Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description Theory | Kripke Vs Description Theory | Evans I 310/311 Reference/Description/Acquaintance/Kripke: Although the reference is set by the standard meter of Paris, not every speaker must know it or even know that it exists (according to Evans). Strawson: "the mean of different opinions". KripkeVsdescription Theory/Evans: His attacks were only directed against the first variant (speaker designation). They ignore the social character of naming. Field II 117 Reference/Deflationism/Field: Deflationism seems to make the hard work of recent years regarding the study of the reference insignificant. For if truth conditions do not play a central role, neither do the references. E.g.: KripkeVsdescription Theory/Name/Field: (Kripke 1972): This is not correct. Field: At least if they do not use metalanguage. Reference/Deflationism/Field: Problem: When the truth condition does not matter, then it is also valid for the reference since the relevant scheme is: (R) if b exists, "B" refers to b and nothing else; if B does not exist, "b" refers to nothing. Problem: It this is all that can be said about reference, what is the meaning of Kripke’s critique on description Theory? description Theory/Gödel-Schmidt Case/Kripke: e.g. Gödel = proves the "Incompleteness Theorems" Then e.g. Schmidt did actually prove it, but was murdered. Everyone would say that "Gödel" nevertheless refers to Gödel and not to Schmidt. Deflationism/Field: Problem: If deflationism is unable to explain this, then something is wrong with it! But it is actually able to: Reference/Deflationism/Field: The reference is not the actual basis, but observations about our practice of closing. That is actually what Kripke shows. Stalnaker I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metasemantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: Arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Hintikka, J. | Quine Vs Hintikka, J. | I 73 Possibilia/Hintikka: Thesis: talk about human experience makes the assumption of possibilia necessary. (Unrealized possibilities). HintikkaVsQuine. Intentionality/Husserl/Hintikka: according to Husserl the essence of human thought is in relation with unrealized possibilities. Possibilia/Hintikka: we need them to deal with logically incompatible entities of the same logical type. Possible World Semantics/Hintikka: is the corresponding model theory. I 137 QuineVsModal Logic: Problem of cross-world identification. Cross-World Identificatin/Cross-Identification/Quine/(s): Problem of identity conditions. If no identity conditions (IC) are given, the question is pointless whether an individual is "the same as" one in a different possible world. HintikkaVsQuine: my modified approach goes beyond the scope of Quine's criticism. Worldlines/Hintikka: are fixed by us, not by God. Nevertheless, they are not arbitrary. Their boundaries are given by the continuity of time and space, memory, location, etc. I 138 It may even be that our presuppositions prove to be incorrect. Therefore, there can be no set of world lines that comprise all possible worlds we need in alethic modal logic. Modal Logic/Quantification/Quine/Hintikka: a realistic interpretation of quantified alethic ML is impossible. But for reasons more profound than Quine assumed. Cross-World Identification/HintikkaVsQuine: is not intrinsically impossible. Quine/Hintikka: has even accepted this lately, with limitations. Solution/Hintikka: Cross-world identification as re-identification. I 139 Propositional Attitude/Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: we will focus here on the problem of propositional attitudes. I 140 Quantification in Epistemic Contexts/Belief Contexts/Intensional/Hintikka: Ex (1) Albert knows who wrote Coningsby (2) (Ex) K Albert (x wrote Coningsby) Notation: (Ex) perspective (perceptual) identification (acquaintance) in the book: not reflected E). Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: e.g. (2) can only then be inferred from (3) K Albert (Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby) i.e. (3) * Albert knows that Beaconsfield wrote Coningsby. ... Only then can be concluded when we have an additional premise: (4) (Ex) K Albert (Beaconsfield = x) i.e. (5) Albert knows who Beaconsfield is. Quine per Hintikka: this solution is better than a criterion for rigid designators (rigidity, QuineVsKripke). Everyday Language: it's of course simply very natural to speak in a way that you say you know who or what something is. HintikkaVsQuine: he praises me for the wrong reasons. He turns things upside down. Although he does not commit the mistake I criticize, he forgives it. I 141 Formal Language/Logic/Canonical Notation/HintikkaVsQuine: we should view logical language as our native language and not set so much store by the translation into everyday language. It is only about semantic clarity anyway. I 145 HintikkaVsQuine: does not understand the role my uniqueness conditions play: Quine: says you can also transfer these conditions to belief, knowledge, etc. Quine: Hintikka requires that the subject know who or what the person or thing is. Who or what the term designates. HintikkaVsQuine: he thinks I only use some type of uniqueness condition. Solution: the semantic situation shows the difference: the relation between the conditions for different propositional attitudes (beliefs, see, know) is one of analogy, not of identity. Solution: the sets of compatible possible worlds in the case of knowing, seeing, memory, belief are different ones every time. I 146 Identification/Belief/Quine/QuineVsHintikka: any belief world (possible worlds) will include countless bodies and objects that are not individually recognizable, simply because the believer believes his world contains countless such objects. Identity: questions about the identity of these objects are pointless. Problem: if you quantify in belief contexts, how can you exclude them? Solution: the scope of variables to those objects about which the subject has a sufficiently clear idea, would have to be limited. Problem: how do you determine how clear these ideas must be? HintikkaVsQuine: the solution is quite simple if we quantify about individuals in doxastic possible worlds: Ex Operator: "in a world w1, compatible with everything Jack believes": Solution/Hintikka: we can quantify about the inhabitants of such worlds, by simply using a quantifier inside the operator. ((s) i.e. Jack, but not we, distinguish). Problem: it could be that we might want to consider the people as our neighbors from the real world w0. ("qua neighbors"). Hintikka: but that is a problem in itself and has nothing to do with uniqueness conditions. Problem: is more due to the notation of conventional modal logic which does not allow that us to turn around the evaluation process which runs from outside to inside so that it extends from the inside out. Solution/Saarinen: "retrospective" operators (see above) Solution/Hintikka: it may still be that we can track an individual back from w1 to w0, even if it does not meet the uniqueness conditions like (16) - (127). (They require an individual to be identifiable in all the possible worlds). HintikkaVsQuine: he is wrong in that the question of identity is pointless if not all the uniqueness conditions are met. On the contrary, it has to make sense for us to ever able to determine that the conditions are not met! Uniqueness Condition/Hintikka: if it is not met, it only means that we cannot find an individual ((s) or its counterpart) in any possible world. Uniqueness Condition/QuineVsHintikka: Quine's most serious objection is that these conditions are always indicated (indexical) i.e. that they are context-dependent. I.e. only in a particular situation it is about whether an individual is the same. I 147 Knowing-Who/Knowing-What/Context/Quine: E.g. "Who is he?" only makes sense in a given situation. HintikkaVsQuine: of course he is right that the truth conditions vary with the situation, but that does not destroy the uniqueness conditions for epistemic logic. HintikkaVsQuine: he only misunderstands the role these conditions play. Truth Value/Hintikka: the truth value of sentences of the form (18) (Ex) K(b = x) and equally of (19) (Ex) K(b = x) become independent of the truth value of other types of simplest sentences! Question/Answer/T Question/Hintikka: we get a new class of atomic sentences! Solution: distinction between identification through acquaintance/description. I 148 World Lines/Identification/Cross-World Identity/Hintikka: Thesis the world lines have to be drawn before the conditions are ever applied. Drawing the world lines is never part of the application of the uniqueness conditions. ((s) otherwise circular). Truth Conditions/Atomic/Atomic Sentence/Hintikka: for my theory, the interplay of specific atomic and non-atomic sentences is essential: it shows how e.g. the truth value of sentences of the form "knows + -one-question-word" sentences depends on the truth value of sentences of the form (18) - (19). HintikkaVsQuine: his criticism is similar to one that would criticize traditional truth value tables, because some of the sentences that are used to put them together are also blurred. Epistemic Logic/Hintikka: is not affected by this criticism. All it claims is that once the world lines are drawn, the rest of the semantics remains as it was. I 160 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: what is true in all knowledge possible worlds (knowledge worlds) of a subject. And, conversely, what is true in all knowledge possible worlds of a person is their knowledge. Important argument: the world lines can be drawn differently, however, while the evaluations (the non-logical constants) remain the same. The variation of the world lines can then be "seen" in the variation of the semantic power of the phrase n of the form know + indirect question. I 161 Quine has used such variation to the reject the possible world semantics of sentences with "knowing-that". HintikkaVsQuine: for him it was actually about the structural (not the referential) system. And this remained untouched. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Hintikka Vs Kripke, S. A. | II XIII Possible Worlds/Semantics/Hintikka: the term is misleading. (Began in the late 50s). Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: is not a viable model for the theory of logical rules (logical necessity and logical possibility). (Essay 1). Problem: the correct logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: interpreting Kripke semantics as non-standard semantics, II XIV in the sense of Henkin’s non-standard interpretation of higher-level logic, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsQuine: we do not have to give them up entirely, but there will probably never be a complete theory. My theory is related to Kant. I call them "epistemology of logic". II XVI Cross World Identity/Hintikka: Quine: considers it a hopeless problem HintikkaVsKripke: he underestimates the problem and considers it as guaranteed. He cheats. World Line/Cross World Identity/Hintikka: 1) We need to allow that some objects in certain possible worlds do not only exist, but that their existence is unthinkable there! I.e. world lines can cease to exist - what is more: it may be that they are not defined in certain possible worlds. Problem: in the usual knowledge logic (logic of belief) this is not permitted. 2) world lines can be drawn in two ways: a) object-centered b) agent-centered. (Essay 8). Analogy: this can be related to Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by description. (Essay 11) II 2 Kripke Semantics/Modal Logic/Logical Possibility/Logical Necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke Semantics: Problem: if we interpreted the operators N, P so that they express logical modalities, they are inadequate: for logical possibility and necessity we need more than an arbitrary selection of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But Kripke semantics does not require all such logically possible worlds to be included in the set of alternatives. ((s) I.e. there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (see below logical possibility forms the broadest category of options). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. Modal Logic/Hintikka: the historically earliest purpose for which it was developed was precisely dealing with logical modalities. This was the purpose for which the Lewis systems were developed. HintikkaVsKripke: does not only have a skeleton in the closet, but said skeleton haunts the entire house. Equivalence Relation/Hintikka: if R is required to be reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive, it does not provide the solution: it still does not guarantee that all logically possible worlds are contained in the set. It can (possibly together with with connectedness) only guarantee that w0 has a maximum number of sets as its alternatives that are, so to speak, already in SF. II 3 KripkeVsVs/Hintikka: It could be argued that this does not yet show that Kripke semantics is wrong. It just needs to be reinforced. E.g. Nino Cocchiarella: Cocchiarella: additional condition: all models (in the usual 1st order sense) with the same domain of individuals do (w0) must occur among the alternative possible worlds to w0. ((s) No new individuals may be added or removed with regard to the original possible world w0). Hintikka: technically it is of course possible. "Old": (= Kripke semantics): non-standard semantics. new: F must include all models that have the same individuals domain do(w0) of well-defined individuals as w0. Individual/Individuals/Modal/Hintikka: an individual must be well-defined, but it does not have to exist! ((s) I.e. it can be expressed then that it is missing, E.g. the hero has no sister in a possible world). Domain of Individuals: for each possible world is then a subset of the domain D. II 4 HintikkaVs: Problem: this is unrealistically interpretative: this flexible approach namely allows non-well-shaped individuals. Then there is no point in asking whether this individual exists or not. Fusion/Fission: a flexible semantics must also allow fission and fusion between one possible world and the another. Def Well-Defined/Individual/Hintikka: an individual is well-defined, if it can be singled out by name at a node of the world line. World Line: can link non-existent incarnations of individuals, as long as they are well-defined for all possible worlds in which a node of the world line can be located. Truth Conditions: are then simple: (Ex) p(x) is true iff there is an individual there, E.g. named z, so that p(z) is true in w. Modal Semantics/Hintikka. About a so defined (new) semantics a lot can be said: Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: corresponds to a non-standard semantics, while the "new" semantics (with a fixed domain of individuals) corresponds to a standard semantics. (For higher-order logic). Standard Semantics/higher level: we get this by demanding that the higher level quantifiers go over all extensionally possible entities of the appropriate logical type (higher than individuals) like quantifiers in the standard semantics for modal logic should go over all extensionally possible worlds. This is a parallelism that is even stronger than an analogy: Decision problem: for 2nd order logic this is reduced to the 1st order standard modal logic. Standard: does the same job in the latter sense as in the former sense. Quantified 1st Order Standard Modal Logic/Hintikka: all of this leads to this logic being very strong, comparable in strength with 2nd order logic. It follows that it is not axiomatizable. (see above HintikkaVsKripke). The stronger a logic, the less manageable it is. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes and focuses on pure modalities. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems to be clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: he has not shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. II 77 Object/Thing/Object/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke Thesis: the existence of permanent (endurant) objects must simply be provided as a basic concept. HintikkaVsKripke: this requirement is not well founded. Maybe you have to presuppose the criteria of identification and identity only for traditional logic and logical semantics. But that also does not mean that the problem of identification was not an enduring problem for the philosophers. II 84 KIripkeVsHintikka: Problem: the solutions of these differential equations need not be analytic functions or features that allow an explicit definition of the objects. Hintikka: it seems that Kripke presupposes, however, that you always have to be able to define the relations embodied by the world lines. HintikkaVsKripke: that is too strict. World Line: we allow instead that they are implicitly defined by the solutions of the differential equations. II 86 HintikkaVsKripke: our model makes it possible that we do not necessarily have to presuppose objects as guaranteed like Kripke. ((s) it may be that a curve is not closed in a time section). II 116 Cross World identity/Rigidity/HintikkaVsKripke: it’s more about the way of identification (public/perspective, see above) than about rigidity or non-rigidity. The manner of identification decides what counts as one and the same individual. HitikkaVsKripke: his concept of rigidity is silently based on Russell’s concept of the logical proper name. But there is no outstanding class of rigid designation expressions. Proper Names/Names/HintikkaVsKripke: are not always rigid. E.g. it may be that I do not know to whom the name N.N. refers. Then I have different epistemic alternatives with different references. Therefore, it makes sense to ask "Who is N.N.?". Public/Perspective/Identification/Russell/Kripke/Hintikka: Russell: focuses on the perspective II 117 Kripke: on public identification. II 195 Identity/Individuals/Hintikka: it is much less clear how the identity for certain individuals can fail in the transition to another possible world. I.e. world lines can branch (fission). Separation/KripkeVsFission/SI/Hintikka: Kripke excludes fission, because for him the (SI) applies. A fission, according to him, would violate the transitivity of identity. After a fission, the individuals would by no means be identical, even if it should be after the transitivity. Therefore, for Kripke the (SI) is inviolable. HintikkaVsKripke: that is circular: Transitivity of Identity/Hintikka: can mean two things: a) transitivity within a possible world. b) between possible worlds. The plausibility of transitivity is part of the former, not the latter. To require transitivity of identity between possible worlds simply means to exclude fission. This is what is circular about Kripke’s argument. II 196 Possible World/Individuals Domain/HintikkaVsKripke: it should not be required that the individuals remain the same when changing from possible world to possible world. Talk about possible worlds is empty if there are no possible experiences that might distinguish them. ((s) is that not possible with a constant domain? Also properties could be partly (not completely) exchanged). Possible World/Hintikka: should best be determined as the associated possible totalities of experience. And then fission cannot be ruled out. II 209 Re-Identification/Hintikka: also with this problem situation semantics and possible worlds semantics are sitting in the same boat. Situation semantics: rather obscures the problem. In overlapping situations, E.g. it assumes that the overlapping part remains the same. Re-Identification/Quine/Hintikka: deems it hopeless, because it is impossible to explain how it works. Re-Identification/Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke ditto, but that’s why we should simply postulate it, at least for physical objects. HintikkaVsQuine/HintikkaVsKripke: that is either too pessimistic or too optimistic. But mistaking the problem would mean to neglect one of the greatest philosophical problems. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. | Schwarz I 31 Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory. Schwarz I 60 Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233). SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts". Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself. Schwarz I 100 Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction). Schwarz I 102 Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties. PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there. Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition). Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23". Schw I 103 Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs. Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is. Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness. 2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today. SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same. Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic). Schwarz I 122 Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis. SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this. So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them. Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural. Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they"). Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL): a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically. b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms. Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL. Schwarz I 134 Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region. Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus: LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds. HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence. Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events. Schwarz I 139 Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished. Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person. Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195). SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?. Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind. I 142 Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon. Schwarz I 160 Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently. Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism). SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information. Schwarz I 178 Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments. Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it. Schwarz I 179 E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture. Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information. Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations. SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well. Schwarz I 186 Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright). LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible. Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94). Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them. Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f). Schwarz I 232 Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true. Schwarz I 233 Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29). Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ". 1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543. 2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92: 3–32. 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377. 6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press 8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398 9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291 9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38. 11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. 12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97. 13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a] 14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137. 15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Objectivity | Chisholm Vs Objectivity | II 105f Referring/Reference/Brandl: through signs or speaker? Through speaker. Strawson ditto: i.e.use of the sign refers, not the sign itself. Problem: intentionality would have to explain the sign - BrandlVsChisholm: Thesis: pointless to decide whether the language or the mental aspects (intentionality) should prevail. Directedness incomprehensible if designation of words not yet introduced. Separation of the areas would either lead to total behaviorism or psychologism. II 107 "Unit" would not explain anything either! Again question of primacy: either "thinking of" or "talking about" objects Solution: Distinguishing various types of singular terms for various types of reference, but only one type of intentionality. II 120 Objective reference/Chisholm: depends on "epistemic proximity". Possibility of identification. E.g. Suppose Tom were the smallest spy: we could not infer that every reasonable person thinks Tom is a spy. He cannot make a de-re attribution yet. So we do not need to classify this belief attitude as de-re in the strict sense. II 120/121 Suppose e.g. the smallest spy was also the richest coffee trader: then I can give two relationships in which I am exclusively to the smallest spy. If I knew, moreover, that it is the same person, I would have to be "epistemically familiar" with him or her. I might as well already be, even if I only have one source of information, without being acquainted with the person. de-re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy de-re, before I know him personally. VsChisholm: we do not learn from him what this closer relationship of "knowing" is to consist in. This again makes it unclear what the mechanism of indirect attribution is supposed to contribute. II 123 Reference/Acquaintance/Description/BrandlVsChisholm: Problem: two types of uniqueness relation correspond to the problem that in addition to the referential one also attributive reference in the game. II 124 Danger of simplification: there is no clear distinction referential/Attributive: we must always ask what role one or the other form of reference has in a particular case. There is a range of possibilities that cannot be explained by the dichotomy ref/att. Own experiences and information from others affect the mechanism of reference. II 125 VsChisholm: only in very special cases, namely the purely referential ones, this succeeds only thanks to "epistemic intimacy". II 126 Question: what could act as such a link between and X? Wittgenstein: two candidates: 1) an image that is more similar to the object than any other 2) an utterance of the presenter which only denotes X. ChisholmVsWittgenstein: The relationship between an utterance (sentence) and an object could not be more "fundamental" than that between V and X. II 128 BrandlVsChisholm: vice versa: Wittgenstein asks a trick question here. If we argue reductionistically, we will never find an end point. We always need more intermediaries as links. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Principia Mathematica | Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica | II 338 Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity. II 352 Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned. II 353 The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down. II 402 Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. II 415 Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing. The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate. Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads. WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class? II 416 It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension. WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity. II 418 Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica(1), there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations") 2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a. The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs. WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one. --- IV 47/48 So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers. IV 73 WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica(1) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic. 5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here. 5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity. People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and IV 74 lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) Simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth). Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations. IV 84 Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form "a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing. WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p" and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences. That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical. 5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there IV 85 would be things but these were not identical with themselves? IV 85/86 Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). IV 87 Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number. IV 98 Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. IV 99 Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 71 Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism". I 72 Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz. Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w.. I 201 Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable. II 24 Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition. Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided. StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case. De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague, II 25 but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it. Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content. II 160 Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions). Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual. Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual. StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine. II 161 De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way? Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe? bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here. acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them. 1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it. 2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions. Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible. Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself. b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts. 1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat 2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach. II 162 Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between. II 163 De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship. That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition. Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set. Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…) |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 215 descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is." I 216 Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand: "The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning. "Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential. Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua." MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context. referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension. Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used. Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name? Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy. a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy. I 217 b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat. Quine: In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach. c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy. Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b). Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same. d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy. Now this is just wrong. Question: but what about e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of). Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain. I 218 She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens. Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt. Millikan: description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ". Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph). referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential. referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her). MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent! Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions. Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally: I 219 Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But: Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity). Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts. Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you. I 299 Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up. I 300 Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances. Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted. MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction? Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree. Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same. Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted. One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer. Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra). Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity). I 309 Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment. agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world. agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true. Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing). Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time. Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time. I 312 Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary I 313 to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested. Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine). Theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data. I 314 Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. Confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data. I 317 Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things. Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A? Millikan. No! From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa. Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees." I 318 Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake. Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real. I 321 Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body." Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction. Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience. I 322 Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. Confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes. From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well. Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Russell, B. | Wittgenstein Vs Russell, B. | Carnap VI 58 Intensional logic/Russell: is not bound to certain statement forms. All of their statements are not translatable into statements about extensions. WittgensteinVsRussell. Later Russell, Carnap pro Wittgenstein. (Russell, PM 72ff, e.g. for seemingly intensional statements). E.g. (Carnap) "x is human" and "x mortal": both can be converted into an extensional statement (class statement). "The class of humans is included in the class of mortals". --- Tugendhat I 453 Definition sortal: something demarcated that does not permit any arbitrary distribution . E.g. Cat. Contrast: mass terminus. E.g. water. I 470 Sortal: in some way a rediscovery of the Aristotelian concept of the substance predicate. Aristotle: Hierarchy: low: material predicates: water, higher: countability. Locke: had forgotten the Aristotelian insight and therefore introduced a term for the substrate that, itself not perceivable, should be based on a bunch of perceptible qualities. Hume: this allowed Hume to reject the whole. Russell and others: bunch of properties. (KripkeVsRussell, WittgensteinVsRussell, led to the rediscovery of Sortals). E.g. sortal: already Aristotle: we call something a chair or a cat, not because it has a certain shape, but because it fulfills a specific function. --- Wittgenstein I 80 Acquaintance/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: eliminates Russell's second class (logical forms), in particular Russell's free-floating forms, which can be expressed by entirely general propositions. So Wittgenstein can say now that we do not need any experience in the logic. This means that the task that was previously done by Russell's second class, now has to be done by the regular objects of the first class. This is an explanation of the most fundamental and strangest theses of the Tractatus: the logical forms are not only accepted, but there are considered very important. Furthermore, the objects are not only substance of the world but also constitutive for the shape of the world. I 81 1. the complex logical propositions are all determined by the logical forms of the atomic sentences, and 2. The shapes of the atomic sentences by the shapes of the objects. N.B.: Wittgenstein refuses in the Tractatus to recognize the complex logical forms as independent objects. Their task must be fulfilled by something else: I 82 The shapes of simple objects (type 1): they determine the way in which the objects can be linked together. The shape of the object is what is considered a priori of it. The position moves towards Wittgenstein, it has a fixed base in Frege's famous principle of composite character (the principle of functionality, called Frege principle by Davidson (s)> compositionality). I 86 Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: thinks, we should be familiar with the logical form of each to understand sentence. WittgensteinVsRussell: disputes this. To capture all logical forms nothing more is needed than to capture the objects. With these, however, we still have to be familiar with. This experience, however, becomes improper that it relates to the existence of objects. I 94ff This/logical proper name/Russell: "This" is a (logical) proper name. WittgensteinVsRussell/PU: The ostensive "This" can never be without referent, but that does not turn it into a name "(§ 45). I 95 According to Russell's earlier theory, there are only two logical proper names in our language for particularistic objects other than the I, namely "this" and "that". One introduces them by pointing to it. Hintikka: of these concrete Russellian objects applies in the true sense of the word, that they are not pronounced, but can only be called. (> Mention/>use). I 107 Meaning data/Russell: (Mysticism and Logic): sense data are something "Physical". Thus, "the existence of the sense datum is not logically dependent on the existence of the subject." WittgensteinVsRussell: of course this cannot be accepted by Wittgenstein. Not because he had serious doubts, but because he needs the objects for semantic purposes that go far beyond Russell's building blocks of our real world. They need to be building blocks of all logical forms and the substance of all possible situations. Therefore, he cannot be satisfied with Russell's construction of our own and single outside world of sensory data. I 108 For the same reason he refused the commitment to a particular view about the metaphysical status of his objects. Also: Subject/WittgensteinVsRussell: "The subject does not belong to the objects of the world". I 114 Language/sense data/Wittgenstein/contemporary/Waismann: "The purpose of Wittgenstein's language is, contrary to our ordinary language, to reflect the logical structure of the phenomena." I 115 Experience/existence/Wittgenstein/Ramsey: "Wittgenstein says it is nonsense to believe something that is not given by the experience, because belonging to me, to be given in experience, is the formal characteristics of a real entity." Sense data/WittgensteinVsRussell/Ramsey: are logical constructions. Because nothing of what we know involves it. They simplify the general laws, but they are as less necessary for them as material objects." Later Wittgenstein: (note § 498) equates sense date with "private object that stands before my soul". I 143 Logical form/Russell/Hintikka: both forms of atomic sentences and complex sentences. Linguistically defined there through characters (connectives, quantifiers, etc.). WittgensteinVsRussell: only simple forms. "If I know an object, I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in facts. Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object." I 144 Logical constants/Wittgenstein: disappear from the last and final logical representation of each meaningful sentence. I 286 Comparison/WittgensteinVsRussell/Hintikka: comparing is what is not found in Russell's theory. I 287 And comparing is not to experience a phenomenon in the confrontation. Here you can see: from a certain point of time Wittgenstein sees sentences no more as finished pictures, but as rules for the production of images. --- Wittgenstein II 35 Application/use/WittgensteinVsRussell: he overlooked that logical types say nothing about the use of the language. E.g. Johnson says red differed in a way from green, in which red does not differ from chalk. But how do you know that? Johnson: It is verified formally, not experimentally. WittgensteinVsJohnson: but that is nonsense: it is as if you would only look at the portrait, to judge whether it corresponds to the original. --- Wittgenstein II 74 Implication/WittgensteinVsRussell: Paradox for two reasons: 1. we confuse the implication with drawing the conclusions. 2. in everyday life we never use "if ... then" in this sense. There are always hypotheses in which we use that expression. Most of the things of which we speak in everyday life, are in reality always hypotheses. E.g.: "all humans are mortal." Just as Russell uses it, it remains true even if there is nothing that corresponds to the description f(x). II 75 But we do not mean that all huamns are mortal even if there are no humans. II 79 Logic/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: his notation does not make the internal relationships clear. From his notation does not follow that pvq follows from p.q while the Sheffer-stroke makes the internal relationship clear. II 80 WittgensteinVsRussell: "assertion sign": it is misleading and suggests a kind of mental process. However, we mean only one sentence. ((s) Also WittgensteinVsFrege). > Assertion stroke. II 100 Skepticism/Russell: E.g. we could only exist, for five minutes, including our memories. WittgensteinVsRussell: then he uses the words in a new meaning. II 123 Calculus/WittgensteinVsRussell: jealousy as an example of a calculus with three binary relations does not add an additional substance to the thing. He applied a calculus on jealousy. II 137 Implication/paradox/material/existence/WittgensteinVsRussell: II 137 + applicable in Russell's notation, too: "All S are P" and "No S is P", is true when there is no S. Because the implications are also verified by ~ fx. In reality this fx is both times independent. All S are P: (x) gx > .fx No S is P: (x) gx > ~ fx This independent fx is irrelevant, it is an idle wheel. Example: If there are unicorns, then they bite, but there are no unicorns = there are no unicorns. II 152 WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for every general sentence, which can be given for the answer to the question "what?" (in contrast to "what kind?"). E.g. "what people live on this island?" one may ask, but not: "which circle is in the square?". We have no names "a", "b", and so on for circles. WittgensteinVsRussell: in his notation it says "there is one thing which is a circle in the square." Wittgenstein: what is this thing? The spot, to which I point? But how should we write then "there are three spots"? II 157 Particular/atom/atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to get through to the basic elements ("individuals") by logical analysis. Russell believed, in the end there would be subject predicate sentences and binary relations. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken notion of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism. Wittgenstein II 306 Logic/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell notes: "I met a man": there is an x such that I met x. x is a man. Who would say: "Socrates is a man"? I criticize this not because it does not matter in practical life; I criticize that the logicians do not make these examples alive. Russell uses "man" as a predicate, even though we almost never use it as such. II 307 We could use "man" as a predicate, if we would look at the difference, if someone who is dressed as a woman, is a man or a woman. Thus, we have invented an environment for this word, a game, in which its use represents a move. If "man" is used as a predicate, the subject is a proper noun, the proper name of a man. Properties/predicate/Wittgenstein: if the term "man" is used as a predicate, it can be attributed or denied meaningfully to/of certain things. This is an "external" property, and in this respect the predicate "red" behaves like this as well. However, note the distinction between red and man as properties. A table could be the owner of the property red, but in the case of "man" the matter is different. (A man could not take this property). II 308 WittgensteinVsRussell: E.g. "in this room is no man". Russell's notation: "~ (Ex)x is a man in this room." This notation suggests that one has gone through the things in the room, and has determined that no men were among them. That is, the notation is constructed according to the model by which x is a word like "Box" or else a common name. The word "thing", however, is not a common name. II 309 What would it mean, then, that there is an x, which is not a spot in the square? II 311 Arithmetics/mathematics/WittgensteinVsRussell: the arithmetic is not taught in the Russellean way, and this is not an inaccuracy. We do not go into the arithmetic, as we learn about sentences and functions, nor do we start with the definition of the number. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. Vsacquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. Vsacquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Hintikka Vs Russell, B. | II 165 On Denoting/Russell/Hintikka: (Russell 1905) Problem: with phrases that stand for genuine constituents of propositions. Problem/Frege: failure of substitutivity of identity (SI) in intensional contexts. Informative Identity/Frege: the fact that identity can even sometimes be informative is connected to this. EG/Existential Generalization/Russell: it, too, may fail in in intensional contexts, (problem of empty terms). HintikkaVsRussell: he does not recognize the depth of the problem and rather circumvents the problems of denoting terms. E.g. The bald king of France/Russell: Problem: we cannot prove by existential generalization that there is a present king of France. HintikkaVsRussell: But there are also other problems. (see below for ambiguity of cross world identificaiton). description/Russell/Hintikka: Def Primary description: the substitutivity of identity applies to them (SI) Def secondary description: for them, substitutivity of identity (SI) fails. II 166 Existential Generalization/Russell: two readings: (1) George IV did not know whether Scott was the author of Waverley. description/Logical Form/Russell/Hintikka: "the author of Waverley": (ix)A(x) primarily: the description has the following power: (2) (Ex)[A(x) & (y) A(y) > y = x) & ~ George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. ((s) notation: quantifier here always normal existential quantifier, mirrored E). I.e. the quantifier has the maximum range in the primary identification. The second reading is more likely, however: Secondary: (3) ~George IV knew that (Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x & (Scott = x)]. ((s) narrow range): Range/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not know that there is also a third option for the range of a quantifier ((s) >"medium range"/Kripke). (4) ~(Ex)[A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x ) & George IV knew that (Scott = x)]. II 166 Existential Generalization/HintikkaVsRussell: he did not see that there was a reason for the failure of the existential generalization, which is not caused by the non-existence of the object. E.g. (5) George IV knew that the author of Waverley is the author of Waverley. a) trivial interpretation: I 167 (6) George IV knew that (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x)) everyday language translation: he knew that one and only one person wrote Waverley. I 166 b) non-trivial interpretation: (7) (Ex)(A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x) & George IV knew that (A(x) & (y)(A(y) > y = x))). ((s) no quantifier after "knew that everyday language translation: George knew of the only person who actually wrote Waverley, that they did. Because knowledge implies truth, (7) is equivalent to (8) (Ex) George IV knew that (Ez)(A(z) & (y)(A(y) > y = z) & x = z). this is equivalent to. (9) (Ex) George IV knew that (the author of Waverley = x) Here, the description has secondary (narrow) range. Everyday language translation: George knew who the author of Waverley is. I 167 Knowledge/Who/What/Where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze structures of the form knows + W-sentence. General: (10) a knows, who (Ex x) is so that A(x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A(x). Hintikka: this is only possible if we modify Russell’s approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be attributed to non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed by Russell’s Theory of descriptions (ThoD). Problem: for every person, there are a lot of people whose names they know and of whose existence they know, but of who they do not know who they are. II 168 E.g. Charles Dodgson was for Queen Victoria someone of whom she had heard, but whom she did not know. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10), the following applies. (12) ~(Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) But that’s trivially false, even according to Russell. Because the following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson) Existential Generalization/EG: then yields (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x) So exactly the negation of (12) contradiction. II 168 Descriptions/Hintikka: are not involved here. Therefore, Russell’s description theory cannot help here, either. E.g. we can also assume that Victoria knew of the existence of Dodgson. Empty Terms/Empty Names: are therefore not the problem, either. Ontology/Hintikka: so our problem gets an ontological aspect. Existential Generalization/EG/Being/Quine/Ontology/Hintikka: the question of whether existential generalization may be applied on a singular term "b", E.g. in a context "F(b)", is the same as whether b may be value of a bound variable. Existential Generalization/Hintikka: does not fail here because of non-existence. II 169 We are dealing with the following problems here: Manifestation used by a) no SI Frege, Russell b) no EG (i) due to non-existence Russell (ii) because of ambiguity Hintikka Ambiguity/Solution/Hintikka: possible worlds semantics. E.g. (12) - (14) the problem is not that Dodgson did not exist in the actual world or not in one of Victoria’s worlds of knowledge, but that the name Dodgson singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. Hence (14) does not follow from (13). II 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Clarity/Russell/Hintikka: Which way would have been open to Russell?. Knowing-Who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself very often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge, who did something with the existence of another individual, which is known to have done... + ... II 173 Denotation/Russell/Hintikka: Important argument: an ingenious feature of Russell’s theory of denotation from 1905 is that it is the quantifiers that denote! Theory of Denotation/Russell: (end of "On Denoting") includes the reduction of descriptions to objects of acquaintance. II 174 Hintikka: this relation is amazing, it also seems to be circular to allow only objects of acquaintance. Solution: We need to see what successfully denoting expressions (phrases) actually denote: they precisely denote objects of acquaintance. Ambiguity/Clarity/Hintikka: it is precisely ambiguity that leads to the failure of the existential generalization. Existential Generalization/Waverley/Russell/Hintikka: his own example shows that only objects of acquaintance are allowed: "the author of Waverley" in (1) is in fact a primary incident i.e. his example (2). "Whether"/Russell/Hintikka: only difference: wanted to know "if" instead of "did not know". (secondary?). Secondary description/Russell: can also be expressed like this: that George wanted to know of the man who actually wrote Waverley whether he was Scott. II 175 That would be the case if George IV had seen Scott (in the distance) and had asked "Is that Scott?". HintikkaVsRussell: why does Russell select an example with a perceptually known individual? Do we not usually deal with beings of flesh and blood whose identity is known to us, instead of only with objects of perception?. Knowing Who/Knowing What/Perception Object/Russell/Hintikka: precisely with perception objects it seems as if the kind of clarity that we need for a knowing-who, is not just given. Identifcation/Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in my approach Dodgson is a bona fide individual iff. he is one and the same individual in all worlds of knowledge of Victoria. I.e. identifiable iff. (15) (E.g.) in all relevant possible worlds it is true that (Dodgson = x). Problem: What are the relevant possible worlds?. II 178 Quantifier/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell systematically confuses two types of quantifiers. (a) of acquaintance, b) of description). Problem: Russell has not realized that the difference cannot be defined solely in terms of the actual world!. Solution/Hintikka: we need a relativization to sets of possible worlds that change with the different propositional attitudes. II 179 RussellVsHintikka: he would not have accepted my representation of his position like this. HintikkaVsRussell: but the reason for this merely lies in a further error of Russell’s: I have not attributed to him what he believed, but what he should have believed. Quantification/Russell/Hintikka: he should have reduced to objects of acquaintance. Russell believed, however, it was sufficient to eliminate expressions that seemingly denote objects that are not such of acquaintance. Important argument: in that his quantifiers do not enter any ontological commitment. Only denoting expressions do that. Variable/Russell/Hintikka: are only notational patterns in Russell. Ontological Commitment/Quine/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell did not recognize the ontological commitment that 1st order languages bring with them. Being/Ontology/Quine: "Being means being value of a bound variable". HintikkaVsRussell: he has realized that. II 180 Elimination/Eliminability/HintikkaVsRussell/Hintikka: in order to eliminate merely seemingly denoting descriptions one must assume that the quantifiers and bound variables go over individuals that are identified by way of description. ((s) Object of the >Description). Otherwise, the real Bismarck would not be a permissible value of the variables with which we express that there is an individual of a certain species. Problem: then these quantifiers may not be constituents of propositions, because their value ranges do not only consist of objects of acquaintance. Therefore, Russell’s mistake was twofold. Quantifier/Variable/Russell/Hintikka, 1905, he had already stopped thinking that quantifiers and bound variables are real constituents of propositions. Def Pseudo Variable/Russell/Hintikka: = bound variable. acquaintance/Russell: values of the variable should only be objects of acquaintance. (HintikkaVsRussell). Quantifiers/HintikkaVsRussell: now we can see why Russell did not differentiate between different quantifiers (acquaintance/description): For him quantifiers were only notational patterns, and for them the range of possible interpretations need not be determined, therefore it makes no difference if the rage changes!. Quantification/Russell: for him, it was implicitly objectional (referential), and in any event not substitutional. Peacocke I 190 Possible Worlds/Quantification/HintikkaVsRussell: R. is unable to explain the cases in which we quantify in belief contexts (!) where (according to Hintikka) the quantifier over "publicly descriptively identified" particulars is sufficient. Hintikka: compares with a "roman à clef". Peacocke: it is not clear that (whether) this could not be explained by Russell as cases of general ideas, so that the person with such and such characteristics is so and so. Universals/acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: we are familiar with universals and they are constituents of our thoughts. HintikkaVsRussell: this is a desperate remedy to save the principle of acquaintance. PeacockeVsRussell: his arguments are also very weak. Russell: E.g. we cannot understand the transitivity of "before" if we are not acquainted with "before", and even less what it means that one thing is before another. While the judgment depends on a consciousness of a complex, whose analysis we do not understand if we do not understand the terms used. I 191 PeacockeVsRussell: what kind of relationship should exist between subject and universal?. Solution: the reformulated PB: Here we can see to which conditions a term is subject, similar to the principle of sensitivity in relational givenness. I 192 HintikkaVsRussell: ("On denoting what?", 1981, p.167 ff): the elimination of objects with which the subject is not familiar from the singular term position is not sufficient for the irreducibility of acquaintance that Russell had in mind. Quantification/Hintikka: the quantifiers will still reach over objects with which the subject is not familiar. But such quantifiers cannot be constituents of propositions, if that is to be compatible with the PB. Because they would certainly occur through their value range Occur and these do not consist of particulars with which one is familiar. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Russell, B. | Chisholm Vs Russell, B. | Chisholm II 113 Knowing/Knowledge/BrandlVsRussell: We can know much more about an object, without knowing him, than we often know about those people and things with which we are well familiar. For us the distinction of knowledge has been transformed by acquaintance or description: II 114 1) There is a way in which the objects of the external world appear to us and 2) our knowledge about how these objects are designed as the cause of these experiences. The border has now shifted to the effect that our own experience are separated from what we can know at second hand. Brandl: although Russell must come to completely different results, we can agree with his justification of the distinction: Russell: insight by description is so important because it allows us to go beyond the limits of our experience. BrandlVsRussell: We do not equate "personal experience" with "immediate experience". II 118 Identification/Chisholm/Brandl: introduces a more sophisticated concept of third-party attribution (briefly: de-re attribution): II 119 1) I need to have at least two relations R and R’ with this and only this object 2) I have to own independent evidence for both relationships 3) I need to know that I am in these relationshipy with the object. Identification/Chisholm: this goes further than Russell, who requested that in order to pass judgment on an object I would have to know which one it is. Russell: If I do not know which object so and so is, I cannot know or believe anything about it. ChisholmVsRussell: if I can only not identify the object, on the other hand, it is not impossible that I will make it the object of an indirect attribution. I can then even relate "to" it. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| substit. Quantific. | Hintikka Vs substit. Quantific. | II 171 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/HintikkaVsSQ/HintikkaVsSubstitutional Quantification/Hintikka: is a mock paradise, at maximum of formal interest, there has never been a satisfactory explanation for them. Ad (i)/Russell/Hintikka: implied the equivalence of (120) and (11) in the period 1905-14). description/Knowledge/Russell. Knowledge by description: E.g. we do not know Bismarck. We do wish that the object itself were a constituent of our proposition, but that is not possible. But we know that there is an object called Bismarck (existence). Russell: We also know about this Bismarck that he is a skillful diplomat. ((s) attribution of properties, predication, to individuation, property that goes beyond the mere naming). Solution/Russell: then we can describe the proposition that we want to assert, namely: "B was a skillful diplomat" with B being the object that Bismarck is. (logical form). Logical Form/Hintikka: (15) (Eb)(b = Bismarck & we judge that b was a skillful diplomat) "b": this variable then has current objects (objects from the real world) as values. Russell/Hintikka: this shows that he has not chosen the solution (i). However, Russell says on another occasion, admittedly: II 172 Description/Knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: knowledge by description: Here we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what the so-and-so is. Ad (ii): E.g. description: instead of Bismarck: "the first chancellor of the German Reich". HintikkaVs (ii) that sweeps the problem under the carpet. Problem: The use of descriptions must ultimately lead to the descriptions being re-translated into names, and that is not possible here! Furthermore: Reduction/description/Name/Hintikka: not all individuals of which we speak with descriptions have identities that are known to everyone. The interpretation of Russell does precisely not exclude that many different entities act as legitimate values of the variables that can, in principle, also be denoted with names. Ad (iii) Russell/Hintikka: that was Russell’s implicit solution: he redefined the domain of the individual variables so that they are limited to individuals who we know by acquaintance. Existential Generalization/EG/Russell/Hintikka: applies only to names of individuals with whom we are familiar. Hidden description/Russell/Hintikka: existential generalization fails for individuals whose names must be regarded as hidden descriptions ((s) because we only know them by description). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Hintikka, J. | Peacocke I 189 Principle of acquaintance / possible worlds / description / Hintikka / Peacocke: Hintikka s interpretation is quite different: the essential thing in Russell: only demonstrative methods of identification by acquaintance, and not physical (i.e. descriptive) are indispensable. Judgment /verdict/ Russell: superior relation between a subject and different objects. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Existence | Russell, B. | Wittg / Hintikka I 92f Existence / expression / inexpressibility / Russell / Hintikka: for the thesis of the inexpressibility of the existence of the object (IEO) there is a perfect example in Russell: Theory of acquaintance / Russell: "There is no point to say of an actually given "this" - an object of acquaintance - that it exists. Russell: this applies to all "true proper names" (as opposed to the "description"). |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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