Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 20 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Attributive/referential Searle IV 101
Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: relative expressions such as "large", "hot" - Searle: require background: all big women are similar in terms of height - Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. ---
IV 161
Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F - you can then also report with other expressions than "the F" - Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed - attributive: the statement can then not be true. ---
IV 164
Donnellan: E.g. "the winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about - referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. ---
IV 165ff
Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object - primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination) - secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions - Champagne example even works if water is in the glass - Searle: then the statement may also be true - the meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. ---
IV 175
Referential/Searle: brings secondary aspect - Attributive: brings primary A. ---
IV 176
Both readings can be intensional and extensional. ---
IV 175
What is meant is decisive - Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, sentence is not (what was said literally).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Consciousness Searle I 103
Consciousness/Block: a > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-list.php?concept=Zombies">zombie can have >consciousness - SearleVs: states of consciousness always have content - but the "of" is not always one of intentionality: e.g. not in case of pain, because it is not outside. ---
I 112
Consciousness does not need to be naturalized, it is completely natural. ---
I 124f
Consciousness/McGinn: is a kind of substance - the substance itself is recognized by >introspection - but we cannot recognize the connection in principle - SearleVsMcGinn: 1) Consciousness is not a substance, but a feature of the brain - 2) Consciousness is not recognized by introspection. ---
I 149
Space/Time/Consciousness: Asymmetry: consciousness is temporal, but not spatial (Kant, Searle). ---
I 153f
Conditions of satisfaction/Searle: properties of the objects are >fulfillment conditions of my experiences, therefore difficult to distinguish from the property of the experiences (these always in perspective) -Consciousness reflects the fulfillment conditions. Consciousness is not always intentional: e.g. depression. ---
I 168 ff
Consciousness/Searle: has nothing to do with incorrigibility and introspection - Self-deception requires Cartesian dualism. ---
I 198 ff
Background: Skills and abilities that allow the consciousness to function (e.g. understanding pictures (uphill/downhill?) - the same real meaning determines different fulfillment conditions in different backgrounds - background: is not itself intention, "to be assumed" not explicit propositional content, not explicit belief (objects are fixed) - Network: additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself) network intentional, no ability (even during sleep) ("Bush is Predsident").

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Consciousness Block II 458
Consciousness/Block: is a mixed concept of "phenomenal consciousness" (p-consciousness/terminology) and "access consciousness" (a-consciousness). Def a-consciousness/Terminology/Block: Being aware of a fact means that the information for rational inferring is available. (Functional concept)
Consciousness/Burge: (VsBlock): p-consciousness Prerequisite for a-consciousness.
Phenomenality is not the same as consciousness! Phenomenal states can also be unconscious.
II 524
Blindsight/Block: Patients who cannot see in part of their visual field can still give true verbal descriptions upon request.       This suggests that consciousness must have a function that is effective in survival, reporting, and behavioral control.
II 530
Access-consciousness/Block: I call its basis the information-processing function of the phenomenal consciousness in >Schacter's model. (s) part or basis as a counterpart).
II 531
Def p-consciousness/phenomenal consciousness/Block: experience. It cannot be described non-circularly! But that's no shortcoming! p-conscious properties are distinguished from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property. Although functionalism is wrong with respect to p-consciousness, functionalism can accept many of my points.
II 535
Def a-consciousness/access consciousness/Block: a state is a-conscious if by virtue of being in the state a representation of its content 1) is inferentially unbound, i.e. is available as a premise for considering
2) is available for rational control of actions
3) is available for rational language control (not necessary, even chimpanzees can be p-conscious).
      p-consciousness and a-consciousness interact: background can become foreground. E.g. feeling the shirt feels at the neck.
Fallacy/Block: it is a mistake, however, to go unnoticed from one consciousness to the other.
Mistake: To conclude from the example blindsight that it is the function of the P consciousness to enable rational control of action.
p-consciousness/Block: not functional! Sensations.
a-consciousness/Block: functional. Typical: "propositional attitudes".
Pain/Block: its representational content is too primitive to play a role in inferring. Pain is not conceptually mediated, after all, dogs can also feel pain.
Summary: p-consciousness can be consciousness of and consciousness of does not need to be a-consciousness.
II 555
Consciousness/Dennett:
1) Cultural construct!
2) You cannot have consciousness without having the concept of consciousness. 3) Consciousness is a "cerebral celebrity": only those contents are conscious that are persistent, that monopolize the resources long enough to achieve certain typical and "symptomatic" effects.
BlockVsDennett:
Ad 1) this is a merging of several concepts of consciousness. 2) Consciousness cannot be a cultural product.
Also probably not the a-consciousness: many lower creatures have it, even without such a concept.
Ad 3) But that is a biological fact and not a cultural one.
II 568
Fallacy/BlockVsSearle: Question: why the thirsty blindsight patient in the example does not reach for the water: he lacks both p-consciousness and a-consciousness. That's right. But it is a mistake to go from a function of the machinery of a-consciousness to any function of p-consciousness.
     Fallacy: to prematurely draw the conclusion that P consciousness has a certain function from the premise that "consciousness" is missing (without being clear what kind of consciousness).

Block I
N. Block
Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007

Block II
Ned Block
"On a confusion about a function of consciousness"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Constructivism Searle III 168
Maturana: nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality - SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed.
SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our picture is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed.
Maturana: rejects the idea of an "objective reality" in favour of the idea that nervous systems like autopoietic systems create their own reality. Since we have no idea and no access to reality except through social construction, there is no independent reality.
SearleVsMaturana: from the fact that our knowledge/imagination/image of reality is constructed by human brains in social interactions, it does not follow that reality has been created by human brains.
III 169
Genetic misconception. Problem beyond that: would the interactions themselves also be constructed by interaction? Rregress). Winograd: Example "there is water in the fridge". Relative to different backgrounds you can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that reality does not exist independently of our representations.
SearleVsWinograd: genetic fallacy as in Maturana: confuses our image (background) with reality. Cf. >Background/Searle.

Derrida: "Il n'y a pas de "hors texte"".
SearleVsDerrida: this is simply claimed without argument. In a later polemical answer to me he seems to take everything back anyway. He claims that the whole thing only means banality, that everything exists in one context or another.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Epistemology Searle III 184
Thing in itself SearleVsKant: from the fact that we cannot see it, it does not follow that it is different from what we perceive, and not that there is a different kind of reality. In particular, from the positioning within our cognitive system it does not follow that this knowledge could never be the knowledge of an independent reality. (independend from our knowledge). ---
III 194
Background: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box - the background helps us determine the truth conditions for our utterances.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Facts Sellars I 28
Definition minimal fact: facts about which can be reported reliable, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs). With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim.
---
I 44
Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing.
Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience.
---
II 315/16
Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made). ---
II 320
SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts. The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense.
Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact":
a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact".
b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement.
---
II 323
Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Identification Tugendhat I 395
Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrow sense - Tugendhat: my own notion "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this concept - "picking out" (to pick put) is Strawson's expression - (assumed from Searle) - (Quine: "to specify"). ---
I 400 ~
Identification/Identification/Tugendhat: space-time-location: this is an object - Specification: reference, stand for (another term) (in front of background of all other objects). ---
I 415
Identification/particular/TugendhatVsStrawson: space-time-relation not only anchored perceptively but also system of possible perception stand points - thus a system of demonstrative specification (in front of background). ---
I 417
Trough space-time description the perceptible object is specified as more perceptible - an essentially perceptibable cannot be the previous object who it is - Reference: is then to specify a verification situation. ---
I 422
Distinguishing objects only from variable usage situations of perception predicates. ---
I 426
Particular/Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: "here", "now" suffice as object to make space-time locations existent - space-time-locations are the most elementary objects - but there must also be something - at least hypothetically, then the corresponding question of verification provides, for which object the singular term stands - top-down: the use of all singular terms refers to demonstrative expressions - bottom-up: if the verification situation for the applicability of the predicate is described by demonstratives. ---
I 436
Localization/identification/Tugendhat: only by several speakers - not zero point, but set of surrounding objects - subjective zero point may be own position. ---
I 462
Identification/Tugendhat: spatial and temporal relation between objects insufficient - an infinite number of space-time locations, finitely many objects - presupposing space-time system - reference to space-time-points cannot fail - talk of existence without location pointless - identification only by simultaneous reference to all other (possible) objects - therefore existence sentences are general.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Intentions Davidson Brandom I 375
Intention/Davidson/early: an intention refers to one thing or state - later Vs - Searle: for intentional action only "action intentions" - for pure intentionality: there is also "preceding intention".
Avramides I 5
Language/Davidson/Avramides: the speaker must have the intention to use the words, so that the sentence is true if the state is as the sentence says.
Glüer II 116
Intention/Davidson/Glüer: unconditioned judgment - contrary: pro-attitude: conditioned judgment: E.g. "If sweets are not harmful, then ...".
Glüer II 183
Intention/language/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: Davidson himself talks about the fact that the speaker can only mean what the interpreter is able to get out with his utterances. Since he speaks of mistakes, he can only start from a background of "correct" linguistic behaviour that is to be followed on the whole.
Glüer II 110
In the terminology of propositional attitudes, there can be no definition of the concept of intentional action. Possible deviating causal chains (e.g. unintentional trembling has an effect) cannot be missed.
Glüer II 112
Explanation/Criterion/Intention/Davidson/Glüer: only the following criterion is possible: (K2) Action x is intentional under description d only if
the actor has a primary reason g for x under the description d, and
g causes x in the right way.

Mere intentions are unrealized decisions to act. They require the assumption of an intermittent event between having the primary reason and the action.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Memory Searle I 211
Memory/Searle: is not a storage, but a mechanism -> Background skills/Searle.
II 115
Perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential.
II 264
Searle: there are forms of intentionality that are quite particulate and yet completely in the head. Intentionality can contain self-referential elements of two kinds: 1. causal: perception, memory, intention and action, and
2. indexical: time, place.

II 305/306
Reference/Reference/Searle: it is simply wrong to believe that a memory is necessary for reference. I can use the name Plotin without remembering from whom I got the name.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Object Sellars II 315/16
Object/Sellars: is named and not predicated - fact: is predicated and not named. (Although the name of a statement can be made). ---
319F II
Definition "natural language object": linguistic objects with abstracted background. (> Bracketing). - We abstract from our knowledge in order to think of the objects as natural objects. ---
II 324
Natural language objects: (> Searle’s background): Solution: natural linguistic objects as linguistic counterparts are non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". This takes over Wittgenstein's idea that basic statements must be construed as proper names, occurring in a certain way.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Principles Rorty II 43
Principles/validity/RortyVsHabermas: the question of the "inner validity" of the principles will not arise. Especially not whether it is "universally valid". The only thing that prevents a society from taking the institutionalized humiliation of the weak for granted is a detailed description of these humiliations. Such descriptions are given by journalists, anthropologists, sociologists, novelists, playwrights, filmmakers and painters.

VI 120
Principle/rationality/background/Searle/Rorty: (with Wittgenstein): for the Western rationalist tradition there are principles that do not function as a theory (Rorty pro). Rather, they function as a background.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Propositional Knowledge Searle I 75
Propositional Knowledge/Searle: abilities of humans belong to the background and do not have the form of propositions. >Abilities, >background/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Realism Searle II 87
Realism/SearleVsNaive: is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. - But he overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content.
II 199
Realism/Searle: no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. I am set to the background - Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses - being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis.
III 160f
External Realism/Searle: must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars)- e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent.
III 165
Realism/Searle: thesis says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological.
III 163f
Realism/Searle: should not be confused with correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth - it is a condition for our hypotheses - it is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true" - no semantic theory - Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint -SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate.
III 165
Searle: realism is not a theory of language - VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. - Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true.- Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are.
III 166
Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. - The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") - would be a property of that representation-independent reality.
III 191
External Realism/Searle: is a condition for understanding other hypotheses.
III 193 ff
Realism: thesis: has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses - realism as part of the background. >Background/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Reality Searle III 168
Reality/Maturana: nervous systems (autopoietic) creates reality. - SearleVsMaturana: genetic fallacy: from the fact that our image is constructed, it does not follow that reality is constructed. ---
III 179
E.g. someone says: "In reality everything is different"/Berkeley: (Berkeley claims anyway, that matter does not exist) if the matter does not exist, everything stays the same.
III 185
Truth/reality/Searle: cannot coincide because each (true or false) representation is bound to certain aspects, but not to others. -> aspects/Searle; >conceptual scheme. Ontology/Searle: an ontologically objective reality seems to have no point of view - PutnamVsSearle: there is no "ready made world".
---
III 194
Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box - the background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. >Background/Searle, >Moore's hands.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Representation Searle Brandom I 923
SearleVsDavidson/representation: content must be intrinsic. Content of beliefs and intentions must be understood before the analysis of the use is done. According to this model, the content cannot be transmitted through the use. Searle/characters: sounds coming out of the mouth, characters on paper, are mere objects in the world. Their representation capacity is not intrinsic, but derived from the intentionality of the mind.
The intentionality of the mind in turn is not derived from any prior intentionality, it is an intrinsic property of these states themselves.
Someone uses a sentence to convey an idea. In this sense, he does not use his ideas and beliefs and desires: he simply has them.
Belief: is a representation: it consists of an intentional content and a psychological mode. It is wrong, that there must be a person who must use any entity as a representation, so that there is a representation at all. This applies to sentences, characters and images, (i.e. derived intentionality) but not for intentional states. (> More autors on representation).
Representation needs background of non-representational skills - Compositionality principle without background is not sufficient.
---
Searle I 271
Pattern: plays in functional terms a causal role, but does not guarantee an unconscious representation (intentionality). ---
II 28 f
Representation: speech acts and intentional states have in common: no pictures, but propositional contents. - Key to understanding: fulfilment conditions - from representation follows no ontology - recognition needs not to contain representation. ---
III 185
Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. ---
III 197f
Representations are private, language is public. ---
I 195
Existence: truth condition, possible existence: comprehensibility condition. ---
Graesser I125
Representation/Searle: an object X represents a situation A, when a subject S is available, that intends that X represents A.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Rules Searle III 42
Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities - constitutive rules: create the possibility of activities Bsp chess rules.
III 39
Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule?
III 54
Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y.
III 55
The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule.
V 59
Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules.
V 64
Rules/Searle: Rules represent obligations - unequal conventions (these play a role in the context of translation). Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention.
Rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules.

I 217
Searle: the rules don't interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. background: is not a rule system.
I 269
Rules: People drive right because they follow a rule, but they don't drive for that reason alone. You also don't speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist.

IV 252
Rules/Searle: Example Promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed.
Rule II: It may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway.
Rule III: The speaker must have the intention to.
Rule IV: With the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted.

VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all.
IV 253
Semantic rules/Language rules/Searle: are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Sentence Meaning Searle I 205
Sentence meaning/truth condition/Searle: thesis: leaves the content of what is said radically underdetermined - e.g. "I had breakfast/had measles: does not say that I had measles today - wrong: to say, the truth conditions would be determined only with respect to a background - right: literal meaning fixes the truth conditions absolutely, but is itself vague and always incomplete - e.g. the assumption that the object can be cut, is not part of the literal meaning of "to cut". - >Background/Searle, >truth conditions. ---
VII 436
Sentence meaning/Searle: consists in the speech act potential.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Truth Conditions Searle II 87
Truth conditions/Searle: a) certain fulfilment conditions - b) certain phenomenal properties of the experience - fulfilment conditions: that there is a yellow wagon, and that this wagon causes the experience - phenomenal properties: determine the fulfilment conditions - so the experience determines the conditions. ---
IV 101
Truth condition/Searle = Literal meaning - but only against background assumptions.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Understanding Searle I 198 ff
Background: skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image (is someone moving uphill/downhill?) - The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. - Background: is not intention itself, "assume" has no explicit propositional content, not explicit belief (E.g. objects are fixed). - Network: additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). Network is intentional, it is no ability (it exissts even during sleep). E. G. "Bush is president". ---
I 245
Simulation/understanding/Searle: a simulation of a hurricane does not provide a causal explanation, therefore also no understanding. - A similar pattern does not proof similar function.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Utterances Searle IV 141
Sentence/statement/Searle: some authors: utterance: token - sentence: type - SearleVs: 1. one can distinguish utterance meaning and sentence meaning - 2. category mistake: to assume that an utterance of an incident is the same as the incident - 3. to accept errors, the meaning would change- e.g. stop sign remains the same. ---
IV 147
If certain background assumptions are missing, the sentence has no certain truth conditions - this is a weaker thesis than that of the context of freedom of the literal meaning.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. Searle Vs Brandom, R. Searle III 153
Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. >Background/Searle. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves
2. they are never exhaustive
3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious!
(SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!) >Rules/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Cognition Theory Searle Vs Cognition Theory I 8
SearleVsCognition Psychology: Black Box, the cognitive scientists repeat the worst mistake of the behaviorists: they insisted to examine only objectively observable phenomena. So they left the essential characteristics of the mind aside. In the big black box they only found a lot of small black boxes.
I 217
cognition theory: Here it is claimed, we would have drawn a conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognition theory: On the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. The background is not a control system.
I 222
SearleVs Cognitive Science/VsCognition: the basic assumptions of cognitive science are wrong. Cognitive Science: neither the examination of the brain nor the study of consciousness is of interest or value.
Although the cognitive mechanisms are actually in the brain, and some of them refer to the awareness a superficial expression, but we are interested in the intermediate level, where actual cognitive processes happen, which are inaccessible to the consciousness.
These processes are not only factually special principle unconsciously. Typical representatives: Chomsky, Marr, Fodor.
I 256
Explanation/SearleVsCognitivism: Thesis: many of our cognitive science explanations do not have the explanatory power, we attach to them. To save them, we will have to make a reversal of its logical structure: as it took place during the transition from pre-Darwin biology to the biology à la Darwin.
I 256/257
The brain produces states of consciousness, and that is all. As for the mind, this is already the whole story. There are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, otherwise however there is nothing. No rule-following, no mental information processing, no unconscious inferences, no mental models, no original drafts, no two and a half dimensional images, no language of the mind, and no universal grammar.
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Donnellan, K. Searle Vs Donnellan, K. IV 160
Referential/attributive/reference/regard/referring/Donellan: two different uses of descriptions. >Attributive/referential. Most philosophers VsDonnellan: both are referential in the sense that is spoken to them about objects, the only difference is the extent to which this intention is made explicit.
Def attributive/tradition: specifies truth conditions laid only against a background of assumptions.
IV 162
SearleVsDonellan: even after his own account is not correct, because there are counter-examples: E.g. Smith died of natural causes, but was recently attacked, and the trail of destruction leave us to call the "murderer of Smith" insane. Then we can say that the finding was true, although no descriptions were met (but that would have been a (possible) attributive use, and thus the distinction is threatened).
DonellanVsVs: in such cases is "near miss", but that it still had something else as truly referential uses.
It goes just nearly wrong when the single thing was a little misdescribed. Only in referential cases it may "go wrong for miles."
IV 165
Reference/SearleVsDonnellan: how is it at all possible for speakers to talk about objects? Reference can be made by a variety of syntactic means: descriptions, proper nouns, pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, etc. The point is that the speaker has a certain relationship to them. He must have some linguistic representation. This representation may represent the object from one or another aspect.
IV 166
Then under any aspect the speaking is always done. In the absence of knowledge it can then be that the term does not express the aspect exactly. (E.g. that he thinks Smith will be pronounced "Schmidt"). But that must be distinguished from a real confusion.
Distinction Meaning/To Mean.
Donnellan's cases are quite simple: under any aspect you have to speak, but you are only choosing exactly this aspect. In indirect speech acts they say even a bit more.
It is only necessary that the speaker and hearer can identify the subject because of the aspect. (That even works if both think the aspect is incorrect!
IV 168
E.g. Both speak of the "king" although they consider him an usurper).
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Fodor, J. Searle Vs Fodor, J. FN
I 283
SearleVsFodor: another incredible view (but with different phil. roots) states that each of us has at his birth all the terms, that can be expressed by any words of any language. Then e.g. A Cro-Magnon-man would have terms that are expressed by the word "carburetor" or "cathode-ray". (Fodor 1975)(1)

III 139
Def background/Searle: Skills, like ability, dispositions, trends and causal structures in general. Ability/Searle: causal ability: E.g. when I say that I am able to speak German, I speak of a causal ability of my brain. There is no reason to identify them without knowing the details of their neurophysiological realization. (SearleVsFodor).
To enable: should therefore be a causal concept.
Intentional states/Searle: are not a problematic concept here.
III 142
Background: Nietzsche saw with horror that the background does not have to be as it is. Cf. >Background/Searle.

1. J. A. Fodor, The Language of Thought, New York 1975
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Foucault, M. Searle Vs Foucault, M. I 217
Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle.
The background is not a control system.
SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here.
Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle.


1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995
Grice, P.H. Searle Vs Grice, P.H. Bennett I 186
SearleVsGrice: Convention not the same as circumstances!
Grice I 31
Searle E.g. An American Soldier in World War II is captured by Italian troops. He wants to believe the Italians do it was a German officer and expresses the single German sentence which he has kept from school yet, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn?" ((s) Do you know the land where the lemon trees bloom?, Goethe). - His captors do not understand any German at all.  Searle: It would nevertheless be wrong to say that he meant by "Do you know the land...": "I ​​am a German officer."
SearleVsGrice: wants to show with by this example that something missing in Grice s explication: H should recognize that the uttered sentence is expressed conventionally to bring about a certain effect.

Searle II 204
Grice : a speaker intends with an utterance, to achieve certain effects. SearleVsGrice: he then uses intention, wish and conviction unanalyzed.

Searle V 68
Meaning/Grice: connects meaning to intention and recognizing the intention.
V 69
SearleVsGrice: insufficient: 1., it is not determined to what extent the meaning depends on rules or conventions. 2. does not differentiate this definition between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.
E.g. Searle. Lemons Example V 70 ... + ... An American soldier gets into Italian war captivity...

Searle IV 53
SearleVsConversational postulates/SearleVsGrice. A shared background is sufficient.
J.R. Searle
I Searle Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt/M (Suhrkamp) 1996
II Searle Intentionalität Frankfurt/M 1996
III Searle Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Reinbek 1997
Husted "Searle" aus: Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993
IV Searle Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1982
V Searle Sprechakte Frankfurt/M 1983
VII Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen aus Grewendorf/Meggle(Hg) Linguistik und Philosophie, Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1975/1995
VIII Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik, aus Grewendorf/Meggle Linguisitk und PHil. Frankfurt (Athenäum) 1974, 1995

Bennett I
Jonathan Bennett
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice I
H. Paul Grice
"Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993

Grice II
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle

Grice III
H. Paul Grice
"Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Grice IV
H. Paul Grice
"Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Hume, D. Searle Vs Hume, D. II 101
Perception/cause/SearleVsHume: my knowledge that my car has caused my visual experience, is because I know that I see the car, and not vice versa. I do not conclude that there is a car, but I just can see it. >Perception/Searle.
II 102
Perception: the experience is not literally yellow, but it is caused literally. Moreover, it is experienced as caused, whether it is satisfied or not. But it is not experienced as yellow, but as of something yellow.
II 103
Causality: I may very well experience directly! However, not independent but the being caused belongs to the experience. (This does not mean that the experience confirms itself).
II 104
Causality: also for things characteristic, which are not directly observable such as ultraviolet and infrared.. If they could not have an impact on our measuring instruments, then we might not know about their existence. >Causality/Hume. ((s) Ultraviolet cannot be hallucination. But one can imagine a sunburn.)

II 156
Causality/SearleVsHume: I believe that "to cause" describes a real relationship in the real world, but it does not follow a universal correlation of similar cases.
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causing experience. SearleVsTradition: you have not often a causing experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such a causing experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked for a wrong spot, he looked for a power.

II 170
Regularity/SearleVsHume: not all regularities are causal. It is wrong to think that we can have in addition of an experience of cause and effect a hypothesis about regularities in the world.
II 171
I have not the hypothesis, but I have the ability to distinguish regularity from irregularity. Regularity becomes the background. >Regularity/Hume.
II 173
SearleVsCausal Law/SearleVsHume: does not need to be derived from the existence of causation. After 300 years of unsuccessful attempts with the regularity you have to see that the concept of to make something happening differs from the concept of regularity.
II 174
There are not two types of causation: "Regularity causation" and "intentional causation". There is exactly one way: this is the action-causation.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Kaplan, D. Searle Vs Kaplan, D. II 275
Indexicality/SearleVsKaplan: we need to show that the statements made by an indexical expression can have a "completing >Fregean sense". By this, however, no >third realm is postulated. We restrict ourselves to respect participating indexicals: me, you, this, that, here, now, he, she, etc .. The phenomenon of indexicality is however very general and not limited to such expressions.
II 276
Background: meets the indexical function. It is in fact relative to our world. If it turned out that 80 billion years ago someone already had invented glasses, that would not affect my background.
II 285
SearleVsKaplan: Hume's and Heimson's statements are self-referential. They express different intentional contents. The use of indexical expression defines the conditions under which it is true. >Heimson example.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Kripke, S. A. Searle Vs Kripke, S. A. Wolf II 30
Names/Understanding/Searle: to understanding belongs the knowledge of one or more descriptions. Extreme case: simply identify the object. Intentional relationship. SearleVsKripke: ignores the intentionality.
Searle: Use of names is "mental reference" in a network of other intentional states and against a background of practice and pre-intentional assumptions.

Searle II 292
SearleVsKripke: the representation of the baptism is completely descriptive. It gives us either an intentional content in spoken form (description) or provides us ostensively with the intentional content of a perception.
II 293
By the way Kripke's theory does not use any causal link between the referring use of names and the named objects. The causal chains are not pure, every speaker must also have a intentionalistic member and intend to talk about the object. SearleVsKripke: Baptism should probably not be a cause, otherwise we would declare a successful reference to a chain of successful references. That would be circular.
II 294
Names/Donnellan:(similar to Kripke) postulates a "historically correct explanation", and secondly, "who that is, from whom" the speaker wants to predicate something. This requires an omniscient observer. E.g. "Socrates had a snub nose".
According to Donnellan owes this obviously no fact at all, which is about us, except for the causal chain. But for what keeps the omniscient observer looking for?
Searle: surely for intentional causation and content. There are always counterexamples of names that do not work this way at all.
II 295
Names/Rorty: Causal theory only needs "ordinary physical causation". Names/Gareth Evans: E.g. Madagascar originally referred to a part of continental Africa. The causal chain is thus a dissenting. Why does the name then today refer to the island?
II 296
Names/description/SearleVsKripke: E.g. Concise Biographical Dictionary ". Ramses VIII is a Pharaoh of a series of pharaohs in ancient times, about whom nothing is known." In reality, the example shows that a lot of him is known. Yes, he is almost from an ideal case for the most naive version of the description theory.
II 346
A perfect identifying description. It is parasitic to other speakers, but it is sufficient. SearleVsCausal theory/VsKripke: it exaggerates the analogy between reference and perception.
Perception: is nailed to each point of the world. By causal self-referentiality of the intentional content.
II 297
But with names that kind of causation does not exist (also of intentional causation). The conditions for successful use of a name can be met, even without causal connection.
II 298
E.g. tribe with the taboo of talking about the dead, and baptism of newborn babies, in which all must participate. Meets descriptive theory.
II 346
The teaching of names defines an intentional content, but no definition.
II 300
E.g. meteorologists can predict storms. They also assign names. But the future events cannot cause the name uses.
Searle IV 179
KripkeVsDonnellan: (similar to Searle): Distinction speaker reference/semantic terms: if the speaker is wrong, the semantic relation can go to something other than that of which he speaks.
IV 179/180
Searle: However, that is not quite correct: E.g. "King" / usurper: the speaker does not even need to have the opinion that the object fulfils the description. Kripke: in a given idiolect the semantic relation is determined (without indexical shares) through a general intention of the speaker.
The speaker reference is determined by a specific intention.
SearleVsKripke: this is precisely where the approach is stuck: in the sense, as I have general and specific intentions, I have no general intentions towards descriptions. If I needed it, I would have an infinite number of them.
E.g.(without index): "The man who eating a ham sandwich on the Empire State Building on 17/06/53 at 10 am." According to Kripke in my idiolect this is determined by my general intention.
IV 181
Searle: I know what the term means, because I know what the case would be if it would be correct to apply it. SearleVsKripke: More than that, no general intentions are necessary.
There are an infinite number of cases in which I have no general intent.

Stalnaker I 173
SearleVsKripke: (Searle 1969 (1)) it is wrong to assume that there could be a class of logically proper names, that means names that consist solely to have a certain reference for an object. It is fundamentally wrong to assume that there are signs that have only denotation without connotation
I 174
SearleVsKripke/Stalnaker: (Searle 1969(2)) (like Frege): describes an axiom of identification: "a generalization of Frege's dictum that every referring expression must have a sense".
I 175
And it was also an attempt to say what the skills of the speaker are. Mill/Kripke/Stalnaker: do not seem to answer that.
Competence/skills/FregeVsMill/Stalnaker: Mill does not explain the speaker's skill to pick his object.
Stalnaker: but that can only be reviewed seriously, if the two issues are separated (see above).



1. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge 1969, p. 93
2. Ibid. p. 80

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Lakoff, G. Searle Vs Lakoff, G. IV 199
Conversational Postulates/To mean/Gordon/Lakoff: SearleVs: represents the phenomena that require explanation is as if they themselves were already the explanation. Problem: how can the speaker say something and still mean something else? (to mean)
IV 201
Conversational Postulates: shall additional rules be known in addition to the three rules (the introduction, the seriousness and the propositional content): for example, to conclude from one speech act to another. Searle: they assume that the patterns are the solution itself.
IV 202
They reveal a pattern, according to which for example a speaker asks the listener for something, by asking the listener if he can do something. E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?". To explain this, they simply give a new description, they say, the speaker knows a rule.
Searle: as with Ross, an unnecessary assumption is made to explain the data. It is completely ad hoc to say, in addition to all the knowledge conversational postulates would still have to exist. In reality, it would then be such conversational postulates that would have to be explained.
IV 203
Searle: what the listener needs is speech act theory, a theory of conversation, background information and rationality and reasoning skill. Each of these components is independently motivated, that means apart from whatever theory of indirect speech acts, we have evidence that the speaker/listener has these features.
IV 204
SearleVsGordon/SearleVsLakoff: their rules do not work that way! They call it "failed" that no question is meant. (E.g. "Can you pass me the salt?").
Speech act theory/SearleVsChomsky: is often said following Chomsky, the language must finally obey many rules (for an infinite number of forms).
IV 205
This is misleading, and was detrimental to the research. Better is this: the purpose of language is communication. Its unit is the illocutionary speech. It's about how we come from sounds to acts.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Moore, G.E. Searle Vs Moore, G.E. III 191
SearleVsMoore: the existence of the outside world is a truth condition of the statement that I have two hands. Difference: between truth conditions and conditions of intelligibility .. There intelligibility conditions of discourse. They are essential to our way of thinking and our language. We cannot give them up, as the idea that the earth is flat. (> Conditions of understanding, understanding condition).
III 193
Similarly, the external realism is not a hypothesis, but a condition of the intelligibility of other theories. It creates a space of possibilities. Background/SearleVsMoore: we keep it for granted that his hands are in a certain relation to the rest of his body. You are not in a safe deposit box. We simply take this for granted. >Certainty, >Moore's Hands, >skepticism.
III 195
The joke is that we keep a lot in our normal understanding for granted, but many of the conditions of our normal understanding cannot be conceived without substantial distortion as truth conditions of the utterance. These are the kinds of conditions that will help us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. They themselves are not part of this truth conditions.

V 264
naturalistic fallacy/SearleVsMoore: the being may well be derived from the ought: a statem 1. Jones expressed, "I hereby promise you, Smith, to pay $ 5." Jones is obliged - Jones has to...Cf. >Naturalistic fallacy.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Putnam, H. Searle Vs Putnam, H. Searle passim
Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself.
Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind.
I 34
SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena.
II 91
Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command.
II 92
SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes:
1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit.
2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation.
Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality.
1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions.
2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions.
3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background).
II 93
Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background.
(...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different?
II 97
TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them!
The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality).

II 250
SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to.
II 251
SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension!
SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension.
Searle: it is for the experts to decide.
Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge.
II 257
SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure.
II 257/258
SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong.
Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions.
II 259
Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions.
Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending).

III 173
SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations.
2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS).
Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two.
SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Searle, J.R. Davidson Vs Searle, J.R. Davidson I (b) 36
John Searle: It is incomprehensible that two different interpretations could each serve to interpret one and the same thought or utterance of a person properly.
I (b) 36
DavidsonVsSearle: indeterminacy of translation does not mean that the thoughts themselves are somehow vague or unreal.
I (b) 37
The threat which Searle and Fodor believe to recognize is a completely different one: one with regard to the condition according to which the meanings intended for the identification of thoughts used entities are somehow "captured" by consciousness so that they themselves would have to point out the thoughts as different, as long as these entities are different. DavidsonVsSearle: E.g. as if the difference between 1 meter and 100 centimeters was a difference in tape measure itself.

Searle II 149
Causality/Searle: From this follows that causal laws express contingent truths!. DavidsonVsSearle: therefore, it depends only on the description whether events are logically linked or not.

Searle IV 98
Metaphor/Searle: Problem: that with some metaphors such as: E.g. "Sally is a block of ice" we know exactly what is meant, but for others E.g. "Sally is a prime number 17-23" we know it less. Question: how can speakers saying something if they do not say what they mean? And why do some metaphors work and others do not?.
Divergence of utterance meaning and word meaning. Recognized by speaker and listeners. (DavidsonVsSearle).
IV 99
Even the relation between word and sentence meaning plays a role. Metaphorical meaning is always the utterance meaning.
IV 116
Metaphor/Cavell: E.g. "Juliet is the sun": the day begins with Juliet: Searle: here, background knowledge about the work is necessary. Similarity/Searle: meaningless predicate: all objects are similar in one respect or another.
IV 117
There are many metaphors in which similarity does not play a role at all: sun gas ball, block of ice human Nevertheless, E.g. "Sally is a bonfire" is a very different statement than "She’s a block of ice".
IV 118
Comparison theoryVsSearle: "cold" is also metaphorical. SearleVsVs: this does not sting, the difficulty is that there are apparently no literal similarities between unfeeling humans and cold objects.
IV 120
The sole fact that theory is so difficult to explain makes it implausible. Nevertheless, it is no difficulty for a native speaker to understand "Sam is a pig". It does not help to say that sweet things and sweet people are pleasant.
IV 107
SearleVsComparison theories: allegedly, metaphors contain a comparison or a similarity between objects which is alluded to.
IV 109
Searle: absurd question: E.g. "With which block of ice do you compare Sally?".
IV 110
Searle: although similarity plays a role in understanding, the metaphor is not a finding about a similarity. A metaphor can remain true, even if the similarity turns out to be wrong. (for example, because gorillas are gentle).
IV 111
Solution: The statement is only about Richard. The truth conditions are not helpful either if gorillas are gentle and Richard is cold.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Searle, J.R. Rorty Vs Searle, J.R. VI 109
Correspondence Theory/Searle: is of moral or social importance. RortyVsSearle: that amalgamates the philosophical with the non-philosophical meaning of the term "exact representation". >Correctness/Rorty.
VI 110
SearleVsRorty/RortyVsSearle: Searle would like to satisfy all competent bodies that the preservation of the "Western Rationalistic Tradition" requires them to cut or cancel funding that contradict this tradition. (In his opinion, Derrida, Kuhn, Rorty).
VI 118
Deconstruction/SearleVsDeconstuctivism/Rorty: let us assume I happened upon a deconstructionist car mechanic who tells me that the carburetor is only text anyway and there was nothing to talk about except the textuality of this text, then communication has collapsed. >Deconstructivism. RortyVsSearle: for the deconstructionist intellectuals who were lucky enough to find a spot as auto mechanics it is not difficult to specify where their work ends and philosophy begins.
The deconstruction has not changed his life than atheism changed the lives of his ancestors. The difference relates to the atmosphere and the spiritual element.
Description/Action/Understanding/Searle: Our practices become incomprehensible if we describe our actions in various ways, SearleVsDavidson/SearleVsDerrida: especially with non-realistic or non-representational terminology. (RortyVsSearle).
      Searle: some sentences cannot be questioned without questioning the practices themselves. They are a condition of intelligibility.
RortyVsSearle: rhetorical frills that are supposed to give practice the appearance of holding on to a huge thing, namely metaphysical reality.
VI 121
Intrinsic/Extrinsic/RortyVsSearle: if this distinction is abolished, we can dispense with the idea of ​​there being a difference between the pursuit of happiness and the pursuit of truth in nature or humanities. >Intrinsic, >extrinsic.
VI 140
RortyVsSearle: our approach to the world is not the frame (Searle: background) which allows mapping (VsRepresentation). Language/Representation/Rorty: Thesis: language and knowledge have nothing to do with mapping, but rather with "getting along". (Taylor: "Handling").
Representation/Taylor/Rorty: Thesis: handling the world more original than representation.
VI 141
Rorty: no break between the non-verbal and the verbal interactions between organisms (and machines) and the world.
VI 157
RortyVsSearle: we must separate two distinctions: physical/non-physical objects us/"the world" E.g. Sherlock Holmes, the number 17, the rules of chess: it is not a matter of them not having a "place in the world", but of us not expecting that our relevant beliefs will change by physics (as "cultural overall activity").

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Skepticism Searle Vs Skepticism II 105
VsSkepticism: we can know how the world is, but our concept of how it is, is even relative to our nature and our causal transactions with it. (background). Realism/Searle: even our concept of how things themselves are is relative to our ability to receive causal effects of a world that mostly exists regardless of how we represent it.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Tradition Searle Vs Tradition II 28
Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation.
II 49
SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions.
II 160
Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience!
SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength.

II 190
Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski.
II 191
This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained.
II 192
They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently!
The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race.
II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states.
II 228
Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. "
II 231
According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.)
II 232
SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name.
II 233
E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical).
II 246
de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states.

III 165
Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true!
Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects).

V 176
Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity?
Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology.

IV 155
Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous.
((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation).
IV 156
SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence.
IV 157
There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Winograd, T. Searle Vs Winograd, T. III 169
Winograd: E.g. "There is water in the fridge": relative to different backgrounds one can make statements that are true or false. From this he concludes that the reality is not independent of our representations. SearleVsWinograd: genetic fallacy as Maturana: Mistakes our image (background) with the reality.

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Wittgenstein Searle Vs Wittgenstein Bennett I 192
SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention.
Searle I 24
Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria".
SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it?
I 156
SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world.

I 169
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised.
I 170
SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are.
Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general?
I 171
Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible.
Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states.
I 172
As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other.
II 76
Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use".
SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects.
Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally.

II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein).
E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents.
II 193/194
Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk.
Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule.

III 112
Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance).
III 113
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!).
III 150
Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays.

V 35
Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean.
V 36
Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance.

V 145
Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance.
SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case.
Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations.
SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts.
V 190/191
Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.-
V 245
SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change.
Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names!
Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet).

IV 50
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games.
IV 89
Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie.
Fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as
E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement).
IV 90
E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements).

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bennett I
Jonathan Bennett
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979
Wittgenstein Sellars Vs Wittgenstein II 318
Mapping/image/world/thinking/language/Sellars: question: is there no mapping relationship between language and the world, which is essential for meaning and truth? Def image/Tractatus: relation between facts about linguistic expressions on the one hand and facts about non-linguistic objects on the other hand.
II 319
Language/world/Sellars: Vs Temptation to imagine facts about non-linguistic objects as non-linguistic entities of a special kind: non-linguistic pseudo entities. We have seen, however, that "non-linguistic facts" in another sense are linguistic entities themselves.
Their connection with the non-linguistic order is rather something one has created, or must establish, as a relation. (But not redundancy).
Fact/statement/Sellars: one can say something "about a fact" in two different ways:
a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact".
b) it contains a fact statement, that means the name of a fact instead of a statement.
K depicts y.
Here K is a complex natural language subject. This assumes the meta-linguistic status of facts. However, the form of:
that p depicts y:
II 321
Fact/object/statement/Sellars: here statements about complex objects would be statements "about facts" in the sense that they contained fact statements. "K" would therefore apparently refer to a complex natural language subject but in reality to the statement that describes its complexity! Statement/world/SellarsVsWittgenstein: Statements, according to which natural language objects are images of other natural objects, would only refer to seemingly natural language objects, but in reality to statements, including the assumed about the statement conception of norms and standards.
Another consequence would be that only simple non-linguistic objects could be depicted when complex objects were facts, which would lead to the well-known antinomy, that there must be atomic facts that would be the condition that language can depict the world, for which no example could be given if one asked a speaker to.
Solution/Sellars: Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus).
SellarsVsWittgenstein: weakened the momentum of the idea that language enables us to depict the world by connecting it too closely to the model
fact depicts fact.
There are in any case n-digit configurations of reference expressions.
Question: what of them leads them to the fact that they say of special reference objects that they are in this particular n-digit relation to each other? One is tempted to say: Convention.
II 322
Maps/Wittgenstein: Configurations are to be found in the map, but it is not necessary that e.g. spatial structures are reproduced through spatial configurations. ((s) E.g. contour lines) The only essential characteristic: that n-digit atomic facts are formed by n-digit configurations of proper names.
SellarsVsWittgenstein : The analogy may even be extended. Maps are only in a parasitic sense a logical picture. Wittgenstein himself emphasized that a logical picture can exist as such only in the domain of truth-operations.
E.g. map: the fact that a certain point is there is linked to the statement, for example, that Chicago is located between Los Angeles and New York.
Moreover, even if we would have a country map language of spatial relationships, and truth functions could be applied directly to them, only as a small part of a comprehensive Universe of discourse existed.
Problem: has the function of elementary statements generally something in common with that of cartographic configurations which is not expressed in the slogan that n-digit configurations of proper names represent n-digit configurations of objects?

II 323
Natural linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: Natural linguistic objects are to be seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!).
II 324
One can speak of them as "proper names". That takes up Wittgenstein's understanding that elementary statements must be constructed as in a particular way occurring proper names. SellarsVsWittgenstein: in my view, however, is the way in which the "proper names" occur in the "image" not a conventional symbol of the way in which objects occur in the world! I believe instead that the position of proper names in an image is a projection of the position of objects in the world.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Background Searle, J.R. I 198
Compared to my earlier books, there are significant changes. The thesis of the background originally referred to the meaning meant by the speaker, even to all forms of intentionality, linguistically or not linguistically. It says the following: intentional phenomena such as meaning, to mean, understanding, believing, desiring and experiencing function only in interaction with a set of background abilities that are themselves not intentional.
I 200
The thesis of background is now a very strong assertion: 1. Intentional states do not function autonomously.
2. A network of other intentional states is required.
3. Even the network is not sufficient. It only works in conjunction with a lot of background capabilities.
4. These abilities are not further intentional states or components of any intentional state.
5. The same intentional content may lay down different fulfilment conditions.
Example background: think of Wittgenstein's example with the picture of the man walking uphill. It could be interpreted as a picture of a man sliding downhill.
Nietzsche may not have been the first, but he was aware that the background does not have to be as it is.
Bourdieu's concept of the Habitus (1979) is closely related to my concept of background.
I 214
Thesis from the background: new: all conscious intentionality: thinking, perceiving, understanding, etc. establishes truth conditions only in relation to certain abilities which neither belong nor could belong to the respective state of consciousness. The actual intentional content in itself is not sufficient to determine the conditions of fulfillment. New as old: still a lot of background ability is needed to interpret thoughts, belief etc..
But new: such a network has no real existing reality!
VI 142
Searle Thesis: the concept of literal meaning has at all only relative to a set of background assumptions an application
VI 147
if certain background assumptions are missing, the sentence has no certain truth conditions that is a weaker thesis than that of the freedom of context of literal meaning.
Causality Searle, J.R. II 286
Searle s thesis: for our language causality is only relevant, by its influence on the brain. And those agents are required to cause the intentionality, including network and background.
Understanding Searle, J.R. VI 69
Meaning/ to mean / understanding / Searle: has to do with the background (knowledge) but not with special syntactic forms.