Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Chisholm, R.M. | Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M. | Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Frege Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 31 Numbers / LeibnizVsKant: because the provability of the numerical formulas has claimed. "There is no immediate truth that 2 and 2 are 4 Assuming that 4 indicates 3 and 1 one can prove it, in a way.: Definitions: 1st 1 and 1 are 2 2nd 2 and 1 are 3 3rd 3 and 1 are 4 Axiom: If one inserts the same, the equation remains true. I 44 Proof: 2 + 2 = 2 + 1 + 1 = 3 + 1 = 4 So by Axiom: 2 + 2 = 4 FregeVsLeibniz: here is a gap that is covered by omitting parentheses. It should be called more precisely: each (1 + 1), (2 + 1), etc. Then we see that the set 2 + (1 + 1) = (2 + 1) + 1 is missing. (see LeibnizVsKant, FregeVsKant) FregeVsLeibniz: this tends falsely to regard all truths as provable. Leibniz I 38f Definition/Leibniz: always in the form of the identical sentence A = B, the predicate is identical to the subject. (FregeVsLeibniz) Substitutability/Leibniz: "Making obvious through the consequences". Contrast: Prove by reason. I 46 "Chain of definitions": reduction of complex concepts to simple ones. I 48 "Chain of evidence": problem: where is the beginning? |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Thomas Aquinas Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Stegmüller IV 395 Cause/Chain/Thomas AquinasVsLeibniz/ThomasVsLeibniz: the chain of causes cannot be endless. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Russell, B. | Holz Vs Russell, B. | Leibniz I 64f Facts of Truth/FoT/Leibniz: are contingent - Reason truths: are necessary. HolzVsRussell: the difference lies in the proof. Otherwise Russell would be right: Truth/necessity/contingent/Russell: it is senseless to say of a true sentence that it is not true in the sense of another, apodictically true proposition. ((s) I.e. that a rational truth would contradict a factual truth). Holz: for the proof of facts of truth we need the preceding chain of links and (because of the infinite divisibility of the body) an infinite number of sentences. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Thomas Aquinas | Mackie Vs Thomas Aquinas | Stegmüller IV 394 proof of the existence of God/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: (third argument) two stages: 1. "What can not be, is not at any one time!: VsThomas: even that is doubtful: if "ephemeral things" are meant, the premise is even analytical. But it does not follow that there would have been nothing at any time. The transience may only occur in the future. 2. VsThomas: The existence of finite objects can overlap. IV 395 VSVS: this overlap could however be regarded as a single object! but this suggests the problematic idea of an underlying carrier substance. 3. VsThomas: implicitly in Aquinas: "What does not exist, can not begin to exist unless through something that exists." Now, if the sequence would have been interrupted once, it could not have been continued by anything. HumeVsThomas: we may well form the concept of uncaused cause (uncaused commencement of existence). If what we can imagine were impossible, this would have to be proven! (> Frege: contradictory terms as possible terms: then simply nothing falls into them, Cf. Round Square/Frege). Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: Anyway, let's assume there is at least one necessary and unchangeable thing. Proof of the existence of God/Infinity/Thomas Aquinas/Stegmüller: 2. second order: Aquinas admits that the eternity of one thing could be caused by another thing; it could remain in existence by the other. But: one can not go back endlessly in the sequence of such things. IV 396 For in this order of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the second and the second is the cause of the latest, whether many intermediate links are present, or just one! But the effect is dependent on the cause. If there is no first in the sequence, then there can be no last or second. In an infinite series there is therefore no effect and no cause. MackieVsThomas: this is not conclusive: although the second is caused by the first in a finite sequence, that does of course not apply if the order of the causes were infinite. Here, every cause is caused by a previous one. Error: if we consider an infinite instead of a finite order, then the way in which the first member (first cause) "disappears", does nt include the "disappearance" of the following causes! VsVs: Mackie admits that one could improve this to become a truly conclusive argument: in a sequence, it is assumed that a relation of '"holding" or "carrying" exists, as there is in a chain. Ex. we would be very surprised if someone claimed that an infinitely long train could go without a locomotive, because the last car would be pulled from the penultimate, this one in turn from its predecessor and so on... Ex. as if an infinitely long chain did not need hangers, because each member would be held by the neighboring member. IV 397 Thomas Aquinas: his argument is: where an order of dependency relations exists, one can not go back infinitely. Such an order can therefore be neither infinite nor circular. (This is also found in the Islamic philosopher Al-Farabi). Mackie: improved version of the argument by Aquinas: ("necessary" means the same as "imperishable" here): Each necessary thing either depends on something in its imperishability or it is necessary in itself. Something whose nature does not include the existence, must others depend for its existence on anything. Mackie: thereby we actually obtain a relationship of dependency which makes it necessary to make the going back in the chain of causes come to an end. In addition, then it is certain that only a being whose essence involves existence, can conclude the going back. MackieVsThomas: however, we have no reason to accept the implicit assumption of Aquinas. IV 398 Why should there be an imperishable primordial matter, whose nature includes existence, but its existence isn't derived from anything? Unlike Leibniz: the primordial matter were simply a hard fact which would have no sufficient reason. Borrowing from Leibniz would also not save Thomas' argument. Conclusion: MackieVsThomas/MackieVsLeibniz: we understand that everything that has a chronologically previous cause depends on this (somehow). But it does not follow that everything besides God needs something else on which it depends in this way (as a cause). IV 399 "Principle of Al Farabi": in a sequence of relations of dependency (that is an order) there must be an end. MackieVsAl Farabi: why should God be the only exception? Thereby one would burden the popular argument with exactly those thoughts that led to the collapse of its philosophical correspondences. Or else one seeks refuge in a mere mystery. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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