Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Brandom, R. | Searle Vs Brandom, R. | Searle III 153 Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. >Background/Searle. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves 2. they are never exhaustive 3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious! (SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!) >Rules/Searle. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Fodor, J. | Searle Vs Fodor, J. | FN I 283 SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1) III 139 Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor). To enable: should therefore be a causal concept. Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here. III 142 Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle. 1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975 |
J.R. Searle I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996 II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996 III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997 Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982 V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983 VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995 VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995 |
Foucault, M. | Searle Vs Foucault, M. | I 217 Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle. The background is not a control system. SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here. Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle. 1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
J.R. Searle I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996 II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996 III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997 Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982 V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983 VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995 VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995 |
Moore, G.E. | Searle Vs Moore, G.E. | III 191 SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition). III 193 Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism. III 195 The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions. V 264 naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy. |
J.R. Searle I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996 II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996 III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997 Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982 V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983 VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995 VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995 |
Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
J.R. Searle I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996 II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996 III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997 Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982 V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983 VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995 VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995 |
Wittgenstein | Searle Vs Wittgenstein | Bennett I 192 SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention. Searle I 24 Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria". SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it? I 156 SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world. I 169 Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised. I 170 SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are. Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general? I 171 Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible. Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states. I 172 As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other. II 76 Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use". SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects. Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein). E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents. II 193/194 Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk. Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule. III 112 Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance). III 113 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!). III 150 Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays. V 35 Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean. V 36 Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance. V 145 Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance. SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case. Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations. SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts. V 190/191 Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.- V 245 SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change. Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names! Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet). IV 50 SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games. IV 89 Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie. Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement). IV 90 E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements). |
J.R. Searle I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996 II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996 III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997 Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993 IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982 V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983 VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995 VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995 Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |