions between individuals that could not otherwise be explained. I 154f Def essential identity/Stalnaker: all things x and y that are identical are essentially identical, i.e. identical in all possible worlds in which the thing exists. I 34 Def Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B gdw. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is inconsistent. I 50 Def doxastically accessible/Lewis: Doxastically accessible means being compatible with other beliefs and knowledge. I 16 Def C-Intension/Jackson: A C-intension is c(x) expressed by u in x. Def A-intension/Jackson: The A-intension is determined by the propositional thought alone. Def necessary a posteriori statement: A necessary a posteriori statement is a statement with a necessary C-intension and a contingent A-intension. Def contingent a priori statement: a contingent a priori statement is conversely one with a necessary A-intension and a contingent C-intension. I 205 Def two-dimensional propositional intents/Stalnaker: a two-dimensional propositional intents is a function with two arguments, a centered world and a possible world. Its value is a truth value (WW). Def A-intentions/primary intension/primary sentence intension/stalnaker: an A-intention is a function with one argument, one centered world. Its value is a truth value. Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/Secondary Sentence Intension/Stalnaker: A C-Intension is a function with an argument and a possible world. Its value is a truth value. I 15 Def Metaphysics/Stalnaker: metaphysics concerns the distinctions that must be made between possibilities. I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/Terminology/Stalnaker: (early thesis): If practice is legitimate, (inferences, etc.) then we are really making assertions and semantics really tells us what the assertions say. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a subregion, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion/Stalnaker: asserting a proposition is nothing more than locating the real world in that subset. Def true-relative-to-x: To say a proposition is true relative to a world x is to say that the world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that the proposition constitutes. Def true simpliciter: "True simpliciter" means to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds constituting the proposition). |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Truth | Kripke | I 47/48 Necessary and a priori are not obviously synonymous. They are not even coextensive: there are both: necessary truths from posteriori and probably contingent truths a priori! >Necessary/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary de re/Kripke, >a priori/Kripke. Many people have thought that these two things should mean the same thing because they imagine we would go through all possible worlds in our minds and then be able to recognize them a priori. But that is not so clear! I 50 Description: if we call Nixon "the man who won the 1988 election", it will of course be a necessary truth. >Description/Kripke. I 66 Prototype meter/standard meter: someone who thinks that everything you know a priori is necessary might think: "This is the definition of a meter. This is a necessary truth." Kripke: however, he/she does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. >Standard meter, >Speaker reference, >Reference/Kripke. I 68 Rigid: a meter is rigid ((s) "rigid" means that the reference is the same in all possible worlds). Non-rigid: the length of S at time t is non-rigid. The "definition" does not say that the two expressions are synonymous, but rather that we have determined the reference of the expression "one metre" by fixing that it is to be a rigid expression of designations, which in fact has the length S. The term "one metre" is not synonymous with the term "one metre". So it is no necessary truth! And that is because under certain circumstances it would not have been one metre long. One expression is rigid and the other is not. The truth he/she knows is contingent. So I prefer not to call them "analytical." >Analytic/synthetic, >Rigidity, >Contingency. I 77 E.g. a thesis may be true because it is simply a definition. >Definition/Kripke. I 153ff Reference of proper names: Definition of the reference: is given a priori (contingent) - this is not the same as synonymy. Meaning: the meaning is analytical (necessary). Definition: defines reference and expresses truth a priori. I 156 E.g. necessary truth: "Cats are animals". I 175 The phrase "heat is the movement of molecules" expresses a truth a posteriori. I 181 A posteriori: one can experience a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. The philosophical analysis tells us that it was not contingent and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity. --- III 409 Truth/formal languages: understanding the meta language > explicit truth-definition > truth conditions > understanding of the language examined. >Truth conditions, >Understanding. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Stalnaker | I 17 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: Twodimensional semantics connects propositional thoughts with sentences, (s) i.e. that in a different possible world something else can be meant with the same expressions. The A-intension (independent of possible worlds) is then usually the only one to which the speaker has cognitive access. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Epistemological status: the epistemological status is therefore determined by the modal state of the A-intension. ((s) What can be known depends on the proposition (content) of the possible world-independent expression). I 18 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics can show how the possible and the true interact, i.e. separate semantic questions from factual ones in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could provide a neutral view of the possibility space. I 192 Def contingent a priori/twodimensional semantics/Stalnaker: contingent a priori is a statement with a contingent secondary intension but not necessarily a primary one. Def necessary a posteriori: other way round: necessary a posteriori is a necessary secondary intension, contingent primary. >Terminology/Stalnaker. Important argument: no proposition is itself contingent a priori or necessary a posteriori. There are only different ways in which necessary and contingent propositions are associated with statements. Def Character/Kaplan: character corresponds to meaning. It is the function of possible (use) contexts on references. >Character/Kaplan. External: Newen/Schrenk: the character is the whole table of two-dimensional semantics. Kaplan: thesis: character and content must be separated. Character/meaning: character provides a rule that says how the reference is determined by facts about the context. Content/Kaplan: content corresponds to the secondary intension. >Content/Kaplan. Content: content is possibly unknown despite language skills. ((s) E.g. Two omniscient gods). >Two omniscient Gods. Character/(s):a character is e.g. who it could be in each case. Content: the content says who it actually is, e.g. to whom "I" refers. I 194 Content/secondary intension: content can be different in different possible worlds a) because the context is different and b) because the meaning is different. ((s) This is part of meta-semantics). >Terminology/Stalnaker. I 199 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: twodimensional semantics should be interpreted meta-semantically, not semantically. I 199 Meta-Semantics/Stalnaker: meta-semantics is fact dependent, therefore it does not give access to a priori truth. Semantics: semantics must assume internal states. I 212 Twodimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: primary propositions are the ones that represent the cognitive values of our thoughts. Secondary propositions/semantic: for Stalnaker, the secondary propositions are described and not expressed. Secondary proposition/semantic: secondary propositions are unambiguously defined as a function of the facts. Problem: they are not something to which we have cognitive access. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Universals | Armstrong | III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Universals | Place | Armstrong III 82 Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation. Armstrong III 88 Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation). 2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal. Armstrong III 99 Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations. Armstrong III 118 Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker. Armstrong III 120 UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist. Place II 57 Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties. Martin I 77 "Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102). Martin II 129 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent. Martin III 179 Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations. |
Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
| Zombies | Chalmers | I 94 Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. I 95 Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do. 2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior. Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences. I 96 Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. I 97 Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical. I 131 Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O. VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism. ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself). I 132 ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. I 180 Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chalmers, D. | Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. | I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Identity Theory | Newen Vs Identity Theory | Newen I 168 Nature/Essential/Kripke/Newen: E.g. original meter shows that objects (or substances) have essential and non-essential properties. E.g. Essential: that water is H2O. Therefore, the proposition is a necessary truth a posteriori. Identity Theory/Philosophy of the Mind/Newen: Thesis: mental states are identical with physical states. KripkeVsIdentity Theory: (modal argument): identity is always necessary identity. But: E.g. zombies could we similar to us, but not feel pain. I 169 If this is possible, identity is no longer a necessary identity, and therefore no identity. Identity TheoryVsVs: could argue that the necessary identity applies only to humans. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Jackson, F. | Stalnaker Vs Jackson, F. | I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: n.a.p. is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It arises from an optional descriptive semantics that characterizes the random natural languages: a mechanism for determining of references. Thesis: there could also be languages without determined reference that says even to some extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: but if the reference-determining mechanisms are part of a meta-semantically story they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our statements and internal states can ever have representational properties. necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. two dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: can show that the possible and the true interact that means separate semantically from factual questions in the context. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language in which we could give a neutral view of the possibility space. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Jackson, F. | Schwarz Vs Jackson, F. | Schwarz I 226 A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind. Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark. Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori. Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Frege Vs Kripke, S. A. | Stalnaker II 14 Diagonalized Proposition/Stalnaker: is not actually a special type of proposition, but only a way of how a proposition is determined or represented. FregeVsKripke/Stalnaker: in Frege, a sense is interposed which determines the reference as a function of certain empirical facts about the use of names. Contingent A Priori/necessary a posteriori/Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: in such cases the modal status of the horizontal and diagonal proposition diverges. Two-Dimensional Semantics/Stalnaker: does not disclose anything about the nature of such cases, it only shows an abstract property of such propositional concepts. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. | V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. a posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. a posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Read Vs Kripke, S. A. | III 135 Necessary and a priori: e.g. four-color Theorem. Already before the evidence the knowledge was available. (s): Just a guess) Read: real knowledge. The truth itself and the theorem were a priori. (KripkeVs: a posteriori). |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Psychofunctionalism | Schiffer Vs Psychofunctionalism | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): should be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology). SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief property of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block must say that there must be a theory Ts nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: to be a token of the z-type, that has the Ts-correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). That means the role that is indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a posteriori knowable after the theory Ts was excavated. Science: might just might find all phenotypic (apparition moderate) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from it, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion of to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype, if... and b) includes in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be of this and that genotype. ((s) without additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there should be a philosophical theory of this strength, it is not known to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.type concepts, are unsuitable for belief predicates. (…+…) |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 71 Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism". I 72 Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz. Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w.. I 201 Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable. II 24 Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition. Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided. StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case. De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague, II 25 but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it. Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content. II 160 Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions). Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual. Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual. StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine. II 161 De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way? Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe? bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here. Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them. 1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it. 2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions. Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible. Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself. b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts. 1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat 2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach. II 162 Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between. II 163 De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship. That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition. Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set. Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reductionism | Physicalism Vs Reductionism | Schwarz I 156 Physicalism/Vs Reductionism/VsLewis. other authors: Physicalism is not at all fixed on the a priori derivability of mental from physical truths, only on supervenience of mental on physical facts. But this does not have to be a priori. It can be a posteriori necessity. For example, the relationship between H2O-truths and water truths. (This is non-reductive physicalism). LewisVs: this is a misunderstanding about a posteriori necessity: e.g. Assuming that "water is H2O" is necessary a posteriori: this is not because there is a modal fact, a necessity that we can only discover a posteriori, but rather because the meaning of certain words depends on contingent, empirical factors: according to our conventions, in all possible worlds "water" picks out the substance that fills our lakes and streams. "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because you first have to find out that the material that fills streams and lakes in our country is H2O. This is a contingent fact that usually requires chemical analysis, no excursions into modal space. The H2O-truths therefore a priori imply the water truths. If pain a posteriori is identical with a physical state, then this must also be due to the fact that the reference to "pain" depends on contingent facts, on what kind of state plays the and the role with us ((s) not what kind of linguistic convention we have). (see 1994b(1),296f). 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke | Chalmers, D. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Kripke | Jackson, F. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: theses of Kripke can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 |
| necessary .a post | Jackson, F. | Staln I 18 Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis: is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism of determining referents - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of metasemantics, the reference-determining mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the representation of why internal states can be representative at all - thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference that even says to some extent how things are, and without necessary truths a posteriori. |
|
| necessary a post | Stalnaker, R. | I 18 necessary a posteriori / Jackson is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it arises from a semantics randomly describing natural languages: a mechanism for determining of reference - StalnakerVsJackson: as part of the metasemantics, the reference-fixing mechanisms are not optional - they are part of the presentation, why internal states can be representational at all - there could be languages that have no specific reference that says to a certain extent, the way things are, without a posteriori necessary truths. |
|
| Possibility | Stalnaker, R. | Field II 100 Possibility/stronger/weaker/real/epistemic/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker thinks worlds are possible in a stronger sense: in which not only denial of logical truths are impossible, but also denial of mathematical truth (pp. 73-7), and even denial of a posteriori identity between name and denial of certain "essentialist" assertions. II 103 FieldVsStalnaker: Thesis: There is no plausible way to describe apparent cases of inconsistent beliefs (e.g. Cantor) so that they match Stalnaker's image. I 40 Possibility/Stalnaker: 1. Semantic Thesis: claims about what is possible and necessary should be analysed in terms of what is true in some or all parts of reality. 2. Metaphysical Thesis: about the existence of worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| |||