Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Fodor Vs Davidson, D. IV 68
Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like!
IV 69
Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well.
Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side.
QuineVsDavidson: Davidson shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: e.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. x is white and LT).
This could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof".
This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem.
E.g. assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a truth theory (WT), which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives.
That seems to be a holistic consequence.
Vs: but that is premature.
Language/radical interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation!
I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct truth theory (WT) by that evidence which observation allows.
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all!
Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior:
1) that the child and the Field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible.
IV 74
Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of a truth theory is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, it is therefore not in the epistemic situation of the radical interpretation.
It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions.
From the perspective of the radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist (> hermeneutic circle).
These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc.
IV 84
Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Davidson's idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W-sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language!
IV 98
"Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true!
IV 100
Principle of Charity/radical interpretation/RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that: 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions,
2) are syntactically atomistic.
The interpretation of such expressions cannot be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts.
IV 101
We do not know whether such forms exist, e.g. maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable.
> Behavior/wish IV 120ff.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Field, H. Fraassen Vs Field, H. I 9
Accept/Belief/Truth/Fraassen: if accepting a theory involves belief in its truth, then tentative acceptance involve tentative belief, etc. If belief is gradual, then acceptance is also. So partial belief: "the theory is true."
This must, however, be distinguished from the belief that the theory is approximately true.
I 216 FN 2
Accept/Field: Thesis: every reason to believe that a part of the theory is not true is one reason not to accept it. FraassenVsField: this leaves open which epistemic attitude accepting involves. Plus problem: how long do we speak of full acceptance instead of partial acceptance?

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Putnam, H. Field Vs Putnam, H. III 113
Pure Mathematics/Putnam: should be interpreted in a way that it asserts the possible existence of physical structures that satisfy the mathematical axioms. FieldVsPutnam: pure mathematics should not be interpreted at all.
I 211
Properties/Relations/Putnam: (1970): are predicative, according to them we have a few basic physical prop and rel from which all others are derived: 1st order: Allows no reference to a totality of physical objects when a new property is constructed.
2nd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st order.
3rd order: Allows reference to the totality of the properties of the 1st and 2nd order. - Every physical property appears on any level of the hierarchy -> functionalism.
Functional properties are 2nd or higher order properties - the prop that the role has may differ from person to person.
I 214
FieldVsPutnam: instead of properties provide instantiations of properties with steps.
I 268
Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: ("Mathematics without foundations", 1976b, 1975 "What is mathematical truth?"): Field: Putnam Thesis: the mathematical realist does not have to accept the "mathematical object picture". He can formulate his views in purely modal terms. And that not as an alternative, but only as another formulation of the same view.
I 269
Indispensability Argument/Putnam: appear in the subsequent text. Field: If "Mathematics as a modal" logic was really an equivalent description of mathematics in terms of mathematical objects (MO), then it should also be possible to reformulate the Indispensability Argument so that there is a prima facie argument for one or the other kind of modalized mathematics and mathematical objects.
FieldVsPutnam: but Section 6 and 7 show that we cannot formulate the indispensability argument like that: it requires MO and modalized mathematics does not bring them forth.
VSVs: but beware: I have not studied all the possibilities.
I 269
FieldVsPutnam: his mathematical realism seems puzzling: Mathematics/Ontology/Putnam: Thesis: there is a modal translation of pure mathematics: he presents a translation procedure that turns mathematical statements into modal statements, one that transforms acceptable mathematical statements (E.g. axioms of set theory) into true modal assertions that include no quantification, unless it is modalized away. (I.e. ​​no mathematical entities (ME) in the modal statements).
I 270
FieldVsPutnam: two general questions: 1) what kind modality is involved here?
2) what benefit is the translation to have?
ad 1): Putnam thinks that the "object-image" (the starting position) and its modal translation are equivalent at a deeper level.
FieldVs: that’s really not interesting: "mathematically possible" should coincide with "logically possible" in any reasonable view (this is stated by conservatism). ((s) contrary to the above).
Important argument: if A is not mathematically possible, then "~A" is a consequence of mathematics - i.e. if A (and then also its negation) are purely non-mathematically, then "~A" is logically true.
If Putnam now says that his modal translation involves a "strong and clear mathematical sense of possibility", then a mathematical possibility operator must be applied to sentences that contain ME.
However, such a sentence A could also be a mixed sentence (see above, with purely mathematical and purely physical components).
I 271
FieldVsPutnam: for purely mathematical sentences mathematical possibility and truth coincide! But then the "modal translations" are just as ontologically committed as the mathematical assertions.
FieldVs"Mathematical Possibility"/FieldVsPutnam: we had better ignore it. Maybe it was about 2nd order logical possibility as opposed to 1st order for Putnam?
I 271
FieldVsPutnam: what benefits does his modal translation have? Does it provide a truth transfer (as opposed to the transmission of mere acceptability)? And what value has it to say that the mathematical statements are both true and acceptable? Etc. Mathematics/Realism/Putnam/Field: Putnam describes himself as
"mathematical realist": Difference to Field’s definition of realism: he does not consider ME as mind-independent and language-independent, but (1975):
Putnam: you can be a realist without being obliged to mathematical objects.
I 272
The question is the one that Kreisel formulated long ago: the question of the objectivity of mathematics and not the question the existence of mathematical objects. FieldVsPutnam: this is puzzling.
I 277
Model Theory/Intended Model/Putnam/Field: this morality can be strengthened: there is no reason to consider "∈" as fixed! Putnam says that in "Models and Reality": the only thing that could fix the "intended interpretation" would be the acceptance of sentences that contain "∈" through the person or the community. Putnam then extends this to non-mathematical predicates. ((s)> Löwenheim-Skolem).
FieldVsPutnam: this is misleading: it is based on the confusion of the view that the reference is determined, E.g. by causal reasoning with the view that it is defined by a description theory (description theory, (labeling theory?), in which descriptions (labels?) that contain the word "cause" should play a prominent role. (> Glymour, 1982, Devitt, 1983, Lewis 1984).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Shapiro, St. Field Vs Shapiro, St. II 357
Intermediate Claim/IC/Parsons/Shapiro/Field: both acknowledge that. They formulate an intermediate position between the strong and the weak assertion saying that according to that skepticism about the determinacy becomes uninteresting. (IC) any two persons who accept the schematic arithmetic must consider the theory of another equivalent to their own.
II 358
FieldVsShapiro/FieldVsParsons: 1) I doubt that you have to accept the intermediate claim (VsIC). 2) Even if we accept it, skepticism about determinacy is not uninteresting.
FieldVsIC: E.g. X (male) considers his own schematic arithmetic as indeterminate, but acknowledges the weak conclusion that each "copy" of it in his own language is equivalent to his own arithmetic.
Question: Does X have to regard a Y (female), who accepts schematic arithmetic, as someone who accepts something equivalent to that which X accepts?.
Assuming both X and Y use the same vocabulary: "number", "successor", etc.
Question: Does X have to
a) translate Y’s number theoretical vocabulary homophonically, or rather.
b) assume that if he introduces a new special term as a translation of Y’s term "number" (E.g. "number*"), etc., he then has an argument for an equivalence between his own vocabulary and the translation of Y’s vocabulary. ((s) equivalence rather than homophony).
Question: can we not simply apply the conclusion from the monolingual case for it? No, because even if X assumes that Y accepts the full scheme (correctly), it only means that he X is tied to the acceptance of any new instances in Y’s own language! (And that X should be committed to their translations).
If X cannot argue that Y can enhance her language for every predicate P in hir own language (i.e. "number", etc.), so that it contains an expression that X can translate as P, then there is no reason to assume that X should consider Y’s schemes complete in relation to X’s language.
Problem: there is no way to argue for it without leaving the question open. E.g. X cannot argue that, because Y accepts full arithmetic, she must accept induction over a predicate, which means "the same" as X’s predicate "natural number". (s) he does not know whether the predicate means the same thing >Translation indeterminacy).
Field: this is just a variant of McGee’s cheating that Y must accept induction on a predicate whose extension are the natural numbers. ((s) he does not know whether this is the extension >indeterminacy of the reference).
II 360
FieldVsShapiro/VsIntermediate Claim/Vs(IC): the reason why we cannot accept the (two-language) intermediate claim is that we are forced (in the single-language case) to consider two copies (of theories) in our own language as equivalent. FieldVs(IC): even if the intermediate claim applied, it would be indeterminate! It would guarantee that in every acceptable semantic interpretation of X’s language the extension of "natural number" would be identical with the extension of the term "the extension of Y’s term "natural number"". But even that would not show that there are no non-standard elements in every acceptable interpretation of this joint extension! (Superior view of asymmetry).

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Negation Field, Hartry II 308
"Reject"/Field: perhaps there is a sense of "reject" in which you reject everything and also the disjunction. "Reject"/Stronger/Lower/Field: this sense must be weaker than the sense of "accepting negation".
But it must again be stronger than "not accepting".
Solution: Def "reject p": as "accept that it is not the case that determines p".
FieldVs: this proves my thesis in the section that moderate non-classical logic needs a det-operator.
But the actual thesis was that he needs it just as much as classical logic does.
Vs: later argued that the det-operator for classical logic is not fundamental, thesis: fundamental are rather non-classical degrees of belief. ((s) But this is about non-classical probability theory, not about non-classical logic). Because one explains acceptance with high and rejections with low degrees of belief.