Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Constructivism Searle III 168
Maturana: the nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality. SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image of reality is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. Maturana: rejects the idea of an "objective reality" in favour of the idea that nervous systems like autopoietic systems create their own reality. Since we have no idea and no access to reality except through social construction, there is no independent reality.
SearleVsMaturana: from the fact that our knowledge/imagination/image of reality is constructed by human brains in social interactions, it does not follow that reality has been created by human brains.
III 169
Genetic misconception: a problem beyond that: would the interactions themselves also be constructed by interaction? (Regress.) Winograd: example: "there is water in the fridge". Relative to different backgrounds you can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that reality does not exist independently of our representations.
SearleVsWinograd: the genetic fallacy as in Maturana confuses our image (background) with reality. Cf. >Background/Searle.
---
Derrida: "Il n'y a pas de "hors texte"".
SearleVsDerrida: this is simply claimed without argument. In a later polemical answer he seems to take everything back anyway. He claims that the whole thing only means banality, that everything exists in one context or another.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Principles Rorty II 43
Principles/validity/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "inner validity" of the principles will not arise. Especially not whether it is "universally valid". The only thing that prevents a society from taking the institutionalized humiliation of the weak for granted is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.

VI 120
Principle/rationality/background/Searle/Rorty: (with Wittgenstein): for the Western rationalist tradition there are principles that do not function as a theory (Rorty pro). Rather, they function as a background.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Propositional Knowledge Searle I 75
Propositional Knowledge/Searle: abilities of humans belong to the background and do not have the form of propositions. >Abilities, >background/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Realism Searle II 87
Realism, naive/SearleVs: naive realism is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. But the realism overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
II 199
Realism/Searle: realism has no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I am set to the background. Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses and being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
III 160f
External Realism/Searle: external realism must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars), e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis: realism says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
III 163f
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with the correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth but a condition for our hypotheses. It is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true". There is no semantic theory. Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint. SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language. VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true. Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
III 191
External Realism/Searle: external realism is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: realism has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses. Realism is part of the background. >Background/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Reality Searle III 168
Reality/Maturana: the nervous system (autopoietic) creates reality. SearleVsMaturana: there is a genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed.
III 179
E.g. someone says: "In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same.
III 185
Truth/reality/Searle: truth cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. -> aspects/Searle; >conceptual scheme. Ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view. PutnamVsSearle: there is no "ready made world".

III 194
Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. >Background/Searle, >Moore's hands.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sentence Meaning Searle I 205
Sentence meaning/truth condition/Searle: thesis: the sentence meaning leaves the content of what is said radically underdetermined, e.g. "I had breakfast/had measles": does not say that I had measles today. Wrong: to say, that the truth conditions would be determined only with respect to a background. Right: the literal meaning fixes the truth conditions absolutely, but is itself vague and always incomplete, e.g. the assumption that the object can be cut, is not part of the literal meaning of "to cut". >Background/Searle, >truth conditions.
VII 436
Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Understanding Searle I 198 ff
Background/Searle: in the background are the skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image: is someone moving uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. Background: the background itself is not an intention, "assume" has no explicit propositional content and no explicit belief (e.g. objects are fixed). Network: is additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). The network is intentional but it is no ability (it exists even during sleep), e.g. "Bush is president".
I 245
Simulation/understanding/Searle: a simulation of a hurricane does not provide a causal explanation, therefore this is not understanding. A similar pattern does not proof a similar function.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. Searle Vs Brandom, R. Searle III 153
Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. >Background/Searle. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves
2. they are never exhaustive
3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious!
(SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!) >Rules/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Fodor, J. Searle Vs Fodor, J. FN
I 283
SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1)

III 139
Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor).
To enable: should therefore be a causal concept.
Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here.
III 142
Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle.

1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Foucault, M. Searle Vs Foucault, M. I 217
Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle.
The background is not a control system.
SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here.
Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle.


1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Moore, G.E. Searle Vs Moore, G.E. III 191
SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition).
III 193
Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism.
III 195
The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions.

V 264
naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy.
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Tradition Searle Vs Tradition II 28
Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation.
II 49
SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions.
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength.

II 190
Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski.
II 191
This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained.
II 192
They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently!
The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race.
II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states.
II 228
Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. "
II 231
According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.)
II 232
SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name.
II 233
E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical).
II 246
de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states.

III 165
Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true!
Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects).

V 176
Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity?
Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology.

IV 155
Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous.
((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation).
IV 156
SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence.
IV 157
There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world.
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Wittgenstein Searle Vs Wittgenstein Bennett I 192
SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention.
Searle I 24
Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria".
SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it?
I 156
SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world.

I 169
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised.
I 170
SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are.
Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general?
I 171
Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible.
Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states.
I 172
As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other.
II 76
Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use".
SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects.
Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally.

II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein).
E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents.
II 193/194
Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk.
Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule.

III 112
Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance).
III 113
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!).
III 150
Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays.

V 35
Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean.
V 36
Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance.

V 145
Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance.
SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case.
Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations.
SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts.
V 190/191
Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.-
V 245
SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change.
Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names!
Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet).

IV 50
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games.
IV 89
Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie.
Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as
E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement).
IV 90
E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements).
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995

Bennett I
Jonathan Bennett
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979