Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Abstraction Bigelow I 380
Abstractions/Figures/Armstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Numbers are causally inactive. Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: some mathematical entities are even observable.
---
I 381
Causation/Mathematics/BigelowVsArmstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: in fact, people are not causes, but they are involved in causal processes. Numbers: they are also involved in causal processes. If objects did not instantiate the quantities they instanced, other changes would have occurred. Thus at least proportions are causally involved. ((s) FieldVsNumbers as causal agents, but not Vs proportions).
---
I 382
Counterfactual dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can again set up consequences of counterfactual conditionals, e.g. For the lever laws of Archimedes. This also provides why-explanations. ---
I 383
Numbers/causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows that numbers play a fundamental role in causal explanations. BigelowVsField: (a propos Field, Science without numbers): he falsely assumes that physics first starts with pure empiricism, in order to convert the results into completely abstract mathematics.
Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: wants to avoid this detour.
BigelowVsField: his project is superfluous when we realize that mathematics is only a different description of the physical proportions and relations and no detour.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Causality Armstrong III 95
Causality/Armstrong: one may not identify causation with (natural) necessity. - There are cases of necessity, which are not cases of causation. - Hence we should not identify causal laws with natural laws.
II 25
Causality/Place: is a modal relation. - between times: a categorical relation.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Causality Hume Armstrong II 122
Causal relation/Hume/tradition/Armstrong: in general, one assumes that the separateness is secured through that A and B are separated by any description, if it was not be self-contradictory, if A exists and B not.
II 125
U. T. Place himself has rejected that 40 years ago, namely the view that two logically different descriptions can not refer to one and the same thing. - order: distinctiveness of descriptions/of objects - solution: we have to assume three entities here - hardness and inelasticity ((s) because its relative to partners). ---
Danto I 307
Causality/cause/effect/Hume/Danto: there are in addition to eventual causal links still logical links - because the various ideas are not randomly together in the mind. ---
Hume I 15
Causality/Hume: is affect! - Impression of self-awareness - Effect of Similarity - The notion of causality is one with the notion of things.
I 71
Causality/Hume: not from probability (this may have to be determined at each stage of the habit) - but from gradual observation.
I 74
Its true content cannot be constituted in experience because it itself constitutes the experience
I 75
ideas need to have a different context than mere individual events - otherwise no inference from effect to cause - solution: habit as a principle - habit: requires experience.
I 146
Causality/Hume: the only relation, from which one can conclude. - Experience: thereby purely selective - constitutive. the habit - Conclusion: changes the level.
I 152
Causality literally stands for the property.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Causality Searle I 287/88 (Note)
Causality/identity/PlaceVsSearle: causal dependency requires separate entities (>Causality/Armstrong). SearleVsPlace: E.g. a liquid state may be causally dependent on the behavior of molecules while being a feature of the system. ---
II 93
Causality/Searle: causality is not an external instance, only more experiences.
II 101f
Causality: e.g. pressure cooker: we can infer from steam to pressure. Through seeing there is no inference on physical objects. SearleVsHume: causality may well be experienced directly, but not independently, but causality is part of the experience.
II 152ff
Causality/SearleVsHume: causality is real and directly observable. ---
I 157
Logical causality: logical causality is not inference, but intentional content and an experience condition. There are not two experiences, but causation = intentional content. ---
II 179
Causality: causality is part of the experience, causation is part of the experience. ---
Danto I 299
Causality/Searle: causality only arises through interpretation.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Danto I
A. C. Danto
Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989
German Edition:
Wege zur Welt München 1999

Danto III
Arthur C. Danto
Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965
German Edition:
Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998

Danto VII
A. C. Danto
The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005
Causality Place Armstrong III 95
Causality/Armstrong: one may not identify causation with (natural) necessity. - There are cases of necessity, which are not cases of causation. - Hence we should not identify causal laws with natural laws.
Armstrong II 25
Causality/Place: is a modal relation. - between times: a categorical relation.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Causation Armstrong III 155
Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause
4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition".
A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature.

Martin III 168
Constitution is not causation.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Causation Martin Armstrong III 155
Causation/necessity/Armstrong: 1) irreflexive: Nothing causes itself, relative to itself no relation. 2) nontransitive: cause is not transmitted, but a new universal, even probability = 1, requires new law. 3) allows no contra-position (reversal), the effect cannot be the cause of the cause
4) not symmetric, special case: causes in chain, but not reverse causality, merely necessary "precondition".
A chain of causes isnot reverse causality, only: each state has a necessary conditio.n - Conditions do not cause! - Analogy: Laws of nature do not evoke anything. - Therefore causal laws are only a subclass of laws of nature.

Martin III 168
Constitution is not causation.

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Causes Hume Armstrong II 58
Cause/effect/Hume: necessary connection - Place: but conceptually, logically necessary. - Place: (and all the others): causes have their effects contingent. A cause cannot be conceptually something else than a cause of effect. ---
Hoerster II 245f
Cause/causality/Hume: logically anything can be any cause of something. - Therefore, the necessity that we need for causality, must be empirically! - Causality is necessary for Hume's psychological examinations of non-rational causes of assumptions.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Hum II
N. Hoerster
Hume
In
Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997
Dispositions Armstrong II 1 f
Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability.
Place III 113
Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong.
Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them.
II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties. >Microstructure/Armstrong.
II 6
Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations.
II 6
Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause).
Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties.
II (c) 90
Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions.
armstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions.
armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property?
II (c) 90/91
Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong.
II 92
the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary.
II 93
Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong.
II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
Place III 108
Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure.
Place III 109
Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties.
Place III 119
Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement.

Martin III 163
Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. -
Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners.
Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation.
II 174
Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Dispositions Place Armstrong II 1 f
Disposition/Armstrong: Problem of unobservability.
Place III 113
Verification/Place: Verification of dispositional properties: this is about what is likely to happen, not about what is observable.
Armstrong II 4f
Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Mellor: also categorical (not only dispositional) properties fulfil counterfactual conditionals. Armstrong: Dispositions are not made true by counterfactual conditionals. >Truthmaker/Armstrong.
Martin: a counterfactual conditional can also be true, while a linked property is not realized - Dispositions cannot be reduced to the facts that are determined by the counterfactual conditionals which often contain them.
Armstrong II 5
Armstrong: Thesis: Dispositional = categorical properties = microstructure (therefore dispositions are no possibilia). - Other authors: categorical properties "realize" dispositional properties.
Armstrong II 6
Dispositions/Martin: just as actual - it would be perverse to call them non-actual. Dispositions/armstrong: dispositions are not in themselves causes - (others dito). - Dispositions are always actual, just not their manifestations.
Armstrong II 6
Example wire/Martin: Problem: a counterfactual conditional can be true without being true by virtue of the prescribed disposition: when the wire contacts, a current flows: can also be true if the wire is dead: e.g., "electro-finch": brings the wire to life the same moment: ((s) This would be a wrong cause).
Place II 62
Dispositional Properties/PlaceVsArmstrong: Genes are not the propensity (tendency) to disease, the propensity is explained by the genes (categorical property), therefore they cannot be identical with the dispositional properties.
Armstrong II (c) 90
Dispositions/Armstrong/Place/Martin: Dispositions are "in" the objects. Martin: E.g. remote elementary particles which never interact with our elementary particles. - > This would require irreducible dispositions.
armstrongVsMartin: there are no irreducible dispositions.
armstrong: why suppose that particles have properties in addition to have the manifested purely categorical property?
Armstrong II (c) 90/91
Martin-Example: Conclusion/Martin: Thesis: Natural laws/Armstrong.
Armstrong II 92
the non-disp prop plus "strong" LoN which connect these non-disp prop are sufficient true makers - no unknown way of interaction necessary.
Armstrong II 93
Armstrong: certain counterfactual conditionals apply, but their consequent must remain indeterminate, not only epistemically but also ontologically. >Counterfactual conditionals/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 94
Intentionality/Armstrong: Vs Parallel to dispositions: in the mental, the pointing is intrinsic, in the case of dispositions it is only projected.
Place III 108
Dispositions/Martin: Solution: we have to assume particles without structure.
Place III 109
Martin-Example/Place: his example with distant particles which themselves have no microstructure allows him to investigate the subtleties of the relation of the properties of the whole and the properties of the parts, but forbids him to examine the relations between categorical and dispositional properties.
Place III 119
Purely dispositional properties/PlaceVsMartin: have a structural basis in the carrier, the two are separate entities in a causal relation. Parts/wholesPlace: are separate entities, they are suitable as partners in a causal relation. - Dispositional properties of the whole are an effect of the dispositional properties of the parts and their arrangement.

Martin III 163
Dispositions/Place: Dispositions are outside the entities, they are properties of interaction. (MartinVsPlace: This brings a confusion with manifestation. armstrong: Should the dispositions be within? No. Rather in the connection. -
Martin: they can be reciprocal reaction partners.
Dispositions/Ryle: are not localized, but belong to the person or object.
Martin III 165
Dispositions/MartinVsPlace: Place's introduction of "causal interaction" between the dispositions is a doubling of causality.
Martin III 166
Dispositions/Martin: dispositions are always completely actual, even without manifestation.
II 174
Armstrong: Dispositions are not in the eye of the beholder - unlike abilities.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Individual Causation Davidson Armstrong III 94
Causality/DavidsonVsHume/Armstrong: individual causation: we often recognize that an individual case is causal, without having any idea to what regular sequence it belongs. Solution: differentiation knowledge-that: that there is a law/knowing what: the law is.
Solution: there is a description, under which the event is lawlike.
AnscombeVsDavidson: many characteristics are causally irrelevant, therefore causality is description dependent. >Causality/Davidson, cf. >regularities.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Laws Nozick II 144
Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently (> Rule Following). ---
II 145
Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. - Other problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn. ---
II 146
If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. - Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived. Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws.
---
II 146
Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem. ---
II 147
If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. - But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again. ---
II 148
Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". - Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. - Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. - Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. - Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

No II
R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

Laws Chalmers I 86
Physical Laws/Causes/Supervenience/Reduction/Chalmers: Natural laws are not logically supervenient on the physical facts of our world with their spatio-temporal history. There could be another world, indistinguishable from our world, on which other physical laws apply. Regularity/Chalmers: on such arguments one can see that causality must be a bit above and independent of regularities (Hume's view of laws and causation: see Lewis 1986b, Mackie 1974, Skyrms 1980. VsHueme's view: armstrong 1982, Carroll 1994, Dretske 1977, Molnar 1969, Tooley 1977)) .. Laws and causality have something irreducible.
---
I 213/214
Laws/Consciousness/Chalmers: we will need psychophysical laws to explain consciousness together with a underlying physical structure. ---
I 216
Data: we have at least data about regularities between physical processes and conscious experiences, from which we can conclude the best explanation. First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc.
---
I 308
Laws/psychophysical laws/Chalmers: some questions need to be answered: 1. If the information space is phenomenologically realized, then why in one way and not in another? E.g. With inverted Qualia?
2. Is the nature of the phenomenal information defined by the structure of space?
---
I 309
How can complex emotional experiences be explained? 4. What kind of formal structure best captures the structure of phenomenal information?
5. How can the unity of consciousness within our framework be captured?
6. What are the criteria according to which information in my brain corresponds to my conscious experiences?



1. D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers Vol II, New York 1986
2. J. L. Mackie, The Cement of the Universe, Oxford 1974
3. B. Skyrms Causal Necessity, New Haven 1980
4. D. M. armstrong, Metaphysics and supervenience, Critica 42, 1982: pp. 3-17
5. J. W. Caroll, Laws of Nature, Cambridge 1994
6. F. Dretske, Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science 44, 1977: pp. 248-68
7. G. Molnar, Kneale's argument revisited. Oghilosophical Review 78, 1969: pp. 79-89
8. M. Tooley, The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7, 1977: pp. 667-98

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Leibniz Principle Adams Millikan I 261
VsLeibniz' Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished from itself, so the two world parts of the world cannot be the same half. Leibniz' law/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): the objections do not consider the fact that this could be about a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here one thing and the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz' Law/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s)> nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then Leibniz' principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsarmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half had been different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only doubled.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, then the identity is random, but not necessary. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given if the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity is derived from causality. (x)(y){[NN(F)Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
NN/Notation: nature-necessary under necessary circumstances.


Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Leibniz Principle Millikan I 259
Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Leibniz/Millikan: Thesis: I treat his principle so that it is an implicit assertion about grammatical categories. (x)(y)[(F)(Fx equi Fy) > x = y]
Problem: what is the domain of the quantifier "(F)"? ((s) >second order logic).
Here, there cannot simply elements of the domain be paired with grammatical predicates. The set of grammatical predicates may not be of ontological interest. E.g. neither "... exists" nor "... = A" nor "... means red" is paired with something which has the same meaning as "... is green" paired with a variant of a world state.
Quantification/properties/2nd level logic/Millikan: perhaps we can say that the quantifier (F) is about all properties, but we must characterize this set differently than by pairing with grammatical predicates.
False: For example, the attempt of Baruch Brody's thesis: "to be identical with x" should be understood as a property of x "in the domain of the quantifier (F)" is quite wrong! ((s) "be identical with oneself" as a property).
If so, then every thing that has all the properties of x would be identical with x. ((s) Even if it had additional properties).
Problem: under this interpretation, property is not a coherent ontological category.
How can we treat the Leibniz principle, and keep the notion of "property" so that it is ontologically coherent?
---
I 260
Leibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan: the Leibniz principle is usually regarded as a claim about the identity of individual substances. Substances in which it is useful to attribute to them place and time. That is, "x" and "y" go over individuals. Quantifier: (F) is generally understood in the way that it only goes via "general properties". Or via "purely qualitative properties".
Purely qualitative properties: i.e. that they are not defined with regard to certain individuals: e.g. the property "to be higher than Mt. Washington"
N.B.: but: "the property of being higher than something that has these and these properties and which are the properties of Mt. Washington".
Individual related properties/Millikan: are normally excluded because they would allow properties like "to be identical to x". That would lead to an empty reading of the Leibniz principle.
MillikanVs: but it is not at all the case that "is identical to x" would not correspond to any reasonable property.
Leibniz principle/Millikan: however, the principle is mostly examined in the context of the domain of general properties in relation to...
---
I 261
...the domain of things that have these properties. Thus question: do we have to postulate a domain of such things beyond the domain of these general properties, or can we define the self-identity of an individual in purely qualitative expressions? Leibniz principle/Millikan: in this context, the relation to a particular individual ((s) and thus of the thing to itself) appears to be an impure or mixed ontological category.
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe could be perfectly symmetrical, whereby then a perfectly identical (indistinguishable) individual would be in another place.
((s) That is, there is something of x that is indistinguishable, which nevertheless is not identical with x, against the Leibniz principle). (See also Adams, below).
Variants: For example, a temporal repetitive universe, etc. e.g. two identical water drops, two identical billiard balls at different locations. ((s) Why then identical? Because the location (the coordinates) does not have influence on the identity!)
Property/Leibniz: Thesis: a relation to space and time leads to a property which is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one ignores such "impure" properties ((s) thus does not refer to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz Principle/Law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: Thesis: the principle that is used when such symmetrical worlds are constructed, is the principle that an individual cannot be distinguished (separated) from itself, so the two world halfs of the world cannot be one and the same half.
Leibniz principle/VsVs/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of hacking): the objections do not consider that this could be a curved space instead of a doubling.
Curved Space/Hacking/Millikan: here the same thing emerges again, it is not a doubling as in the Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
---
I 262
But there are still two interesting possibilities: > indistinguishability. Leibniz Principle/Principle/Identity/Indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. Symmetrical world: one could argue that there is simply no fact here that decides whether the space is curved or doubled. ((s) > nonfactualism).
N.B.: this would imply that the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very well be a fact whether the space is curved or not. A certain given space cannot be both!
N.B.: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
N.B.: but in this case this is not a question of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsarmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor armstrong take that into account.
Curved space/Millikan: here, what is identical is necessarily identical ((s) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if the one half were different, then also the other. Here the space seems to be only double.
Doubling/Millikan: if the space (in Euclidean geometry) is mirrored, the identity is a random, not a necessary one. Here one half could change without changing the other half. ((s) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is then given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law applies in situ, but a natural law, a natural necessity.
---
I 263
Then, in the second option, identity from causality applies. (x) (y) {[NN (F) Fx equi Fy] equi x = y}
Natural necessary/Notation: natural necessary under natural possible circumstances.
Millikan: this is quite an extreme view, for it asserts that if there were two sets of equivalent laws that explain all events, one of these sets, but not the other, would be true, even if there was no possibility to find out which of the two sets it is that would be true.
This would correspond to the fact that a seemingly symmetrical world was inhabited. Either the one or the other would be true, but one would never find out which one.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Mathematical Entities Armstrong Bigelow I 380
Numbers/Armstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Armstrong Thesis: Numbers are causally inactive. (Field ditto). Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: some mathematical entities are even observable!(1)
I 381
Causation/Mathematics/BigelowVsArmstrong/Bigelow/Pargetter: Numbers: even they are involved in the causal processes. If objects did not instantiate the quantities they instantiate, other changes would have occurred. Thus at least proportions are causally involved. (s) FieldVsNumbers as causal agents, but not FieldVsProportions).
I 382
Counterfactual Dependence/Bigelow/Pargetter: thus we can again set up sequences of counterfactual conditionals, e.g. for the lever laws of Archimedes. This also provides why explanations. ((s) >Cf. >Counterfactual Dependence.)
I 383
Numbers/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows that numbers play a fundamental role in causal explanations. ((s) Cf. >Mathematical Entities/Benacerraf.) BigelowVsField: (a propos Field, Science without numbers): he falsely assumes that physics first starts with pure empiricism to then convert the results into completely abstract mathematics.
Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: wants to avoid this detour.
BigelowVsField: his project is superfluous if we realize that mathematics are only a different description of the physical proportions and relations and no detour.


1.J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Modalities Bigelow I 101
Modality/Necessity/Possibility/Modal/Montague/Bigelow/Pargetter: Montague is extreme by - Thesis: attributing modal operators (MO) to referents. Bigelow/Pargetter: instead, we can assume functions.
Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: our strategy will be an intermediate position: we only assign referents to names and open sentences. (Not to the modal operators "possible" and "necessary").
Name/individual constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time.
We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia.
Group: Possibilia: Bigelow pro Possibilia - - against: QuineVsPossibilia/TarskiVsPossibilia.
Possibilia/Bigelow/Pargetter: Things that are not located anywhere but could have been. They are not universals at first! In the end, however, we will argue that they are universals after all.
Definition predicate/Bigelow/Pargetter: at the end we will say that predicates refer to sets constructed from universals and possibilia.
Modality/Modal Operator/Bigelow/Pargetter: for "possible", "necessary", "likely" we do not introduce referents, but rules.
---
I 290
Necessity/Modality/Causality/Bigelow/Pargetter: although we do not define causes with necessary and sufficient conditions, there are connections between causes and necessity. In one sense, the effect is more than just a coincidental consequence. There are two ways that leads causation to modalities.
1.
This comes from two terms of "cause", we call them "fat" and "thin" in analogy to Armstrong's "thick" and "thin" single particulars. (Armstrong 1978) a) Definition thin cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: is simply the complex of particulars, properties and relations that are causally related to the effect.
b) Definition thick cause/terminology/Bigelow/Pargetter: additionally the external properties, including all force relations.
Modality/Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: comes into play, because there is certainly a necessary connection between thick causes and their effects. This is because a relation cannot exist if its Relata does not exist.
Forces/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this means that forces must be active.
---
I 291
Cause/effect/necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: this trivial statement explains why causes are necessary for their effects. Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also consider it the rest of all causal interaction when everything else is eliminated. Conversely, if we are the only ones to remove the effect from the interaction, the effect must follow.
2.
Necessity/Modality/Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: the second way in which causation leads to modality has more to do with thin causes:
We have seen that thin causes are not always sufficient and necessary conditions for an effect.
Sometimes, however, thin causes are quite sufficient and necessary for the effect.
Modality: comes into play when we modify Lewis' analysis to say that the next possible worlds are where the cause has this or that effect. This is true for most of the causes, and so we also have counterfactual conditionals again.
Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the proximity of possible worlds is determined by the individuals, properties and relations (1st and higher level) they have in common.
Similarity metrics/similarity/next possible world/most similar/Bigelow/Pargetter: the greater weight should have properties and relations of a higher level. That is, the next world will generally be the one that has most relations in common. If we then have the thick cause, the effect must also set in (necessity).
---
I 292
Effect/Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: the effect will occur in the majority of the next possible worlds. ---
I 383
Modality/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the hardness of the mathematical "must" is something that has to be foreseen. Science: reveals necessities in nature. But these are only relative, conditional necessities.
Natural necessity/natN/Bigelow/Pargetter: is always only relative, a conditional necessity.
Absolute necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: only arises from mathematics.
---
I 384
Necessity/Bigelow/Pargetter: imposes restrictions. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: Science also shows us possibilities that we would never have seen without it. Mathematics again plays a key role here.
Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: derives from mathematics, which cannot be separated from science.
Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter. Problem: must also be realism in relation to mathematical objects, and thus it becomes platonism.
Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: as a scientific realist, you can also be a nominalist. However, he must then either reject parts of the mathematics or take a strongly instrumentalistic view.
---
I 385
Quine/Bigelow/Pargetter: was driven away from nominalism by his scientific realism. Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: much of his modal realism was formulated within a nominalist framework. His later preference for universals does not alter the fact that his central theories are based on individuals and sets.
Nominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: is only committed to antirealist consequences if he nourishes "worldly" presuppositions.
Scientific Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should be a scientific Platonist at the same time. That means he needs mathematical entities and universals Bigelow/Pargetter pro.
Combinatorial theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: the world contains a collection of particulars and universals. This also gives us modalities.
In this way, we obtain a world book that corresponds to a complex property that either instantiates the world or not.
---
I 386
We call these possible worlds.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Necessity Hume Armstrong II 155
Necessity / Hume: a) "cement" between "facts" as separate existences - actual nec.: unlike contingency - just between ideas.
Hume I 66
Necessity / Hume: n. of an action is not a property of this action, nor of the actor, but a property of the thinking being -. ((s) > Harman, ethics / action)
Hume II 246
Necessity / Hume: (empirical, for causality) is nothing more than an impression which is established under certain conditions - i.e. spatial and temporal link and repetition - nothing that goes beyond.
D. Hume
I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988)
II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Properties Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
armstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Properties Place Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
Armstrong III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
Armstrong III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
Armstrong III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
Armstrong III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
Armstrong III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
Armstrong III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
Armstrong II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
Armstrong II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
Armstrong II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
armstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Properties Martin Armstrong III 12
Properties/Armstrong: properties are always non-local! - E.g. "living in Australia" is not a property. - Relational properties may not be local either! ((s) Cf. >Properties/Chisholm).
Armstrong III 14
Individuation/Individual/particulars/properties/Armstrong: It is likely that for every particular there is least one individuating conjunction of properties. - E.g. no property: "being one light-second away from proton A". - But: E.g. this is a property: "being one light-second away from a proton" would be correct. ((s) Generality).
Armstrong III 83
Properties/Armstrong: properties are strictly identical in all different instantiations (universals) - therefore they are not all arbitrary predicates. Pseudo-property: self-identity (not a universal). - Identity lends no causal or nomic force. >Identity.
Armstrong III 114f
Properties/Armstrong: the state N(F,G) is also a 1st order relation. - If E.g. "to be a mass" is a property of properties, then "the property of 1 Kg to be a mass" will be a second order state (M(K) and this will, for reasons of symmetry, also be a 1st order property that is applied to 1st order particulars, just like this weight. >Laws/Armstrong, >Natural laws/Armstrong. VsRealism of Properties/VsProperty realism: there is a risk of duplication and intermediate elements. - armstrong late: skeptically Vs "property of being a mass".
Armstrong III 141
Properties/Armstrong: a "property of being a property" is not desirable. - At least it is not a second order Humean regularity, - But it is used by Tooley when he assumes a universal law as second order law about laws. >Tooley.
Armstrong III 145
Solution/Armstrong: We should rather introduce new properties than new laws.
Armstrong III 163ff
Properties/Armstrong: if they are essential, then only in relation to a conceptual scheme. >Conceptual schemes.
Armstrong II 5
Properties/Armstrong: categorical property = non-dispositional property. - But many properties are actually dispositional, E.g. "hard" as well as "flexible". - But dispositional properties cannot be reduced to categorical properties. >Dispositions/Armstrong.
Armstrong II (c) 96
Properties/Categorical/Dispositional/Armstrong: there is a asymmetry between categorical/dispositional: dispositional properties require categorical properties in a way, in which categorical properties do not need dispositions. - It is possible that in a possible world things have only categorical properties without dispositional side. - According to Martin that would be a "lazy" world, because there would be no causality.
Armstrong II (c) 102
MartinVsArmstrong: A world does not have to be so "busy" that every disposition would be manifested. (> 77 II)
Armstrong II (c) 97
Properties/Nominalism/Martin/Place: properties are individuals! - Therefore there is no strict identity between different manifestations or occurrences of properties. - Instead: "exact similarity" - Causation: principle: "The same causes the same". ArmstrongVs: 1st that's just a cosmic regularity and thus as a whole a cosmic coincident! >Regularity.
armstrongVs: 2md Per universals view: explains why the same property in the same circumstances produces the same effects (not just the same) - principle: "The identical causes the identical".

Martin III 168
Composition Model/Martin: Thesis: We should assume properties instead of parts. - The complex properties and dispositions and relations of the whole are composed of the simpler properties and relations and dispositions of the parts.
Martin III 169
Properties/Martin: Thesis: whatever the ultimate constituents (properties) of the nature should be, they are no purely qualitative properties or pure acts like any macroscopic or structural properties. ((s) Talking about "whatever" leads to the assumption of "roles", e.g. "causal role", >functional role" etc. Example "whatever plays the causal role of pain..."). Martin: The properties of merely assumed particles must be capable of more than is manifested. ((s) Cf. >Hidden parameters).

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Reference Putnam VI 395
Theory of reference/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: might refute that - (but not a theory of meaning). ---
III 52f
Counterfactual Conditional/reference/Representation/Fodor: Thesis: to explain the actual nature of the reference by means of counterfactual conditionals. Asymmetric dependence - Cat token expressions are triggered by cats, but also by many other things.
III 54
Reference by causal attachment to the world. So also through images and mockups. - If not by cats, then not by pictures of cats.
III 56
Then (counterfactual) law: pictures of cats trigger "cat". - N.B.: ultimately dependent on real cats. III 57 Fodor: if not pictures, then also not cats as a trigger. - PutnamVs.
III 61
Reference/Hermeneutics: there cannot be necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of a word to individual x - FodorVs. that leads to meaning-holism, which in turn is followed by a meaning-nihilism.
III 64
PutnamVs: E.g. witch, perhaps analytically female, nonetheless there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for "witch". - A witch-law would be wrong because of non-existence - because there is no world with witches - however, appropriate counterfactual conditionals could be true. - N.B.: their truth is not explained by the law. - (Armstrong: anyway vice versa).
III 65
PutnamVsFodor: for correct asymmetric dependence (the word through the trigger) this counterfactual conditional has to be wrong: if conmen cannot trigger any statement, then soldiers cannot either.
III 69
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: previous speech behavior of previous generations is a contributing cause - otherwise "backward law": false: if cats do not trigger, then there is also no previous behavior - but right vice versa - (but only if the cause is interpreted as a causal factor). - FodorVs: its causality underlies the colloquial cause-term (direct response? behaviouristic?) - PutnamVs: that is interest-relative.
III 78
Reference/PutnamVsFodor: cannot reduce them with the help of the terms law, counterfactual conditionals, causality.
III 133
Reference/Fodor. according to Quine's criticism of the inscrutability of reference: individual sciences or everyday language causality.
III 140
Refernce: the fundamental physics, cannot explain the possibility of referring to something or the assertion of something. It cannot even do it when it comes to their own territory.
III 208
Reference: from the fact that some words do not refer without causal link it does not follow that reference itself would be causal. - It is only subject to causal restrictions. ---
V 75
Reference: Thesis: Input is shaped by concepts. - There are no inputs that allow only a single description that would be independent of all conceptual decisions.
V 79
Reference/externalism: (external, divine position): Problem: what actually is reference - Reference cannot be causal because "alien" always refers to aliens. ---
I (a) 34
Reference: if it is fixed, you can come up with any theories on the subject.
I (a) 35
Physical broadband concepts such as size and cause allow also to formulate failed markings - Kripke: then names are usable without having true beliefs about the referent.
I (b) 65
Reference: in logic: that what corresponds to the description - Field: has shown that this does not fulfill the task.
I (a) 67ff
Primitive Reference/Putnam: E.g. creatures that can distinguish 17 properties and number them: "Pee-sevunteen-this" (sic): in fact, feelings of the beings themselves - amounts to causal theory of reference - when expanded to absent, past, future objects not necessary and sufficient conditions are introduced.
I (b) 69
Semantic rise: one day the mass introduces the concept of a reference: "Uk-ook reefur-this" (sic) - that would not be our reference, otherwise paradoxes arise. - It only becomes a correct language with quantifiers - N.B.: with quantifiers the causal connection between X and the reference to X is dissolved.
I (b) 70
Field: Tarski has shown how reference to primitive reference (show plus noise) can be traced back. - +> Gricean intention: Grice/Avramides, > Intentions.
Rorty I 312
(According to Rorty): Putnam: a "causal" theory of reference cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly relate to something is just as mysterious as the question, how the term "cat" has done this.
---
Rorty IV 20 ff
Rorty: relation/Putnam: early: only causal theory of reference (not intentional). Can save us from relativism. ---
Rorty VI 123
Rorty: causal theory of reference: PutnamVsKripke, also self-criticism on earlier writings: The description of the causal relationships between a something and other things is nothing more than the description of characteristics that neither in a greater nor lesser extent stand in an "intrinsic" or "extrinsic" relationship. So also the feature "to be described by a human being". PutnamVsSearle: Vsdifferentiation "Intrinsic"/"relational".

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Anscombe, E. Armstrong Vs Anscombe, E. Armstrong III 95
Causality/VsAnscombe: here it looks as if Anscombe’s position is weakened: if a’s F become b’s G are caused, don’t we have a law F>G? armstrong: (pro Anscombe) that actually does not follow. We only have such a law if the first event causes the second by virtue of the universals F and G.
Although it is natural to expect that universals are as operational as this, I do not see how it can be proven. I for my part would think worse of the universe if they were non-operational. Nevertheless Anscombe can rightly say that it is logically possible that the causation is a mere isolated case causation. She is also right with AnscombeVsDavidson. (armstrongVsDavidson).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Hume, D. Armstrong Vs Hume, D. Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?.
And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress).
This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real).

Arm II (b) 46
Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type.
II (b) 47
Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (armstrong pro).
But that’s not the whole truth!.
Surface structure/Proposition/armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound.
If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course.
But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!.

Place II 64
Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional.
Proof/Hume/armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity).
Place II 65
Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory.
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’s and Armstrong’s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Hume, D. Verschiedene Vs Hume, D. Hacking I 68
Causality/W.C.BroadVsHume: VsRegularity: For example we can see that the siren of Manchester howls every day at the same time, whereupon the workers of Leeds let the work rest for one hour. But no causation.
Hacking I 70
CartwrightVsHume: the regularities are characteristics of the procedures with which we establish theories. (>Putnam).
Hume I 131
Def Atomism/Hume/Deleuze: is the thesis that relations are external to conceptions. (KantVs). VsHume: Critics accuse him of having "atomized" the given.
Theory/DeleuzeVsVs: with this one believes to have pilloried a whole system. As if it were a quirk of Hume. What a philosopher says is presented as if it were done or wanted by him.
I 132
What do you think you can explain? A theory must be understood from its conceptual basis. A philosophical theory is an unfolded question. Question and critique of the question are one.
I 133
It is not about knowing whether things are one way or the other, but whether the question is a good question or not.
Apron I 238
Lawlikeness/lawlike/Schurz: b) in the narrower sense: = physical necessity (to escape the vagueness or graduality of the broad term). Problem: not all laws unlimited in space-time are legal in the narrower sense.
Universal, but not physically necessary: Example: "No lump of gold has a diameter of more than one kilometre".
Universality: is therefore not a sufficient, but a necessary condition for lawfulness. For example, the universal statement "All apples in this basket are red" is not universal, even if it is replaced by its contraposition: For example "All non-red objects are not apples in this basket". (Hempel 1965, 341).
Strong Hume-Thesis/Hume/Schurz: Universality is a sufficient condition for lawlikeness. SchurzVs: that is wrong.
Weak Hume-Thesis/Schurz: Universality is a necessary condition for lawfulness.
((s) stronger/weaker/(s): the claim that a condition is sufficient is stronger than the claim that it is necessary.) BhaskarVsWeak Hume-Thesis. BhaskarVsHume.
Solution/Carnap/Hempel:
Def Maxwell Condition/lawlikeness: Natural laws or nomological predicates must not contain an analytical reference to certain individuals or spacetime points. This is much stronger than the universality condition. (stronger/weaker).
Example "All emeralds are grue": is universal in space-time, but does not meet the Maxwell condition. ((s) Because observed emeralds are concrete individuals?).
I 239
Natural Law/Law of Nature/Armstrong: are relations of implication between universals. Hence no reference to individuals. (1983) Maxwell condition/Wilson/Schurz: (Wilson 1979): it represents a physical principle of symmetry: i.e. laws of nature must be invariant under translation of their time coordinates and translation or rotation of their space coordinates. From this, conservation laws can be obtained.
Symmetry Principles/Principle/Principles/Schurz: physical symmetry principles are not a priori, but depend on experience!
Maxwell Condition/Schurz: is too weak for lawlikeness: Example "No lump of gold..." also this universal statement fulfills them.
Stegmüller IV 243
StegmüllerVsHume: usually proceeds unsystematically and mixes contingent properties of the world with random properties of humans. Ethics/Morality/Hume: 1. In view of scarce resources, people must cooperate in order to survive.
2. HumeVsHobbes: all people have sympathy. If, of course, everything were available in abundance, respect for the property of others would be superfluous:
IV 244
People would voluntarily satisfy the needs in the mutual interest according to their urgency. Moral/Ethics/Shaftesbury/ShaftesburyVsHume: wants to build all morality on human sympathy, altruism and charity. (>Positions).
HumeVsShaftesbury: illusionary ideal.
Ethics/Moral/Hume: 3. Human insight and willpower are limited, therefore sanctions are necessary.
4. Advantageous move: intelligence enables people to calculate long-term interests.
IV 245
The decisive driving force is self-interest. It is pointless to ask whether the human is "good by nature" or "bad by nature".
It is about the distinction between wisdom and foolishness.
5. The human is vulnerable.
6. Humans are approximately the same.





Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Leibniz, G.W. Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. I 261
VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations.
Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative.
Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties!
VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half.
Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication.
Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry.
MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question.
I 262
But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan:
1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism).
Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention.
2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both!
Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary.
Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact!
MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsarmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor armstrong consider that.
Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double.
Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional).
Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement.
I 263
Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y}
Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances.
MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong.
Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world.
I 264
Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them.
I 268
Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property.
The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle:
Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable.
complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B".
((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".)
Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B".
Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction.
I 269
Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds:
1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or
2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together.
MillikanVsLeibniz.
Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property!
Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties.
Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other.
Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz.
Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency.
Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity.
Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template.
Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology:
I 270
Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...".
ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red.
But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Tooley, M. Lewis Vs Tooley, M. Schwarz I 119
Natural Laws/Law of Nature/Reductionism/LewisVsTooley: this is the price for anti-reductionist intuitions: it sounds nice and good that laws of nature do not supervene on local events, that our concepts of counterfactual truths and causality cannot be reduced to something outside. (Tooley 1987(1), 2003(2)). Problem: the most obvious features of laws of nature become incomprehensible! Lewis: (as a reductionist) can explain why one can empirically discover the laws of nature, why physics is on the way to it, why it is useful to know the laws of nature, and why all Fs are Gs, if "all Fs are Gs" is a law of nature. As an anti-reductionist, one just has to acknowledge all this with humility.
Lewis: the assumption of a primitive modal fact which ensures that in every possible world in nature (F,G) exists, also all Fs are Gs, is obscure and almost pointless: if there is no possible world in which nature (F,G) exists, but some Fs are not G, then this must have an explanation, then the idea of such worlds must be somewhat incoherent. Possible worlds cannot simply be missing.
Laws of nature/LewisVsarmstrong: perhaps better: regularities that are additionally blessed by a primitive relationship between universals, a relationship that also exists in possible worlds where the law of nature does not apply. That's even more obscure, but then it's at least no wonder that all Fs are Gs if a law of nature demands it.


1. Michael Tooley [1987]: Causation: A Realist Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press
2. Michael Tooley [2003]: “Causation and Supervenience”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003]

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005