Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Actions Davidson Glüer II 108
Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation.
Glüer II 109 f
Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws.
Brandom I 724
Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved
I 726
Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent.
Brandom I 727
She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow).
I 728
Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs.
Brandom I 957
Accordion Effect/Success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action - Example Mountain Climber.
I 958
Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURD: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded.
I 729
Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine.
I 957
Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). - Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established.
Glüer II 92
Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object.
Glüer II 96
Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable - 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted - MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely)
Glüer II 110
Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - (s) because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers - (s) something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Compatibility Brandom I 244
Incompatibility/Brandom: normative-functionally analyzed: the determination of a claim precludes the authorization of another - advantage of this analysis: inconsistent beliefs are made understandable - definition: commitments exist only because people treat each other as fixed. ---
I 252
Assigning foreign commitments is fundamental for entering own commitments.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Correctness Brandom I 24 ff
Correctness/judgment/Kant/Brandom: normative, not governed by natural laws - contradictions not prohibited by natural laws. ---
I 48
KantVsDescartes: not correctness of representations, but of inferences is crucial. --
I 403
Definition correct: an inference from p to q is correct (in the sense of preserving the commitment) if the truth conditions of p are a subset of those of q.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Implication Lorenzen Berka I 267f
Implication/dialogical logic/Lorenzen: here it is different than in the case of "and", "or", where only the proponent is affected by instructions. In "if, then", there are also obligations for the opponent. If P asserts a > b, the dialogical meaning of > is that P is obliged to assert also b if O on its part asserts a and defends it against P successfully. (> Brandom: >commitment.)
Lorenzen: from this determination it follows already that P can always win an assertion of the form

(A v B) u C > (A u C) v (B u C)

(With statement variables A, B, ...).
Spelling/(s): Lorenzen writes the main operator with a point above it:

E.g. A v B u' C > A u C v' B u C.
Could also be written like this, e.g. A v B u C > A u C v B u C.

Winning strategy/dialogical logic/Lorenzen: one can write it as follows:

O P
(A v B) u C > (A u C) v (B u C)

(A v B) u C ?
A v B, C ?
A I B (A u C) v (B u C)
? I ? A u C I B u C
? I ? A, C I B, C

This corresponds precisely to the semantic tableaux of Beth.
Implication/winning strategy: because the Gs of P are such that it can only assert those primacy statement which have already been asserted by O, P can obtain any statement of this form.
If, on the other hand, P may be forced by O to assert a primacy statement in any other assertion which O has not yet asserted, then P will not be able to obtain every statement of the asserted form. He may not be able to prove precisely the primacy statement that has to be asserted.(1)


1. P. Lorenzen, Ein dialogisches Konstruktivitätskriterium, in: Infinitistic Methods, (1961), 193-200

Lorn I
P. Lorenzen
Constructive Philosophy Cambridge 1987


Berka I
Karel Berka
Lothar Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983
Language Rules Searle J. Husted "Searle" in: A.Hügli (Ed.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993, p. 253

Language rules/Searle: language rules are doubted by many authors. They are actually rules for speech acts. In any case rules for singular terms are of a very different kind. VsSearle: then the relations between the analysis of speech acts and of the meaning are not clarified at all.
---
IV 84
Language rules/Searle: e.g. someone who makes an assertion, commits himself/herself to the truth. ((s) > Commitment/Brandom).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Negation Brandom I 541
Negation/Brandom: task: formulating incompatibilities - everything that is incompatible with "Wulf is a mammal" is incompatible with "Wulf is a dog" but not vice versa. ---
I 610
Definition negation/Brandom: negation of p: the minimum irreconcilable with the statement: the strongest inferential claim that follows from any proposition incompatible with p in a way that fixes a commitment.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Ontological Commitment Kripke III 379
"There is"/interpretation/ontology/"ontological commitment"/Kripke: can it even be a meaningful question whether someone who says "there are people" is "committed to a viewpoint" that such things as people exist? (KripkeVsBrandom). It is simply the case that "there are people" is true when there are people. What other question is there? (KripkeVsQuineans, epigones of Quine; Quine himself, on the other hand, is about formulations like "there are 3 meters between...").
Kripke: one could perhaps claim that in some rare special cases "there are" is only superficially reminiscent of "there are rabbits" and then brings with it no "ontological commitment", and one could even try substitutional quantification to show this. But it would be something else to say that "there are rabbits" is not true iff there are rabbits.
This is analogous to denying that "John is tall" is true, iff John is tall.
"Ontological commitment"/Kripke: the ontological commitment was not developed for "there are rabbits".
Now someone might think it was developed for first level referential language, and the question is whether English should be translated into such a referential language or into a substitutional one. The latter does not make any ontological specifications.
KripkeVs: the question does not make sense: we have not learned a formal language like our mother tongue. In some logic books the crazy notation "(Ex)" is explained either in such a way that one gives an example: "(Ex)Rabbit(x)" means: "there is an x that is a rabbit" or...
III 380
...by a formal definition of fulfillment (as here, see above). Def fulfillment/Kripke: "(Exi) Rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s' that deviates from s at the most i-th place that fulfills "Rabbit (xi)".
((s) Example "cat3 is not on the mat" differs from "cat1-5 is on the mat" in the third place.)
Then the quantifiers are assumed to go over a non-empty area and the technical term "non-empty" is explained by saying that D is not empty iff there is an element of D.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Reason/Cause Brandom II 121
Reason/Hume/Brandom: must be accompanied by a desire to perform an action - KantVsHume: Desire (sensual inclination) can provide no basis for an action - in addition: recognition of an obligation. ---
II 122
Brandom: to have a reason is to be eligible to own practical commitment. ---
II 123
Recognition of a commitment can cause and can be caused.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Weak Will Brandom II 125
Weakness of will/Brandom: Solution: if the self-assignment of practical commitments (I should) does not possess the causal significance of recognition of these practical commitments - not mysterious.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Quine, W.V.O. Harman Vs Quine, W.V.O. Brandom I 666
Gilbert HarmanVsQuine: E.g. If a cloud passes the sun, will it change the meaning of my words? At least the conditional "If a cloud is from the sun, then p" gets another potential to transform my commitments.
Rorty I 220
HarmanVsQuine/Rorty: (Two Dogmas): the behavioral treatment of "truth by virtue of meaning" in this essay is actually uninteresting (Harman): E.g. "the president went to Vietnam" and "Johnson went to Vietnam".

Harman I
G. Harman
Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity 1995

Harman II
Gilbert Harman
"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam’s Reason, Truth and History" The Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982) pp. 568-75
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000