Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Stegmüller, W. Hintikka Vs Stegmüller, W. Wittgenstein I 273
Language/World/Language Game/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: according to the popular view (among others, Stegmüller 1975, 584) Wittgenstein abstains from showing in his late philosophy in how far language is directly linked to the reality. Stegmüller: thesis: we should not pay attention to the meaning of our expressions, but to the manner in which they are used.
Hintikka: according to this (supposedly Wittgensteinian) view the "vertical" connections do not matter through which our words are linked with objects and our sentences to facts, but it is "horizontal" connections between different moves in the course of our language games that matter.
That means suggesting that Wittgenstein says understanding of language is nothing more than understanding the role that different types of statements play in different circumstances in our lives (Vs: Understanding Language = Understanding the Role it Plays).
HintikkaVsStegmüller: this interpretation would result in that according to Wittgenstein not even the ordinary descriptive meaning is based on truth conditions. According to that, assertibility and justifiability conditions were a possible Wittgensteinian counterpart to the truth conditions.
Then a statement would not be justified if it corresponds to a fact, but if its assertion is justified through its role in our language-related activities - ultimately through its role in our lives.
Wittgenstein I 274
HintikkaVsStegmüller: the late Wittgenstein is far from abolishing the vertical relations between language and reality. He rather emphasizes them! The main function of language games (though not the only one) is to accomplish this task.
Wittgenstein I 279 ff
Use Theory/Wittgenstein/HintikkaVsStegmüller: in the (here criticized) "naturalized" view "X" (Stegmüller among others) Wittgenstein is said to eventually have given up asking questions about meaning, and instead examined the use. Variant: according to a subordinate interpretation Xa, use is to be understood as the language game which is the "logical home" this expression. However, this is not the interpretation that is assumed by the "naturalized" the interpretation of "X".
Several facets: in X Wittgenstein understands the use of an expression as something that is not very different from the usual traditional language use.
Wittgenstein I 280
Use Theory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: does this correspond to Wittgenstein, though? In the famous equation of use and meaning Wittgenstein uses a word that essentially has two meanings: for use a) can serve to emphasize the usual, the traditional, or it can.
b) indicate that it is about the practical application of a thing (such as "Instructions for Use"). That
is consistent with Wittgenstein’s comparison of words with tools and speaks to a high degree in favor of
the new interpretation.
Wittgenstein speaks of "use" and "application". "Application I understand to be that which makes a language out of the sound combinations or lines.
"You can shorten the description of use by saying this word designates the object."
Hintikka: if use did not serve as a link between language and the world, it could not be abbreviated in this way.
HintikkaVsStegmüller: the mistake is to regard language games as a predominantly intra-linguistic (verbal) games, i.e. games whose moves typically consist in speech acts.
Move/Language Game/Hintikka: in contrast, the moves of the interpretation advocated here consist in transitions, where utterances can indeed play a role, but usually not the only role. On the contrary, many moves do not need to contain any linguistic utterances.
X/Terminology/Hintikka: we shall call X the "mistake of verbal language games". Wittgenstein already warned against this error in his explanation of the expression "language game": "The word is to emphasize here that the speaking of a language is part of an activity or a way of life".
Wittgenstein I 281
Hintikka: according to X, speaking the language would not be a part of the language game, but it would be the whole language game as such. Evidence: in "Über Gewissheit" language games are apparently contrasted to speaking: "Our speech obtains its meaning by the rest of our actions".
Wittgenstein I 314/315
E.g. beetle in the box. PU § 293. "The thing in the box does not belong to the language game, not even as a something. Through the thing in the box abbreviations can be made. It lifts off itself, whatever it is". Stegmüller: (according to Hintikka): asserts that Wittgenstein denies the existence of private experiences in general.
Hintikka: if we are right, the naturalized conception is not only wrong, but diametrically wrong:
Private Language/HintikkaVsStegmüller: the changeover from the phenomenological to the physical language does not even touch the ontological status of the phenomenological objects, including private experiences!.
The world in which we live remains for us a world of phenomenological objects, but we need to talk about it in the same language in which we talk about physical objects.

Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Wittgenstein Newen Vs Wittgenstein New I 94
Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles
2) Hintikka: points in the visual field
3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties
4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects.
Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned
I 95
to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed.
(ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors.
(iii) elementary propositions are logically independent.
Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time.
Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent.
Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form.

I 98
Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties).
I 99
Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red."
Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names.
Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised.
 100
Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here.

NS I 35
Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them.
This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign.
((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.)
NS I 36
VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change.

NS I 37
Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293).
Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community.
One person alone cannot give meaning expressions.
NS I 38
Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow.
VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008