Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benacerraf, P. | Wright Vs Benacerraf, P. | Field I 23 Mathematics/Uncertainty/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright (1983): Benacerraf's paper does not create a particular problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any, sets they are. WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies for the singular terms representing sets themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms that stand for rabbits! FieldVsWright: this goes past Benacerraf's argument. It is aimed more against an anti-platonist argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems to be impossible to explain how we refer to them or have beliefs about them. According to Benacerraf's argument our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" form a sequence of distinct objects, under the relation that we call "<". (less than-relation). But that's all. But perhaps our use not does not even determine that. Perhaps they only form a sequence that satisfies our best axiomatic theory of the first stage of w sequences. I.e. everything that is determined by use, would be a non-standard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets. Wright (s): Thesis our standard use is not sufficient for the determination of the mathematical entities. (FieldVsWright). I 24 VsWright: but the assertion that this also applied to rabbits is more controversial. A bad argument against this would be a causal theory of knowledge (through perception) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Best Explanation | Fraassen Vs Best Explanation | Field I 15 Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up b) this class of phenomena is large and complex c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S. Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S. False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct": As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc). Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact. (van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980) Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things. Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed. I 16 Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief. FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc. Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such. FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc! I 25 VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge. I 90 Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness. Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true. FraassenVsSimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics. 2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy. 3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic? I 91 Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity: Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent. b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent. Difference: a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention). b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains". Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances. Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic. I 92 Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal). I 197 Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it. Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics. I 23 Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars). Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs). |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Carnap, R. | Stalnaker Vs Carnap, R. | I 43 Def Liberal Platonism/LP/terminology/Stalnaker: I developed the liberal platonism (LP) earlier to explain the difference between reference to numbers and normal things. But it is not a defense of the MR: thesis: one starts with facts of mathematical discourse e.g. existence of a practice that contains among others assertions, inference, arguments. If we then have Tarskian semantics (and require a domain of goods we are talking about) then this explains the facts about the discourse. Thesis: when we say that our practice is legitimate it is not a sufficient reason to say that we really make assertions and the semantics really tells us what the statements say? ((s) >content, >assertion). ((s) short: LP: thesis: practice is sufficiently without immaterial realm). I 44 Problem: then the LP says carelessly, that the existence of numbers is constituted by the fact that there is a legitimate practice. FieldVsStalnaker: that is a kind of linguistic idealism. Field pro Carnap: (Carnap: "Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology", 1950): as an external issue what numbers are it violates Carnap's principle. Platonism/Field: two theses: 1. numbers, functions and sets exist 2. they are mind-independent. Stalnaker: if I had formulated more cautiously, I would have set up a real platonism. Empiricist sense criterion/Carnap/Stalnaker: would say as we all: if the language did not exist, the statements would not be meaningful. Stalnaker: but that is still compatible with the fact that it still could be true. Internal issues: within a frame External issues: purely practical questions of whether to accept the frame. QuineVsCarnap/Stalnaker: thesis: all questions are asked in any linguistic context, and questions such as "Is it reasonable to accept a frame of numbers?" and "Are there numbers?" are not easy to separate. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Carnap, R. | Stroud Vs Carnap, R. | I 182 External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category). Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist. I 183 Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things. I 191 StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language. One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things. Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless. But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal? Carnap does not answer that. I 192 This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference. StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation? 1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false? 2. What does the thesis express at all then? Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain. StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system? Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true? Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language? I 193 And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language. Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language. StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things. Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts. CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally". StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless. Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism. Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system). I 194 StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework. Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose. CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism. "Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail. StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.) Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things. Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all? Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible). StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian. I 196 And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned). I 197 Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition. I 198 A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced. It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation. StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before! 2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do, I 199 it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification Principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded. Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible. Verification Principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that 1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content", 2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true. Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite. StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences. I 205 SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question). I 207 StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification Principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct. I 214 Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Cassirer, E. | Quine Vs Cassirer, E. | I 143 It is an illusion to think that our sentences, which can be easily translated into one another, are different linguistic incarnations of a certain intercultural proposition or meaning, they are rather nothing but mere variations of the same intra-cultural word usage. For theoretical propositions like "neutrinos have no mass" applies Wittgenstein's dictum "To understand a proposition is to understand a language." I 144 Ex Certain islanders are said to call pelicans their half-brothers. The islanders have a brief occasion proposition to which an islander always agrees when he is introduced to one of his actual half brothers or a pelican, and probably no comparably short sentence in the event that it is exclusively about the one half brother. The equipment of the German language is the complete opposite of that. Such difference are true cultural differences. Not infrequently (for example, in Cassirer) one comes up against the assertion: Cassirer: profound linguistic differences are ultimately differences of mindset or the way of seeing the world. QuineVsCassirer: this is often an indeterminacy of correlation. I 146 In proportion to how the radical translation is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions about linguistic behavior, also all of our theories and beliefs are forever underdetermined !. Here it may be objected that if two theories match in this way with respect to all possible sensory determinants, in an important sense it is no longer about two, but only about one theory. But nevertheless if two theories contradict with regard to individual sentences, then it is just a conflict betw. the parts. The principle of indeterminacy is noteworthy because translations usually progress step by step. I 147 The indeterminacy of translation has been less appreciated than its Proteus-like intra-linguistic counterpart in private worlds. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Chomsky, N. | Searle Vs Chomsky, N. | SearleVsChomsky: he went a step too far: he should deny that the speech organ has any structure that can be described as an automaton. So he became a victim of the analytical technique. Dennett I 555 Language/SearleVsChomsky: One can explain language acquisition this way: there is actually an innate language acquisition device. Bat that will ad nothing to the hardware explanation assuming deep unconscious universal grammatical rules. This does not increase the predictive value. There are naked, blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness. There is nothing else. ((s) otherwise regress through intermediaries). Searle I 273 SearleVsChomsky: for universal grammar there is a much simpler hypothesis: there is indeed a language acquisition device. Brings limitations, what types of languages can be learned by human being. And there is a functional level of explanation which language types a toddler can learn when applying this mechanism. By unconscious rules the explanatory value is not increased. IV 9 SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsRyle: there are neither alternative deep structures nor does is require specific conversations potulate. IV 204 Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: it is often said folllowing Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms). IV 205 This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Their unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we go from sounds to files. VIII 411 Grammar/language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's students (by Searle called "Young Turks") pursue Chomsky's approach more radically than Chomsky. (see below). Aspects of the theory of syntax/Chomsky: (mature work, 1965(1)) more ambitious targets than previously: Statement of all linguistic relations between the sound system and the system of meaning. VIII 412 For this, the grammar must consist of three parts: 1. syntactic component that describes the internal structure of the infinite number of propositions (the heart of the grammar) 2. phonological component: sound structure. (Purely interpretative) 3. semantic component. (Purely interpretive),. Also structuralism has phrase structure rules. VIII 414 It is not suggested that a speaker actually passes consciously or unconsciously for such a process of application of rules (for example, "Replace x by y"). This would be assumed a mix of competence and performance. SearleVsChomsky: main problem: it is not yet clear how the theory of construction of propositions supplied by grammarians accurately represents the ability of the speaker and in exactly what sense of "know" the speaker should know the rules. VIII 420 Language/Chomsky/Searle: Chomsky's conception of language is eccentric! Contrary to common sense believes it will not serve to communicate! Instead, only a general function to express the thoughts of man. VIII 421 If language does have a function, there is still no significant correlation with its structure! Thesis: the syntactic structures are innate and have no significant relationship with communication, even though they are of course used for communication. The essence of language is its structure. E.g. the "language of the bees" is no language, because it does not have the correct structure. Point: if one day man would result in a communication with all other syntactic forms, he possessed no language but anything else! Generative semantics/Young TurksVsChomsky: one of the decisive factors in the formation of syntactic structures is the semantics. Even terms such as "grammatically correct" or "well-formed sentence" require the introduction of semantic terms! E.g. "He called him a Republican and insulted him". ChomskyVsYoung Turks: Mock dispute, the critics have theorized only reformulated in a new terminology. VIII 422 Young Turks: Ross, Postal, Lakoff, McCawley, Fillmore. Thesis: grammar begins with a description of the meaning of a proposition. Searle: when the generative semantics is right and there is no syntactic deep structures, linguistics becomes all the more interesting, we then can systematically investigate how form and function are connected. (Chomsky: there is no connection!). VIII 426 Innate ideas/Descartes/SearleVsChomsky: Descartes has indeed considered the idea of a triangle or of perfection as innate, but of syntax of natural language he claimed nothing. He seems to have taken quite the contrary, that language is arbitrary: he assumed that we arbitrarily ascribe our ideas words! Concepts are innate for Descartes, language is not. Unconscious: is not allowed with Descartes! VIII 429 Meaning theory/m.th./SearleVsChomsky/SearleVsQuine: most meaning theories make the same fallacy: Dilemma: a) either the analysis of the meaning itself contains some key elements of the analyzed term, circular. ((s) > McDowell/PeacockeVs: Confusion >mention/>use). b) the analysis leads the subject back to smaller items, that do not have key features, then it is useless because it is inadequate! SearleVsChomsky: Chomsky's generative grammar commits the same fallacy: as one would expect from the syntactic component of the grammar that describes the syntactic competence of the speaker. The semantic component consists of a set of rules that determine the meanings of propositions, and certainly assumes that the meaning of a propositions depends on the meaning of its elements as well as on their syntactic combination. VIII 432 The same dilemma: a) In the various interpretations of ambiguous sentences it is merely paraphrases, then the analysis is circular. E.g. A theory that seeks to explain the competence, must not mention two paraphrases of "I went to the bank" because the ability to understand the paraphrases, just requires the expertise that will explain it! I cannot explain the general competence to speak German by translating a German proposition into another German proposition! b) The readings consist only of lists of items, then the analysis is inadequate: they cannot declare that the proposition expresses an assertion. VIII 433 ad a) VsVs: It is alleged that the paraphrases only have an illustrative purpose and are not really readings. SearleVs: but what may be the real readings? Example Suppose we could interpret the readings as heap of stones: none for a nonsense phrase, for an analytic proposition the arrangement of the predicate heap will be included in the subject heap, etc. Nothing in the formal properties of the semantic component could stop us, but rather a statement of the relationship between sound and meaning theory delivered an unexplained relationship between sounds and stones. VsVs: we could find the real readings expressed in a future universal semantic alphabet. The elements then stand for units of meaning in all languages. SearleVs: the same dilemma: a) Either the alphabet is a new kind of artificial language and the readings in turn paraphrases, only this time in Esperanto or b) The readings in the semantic alphabet are merely a list of characteristics of the language. The analysis is inadequate, because it replaces a speech through a list of elements. VIII 434 SearleVsChomsky: the semantic part of its grammar cannot explain, what the speaker actually recognizes when it detects one of the semantic properties. Dilemma: either sterile formalism or uninterpreted list. Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: Solution: Speech acts have two properties whose combination we dismiss out of the dilemma: they are regularly fed and intentional. Anyone who means a proposition literally, expresses it in accordance with certain semantic rules and with the intention of utterance are just to make it through the appeal to these rules for the execution of a particular speech act. VIII 436 Meaning/language/SearleVsChomsky: there is no way to explain the meaning of a proposition without considering its communicative role. VIII 437 Competence/performance/SearleVsChomsky: his distinction is missed: he apparently assumes that a theory of speech acts must be more a theory of performance than one of competence. He does not see that competence is ultimately performance skills. ChomskyVsSpeech act theory: Chomsky seems to suspect behaviorism behind the speech act. 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge 1965 |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Compositionality | Schiffer Vs Compositionality | I 220 SchifferVsCompositionality: my rejection is based all the time on the rejection of the theory of relations for belief. Here it is difficult to speculate about what kind of conditional sentences for "believes" would require a meaning theory that would not be a truth-theoretic semantics. How could such m.th. look like at all?. E.g. Conceptual Role Semantics: (Schiffer Vs: see section 4.3). Bsp Game Theoretical Semantics/game theory/Hintikka/Schiffer: (Hintikka 1982): this is not an alternative to the conventional theory. PeacockeVsHintikka: (1978) has shown that game theoretical rules provide corresponding truth-theoretical or model theoretical axioms. I XV SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural languages do not have any compositional meaning theories (m.th.). I 137 Paul and Elmer/SchifferVsQuine: Quine: there are no countable belief objects. E.g. if John believes that snow is white, and Mary believes that snow is white, there must be something that both believe. Schiffer: this conditional is false: I 138 Either that or the alleged quantification through belief objects is not what it appears to be the Quine eye. I 144 SchifferVsQuine: harmless apparent quantification. SchifferVsCompositionality: we can now conclude that no natural language has a compositional truth-theoretic semantics (comp.tr.th.Sem.). Otherwise the theory of relations would be correct. In addition, it also has no compositional m.th. because then it has to be a compositional semantics. Understanding/SchifferVsFrege: So compositional semantics are not required to explain speech understanding! I 182 SchifferVsCompositional Semantics: it is false, even regardless of the falsity of the theory of relations of belief. ((s) Compositional Semantics/(s): does not consider the truth conditions but speaks only of the contributions of the meaning of words for the meaning of the proposition.) Schiffer. 1. t is not plausible that languages have a compositional truth-theoretic semantics unless it follows from the stronger assertion that they have compositional truth theories, which themselves are truth-theoretic. (> stronger/weaker; >Strength of Theories). I 192 SchifferVsCompositionality/public language/Mentalese/Schiffer: if I'm right, that no public language has a compositional semantics, I have to find a mistake in (U). It is not my goal to show that speech comprehension does not imply that the natural languages have compositional semantics, the explanation of our understanding would be an empirical task. I rather want to give a counter-E.g. VsCompositionality. E.g. (1) Harvey understands an indefinite number of new propositions of a language E1, which itself contains infinitely many propositions. (2) an explanation of his capabilities does not require compositional semantics. E1: is not a fully-developed natural language. I 193 Harvey: is in this considered possible world an information-processing machine that thinks in machine language: "M": Belief/conviction: Harvey has it if it is in a certain computational relation to an embodied (tokened) proposition of M. ((s) Mentalese: so there is still an internal relation to one's own thought language). B: is a box in Harveys head in which a proposition of M (tokened) exists exactly then when a token from the proposition occurs in B. (Assuming, Harvey has only a finite number of convictions). Belief: for each there is exactly one proposition in Mentalese whose occurrence in B realizes it. µ: is a formula in M so that Harvey believes that snow is white. Realisation/"meaning"/Schiffer: as propositions of M (machine language, Mentalese) realize belief, they also have ipso facto semantic or representational properties. Then it is fair to say that μ "means" that snow is white. And also, that a component of μ references as inner counterpart of the word to snow in the public language. I 195 Speech comprehension/Understanding/Schiffer: without compositionality: E.g. (Continuation: E1: spoken language (without ambiguity and indices) M: Mentalese for Harvey conceptual role: to explain the transition from (1) to (2). (and any others that correspond to it). Propositions in internal code: (or representations thereof: (3) Nemrac derettu "sum"-"sno"-"iz"-"pör-pol" ((s) English backward, [phonetic language], metalanguage (ML) and object language (OL) mixed) (4) Nemrac dias taht emons wons si elprup ((s) English backward, but explicit language, ML) and (5) Nemrac ecnarettu si eurt ffi emos wons si elprup ((s) ML and OL! "true" and "iff" in machine language, but without everyday linguistic meaning or "eurt" does not have to mean "true"! Conceptual role instead of meaning). I 196 Conceptual Role/c.r./SchifferVsCompositionality: we hereby show that "dias taht" and "eurt" can have conceptual roles that a) do not require any compositional semantics, b) explain the transition from one occurrence of (3) in Harveys B-Box to an occurence of (4) and (5) We do not need to specify the full meaning role! I simply assume that (4) and (5) have a role ("whichever"), which by virtue of their formula in Harvey triggers this belief. And none of this makes a compositional semantics necessary: Justification: E.g. you could just have a mapping relation for propositions between two different languages, with which a person who does not understand the other language, knows when a proposition of the other language is true. (…+…) I 200, 202f, 208. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Deflationism | Davidson Vs Deflationism | Horwich I 457 Reduction/Reductionism/Rorty: all authors who try to strike a balance between reductionism and anti-reductionism like Davidson are constantly attacked by both sides. Davidson: One must distinguish: standards are one thing and descriptions are another. This assumes the following form: I 457/458 Truth/DavidsonVsDeflationism/Rorty: we get to know infinitely more about what truth is if we say that we now know more than tomorrow, than we learn from Tarski’s disquotation scheme. Rorty: this parallel between Dewey and Davidson is exacerbated by the NI of Leeds: Naturalistic instrumentalism/NI/Leeds/Rorty: (see above): the combination of the view similar to Quine that the only objective relative to which our methods can be rational, is the objective of predicting observations - with the assertion that the world literally consists of the entities of current science. The NI has to do with: Semantics/Explanation/Prediction/Theory/Leeds/Arthur Fine/Rorty: you cannot use semantics to explain the success of predictions. That would be circular. The circle comes from attempt to be simultaneously inside and outside of our investigations. That leads to: Action theory/Davidson/Rorty: you do not need to choose between these two descriptions (external/internal), we just have to distinguish them consistently. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Rorty VI 32 Def Deflationism/Rorty: the view that Tarski’s work encompasses all essential characteristics of the truth. DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: Tarski’s "true in L" is the extension and thus no indication of future or general cases! >Disquotationalism, >Minimalism, >Quote/Disquotation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Empiricism | Sellars Vs Empiricism | Rorty VI 205 SellarsVsEmpiricism, British/Rorty: Confusion of causal conditionality and justifiable reason. Rorty I 194 QuineVsEmpiricism/SellarsVsEmpiricism/logical/Rorty: their legal doubts about the epistemic privilege: that certain assertions are used as reports of privileged ideas. Gavagai/Quine/Rorty: asks how the propositions of the natives can be distinguished in contingent empirical platitudes on the one hand and necessary conceptual truths on the other hand. For the natives it is enough to know which propositions are certainly true. They have no idea of conceptual, necessary truths. I 195 Assertibility/Rorty: if assertions are justified by their being common and not by their nature of inner episodes it makes no sense to try to isolate privileged ideas. I 196 Necessity/Quine/Rorty: necessary truth: equivalent to the fact that nobody had to offer an interesting alternative that could cause us to question it. Incorrigibility/Sellars/Rorty: until now nobody has proposed a viable method of controlling human behavior that could verify the doubt in this matter. I 196/197 Truth/justified assertibility/Rorty: (stems from Dewey). Sellars, Quine, Chisholm and many others have the intention of making truth more than this modest approach. VI 219 RortyVsEmpiricism: contains nothing that would be worth a rescue. Sellars I XVII To seem/to appear/Sellars: like Lewis and Chisholm: about how something appears to someone any error is in fact impossible! But VsLewis: by this the propositions do still not advance to the foundation of the justification. Observation reports/SellarsVsEmpiricism/Sellars: seem to be able to build instead of the sense-data the foundation of justification. Vs: they are not in the sense independent that they require no further knowledge. Someone who always only responds with "This is green" does not express with it alone any knowledge. (> Thermometer, parrot). He has no position in the "logical space of reasons". I XXI SellarsVsLogical Empiricism/SellarsVsEmpirismus/Sellars: the special wit his criticism is that the experiences of the minute taking persons that should constitute the basis of the theory in logical empiricism, are reconstructed by him as quasi theoretical postulated entities of an everyday world view. I XXII Sellars: (different than Wittgenstein and Austin): Connection between questions of classical philosophy and everyday language. Sellars I 54 Elementary word-world connections are made between "red" and red physical objects and not between "red" and a suspected class of private red single objects. (SellarsVsEmpiricism). This does not mean that private feelings are maybe not an essential part of the development of these associative connections. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Feyerabend, P. | Quine Vs Feyerabend, P. | Feyerabend: (he took Quine s holism seriously): speaks of incommensurability of theories and systems. The transmission model of communication corresponds to an accumulation model of progress. E.g. If "electron" for us means something completely different than for the early theorists, how can we deny the former assertion? Brandom I 670 QuineVsFeyerabend: solution: that is semantically relevant to the meaning but not the reference! What we want to represent, and not what we say about it. E.g. Even from the mouth of a Zarathustra disciple you can find out whether the sun is shining or not. What is communicated, is the purely extensional content! |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Frege, G. | Russell Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 59 RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) --- Stepanians I 44 Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient. --- Stepanians I 87 Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis. 2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above). --- I 88 VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one. Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this. Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope. I 88 Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). I 91 Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V": The scope of F = is the scope of G bik All Fs are G and vice versa. Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F. It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty. I 92 RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is. If so, it includes itself, otherwise not. Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat. On the other hand: Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat. Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition. I 96 Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. I 97 VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. I 114 Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence). Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing. Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something. --- Horwich I 57 RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Newen I 61 Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence. b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence. Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance. --- I 62 RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually). Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme). --- Quine II 103 Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction a) expression, b) what it means, c) that to what it (if at all) refers to. This is not natural for Russell. RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C? QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Hilbert | Quine Vs Hilbert | IX 187 Notation/Set Theory/Terminology/Hilbert/Ackermann: (1938, 1949): still lean to the old theory of Russell's statements functions (AF): for classes and relations: "F", "G", etc. with repressible indices, in stead of "x ε a" and "xRy" (Russell: "φx" and "ψ(x,y)" Hilbert "F(x)" and "G(x,y)". Quine: the similarity is misleading: The values of "F", "G", etc. are not AF, but classes and extensional relations and so for the only criterion that those are identical with the same extension. QuineVsHilbert: disadvantage that the attention is drawn away from essential differences between ML and logic. IX 188 It encourages us (incorrectly) to just consider the theory of classes and relations as a continuation of the QL, in which the thus far schematic predicate letters are re-registered in quantifiers and other places which were previously reserved for "x", "y" I.e. "F", "EG", "H(F,G)". The existence assumptions become too inconspicuous, although they are far-reaching! Just implicitly by quantification. Therefore every comprehension assertion, e.g. EF∀x(FX >> ... x ...) by such insertions simply follows from "G EF ∀x (Fx Gx) which in turn follows from "∀x(Gx Gx)". This had escaped Hilbert and Ackermann, they also took on comprehension axioms, they realized that they could have taken a primitive concept of abstraction instead (like Russell). Predicate Calculus/Functions Calculus/Church/Quine: (nth order): type theory breaking of after n types, fusion of set theory and logic (QuineVs). E.g. PK 2nd Stage: Theory of individuals and classes of individuals. It was simply seen as a QL where predicate letters are approved quantifiers. The actual QL then became a first stage PK. This trend also contained an erroneous distinction between TT and ML, as if one did not contain as good as assumptions about the other. On the other, hand he nourished the idea that the Ql itself already contained a theory of classes or attributes and relations in its "F" and "G". QuineVs: the vital distinction between schematic letters and quantifiable variables is neglected. X 96 Logic 2nd Stage/Hilbert's Successor/Quine: "higher-level PK": the values of these variables are in fact sets. This type of introduction makes them deceptively similar to logic. But it is wrong that only a few quantifiers are applied to existing predicate letters. E.g. the hypothesis "(Ey)(x)((x ε y) Fx)": here the existence of a set is asserted: {x:Fx}. This must be restricted to avoid antinomies. QuineVsHilbert: in the so-called higher order PK this assumption moves out of sight. The assumption is: "(EG) (x) (Gx Fx)" and follows from the purely logical triviality (x)(Fx Fx)" As long as we keep the scope of the values of "x" and "G" apart there is no risk of an antinomy. Nevertheless, a large piece of set theory has crept in unnoticed. XI 136 Mathematics/QuineVsHilbert/Lauener: more than mere syntax. Quine reluctantly professes Platonism. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 |
| Kant | Frege Vs Kant | I 30 HankelVsKant: the assumption of an infinite number of irrefutable original truths is inappropriate and paradoxical. (Frege pro Hankel) Axioms/FregeVsKant: should be immediately obvious. E.g. is it obvious that 135 664 + 37 863 = 173 527? And that is precisely what Kant cites for their synthetic nature! I 30 Frege: much more speaks against their unprovability. How should they be viewed other than by evidence, since they are not immediately obvious. I 41 Numbers/FregeVsKant: Kant wants to use the view of fingers and points, but that is precisely what is not possible here! A distinction between small and large numbers should not be necessary! FregeVsKant: "pure view" does not help! The things that are called views. Quantities, lengths, surface areas, volumes, angles, curves, masses, speeds I 42 Forces, light levels, currents, etc. In contrast, I cannot even admit the view of the number 100 000. The sense of the word number in logic is therefore a further advanced than that in the transcendental aesthetic. Numbers/Frege: the relationship with geometry should not be overestimated!. I 43 A geometric point is, considered by itself, is impossible to distinguish from another, individual numbers, on the other hand, are not impossible to distinguish! Each number has its peculiarity. I 120 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 121 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. IV 61 Negation/FregeVsKant: he speaks of affirmative and negative judgments. Then you would also have to distinguish affirmative and negative thoughts. This is quite unnecessary in logic. I 119 FregeVsKant: he has underestimated the analytic judgments:. I 120 He thinks the judgement in general affirmative. Problem: what if it is about an individual object, about an existential judgement? Kant: seems to think of adjunctive properties. But E.g. in the case of a continuous function of a really fruitful definition there is certainly a more intimate connection. I 121 The implications of mathematics enrich our knowledge, therefore, they should be called synthetic according to Kant, but they are certainly also analytical! They are included in the definitions as the plant in the seed, not like the beam in the house. Numbers/FregeVsKant: he thinks that without sensuality no object would be given to us, but the numbers are it, as abstract but very specific items. Numbers are no concepts. Stepanians I 34 Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. Stepanians I 34 pPure View/Kant/Frege/Stepanians: (like Kant): geometrical knowledge is based on pure view and is already synthetic "in us", a priori. FregeVsMill: geometrical knowledge is not a sensation, because point, line, etc. are not actually perceived by the senses. Mathematics/Truth/FregeVsKant: it is false to generalize geometric knowledge (by mere view) to all mathematics. I 35 Numbers/KantVsFrege: are not given to us by view. I 36 Numbers/Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: purely logical definitions can be given for all arithmetical concepts. ((s) Therefore, it is a safer knowledge than the geometric one). Def Logicism/Frege/Stepanians: this is the view that was called "logicism". I.e. arithmetic is a part of logic. Arithmetic/FregeVsKant: is not synthetic but analytic. Newen I21 Discovery Context/Justification Context/Newen: the distinction has its roots in Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic. Def Analytical/Frege: is the justification of a sentence if only general logical laws and definitions are needed in the proof. I 22 Frege/FregeVsKant: all numerical formulas are analytical. Quine X 93 Analytic/FregeVsKant: (1884): the true propositions of arithmetic are all analytic. Quine: the logic that made this possible also contained the set theory. Tugendhat II 12 "Not"/Tugendhat: Error: considering the word "not" as a reflection of the "position". (Kant calls "being" a "position"). FregeVsKant: has shown that the negation always refers to the so-called propositional content and does not stand at the same level with the assertion-moment (position). The traditional opposition of negating and affirming judgments (Kant) is therefore untenable! |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Propositions | Quine Vs Propositions | V 61 QuineVsPropositions: to maintain the old "ideas": the idea that a sentence expresses. Superfluous. VI 99 QuineVsPropositional Stances de re: peculiar intention relation between thoughts and intended things. There are no reliable policies for that. Not scientific. Better: Opinions de dicto. VI 142 Propositions/QuineVsPropositions: are not sentence meanings. This is shown by the indeterminacy of translation. X 19 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: as meaning of sentences, as an abstract entity in its own right. Some authors: consider it as what t/f is, and between which there are implications. Oxford/Terminology: many authors use "proposition" for statements. Quine: in my earlier works I used it for assertions. I gave up on it, because of the following trend: Proposition/Oxford: actions that we perform when we express assertions. X 20 Proposition/QuineVsPropositions: their representative believes to save a step and thus to achieve immediacy: Truth/Tarski/Quine: the Englishman speaks the truth, 1) Because "Snow is white" means that snow is white and 2) Snow is white. Quine: the propositionalist saves step (1). The proposition that snow is white is simply true, because snow is white. ((s) >Horwich: "because snow..."). He bypasses differences between languages and differences between formulations within a language. Quine: my disapproval does not arise from dislike of abstract things. Rather: QuineVsPropositions: if they existed, they would bring about a certain relationship of synonymy or equivalence between propositions themselves: False Equivalence/Quine: such sentences would be equivalent that express the same proposition. QuineVsEquivalence of Sentences/VsSentence Equivalence: the equivalence relation makes no objective sense at the level of sentences. X 32 Letter/Quine: p can be schematic letter (only for sentences) or variable (then only for objects). Here problem: that does not work simultaneously! Solution: semantic ascent: we only talk about sentences. Sentence/Name/Quine: the other formulation could be given sense by stipulating that sentences are names, for example, of propositions. Some Authors: have done that. Before that, however, the letter "p" is no variable about anything except schematic letters, placeholder for sentences in a logical formula or grammatical structure. QuineVsPropositions: Problem: once sentences are conceived as names of propositions, the letter "p" is also a variable about objects, namely propositions. Then, however, we can correctly say: "p or not p' for all propositions p" ((s) Because the letter p is no longer at the same time a variable about objects and a schematic letter for sentences, but only a variable about objects.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Putnam, H. | Rorty Vs Putnam, H. | McDowell I 175 Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory. McDowell I 178 RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty. Rorty I 304 RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning. I 307 Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth. 2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism. 3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam. I 308 RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness". I 312 Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory. I 313 RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end. 2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it. I 314 In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe. I 315 Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world. Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.) I 319 Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about. I 320 Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all! We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing. I 324 Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory. I 326 Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever. RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time. I 327 The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image". Rorty V 21 Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists. V 22 Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all? Rorty VI 75 Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research"). VI 76 Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce! VI 79 Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion. VI 80 This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview! PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ... (Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.) RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking. VI 82 Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image? VI 87 Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam). VI 90 Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric. Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today). RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chomsky Vs Quine, W.V.O. | II 319 Language/Quine: interweaving of sentences. Theory/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: Quine himself must even presuppose that both are separated here: he certainly does not believe that two monolingual speakers of the same language can have no differences of opinion. ((s) If language and theory were identical, one could not argue, since even according to Quine the theories must have a certain unity. Chomsky: otherwise, according to Quine, every dispute would be completely irrational, as between two speakers of different languages. II 320 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of present dispositions to verbal behavior, in which speakers of the same language have necessarily corresponded to one another." (W + O, 27) Language/ChomskyVsQuine: then our disposition would have to be explained to a certain verbal behavior by a certain system. This is certainly not the case. II 321 Reinforcement/ChomskyVsQuine: his concept of "reinforcement" is almost empty. If reinforcement is needed to learn, this means that learning cannot go without data. This is even more emptier than with Skinner, who, unlike Quine, does not even require that intensifying stimuli influence. It is sufficient here that the reinforcement is merely imagined. II 324 Language learning: behavioristic/Quine: conditioning, association ChomskyVsQuine: additional principles, only so endlessly many sentences explainable. Probability/Language/ChomskyVsQuine: the concept of the "probability of a sentence" is completely useless and empty: II 325 Translation indeterminacy, indeterminacy: ChomskyVsQuine: disposition either with regard to stimulus, or with regard to the total body of the language: then all sentences are equally probable (reference classes). II 326 Logical truth/Quine: is derived by him by conditioning mechanisms that associate certain sentence pairs with each other, II 327 so that our knowledge of the logical relations can be represented as a finite system of linked propositions. ChomskyVsQuine: it remains unclear how we distinguish logical from causal relations. Truth functions/Quine: allow a radical translation without "non verifiable analytical hypotheses", so they can be directly learned from the empirical data material (W + O § 13) ChomskyVsQuine: his readiness to settle these things within the framework of the radical translation may show that he is ready to regard logic as an innate experience-independent basis for learning. Then it is, however, arbitrary to accept this framework as innate, and not much else that can be described or imagined. II 328 ChomskyVsQuine: his narrowly conceived Humean frame (Chomsky pro) with the language as a finite (!?) interweaving of sentences is incompatible with various triusms, which Quine certainly would accept. II 329 Analytical hypothesis/stimulus meaning/Quine: stimulus meaning invloves, in contrast to the analytical hypothesis only "normal inductive uncertainty". Since the corresponding sentences can contain truth functions, they lead to "normal induction". This is not yet a "theory construction" as in the case of analytical hypotheses. ChomskyVsQuine: the distinction is not clear because the normal induction also occurs within the radical translation. II 330 ChomskyVsQuine: Vs "property space": not sure whether the terms of the language can be explained with physical dimensions. Aristotle: more connected with actions. VsQuine: not evident that similarities are localizable in space. Principles, not "learned sentences". II 333 VsQuine: cannot depend on "disposition to reaction", otherwise moods, eye injuries, nutritional status, etc. would be too authoritive. II 343 Language may not be taught at all. II 335 Synonymy/ChomskyVsQuine: (he had suggested that synonymy "roughly speaking" exists in approximate equality of situations, and approximately equal effect). Chomsky: there is not even an approximate equality in the conditions that are likely to produce synonymous utterances. ChomskyVsQuine: Synonymy can thus not be characterized by means of conditions of use (conditions of assertion) or effects on the listener. It is essential to distinguish between langue and parole, between competence and performance. It is about meaningful idealization, Quine's idealization is meaningless. II 337 Translation indeterminacy/ChomskyVsQuine: the reason for the thesis is, in a psychological context, an implausible and rather contentless empirical assertion, namely, which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemic-theoretical context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the well-known skeptical arguments, which can equally well be applied to physics or others. II 337 Inconsistency/indeterminacy/theory/ChomskyVsQuine: any hypothesis goes beyond the data, otherwise it would be uninteresting. --- Quine V 32 Definition Language/Quine: "Complex of dispositions to linguistic behavior". ((s) that could be called circular, because "linguistic" occurs. Vs: then it should be expressed by the fact that there is not yet a language besides the behavior.) Disposition/ChomskyVsQuine: such a complex can presumably be presented as a set of probabilities to make an utterance under certain circumstances. Vs: the concept of probability fails here: the probability with which I utter a certain English sentence cannot be distinguished from the probability with which I express a particular Japanese sentence. QuineVsChomsky: one should not forget that dispositions have their conditions. --- V 33 We find this through the procedure of question and consent. --- Quine XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: the language of a person and their theory are in any case different systems, even if one would agree with Quine otherwise. --- XI 116 Quine: (dito). Indeterminacy of the translation: because of it one cannot speak of an invariant theory opposite translations. Nor can we say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or vice versa, that different theories (even contradictory ones) can be expressed in one language. ((s)> Because of the ontological conclusion that I cannot argue about ontology, by telling the other that the things that exist with him are not there, because I then make the self-contradiction that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the error that the language contributes the syntax, the theory but the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: that does not mean that there is no contradiction between the two: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, it means then that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction language/theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language/theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Field Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 129 Nominalism/Philosophy of Science/FieldVsQuine-Putnam Argument: An argument to show that nominalistic resources are adequate for good science would be: (E) For each Platonic scientific theory there is a nominalist theory to which the Platonic one is a conservative extension. But this is trivial if there are no restrictions regarding which sets of sentences that have been completed under a logical entailment count as theories. Of course, any Platonic theory T is a conservative extension of the "theory" which consists of nominalistic inferences from T. We have to reinforce (E) so that uninteresting nominalistic theories are excluded. Science Without Numbers: here I did not argue with (E). (E) or any amplifying extension is an existence assertion of a sufficiently wide variation of nominalist theories, and that goes beyond the assertion of the conservatism of mathematical theory. I 241 Conservatism/Mathematics/Field: Truth does not require conservatism! True empirical theories are obviously not conservative! But conservatism is certainly also recognized by most realists for mathematics. For they say that good mathematics is not only true, but necessarily true! Conservatism/Field: (see above) conservative mathematics has the properties of necessary truth, without having to be true itself! Quine: is a realist in terms of mathematics. He wants to nip talk of mathematical necessity in the bud. But for that he needs conservatism. FieldVsQuine: for that he would have to make a major renovation to his thesis that mathematics continuously flows into the rest of the other sciences. Logic/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: logic could be empirically refuted. Conservatism/Field: The fact that mathematics is empirically refuted is consistent with that, while the logic remains intact. IV 407 Internal Realism/IR/Existence/Ontology/Property/Putnam: what kind of objects exist can only be decided within a theory, according to the IR. FieldVsPutnam: I’m not sure I understand what he means. I suppose he thinks there are several correct theories that answer the question of ontology differently. But this is too trivial. sharper: (Put p 72 74.) two equally correct theories may have different ontologies. PutnamVsRedundancy Theory: does not offer an explanation of our understanding. FieldVsPutnam: this implied neither mind-independence nor theory-dependence, however! And it does not refute the correspondence theory. E.g. you can explain the behavior of electrically charged bodies with or without the assumption of fields. Ontology/Existence/Field: most of us would say that there is more than we are forced to assert. FieldVsQuine: E.g. is rarely critical to assert the existence of unseparated rabbit parts in addition to the existence of rabbits. FieldVsPutnam: if this is clear, then you can hardly draw anti-realistic conclusions from the fact that two equally good theories may differ in ontology. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. | Esfeld I 62 FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both. Fodor II 114 Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar. Fodor/Lepore IV 54 Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely: IV 52 Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.). IV 76/77 Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note IV 237 13> IV 157 o Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!. IV 218 Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Russell, B. | Strawson Vs Russell, B. | Wolf II 17 StrawsonVsRussell: Vs Russell's resolution of singular sentences like "the F, which is G, is H" are general sentences such as "There is exactly one F, which is G, and this F is H" : this is inappropriate. Thus it is not included, that we refer with the singular term to individual things. --- Newen/Schrenk I 92 Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: ("On Referring") in 1950, 45 years after Russell's "On Denoting" (1905)). Strawson: 5 theses (i) one must distinguish between a) the sentence, b) the use, c) the expression (on one occasion) (ii) there is a difference between (logical) implying and presupposition (iii) truth value gaps are allowed (iv) The meaning of an expression is not its referent, but the conventions and rules. In various uses the term can therefore refer to different objects. (v) expressions can be used referential and predicative (attributing properties). Sentence/truth value/tr.v./Strawson: Thesis: sentences themselves cannot be true or false, only their use. Presupposition/implication/Strawson: difference: Definition implication/Strawson: A implies B iff it cannot be that A is true but B is false. On the other hand: Definition presupposition/Strawson: A presupposes B iff B must be true so that A can take a truth value. Existence assertion/uniqueness assertion/Strawson: are only presupposed by a sentence with description, but not implied. E.g. King of France/presupposition/Strawson: the sentence presupposes the existence, however, does not imply it. And also does not claim the existence and uniqueness. Newen/Schrenk VsStrawson: Strawson provides no philosophical-logical arguments for his thesis. Newen/Schrenk I 94 He rather refers to our everyday practice. Truth-value gaps/StrawsonVsRussell: accepted by him. Negative existential statements/existence/existence theorem/Strawson/VsStrawson/Newen/Schrenk: his approach lets the problem of empty existence theorems look even trickier. Referential/predicative/singular term/designation/name/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referential. Description: have a maximum predicative, so descriptive meaning (but can also simultaneously refer). Identity/informative identity sentences/referential/predicative/Strawson/Newen/Schrenk: here the description has (or two occurring descriptions) such an extreme predicative use that E.g. "Napoleon is identical to the man who ordered the execution of the Duke" is as good as synonymous with the phrase "Napoleon ordered the ...". In principle, both sentences are used for a predication. Thus, the first sentence is informative when it is read predicative and not purely referential. --- Quine I 447 StrawsonVsRussell: has called Russell's theory of descriptions false because of their treatment of the truth value gaps. --- Schulte III 433 StrawsonVsRussell/Theory of descriptions: Strawson brings a series of basic distinctions between types and levels of use of linguistic expressions into play. Fundamental difference between the logical subject and logical predicate. Pleads for stronger focus on everyday language. "The common language has no exact logic" Schulte III 434 King-xample: "The present king of France is bald". Russell: here the description must not be considered a logical subject. Russell: Such sentences are simply wrong in the case of non-existence. Then we also not need to make any dubious ontological conditions. We analyze (according to Russell) the sentence as follows: it is in reality a conjunction of three sentences: 1. There is a king of France. 2. There are no more than a king of France. 3. There is nothing that is King of France and is not bald. Since at least one member in the conjunction is false, it is wrong in total. StrawsonVsRussell: 1. he speaks too careless of sentences and their meanings. But one has to consider the use of linguistic expressions, which shows that there must be a much finer distinction. 2. Russell confused what a sentence says with the terms of the meaningful use of this sentence. 3. The everyday language and not the formal logic determines the meaning. --- Schulte III 435 Reference/Strawson: an expression does not refer to anything by itself. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: with the sentence "The present king of France is bald" no existence assertion is pronounced. Rather, it is "implied". Therefore, the sentence does not need to be true or false. The term does not refer to anything. Definition truth value gap (Strawson): E.g. King-Example: refers to nothing. Wittgenstein: a failed move in the language game. --- VII 95 Description/Strawson: sure I use in E.g. "Napoleon was the greatest French soldier", the word "Napoleon", to name the person, not the predicate. StrawsonVsRussell: but I can use the description very well to name a person. There can also be more than one description in one sentence. VII 98 StrawsonVsRussell: seems to imply that there are such logical subject predicate sentences. Russell solution: only logical proper names - for example, "This" - are real subjects in logical sentences. The meaning is exactly the individual thing. This leads him to the fact that he can no longer regard sentences with descriptions as logical propositions. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: Solution: in "clear referring use" also dscriptions can be used. But these are not "descriptions" in Russell's sense. VII 99 King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: claims three statements, one of which in any case would be wrong. The conjunction of three statements, one of which is wrong and the others are true, is false, but meaningful. VII 100 Reference/description/StrawsonVsRussell: distinction: terminology: "Unique reference": expression. (Clearly referring description). Sentence begins with clear referring description. Sentences that can start with a description: (A1) sentence (A2) use of a sentence (A3) uttering of a sentence accordingly: (B1) expression (B2) use of an expression (B3) utterance of an expression. King-Example/StrawsonVsRussell: the utterance (assertion (>utterance) "The present king of France is wise" can be true or false at different times, but the sentence is the same. VII 101 Various uses: according to whether at the time of Louis XIV. or Louis XV. Sentence/statement/statement/assertion/proposition/Strawson: assertion (assertion): can be true or false at different times. Statement (proposition): ditto Sentence is always the same. (Difference sentence/Proposition). VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: he overlooks the distinction between use and meaning. VII 104 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: the question of whether a sentence makes sense, has nothing to do with whether it is needed at a particular opportunity to say something true or false or to refer to something existent or non-existent. VII 105 Meaning/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "The table is covered with books": Everyone understands this sentence, it is absurd to ask "what object" the sentence is about (about many!). It is also absurd to ask whether it is true or false. VII 106 Sense/StrawsonVsRussell: that the sentence makes sense, has to do with the fact that it is used correctly (or can be), not that it can be negated. Sense cannot be determined with respect to a specific (individual) use. It is about conventions, habits and rules. VII 106/107 King-Example/Russell/Strawson: Russell says two true things about it: 1. The sentence E.g. "The present king of France is wise" makes sense. 2. whoever expresses the sentence now, would make a true statement, if there is now one, StrawsonVsRussell: 1. wrong to say who uttered the sentence now, would either make a true or a false claim. 2. false, that a part of this claim states that the king exists. Strawson: the question wrong/false does not arise because of the non-existence. E.g. It is not like grasping after a raincoat suggests that one believes that it is raining. (> Presupposition/Strawson). Implication/Imply/StrawsonVsRussell: the predication does not assert an existence of the object. VII 110 Existence/StrawsonVsRussell: the use of "the" is not synonymous with the assertion that the object exists. Principia Mathematica(1): (p.30) "strict use" of the definite article: "only applies if object exists". StrawsonVsRussell: the sentence "The table is covered with books" does not only apply if there is exactly one table VII 111 This is not claimed with the sentence, but (commonplace) implied that there is exactly one thing that belongs to the type of table and that it is also one to which the speaker refers. Reference/StrawsonVsRussell: referring is not to say that one refers. Saying that there is one or the other table, which is referred to, is not the same as to designate a certain table. Referencing is not the same as claiming. Logical proper names/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. I could form my empty hand and say "This is a beautiful red!" The other notes that there is nothing. Therefore, "this" no "camouflaged description" in Russell's sense. Also no logical proper name. You have to know what the sentence means to be able to respond to the statement. VII 112 StrawsonVsRussell: this blurs the distinction between pure existence theorems and sentences that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. Russell's "Inquiry into meaning and truth" contains a logical catastrophic name theory. (Logical proper names). He takes away the status of logical subjects from the descriptions, but offers no substitute. VII 113 Reference/Name/referent/StrawsonVsRussell: not even names are enough for this ambitious standard. Strawson: The meaning of the name is not the object. (Confusion of utterance and use). They are the expressions together with the context that one needs to clearly refer to something. When we refer we do not achieve completeness anyway. This also allows the fiction. (Footnote: later: does not seem very durable to me because of the implicit restrictive use of "refer to".) VII 122 StrawsonVsRussell: Summit of circulatory: to treat names as camouflaged descriptions. Names are choosen arbitrary or conventional. Otherwise names would be descriptive. VII 123 Vague reference/"Somebody"/implication/Strawson: E.g. "A man told me ..." Russell: existence assertion: "There is a man who ..." StrawsonVsRussell: ridiculous to say here that "class of men was not empty ..." Here uniqueness is also implicated as in "the table". VII 124 Tautology/StrawsonVsRussell: one does not need to believe in the triviality. That only believe those who believe that the meaning of an expression is the object. (E.g. Scott is Scott). VII 126 Presupposition/StrawsonVsRussell: E.g. "My children sleep" Here, everyone will assume that the speaker has children. Everyday language has no exact logic. This is misjudged by Aristotle and Russell. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Schulte I J. Schulte Wittgenstein Stuttgart 2001 Schulte II J. Schulte U. J. Wenzel Was ist ein philosophisches Problem? Frankfurt 2001 Schulte III Joachim Schulte "Peter Frederick Strawson" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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Reference |
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| Indetermination | Chomsky, N. | I 325 Indetermination of Translation/Quine/Chomsky: according to this thesis "all proposals for translation should be compatible with the totality of the speech disposition, but incompatible with each other". (Q+O, 27). Chomsky: this is not possible because of the problems related to probability. The thesis when all probabilities are indistinguishable, both inside and outside a language. Quine: bypasses the problem by starting not from the "totality of dispositions" but from the "stimulus meaning". I 337 Indetermination of Translation/ChomskyVsQuine: the thesis, in a psychological context, amounts to an implausible and rather meaningless empirical assertion, namely which innate qualities the mind contributes to language acquisition. In an epistemological context, Quine's thesis is merely a version of the known sceptical arguments that can be applied just as well to physics or otherwise. It is quite certain that serious hypotheses "go beyond the data". If this was not the case, they would be uninteresting as hypotheses! |
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