Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Acts of Will Geach I 251f
Vs"Acts of Will"/Geach: attribution of responsibility instead of causality (GeachVs)-Vs: "ascription theory" ("ascriptivism", Oxford) - Ascriptivism/Oxford: Thesis: saying that an action is voluntary is not a description of the action, but an attribution.
"All he said"/Oxford: Thesis: this would not be about description but about "confirmation". GeachVs: such theories can be invented by the dozen. - The actual distinction to be observed is the one between naming and predication. - VsAscription theory: condemning a thing by calling it "bad" must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also be done without condemnation. - Neither can "done deliberately" be characterized by attribution of responsibility or "being imposed" without describing the act as such first.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Analyticity/Syntheticity Quine I 120
Lasting Sentences: In lasting sentences the meaning of the stimulus is more sparse. Accordingly, the synonymy of stimuli is less plumable. > VsAnalyticity.
I 339
Material implication "p impl q" is not equal to "p > q" (> mention/use) "Implies" and "analytical" are the best general terms.
V 114
QuineVsAnalyticity: one can form universal categorical sentences later e.g. "A dog is an animal". Of these, we will not say that they are analytical or even true. Analyticity is as social as language. Random first examples should not have any special status. Definition Analytical/Quine: a sentence is analytical if everyone learns the truth of the sentence by learning the words. That is bound as social uniformity because of the observation character. Every person has a different set of first learned analytical sentences - therefore Vs.

VI 79
Quine: HolismVsAnalyticity. >Holism/Quine.
---
VII (b) 21
Analytical/QuineVsKant: Quine limits them to the subject-predicate form. They can be reformulated as following: "true by force of meaning, regardless of the facts". VsEssentialism: a creature is arbitrary: a biped must be two-legged (because of his feet), but he does not need to be rational. This is relative.
VII (b) 23
Analyticity/Quine: a) logically true: "No unmarried man is married" - b) this is translatable into logical truth: Bachelor/unmarried. The problem is that it is based on unclear synonymy. Analytical/Carnap: "true under any state description" - QuineVsCarnap: this only works when the atom sentences are independent. it does not work with e.g. bachelor/unmarried.
VII (b) 28ff
Analyticity/Quine: we need an adverb "neccess.", which is designed in that way that it delivers truth when it is applied to an analytical truth, but then we would indeed have to know what "analytical" is. - Problem: The extensional agreement of bachelor/unmarried man relies more on random facts than on meaning. A. cannot mean that the fact component would be zero: that would be an unempirical dogma.
VII (b) 37
Verification Theory/Peirce: the method is the meaning. Then "analytically" becomes a borderline case: method does not matter. Synonymous: the method of refutation and confirmation are the same.
VII (b) 37
Analytical/Quine: early: a is a statement when it is synonymous with a logically true statement.
VII (i) 161ff
Analyticity/Quine: analyticity is an approximate truth because of meaning. That says nothing about existence. >Synonymy/Quine, >Verfication/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Bounded Rationality Jolls Parisi I 60
Bounded rationality/Jolls: Many important questions in behavioral law and economics today turn on competing conceptions of bounded rationality. Cf. >Bounded rationality/Simon. Economic analysis: Normative analysis of legal policy tends to be more complex when nonoptimizing decision rules are added to Simon’s original model of nonomniscience. For instance, a legal rule such as New York City’s now-defunct “soda law,” which restricted the sale of sugary drinks in servings above sixteen ounces, might have been an attempt to address the reflexive ordering of supersized sugary drinks simply because they (say) offered reasonable “bang for the buck” on a per-ounce basis—but from a normative standpoint it is difficult to be certain that such reflexive purchasing is truly a “failing” in need of legal “correction.”
Nonomniscience: A simple error in judgment about the caloric content of supersized sugary drinks, by contrast, is amenable both to empirical confirmation - do people entering an eating establishment know approximately how many calories a supersized sugary drink has? - and to legal responses designed simply to reduce the degree of nonomniscience (though of course the costs of any such response must also be considered). For purposes both of analytic clarity and of normative debate, distinguishing between the nonomniscience and nonoptimization aspects of Simon’s bounded rationality is tremendously valuable (...).*
Parisi I 62
Nonoptimization: “Nonoptimization” (...) will refer to decision-making that is not in accordance with the optimizing behavior postulated by expected utility theory. „Satisficing“/Herbert Simon/example: As an (...) illustration of the Simonian notion of an individual “satisficing” rather than choosing the option that is “optimal,” imagine an individual assessing whether a price offered for property (...) is at or above a level considered to be “acceptable.” The individual, Simon writes, “may regard $15,000 as an ‘acceptable’ price, anything over this amount as ‘satisfactory,’ anything less as ‘unsatisfactory’ ” and, accordingly, may accept the first offer received at or above $15,000 regardless of whether such acceptance is “optimal” (Simon, 1955(4), p. 104). >Optimism/Bibas, >Loss aversion/Bibas, >Plea bargain/Bibas, >Non-omniscience/Jolls, >Availability heuristic/Economic theories, >Risk perception/Economic theories.

*Behavioral Economics: Behavioral economics focuses on bounded willpower and bounded self-
interest alongside bounded rationality (Thaler, 1996(1). Bounded rationality has been particularly prominent within behavioral law and economics, however (...). For description of behavioral law and economics work on bounded willpower and bounded self-interest, see Jolls (2007(2), 2011(3)). >Bounded rationality/Simon, >Bounded rationality/economic theories.


1. Thaler, Richard H. (1996). “Doing Economics Without Homo Economicus,” in Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels, eds., Foundations of Research in Economics: How Do Economists Do Economics?, 227–237. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
2. Jolls, Christine (2007). “Behavioral Law and Economics,” available at (previously published in Peter Diamond and Hannu Vartiainen, eds., Behavioral Economics and Its Applications. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
3. Jolls, Christine (2011). Behavioral Economics and the Law. Boston, MA and Delft: now Publishers.
4. Simon, Herbert A. (1955). “A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99–118.


Jolls, Christine, „Bounded Rationality, Behavioral Economics, and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press.


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Correspondence Theory Searle III 163
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory.
III 211
Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true".
III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.)
III 215
StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities.
III 216
Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory.
III 217
These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory.
III 220
Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation.
Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument.
III 230
Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant.
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Criteria Rescher In: Skirbekk, Wahrheitstheorien Frankfurt/M 1996
I 341
Def Guaranteeing criterion/Rescher: logically excludes absence of features - E.g. triangularity guarantees three-sidedness. Def entitling criterion: if compliance is at best a rational justification, probable confirmation - question: what is the relationship between "corresponds to the criterion for X" and "is actually an X "?
I 349
Criterion/Truth/Rescher: Problem: truth is not homogeneous - no single criterion possible - I 353 since a criterion need not be linked to a definition, there is a potential gap between the correspondence with the criterion and with a definition
I 378
Criterion/Truth/Rescher: truth is not the starting point, but the objective.
I 379
I.e. the criterion assumes a coherence under internal orientation. Coherence: key criterion - Problem: what conclusions should be drawn from an inconsistent set?
I 384
There is no criterion that shows that no statement of an empirical theory is false.

Resch I
Nicholas Rescher
The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Resch II
N. Rescher
Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010

Empiricism Feyerabend I 51
Empiricism/Feyerabend: older empirical theories are often no longer distinguishable from myths: Belief in witches had a high degree of confirmation. (Context: >theory-ladenness of observation).

Feyerabend I
Paul Feyerabend
Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971
German Edition:
Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997

Feyerabend II
P. Feyerabend
Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982
German Edition:
Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979

Epistemology Epistemology, philosophy: examines the conditions for the emergence of knowledge and the basis for justification and confirmation. Epistemology cannot explain special cases in which someone who has less information may give more correct answers. See also knowledge, theory, justification, confirmation, reliability.

Epistemology Carnap Quine XII 90
Epistemology/Carnap/Quine: Carnap had two good reasons for his attempt to clarify the conceptual side of epistemology: 1. One could expect constructions that clarify which observations speak for or against scientific theories. Even if the conclusions cannot be certain.
2. Would these constructions make the way we talk about the world better understandable, even apart from questions of confirmation, they would make cognitive speech as clear as observation concepts, logic, and set theory (with limitations).

Ca I
R. Carnap
Die alte und die neue Logik
In
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996

Ca II
R. Carnap
Philosophie als logische Syntax
In
Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

Ca IV
R. Carnap
Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992

Ca IX
Rudolf Carnap
Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ca VI
R. Carnap
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998

CA VII = PiS
R. Carnap
Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Ca VIII (= PiS)
R. Carnap
Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982


Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
Everything he said is true Geach I 250f
Attribution theory/Oxford: here it was not about description but "confirmation". GeachVs: you can come up with lots of such theories - the really important distinction is between naming and predication.
VsAttribution theory: that you condemn a thing, by "calling it bad". But that must be explained by the more general concept of predication, and such predication can also happen without condemnation; nor can you explain "done deliberately" by attribution of responsibility or characterize "being imposed" without describing the act as such first.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Evidence Quine Fodor IV 44
Confirmation/Peirce: confirmation relations are ipso facto semantic. QuineVs: evidence is not semantic, otherwise they would be a priori - see below.
IV 37
Confirmation cannot follow from meaning.
VI 3
Evidence/Quine: we do without this term in favor of stimulus influence! Instead, we speak of observation sentences.
VI 6
Observation sentences/compound/Quine: complex observation sentences: are not merely conjunctions of e.g. "There is blue, and there is pebble" but: "This pebble is blue". This connection is closer. The observation sentence is the means of verbalizing a prediction, with which a theory is tested. It is the last controlling authority.
>Observation Sentence/Quine.
VI 7
It is the vehicle of all evidence. Dual function: simultaneous entry into the language. (language learning of the child). Many observation sentences are not learned by simple conditioning or imitation, but by subsequent construction from complicated linguistic building blocks.
VI 8
But every sentence of observation could also be learned directly.
VI 18
Pure observation actually only provides us with negative evidence, namely by falsifying the categorical observation sentences implied by the respective theories.
I 44
Evidence/Stimulus/Quine: any realistic theory of evidence is inextricably linked to the psychology of stimulus and reaction. To call a stone a stone from close proximity is already an extreme case.
I 54
The question of what is there is the question of the evidence. The last arbitration board in this matter is the scientific method, amorphous as it may be.
X 23
Theory/Evidence/Quine: only one theory as a whole allows evidence. > Holism.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Explanation Hacking I 98ff
Good explanation/Hacking: a good explanation displays context. However, the same entities can always be explained otherwise. VsReichenbach/VsSalmon: that we arrive at the same result on various ways, proves nothing.
I 98
The reality is not part of the explanation.
I 100
It follows: VsConvergence theory: convergence theory is only cumulative. Convergence: is not itself focussed on convergence.
I 103
HackingVsPopper: success is no confirmation of a declaration. It shows nothing more than that we reasonably live in a reasonable world (>adequacy, as Aristotle).

Hacking I
I. Hacking
Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983
German Edition:
Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996

Models Climatology Edwards I 474
Models/climatology/Edwards: Simon Shackley, described two “epistemic lifestyles” in climate modeling. In his terms, a) climate seers use models to “understand and explore the climate system, with particular emphasis on its sensitivity to changing variables and processes,” seeing the models as tools for this purpose. Meanwhile,
b) climate model constructors see models as an end in themselves. They seek to “capture the full complexity of the climate system [in models] which can then be used for various applications.” Climate model constructors are more likely to focus on increased “realism,” an adjective referring not to accuracy but to the inclusion in the model of all physical processes that influence the climate. Climate seers, by contrast, tend to focus on modeling the most fundamental and best understood processes, and to use a variety of different models, including simpler zero-, one-, and two-dimensional models.(1)
Edwards I 475
The model constructors’ approach also has a political dimension, since those who challenge GCM results often argue that they do not account for the effects of some unincluded process, such as cosmic rays.(2) Adding more processes reduces modelers’ vulnerability to this line of attack, though at the same time it increases the opportunities to question the accuracy of parameterizations.
Edwards I 476
Corrections: Controversies about tuning rage both inside and outside the climate modeling community. The philosopher-physicist Arthur Petersen notes that “simulationists hold divergent views on the norm of not adding ad hoc corrections to models.”(3) Some accept these corrections as necessary; others view them almost as morally suspect and seek to eliminate them. David Randall and Bruce Wielicki argue that tuning “artificially prevents a model from producing a bad result.” Noting that some modelers refer to tuning as “calibration”—exploiting that term’s positive connotations - Randall and Wielicki write: “Tuning is bad empiricism. Calibration is bad empiricism with a bag over its head.” Yet Randall and Wielicki also acknowledge that, in the case of physical processes that are known to be important but are not well understood, there may be no choice.(4) In general, modelers view tuning as a necessary evil. Most try to observe certain constraints. Tuning should not, for example, bring the tuned variable outside its known range of observed behavior.
Edwards I 478
Provability of models: the logic of simulation modeling does not require, or even permit, definitive proof. For example, parameterizations by definition do not derive from exact physical principles; no one expects them to prove perfectly accurate. Naomi Oreskes, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, and Kenneth Belitz argued in the pages of Science that talk of “verification” or “validation” of models was bad epistemology.(5) The word ‘verification’, they wrote, normally implies definitive proof. But models, Oreskes et al. argued, are essentially intricate inductive arguments. Edwards: This implies only that model results agree with observations. This agreement, by itself, tells us nothing about whether the model reached its results for the right reasons.


1. Shackley. “Epistemic Lifestyles.” Changing the atmosphere: Expert knowledge and environmental governance, 107-33. 2001. Cambridge: MA MIT Press.
2. H. Svensmark and N. Calder, The Chilling Stars: The New theory of Climate Change (Icon Books, 2007).
3. A. Petersen, Simulating Nature: A Philosophical Study of Computer-Simulation Uncertainties and Their Role in Climate Science and Policy Advice (Het Spinhuis, 2007), 39.
4. D. A. Randall and B. A. Wielicki, “Measurements, Models, and Hypotheses in the Atmospheric Sciences,” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 78, no. 3 (1997), 403–.
5. N. Oreskes et al., “Verification, Validation, and confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences,” Science 263, no. 5147 (1994): 641–.


Edwards I
Paul N. Edwards
A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013
Modernism MacIntyre Brocker I 660
Modernism/Moral/MacIntyre: Thesis: Despite the efforts of three centuries, there is still no uniform, rationally justifiable explanation of a liberal, individualistic point of view (1). Dilemma: either one follows the efforts and the collapse of the Enlightenment (see Enlightenment/MacIntyre) until only Nietzsche's diagnosis remains, or one must say that the project of the Enlightenment should never have been tackled. (2)
See also Morals/MacIntyre, Enlightenment/MacIntyre, Nietzsche/MacIntyre.
Brocker I 661
Modernism Politics/MacIntyre: is nothing more than a "civil war by other means". (3) Solution/MacIntyre: as a last resort, MacIntyre proposes to develop local forms of community "in which civilisation and intellectual and moral life can be maintained beyond the new dark age that has already come upon us.“(4)
Brocker I 664
Modernism/MacIntyre: modernism does not understand itself. Modern fake morality is the result of a catastrophe that was not recognizable as a catastrophe (...). (5) Solution/MacIntyre: MacIntyre mobilizes the power of the saving narrative rather than rational arguments against the epochal context of delusion.
Brocker I 665
For MacIntyre, the human is a "narrative animal". (6) We are the story we live. Solution/MacIntyre: an affirmative confirmation of one's own dependence on tradition.
Brocker I 666
This would be a new virtue which should not be confused with a form of conservative enthusiasm for the old. Instead, an adequate sense of tradition manifests itself in the access to those future possibilities that the past has made available for the present. (7) MacIntyre has no hope of salvation from the unease of modernism. A feeling of sentimentality or even grief is intended. (8)


1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987), p. 345
2. Ibid. p. 160
3. Ibid. p. 337.
4. Ibid. p. 350.
5. Ibid. p. 16
6. Ibid. p. 288
7. Ibid. p. 297f.
8. Ibid. p. 201.

Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Observation Quine Rorty I 296
Weight of theory in observation: from it follows Quine’s overthrow of the two dogmas. (Kuhn, Feierabend). If we were to admit for once that Newton was not better than Aristotle, because his words corresponded with reality, and if we were to base our preference not simply on the vague holistic reasoning that Newton allowed us to better get on with reality, then we would have no arguments for the separation of science from religion.
Quine I 89f
Stimulus meaning is independent of number of speakers - observation proximity: societal: similarity of the stimulus meaning in the Community. - Observation proximity high: colors. - Low: Bachelor. >Stimulus Meaning/Quine.
I 97f
Gaurisankar: opportunity sentences are mutually exclusive, after discovery stimulus meanings collapse.
II 43
Categorical observation sentences: are independent of space and time where there’s smoke, there’s fire - through language learning - knowledge still needs space/time - but they are theoretical terms! - Truth of categorical observation sentences not by observation - But by falsification. (> Falsification/Popper).
V 61f
Observation/Theory/Quine: here there are two relationships: an epistemological one of confirmation and a semantic one through which the sentences acquire meaning - these two relations are coextensive, in other words: the epistemological and semantic relationship between observations and sentences are coextensive. - ((s) This is not identity.)
V 64
Observation/Quine: does not define! - Instead: observation sentences. - Observation: smell, taste, touch, hearing sensation. - Behavioral criterion: consent, agreement that do not rely on sense data. - ((s) but on language? - B-sentence: Does usually not speak about feelings but external things, no conclusions - ultimately everyday language, not specialization. >Observation Sentences/Quine.
V 67
Everyone learns their object language in their own way. >Object Language/Quine.
V 68
But it must be possible to learn by direct conditioning - learning by determining the similarity basis.
V 94
Observation sentence: only has a truth value in conjunction with a situation.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Physics Quine X 132
Physics/theory/empirical/Quine: a partial physical theory (also completely theoretically) is still regarded as physics, as long as it has a mixed lexicon. Anything that it contributes to the order of the data is attributed to the partial theory as indirect empirical confirmation. - ((s) > network, holism). - Empiricism always confirmed the overall system. Logic is just as revisable as quantum mechanics or the Relativity Theory. - Even mathematics is moderately receptive to empiricism. >Empiricism/Quine.
X 117
Physics/Quine: has more weight than set theory, because I see the justification of mathematics only in what it contributes to real science. Physics: is closer to the observation data than set theory.
>Set Theory/Quine.
X 133
Mathematics/Physics/Logics/Empiricism/Quine: Thesis: there are only differences in the degree of susceptibility to empiricism here.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Police Interrogations Social Psychology Parisi I 133
Police interrogations/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: In the United States, physical force is no longer permitted in interrogations - the law requires confessions to be given voluntarily. Today, about half of all interrogations produce incriminating statements (Kassin et al., 2007(1); Schulhofer, 1987(2); Thomas, 1996(3)). Given that confessing to a crime is "an exceedingly self-defeating proposition, regardless of one's actual guilt" (D. Simon, 2012)(4), social psychologists have been interested in investigating why so many suspects choose to confess. More importantly, why do suspects confess to crimes they did not commit? False confessions: In most cases, the answer lies in the psychological pressures brought to bear in modern interrogation procedures. In one experiment, 36% of guilty suspects and 81 % of innocent suspects agreed to waive their right to remain
Parisi I 134
silent and talk to police (Kassin and Norwick, 2004)(5). Of those who agreed to waive their right to remain silent, most guilty suspects did so to avoid looking suspicious. Most innocent suspects did so because they felt they had nothing to hide. Deception: A large body of literature reporting tests of people's ability to detect deception has demonstrated that people on average perform no better than chance, and with few exceptions trained offcers perform at the same level as laypersons, albeit with high levels of confidence (Bond and DePaulo, 2006(6); Kassin, 2008(7); Kassin Meissner and Norwick 2005(8). Meissner and Kassin 2002(9). D. Simon 2012(4). Vrij, Edward, and Bull, 2001)(10). Because police investigators have trouble distinguishing between true and false confessions, they have little reason to stop an interrogation until the confession is obtained.
Bias: Generally, once people form an impression, they are motivated to verify it rather than disconfirm it (Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968(11); Snyder and Swann, 1978(12)), and the tendency to try to confirm guilt holds true in the interrogation room - when interrogators already believe that a suspect is guilty, they are more likely to use aggressive tactics like the presentation of false evidence and promises of leniency (Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, 2003)(13).
>False confessions/Social psychology.


1. Kassin, S. M., R. A. Leo, C. A. Meissner, K. D. Richman, L. H. Colwell, A.-M. Leach, and D. L. Fon (2007). "Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs." Law and Human Behavior 31 381-400. doi:10.1007/s10979-006-9073-5.
2. Schulhofer, S. J. (1987). "Reconsidering Miranda." University of Chicago Law Review 54: 435.
3. Thomas, G. C. I. (1996). "Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A Steady-State
theory of Confessions." UCLA Law Review 43:933.
4. Simon, D. (2012). In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal Justice Process. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
5. Kassin, S. M. and R. J. Norwick (2004). "Why People Waive Their 'Miranda' Rights: The Power of Innocence." Law and Human Behavior 28(2): 211—221.
6. Bond, C. F. and B. M. DePaulo (2006). "Accuracy of Deception Judgments." Personality and
Socia Psychology Review doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003 2.
7. Kassin, S. M. (2008). " The Psychology of Confessions." Annual Review of Law and social science 4(1): 193-217. doi:10.1146/annurev.1awsocsci.4.110707.172410.
8. Kassin, S. M., C. A. Meissner, and R. J. Norwick (2005). "'I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One': A Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators." Law and Human Behavior 29(2): 211-227. doi:10.1007/s10979-005-2416-9.
9. Meissner, C. A. and S. M. Kassin (2002). "'He's Guilty!': Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception." Law and Human Behavior 26(5):469-480. doi:10.1023/ A:1020278620751.
10. Vrij, A., K. Edward, and R. Bull (2001). "Police Offcers' Ability to Detect Deceit: The Benefit of Indirect Deception Detection Measures." Legal and Criminological Psychology 6(2): 185-196. doi:10.1348/135532501168271.
11. Rosenthal, R. and L. Jacobson (1968). "Pygmalion in the Classroom." The Urban Review 3(1):
16-20. doi:10.1007/BF02322211.
12. Snyder, M. and W. B. Swann (1978). "Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction."
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36: 1202-1212.
13. Kassin, S. M., C. C. Goldstein, and K. Savitsky (2003). "Behavioral confirmation in the Interrogation Room: On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt." Law and Human Behavior 27(2):
187-203.

Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press


Parisi I
Francesco Parisi (Ed)
The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Positivism Putnam I (a) 41
PutnamVsPopper/PutnamVsMach: VsPositivismus: is idealistic, does not correspond to reality.
I (a) 44
PutnamVsPositivismus: according to him truth is not trans-theoretical - it is only a trans-theoretical concept, "leads to successful prediction" - >Prediction. Putnam: instead: Realism: must adhere to logic of truth transfers. >Realism.
I (a) 45
From the fact that two theories lead to successful predictions, it does not follow, that their conjunction leads to that - reason: the predicate, which plays the role of truth ("leads to prediction") does not have the characteristics of truth.
I (a) 49
Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivism: the theory does not determine the significance - otherwise the concept of gravity would change if a 10th Planet would be discovered - also the positivists demand that the theory is also dependent on all additional assumptions, otherwise the scheme of theory and prediction would collapse. ---
I (h) 215
Truth/Positivism: which degree of confirmation one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose - Putnam: that is relativism - it has no answer to the enemy that says, "in my system the P is not rational". >Rationality/Putnam.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Probability Theory Norvig Norvig I 503
Probability theory/Norvig/Russell: Probability theory was invented as a way of analyzing games of chance. In about 850 A.D. the Indian mathematician Mahaviracarya described how to arrange a set of bets that can’t lose (what we now call a Dutch book). In Europe, the first significant systematic analyses were produced by Girolamo Cardano around 1565, although publication was posthumous (1663). By that time, probability had been established as a mathematical discipline due to a series of
Norvig I 504
results established in a famous correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat in 1654. As with probability itself, the results were initially motivated by gambling problems (…). The first published textbook on probability was De Ratiociniis in Ludo Aleae (Huygens, 1657)(1). The “laziness and ignorance” view of uncertainty was described by John Arbuthnot in the preface of his translation of Huygens (Arbuthnot, 1692)(2): “It is impossible for a Die, with such determin’d force and direction, not to fall on such determin’d side, only I don’t know the force and direction which makes it fall on such determin’d side, and therefore I call it Chance, which is nothing but the want of art...”
Laplace (1816)(3) gave an exceptionally accurate and modern overview of probability; he was the first to use the example “take two urns, A and B, the first containing four white and two black balls, . . . ” The Rev. Thomas Bayes (1702–1761) introduced the rule for reasoning about conditional probabilities that was named after him (Bayes, 1763)(4). Bayes only considered the case of uniform priors; it was Laplace who independently developed the general case.
Kolmogorov (1950(5), first published in German in 1933) presented probability theory in a
rigorously axiomatic framework for the first time. Rényi (1970)(6) later gave an axiomatic presentation that took conditional probability, rather than absolute probability, as primitive.
Objectivism: Pascal used probability in ways that required both the objective interpretation, as a property
of the world based on symmetry or relative frequency, and the subjective interpretation, based on degree of belief—the former in his analyses of probabilities in games of chance, the latter in the famous “Pascal’s wager” argument about the possible existence of God. However, Pascal did not clearly realize the distinction between these two interpretations. The distinction was first drawn clearly by James Bernoulli (1654–1705).
Subjectivism: Leibniz introduced the “classical” notion of probability as a proportion of enumerated, equally probable cases, which was also used by Bernoulli, although it was brought to prominence by Laplace (1749–1827). This notion is ambiguous between the frequency interpretation and the subjective interpretation. The cases can be thought to be equally probable either because of a natural, physical symmetry between them, or simply because we do not have any knowledge that would lead us to consider one more probable than another.
Principle of indifference: The use of this latter, subjective consideration to justify assigning equal probabilities is known as the principle of indifference. The principle is often attributed to Laplace, but he never isolated the principle explicitly.
Principle of insufficient reason: George Boole and John Venn both referred to [the principle of indifference] as the principle of insufficient reason; the modern name is due to Keynes (1921)(7).
Objectivism/Subjectivism: The debate between objectivists and subjectivists became sharper in the 20th century. Kolmogorov (1963)(8), R. A. Fisher (1922)(9), and Richard von Mises (1928)(10) were advocates of the relative frequency interpretation.
Propensity: Karl Popper’s (1959(11), first published in German in 1934) “propensity” interpretation traces relative frequencies to an underlying physical symmetry.
Belief degree: Frank Ramsey (1931)(12), Bruno de Finetti (1937)(13), R. T. Cox (1946)(14), Leonard Savage (1954)(15), Richard Jeffrey (1983)(16), and E. T. Jaynes (2003)(17) interpreted probabilities as the degrees of belief of specific individuals. Their analyses of degree of belief were closely tied to utilities and to behavior - specifically, to the willingness to place bets.
Subjectivism: Rudolf Carnap, following Leibniz and Laplace, offered a different kind of subjective interpretation of probability - not as any actual individual’s degree of belief, but as the degree of belief that an idealized individual should have in a particular proposition a, given a particular body of evidence e.
Norvig I 505
Confirmation degree: Carnap attempted to go further than Leibniz or Laplace by making this notion of degree of confirmation mathematically precise, as a logical relation between a and e. Induction/inductive Logic: The study of this relation was intended to constitute a mathematical discipline called inductive logic, analogous to ordinary deductive logic (Carnap, 1948(18), 1950(19)). Carnap was not able to extend his inductive logic much beyond the propositional case, and Putnam (1963)(20) showed by adversarial arguments that some fundamental difficulties would prevent a strict extension to languages capable of expressing arithmetic.
Uncertainty: Cox’s theorem (1946)(14) shows that any system for uncertain reasoning that meets his set of assumptions is equivalent to probability theory. This gave renewed confidence to those who already favored probability, but others were not convinced, pointing to the assumptions (primarily that belief must be represented by a single number, and thus the belief in ¬p must be a function of the belief in p). Halpern (1999)(21) describes the assumptions and shows some gaps in Cox’s original formulation. Horn (2003)(22) shows how to patch up the difficulties. Jaynes (2003)(17) has a similar argument that is easier to read. The question of reference classes is closely tied to the attempt to find an inductive logic.
Reference class problem: The approach of choosing the “most specific” reference class of sufficient size was formally proposed by Reichenbach (1949)(23). Various attempts have been made, notably by Henry Kyburg (1977(24), 1983(25)), to formulate more sophisticated policies in order to avoid some obvious fallacies that arise with Reichenbach’s rule, but such approaches remain somewhat ad hoc. More recent work by Bacchus, Grove, Halpern, and Koller (1992)(26) extends Carnap’s methods to first-order theories, thereby avoiding many of the difficulties associated with the straightforward reference-class method. Kyburg and Teng (2006)(27) contrast probabilistic inference with nonmonotonic logic. >Uncertainty/AI research.


1. Huygens, C. (1657). De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. In van Schooten, F. (Ed.), Exercitionum Mathematicorum. Elsevirii, Amsterdam. Translated into English by John Arbuthnot (1692
2. Arbuthnot, J. (1692). Of the Laws of Chance. Motte, London. Translation into English, with additions, of Huygens (1657).
3. Laplace, P. (1816). Essai philosophique sur les probabilit´es (3rd edition). Courcier Imprimeur,
Paris.
4. Bayes, T. (1763). An essay towards solving a problem in the doctrine of chances. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 53, 370–418.
5. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1950). Foundations of the theory of Probability. Chelsea.
6. Rényi, A. (1970). Probability theory. Elsevier/North-Holland.
7. Keynes, J. M. (1921). A Treatise on Probability. Macmillan.
8. Kolmogorov, A. N. (1963). On tables of random numbers. Sankhya, the Indian Journal of Statistics,
Series A 25.
9. Fisher, R. A. (1922). On the mathematical foundations of theoretical statistics. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series A 222, 309–368.
10. von Mises, R. (1928). Wahrscheinlichkeit, Statistik und Wahrheit. J. Springer
11. Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Basic Books.
12. Ramsey, F. P. (1931). Truth and probability. In Braithwaite, R. B. (Ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
13. de Finetti, B. (1937). Le prévision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives. Ann. Inst.Poincaré, 7, 1-68.
14. Cox, R. T. (1946). Probability, frequency, and reasonable expectation. American Journal of Physics,
14(1), 1–13.
15. Savage, L. J. (1954). The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley. 16. Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The Logic of Decision (2nd edition). University of Chicago Press.
17. Jaynes, E. T. (2003). Probability theory: The Logic of Science. Cambridge Univ. Press.
18. Carnap, R. (1948). On the application of inductive logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, 133-148.
19. Carnap, R. (1950). Logical Foundations of Probability. University of Chicago Press
20. Putnam, H. (1963). ‘Degree of confirmation’ and inductive logic. In Schilpp, P. A. (Ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, pp. 270–292. Open Court.
21. Halpern, J. Y. (1999). Technical addendum, Cox’s theorem revisited. JAIR, 11, 429–435.
22. Horn, K. V. (2003). Constructing a logic of plausible inference: A guide to cox’s theorem. IJAR, 34,
3–24.
23. Reichenbach, H. (1949). The theory of Probability: An Inquiry into the Logical and Mathematical
Foundations of the Calculus of Probability (second edition). University of California Press
24. Kyburg, H. E. (1977). Randomness and the right reference class. J. Philosophy, 74(9), 501-521.
25. Kyburg, H. E. (1983). The reference class. Philosophy of Science, 50, 374–397.
26. Bacchus, F., Grove, A., Halpern, J. Y., and Koller, D. (1992). From statistics to beliefs. In AAAI-92,
pp. 602-608.
27. Kyburg, H. E. and Teng, C.-M. (2006). Nonmonotonic logic and statistical inference. Computational
Intelligence, 22(1), 26-51.

Norvig I
Peter Norvig
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010

Psychological Stress Neurobiology Corr I 417
Psychological Stress/Neurobiology/Matthews: The Yerkes-Dodson Law is also discredited as a principle for stress research (Matthews, Davies, Westerman and Stammers 2000)(1). It claims that higher levels of arousal are optimal for easier tasks, but Matthews, Davies and Lees (1990) provided a direct disconfirmation. Energetic arousal related to better performance on difficult vigilance tasks, but not easy ones. Other biologically-based theories may do a better job of explanation. For example, Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST) (Philip J. Corr 2004(3), >Reinforcement sensitivity/Corr) links the impulsivity and anxiety traits to the sensitivity of brain systems for reward and punishment.

1. Matthews, G., Davies, D. R., Westerman, S. J. and Stammers, R. B. 2000. Human performance: cognition, stress and individual differences. London: Psychology Press
2. Matthews, G., Davies, D. R. and Lees, J. L. 1990. Arousal, Extraversion, and individual differences in resource availability, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 150–68
3. Corr, P. J. 2004. Reinforcement sensitivity theory and personality, Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 28: 317–32


Gerald Matthews, „ Personality and performance: cognitive processes and models“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009

Corr II
Philip J. Corr (Ed.)
Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018
Reason McGinn I 171
Reason/McGinn: cannot establish a complete theory of its own. ---
I 216
Reason/biology/McGinn: our reason is not sufficient to explain our reason - That the existence emerges of theories which we cannot comprehend, is a confirmation of biology. ---
I 217
Why should we be equipped by biology so that we philosophically understand confusion? - We should, however, be surprised that we know so much at all.

McGinn I
Colin McGinn
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
German Edition:
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McGinn II
C. McGinn
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
German Edition:
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

Science Mayr I 51
Science/Mayr: puts great importance on the discovery of new "facts" that the creation of new concepts (or terms) moves into the background. Darwin would not have won the Nobel Prize because "selection" was not a "discovery" but a new concept, a new theory. ---
I 54
Science/Mayr: the development against superstition, in the direction of provability, was unfavorable to biology itself, since it could not offer reproducible experiments. ---
I 56
John Moore (1993) "Eight Criteria of Science": 1. Must be based on data obtained in the field or laboratory by observation or request
Without relying on natural factors.
2. In order to answer questions, data must be collected. In order to confirm assumptions observations must be done.
3. Objective methods must be used to avoid subjective bias.
4. Hypotheses must agree with observations and concepts.
5. Any hypothesis must be verified, competing hypotheses have to be developed. Their suitability is to be compared.
6. Generalizations must be universally valid in the field of corresponding science. Unique events must be explainable, without supernatural factors.
7. confirmation only after repetition.
8. Steadily improving theories.
---
I 58
"Provincial Science": a polemical concept, introduced for a distinction from physics whose law is universally valid. ---
I 62
Science/Biology/Mayr: the integration of biology into science philosophy has changed many of its principles: Rejection of strict determinism and trust in universal laws, the acceptance of purely probabilistic predictions and historical representations.
---
I 65
E. M. Carr (Spiritual Scientist) (1961) 5 Differences History/Science: 1. History: Special, Science: General
2. History does not teach lessons
3. History, unlike science, makes no predictions
4. History subjective, science: objective
5. History, unlike science, also touches religious and moral questions.
---
I 141
Science/Evolution/Mayr: Difference: genetic diversity is random and not a fruit of considerations. This difference is not so important, however, because the source of diversity does not play an important role in Darwinism! Cultural transmission is something quite different than genetic inheritance.
But: the most appropriate theory comes through: this is a Darwinian process.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Semantic Holism Fodor IV 41
Semantic holism/Fodor/Lepore: Combination of Quine-Duhem thesis (no sentence individually verifiable) with Verificationism. - QDT: every sentence of a theory determines the level of verifiability of every other sentence of the theory. - Verificationism: Meaning = verification method. - Holism: every sentence of the theory determines the meaning of every other seentence of the theory. - Fodor/LeporeVsHolism: then only identical theories could have any common inferences - that cannot be true.
IV ~ 49
Fodor/Lepore VsSH: natural semantic objects are linguistic: for example, Formulas of nat. Object of confirmation. Trans-linguistically: propositions. - Verificationism and CH are both true, but of different things! - Therefore, SH does not follow.
IV 54
Meaning holism/Fodor/Lepore: additional argument pro: according to Russell s incomplete symbol: this is defined in use - use then represents the larger unit - Fodor/LeporeVs: 1) Definition in use does not guarantee meaning - 2) unclear whether they have the semantic properties from the relations of words to the sentences in which they occur 3) unclear whether the syntactic and semantic units match.
IV 125
Meaning holism/MH/Fodor/Lepore: we can avoid the inference from belief holism to MH if we assume that the objects which have inherent semantic properties are initially neither prop. att.s nor speech acts, but representations.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Sensations Quine Rorty I 135
Quine: there are no feelings. (As the sun is not "rising".)
Quine V 15ff
Sensation/Quine: structured wholes (figures) - not flashes of light - VsBerkeley: Depth: is not accessible - perceived shape, not stimuli (> consciousness/Quine) - (this is within reception) - stimuli instead of sense data.
V 17
Gestalt TheoryVsSense Data - QuineVsGestalt Theory: meaning related with receptors, not with consciousness.
V 63
Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch and smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided.
Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories.
V 64
Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions ((s) circumstances), but of language ((s) > semantic ascent).
V 65
Observation Sentences/Quine: are the gateway to language and science. They usually do not talk about feelings but about external things.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Stereotype Threat Psychological Theories Haslam I 249
Stereotype threat/psychological theories: after Steele and Aronson’s (1995)(1) article introducing the concept of stereotype threat which was about the behavior of African Americans in test situations Stereotype threat/Aronson/Steele, >Experiment/Aronson/Steele), researchers from many different labs began reporting evidence for the notion that essentially any group, given the right context, could feel threatened by a negative stereotype in ways that might undermine performance. In addition to the original effects among African Americans taking a verbal ability test, stereotype threat effects have been documented among Latinos, individuals of low socioeconomic status (SES), and psychology majors (compared with science majors) taking a challenging test of intellectual ability (Gonzales et al., 2002(2); Croizet et al., 1998,2004(3)). Other studies of cognitive performance have shown that stereotype threat can affect elderly individuals completing a memory assessment, individuals with a history of mental illness taking an intellectual test (Quinn et al., 2004)(4), or head trauma patients taking a neurological test (Kit et al., 2008)(5). Considerable follow-up research has applied the theory to understand the often-found gender gap in mathematical testing (Logel et al., 2012(6); Spencer et al., 1999)(7). Behavior: Beyond effects on intellectual or cognitive performance, stereotype threat has also been shown to impair other kinds of behaviours.
Sports: Stereotype threat can affect Whites completing what was assumed to be a test of athletic ability (Stone et al., 1999)(8), women engaging in negotiations with men (Kray et al., 2001)(9), and women completing driving simulations (Yeung and von Hippel, 2008)(10).
Associations: In more social contexts, stereotype threat can lead Whites concerned with appearing racist to experience mental load in interracial interactions (Richeson and Shelton, 2003)(11) or exhibit greater activation of bias on an implicit association test (Frantz et al., 2004)(12).
Sensitivity: Stereotype threat can lead men to underperform on measures of social sensitivity (Koenig and Eagly, 2005)(13) and elevate anxiety among gay men led to believe they would be interacting with children (Bosson et al., 2004)(14).
Sexism: Cues to subtle sexism, a cartoon demeaning women’s math performance on a lab wall, can for example impair women’s math performance (Adams et al., 2006(15); Oswald and Harvey, 2000(16)).
Minority: But simply being outnumbered by men in a math or science context can also trigger a concern among women that they might not belong or perform well in the setting (Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev, 2000(17); Murphy, Steele and Gross, 2007(18)).
Anonymity: Importantly, individuals often need to feel personally invested in doing well, as individual anonymity often reduces effects (Jamieson and Harkins, 2010(19); Wout et al., 2008(20); Zhang et al., 2013)(21). >Stereotype threat/Forbes/Schmader, >Explanation/Forbes/Schmader, >Stereotypes/Social Psychology.



1. Steele, C.M. and Aronson, J. (1995) ‘Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African-Americans’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 797—811.
2. Gonzales, P.M., Blanton, H. and Williams, K.J. (2002) ‘The effects of stereotype threat and
double-minority status on the test performance of Latino women’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28: 659—70.
3. Croizet, J., Després, G., Gauzins, M., Huguet, P., Leyens, J. and Méot, A. (2004) ‘Stereotype threat undermines intellectual performance by triggering a disruptive mental load’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30: 721—31.
4. Quinn, D.M., Kahng, S.K. and Crocker, J. (2004) ‘Discreditable: Stigma effects of revealing a mental illness history on test performance Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30: 803—15.
5. Kit, K.A., Tuokko, H.A. and Mateer, C.A. (2008) ‘A review of the stereotype threat literature and its application in a neurological population’, Neuropsychology Review, 18: 132—48.
6. Logel, C.R., Walton, G.M., Spencer, S.J., Peach, J. and Mark, Z.P. (2012) Unleashing latent ability: Implications of stereotype threat for college admissions’, Educational Psychologist, 47: 42—50.
7. Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M. and Quinn, D.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat and women’s math performance’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 35:4—28.
8. Stone, J., Lynch, C.I., Sjomeling, M. and Darley, J.M. (1999) ‘Stereotype threat effects on Black and White athletic performance’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77: 1213—2 7.
9. Kray, L.J., Thompson, L. and Galinsky, A. (2001) Batt1e of the sexes: Gender stereotype confirmation and reactance in negotiations’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80: 942—58.
10. Yeung, N.CJ. and von Hippel, C. (2008) ‘Stereotype threat increases the likelihood that female drivers in a simulator run over jaywalkers’, Accident Analysis and Prevention, 40: 66 7—74.
11. Richeson, J.A. and Shelton, J.N. (2003) ‘When prejudice does not pay: Effects of interracial contact on executive function’, Psycho1ogica Science, 14: 28 7—90.
12. Frantz, C.M., Cuddy, A.J.C., Burnett, M., Ray, H. and Hart, A. (2004) ‘A threat in the computer:
The race implicit association test as a stereotype threat experience’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30: 1611—24.
13. Koenig, A.M. and Eagly, A.H. (2005) ‘Stereotype threat in men on a test of social sensitivity’,
Sex Roles, 52:489—96.
14. Bosson, J.K., Haymovitz, E.L. and Pinel, E.C. (2004) When saying and doing diverge: The effects of stereotype threat on self-reported versus non-verbal anxiety’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40: 247—5 5.
15. Adams, G., Garcia, D.M., Purdie-Vaughns, V. and Steele, C.M. (2006) ‘The detrimental effects of a suggestion of sexism in an instruction situation’, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42: 602—15.
16. Oswald, D.L. and Harvey, R.D. (2000) ‘Hostile environments, stereotype threat, and math performance among undergraduate women’, Current Psychology: Developmental, Learning, Personality, Social, 19: 3 38—56.
17. Inzlicht, M. and Ben-Zeev, T. (2000) ‘A threatening intellectual environment: Why females are susceptible to experiencing problem-solving deficits in the presence of males’, Psychological Science, 1 1: 365—71.
18. Murphy, M.C., Steele, C.M. and Gross, J.J. (2007) ‘Signaling threat: How situational cues affect women in math, science, and engineering settings’, Psychological Science, 18: 879—85.
19. Jamieson, J.P. and Harkins, S.G. (2010) ‘Evaluation is necessary to produce stereotype threat performance effects’, Social Influence, 5: 75—86.
20. Wout, D., Danso, H., Jackson, J. and Spencer, S. (2008) ‘The many faces of stereotype threat: Group- and se1f-threat, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44:792—99.
21. Zhang, S., Schmader, T. and Hall, W.M. (2013) L’eggo my ego: Reducing the gender gap in math by unlinking the self from performance’, Self and Identity, 12: 400—12.


Toni Schmader and Chad Forbes, “Stereotypes and Performance. Revisiting Steele and Aronson’s stereotypes threat experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Theories Wright I 205f
The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not be to question the contrast between data and theory. (Wright6) Theoreticity of observation/theory/Wright:
  4. the type if theory ladenness that it needs to bring the distinction data/theory in trouble is a lot more (see above):
  It must be shown that the conditions for legitimate assertion (assertibility) is necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experience, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs.
---
I 207
WrightVsTheoreticity of observation/theory ladenness: if all observation is theory-laden, there are no statements, to which any subject is obliged to agree to. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section).   Wright: the legitimate assertibility is rather a four-digit relation between:
Statement - subject - experience development - background assumptions.
Evidence: Whether a theory is erroneous or properly, must now (see above) be visible in principle at least. However, such confirmation may ultimately only be provided with independent credible data. (Vstheory-ladenness of observation).
  The Example can show the possibility that this remains undecidable.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Truth Quine Rorty I 217
Quine: "Hund" is the German word for "dog" and "Robinson believes in God" this is not a truth type that expresses a "fact", something "actual". Instead the positivist distinction between conventional and empirically confirmed truth, Quine offers us a distinction between truth by virtue of convenience and truth by virtue of correspondence.
Quine: truths about meaning, opinions and propositional truths are somehow not real truths - just as applied for the positivists that necessary truths are not really "about the world".
---
Quine I 55
Truth: QuineVsPeirce infinite confirmation is not ideal but always correctable - false analogy of the limit value of an approach to truth.
I 117
Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object - Our special denoting apparatus - but stimulus meaning similar for natives - Goodman’s individual calculus translatable as syllogistic.
I 232
Truth is not ambiguous, but universal: a true confession is as true as mathematical law - difference between laws and confessions - Even "existence" is not ambiguous.
I 425/26
"Make true": takes facts as something concrete (VsDummett?). Truth: not confirmation through evidence - it could always be reinterpreted - Truth is immanent, there is nothing above it - Interpretation is always within a theory.
---
II 55 f
DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: No thing makes sentences true (make true) - Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to beliefs. ---
Putnam II 205f
Truth/Quine: is not a property - (where?) - But only recognizes immanent truth - within evolving theory - problem: how to escape solipsism? ---
Quine VI 109
Truth/Meaning/Quine: 1) sentences themselves bear truth - 2) sentence meaning as truth bearer - Problem: sentence meaning is unclear - dependent on other sentences (circular) - truth value may depend on the situation and intention - i.e. better 1st sentence as the truth bearer - "Proposition": as sentence meaning only timeless sentences, the truth value must not change, even if unknown.
VI 113
Truth is quote redemption. ---
VII (b) 35ff
Truth/Quine: based on two components: language and extralinguistic reality - but that does not mean that truth could be split into a linguistic and a fact component - (s) because it consists of both, it cannot be separated. ---
VII (g) 134
Truth/Tarski/Quine: always only with reference to language - "is white iff" is just gibberish - i.e. a combination of letters that cannot be true. ---
X 34
Truth/language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or signs in one language are equivalent with E.g. 55 - because of this relativity it makes sense to ascribe a truth value only to tokens of sentences.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Two Dogmas Fodor IV ~ 45
Meaning/Two Dogmas/Quine/Fodor: if confirmation is reversible and meaning depends on confirmation (Peirce), then their statements may have their significance not essentially - PeirceVsQuine: confirmation constitutes meaning and therefore can not be contingent. - Then see Quine-Duhem Thesis and Peirce's theory of incompatible - but Two Dogmas seems to becommitted to both.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Verification Hempel I 99
Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. ---
Bubner I 125
Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences.
Formal rules of derivation:
Rehabilitation of deduction.
With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr)
I 127
Deduction schema/Hempel:
C1, C2,... Ck
L1, L2,... Lr
E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle).
GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws.
Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses.

Hempel I
Carl Hempel
"On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Hempel II
Carl Hempel
Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950
German Edition:
Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982

Hempel II (b)
Carl Hempel
The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951
German Edition:
Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung
In
Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982


Bu I
R. Bubner
Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992
Verification Kuhn I 156
Verification/Science/Kuhn: is always theory-relative. - has no fixed criteria. - Rather probability. ---
I 157
Therefore verification rather resembles a selection. See also >Confirmation, >Falsification, >Confirmation/Science.

Kuhn I
Th. Kuhn
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962
German Edition:
Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973

Verification Quine I 56
QuineVsVerification: it is pointless to equate a sentence with one outside of the theory - Inter-theoretically this has no meaning.
VII (b) 38
Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke).
Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it.
Quine: that's ambivalent between:
Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as
a) event
b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned.
Verification theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning
VII (b) 39
to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression.
VII 40
Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance
VII (b) 41
or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory.
Quine thesis: (based on Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Verification (Confirmation) Davidson Horwich I 463
Confirmation/Reference/Empiricism/Evidence/Davidson/Rorty: the lines of confirmation are not parallel to those of the reference. This is due to epistemic holism. - The knowledge of the former is the knowledge of the language, the one of the latter an empirical theory about the meaning (to mean) of the language. - This is also a history about the causal roles within the language behaviour in the interaction with the environment. confirmation/Wittgenstein/Davidson: not by "evidence". - No link with causality - otherwise "meanings" as entities.


Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Verification (Confirmation) Quine I 54
Confirmation/QuineVsPeirce: infinite confirmation is not ideal but always correctable. False analogy of the limit value of an approximation to truth.
II 36
Truth/Quine: is not confirmed by evidence! They could always be reinterpreted. Truth is intrinsic, there is nothing about it. Interpretation always takes place within a theory.
II 43
Quine: but we still see room for intuitive confirmation.
II 44
We rely more and more on confirmed observation sentences through conditioning. The categorical observation sentences form the empirical content because only through them theory is linked to observation.
V 61/62
Observation/Theory/Quine: here there are two relationships: one epistemological of confirmation and one semantic, through which the sentences get their meaning. These two relations are coextensive.
V 63
Observation/Quine: e.g. face, hearing, touch, smell sensation. N.B.: for their role as confirmation or also as semantic reference points, however, it is crucial that they are something socially divided.
Problem: two people will judge them differently, partly because they notice different characteristics, partly because they have different theories.
V 64
Solution/Quine: one should speak neither of sensations nor of environmental conditions, but of language. ((s) >Semantic Ascent).
Fodor IV 37ff
Verification (Confirmation)/Quine: cannot follow from meaning - Tarski/(s) in the case of "snow is white" it can naturally not be about verification - although statements are individuated through their content, i.e. that they are essential to them, from this does not follow anything related to possible verification - ((s) but certainly about verification conditions?) - QuineVsPeirce: (Peirce thesis meaning = method of verification): it can all turn out to be wrong, i.e. ~ even the meaning - ((s)> E.g. Putnam, stars replaced by light bulbs).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Verificationism Putnam VII 440
VsVerificationism: must say that we understand sentences about the past by asking how we will verify them in the future. >Meaning change, >theory change, >confirmation.
V 145
Verificationism/Putnam: the methods of verification have been institutionalized by modern society.
I 52
Def Meaning/Perice: the meaning of a mental view is identical to the sum of its practical consequences. Putnam: this leads to verificationism.
I 53
Argument of the open question/Putnam: what does an expression mean if it means more than that we will have certain experiences? (Position of Verificationism). PutnamVs: the verificationist talks here as if he had succeeded in translating our everyday language into a special sensualist language.
But one should not demand that every word of the thing speech (thing language) has the same meaning in the sensual language.
Verificationism/Putnam: is a phenomenalism in the heart.

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Verificationism Quine VII (b) 37
Verification Theory of Meaning/Peirce/Quine: the method of empirically determining the confirmation or refutation of a statement is its meaning. Then an analytical statement is the boundary case that is confirmed no matter what the case is.
Synonymy exists when the method of empirical confirmation or refutation is the same.
This is then about cognitive synonymy of statements, not generally about linguistic forms. ((s) Terms below the sentence level).
Meaning/Term/Cl.Lewis/Quine: Meaning of an expression: "a criterion in mind" mental criterion (criterion in mind) in relation to which one is able to accept or reject the expression in the face of a fact. (Cl. I. Lewis 1948,p.133).
VII (b) 38
Verification Theory/Verificationism/Quine: but what are the methods or the nature of the relation between a statement and the experiences that should contribute to confirmation or refutation? 1. Most naïve view: radical reduction: direct report. This precedes the actual verification theory for a long time. (Locke and Hume, Tooke).
Tooke: a term should be the name of a sense date or a part of it, or an abbreviation for it.
Quine: that is ambivalent between:
Sense Data/Quine: can be understood as
a) event
b) quality. This remains vague as far as the contribution to the whole statement is concerned.
Verification theory/Quine: we better take whole statements as units of meaning,
VII (b) 39
to translate them into sense data language, not expression for expression.
VII (b) 40
Reductionism/Two Dogmas/Quine: 2. More refined form: each utterance is associated with a uniform range of possible sensory impressions, so that each occurrence either increases the probability (likelihood) of the truth of the utterance
VII (b) 41
or narrows it. This, of course, is contained in the verification theory.
Quine thesis: (comes from Carnap's "construction"): our statements stand before the tribunal of experience not individually, but as a whole corpus. (>Quine-Duhem-Thesis).
Two Dogmas/Quine: the verification theory thus shows us the intimate connection of the two dogmas of empiricism: 1. Analytic/Synthetic and 2. Reductionism.

X 23
Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a proposition would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning. QuineVsPeirce: that also equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information.
Basic order: is here the totality of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions.
Introspection: some knowledge theorists would catalogue these alternatives by introspecting the sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve irritation (at the nerve ends).
Problem: one cannot clearly assign the sensory evidence to individual sentences ((s) formulations). (Indeterminacy of empiricism).

XI 76
Def Synonymy/Verification Theory/Meaning/Lauener: according to verification theory, two statements are synonymous if the method of their empirical verification is the same. Def Analyticity: is then the borderline case where there is no need for a method of confirmation.

XII 11
Verificationism/Quine: what is its status? Ultimately, the theory of meaning must also be empirical. Because analyticity is not tenable, the verification theory of meaning is not tenable either.
XII 96
Verification Theory/Quine: the Viennese Circle did not advocate verification theory strongly enough. Problem: many sentences are theoretical.
Thus the concept of facts has no meaning!
Subject Matter/QuineVsSubject Matter/QuineVsWittgenstein: the term has no meaning, because most propositions are theoretical (except for the pure observation sentences).
But this is not a problem for the verification theory of meaning.
Verification theory of Meaning/Quine: pro: the kind of meaning necessary for language learning and translation is the empirical meaning and nothing more.
XII 105
Epistemology/Quine: thus becomes semantics. But it still revolves around observation (because of the verification theory of meaning). If we go beyond the observation sentences, epistemology merges with psychology and linguistics.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Verificationism Stroud I 203
Verificationism / Stroud: in everyday life, it is never satisfied. - A successful theory of confirmation must therefore show what is wrong with the concept of confirmation. - But the problem of the external world is true for each term of confirmation as empirically undecidable.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984


The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. McDowell Vs Brandom, R. Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Cavell, St. Fodor Vs Cavell, St. III 222
Voluntary/CavellVsRyle: Thesis: such contradictions are not empirical in any reasonable sense.
III 224
FodorVsCavell: Fallacy: Cavell overlooks the difference between what a native speaker says (when speaking) and what a native speaker says about what he and others say (metalinguistic comments). However, the latter need not be true for the linguist to begin his investigation. Cavell has not shown that an empirical description is possible only if the metalinguistic assertions are true. If the linguist wanted to separate true findings from false ones before he starting with the description of the language, he would have to know a whole lot about the language before he begins with his work. If you cordon off empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant, you make a distinction without a difference. Distinction Without Difference/Fodor: E.g. when differentiating empirical linguistics from grammar and semantics as domains where empiricism is not relevant.
III 225
Cavell: empirical are E.g. statements of native speakers about the phonology of the language, but not statements about syntax and semantics. FodorVsCavell: 1) this is inconsistent: conversely, every argument that shows that the native speaker is privileged to findings about syntax and semantics would equally show that he is privileged to such about the phonology. That would be a reductio ad absurdum of the argument, because then the native speaker could never err about pronunciation (?). 2) Even if CavellVsRyle was right, that would not show that Ryle’s error is not empirical. Language/Empiricism/Cavell: his position is very extreme. Since he refers to the findings of native speakers as the truths of transcendental logic, he actually excludes the relevance of empirical confirmation! FodorVsCavell: he overlooks the fact that there are infinitely many findings that require empirical confirmation: E.g. "My name is not Stanley Cavell"... etc.
FodorVsCavell: 1) error: the assumption that we could only question the findings in a sensible way if there is a specific reason to believe they might be wrong. This makes credulity a virtue and philosophy a vice.
III 230
FodorVsCavell: 2) admittedly: it would be extraordinary to request reasons if we were often mistaken about what we say. Fodor: but if we are only sometimes mistaken, then it is always appropriate to demand reasons! From Cavell’s view it follows, however, that even if our lives depended on it, it would not be appropriate to question the findings! FodorVsCavell: 3) wrong assumption that what we say about our language is rarely wrong. He overlooks his own distinction between type I and type II findings. He is certainly right that we do not often err about type I.
Fodor: but we can often be mistaken with respect to type II findings: they are a kind of theory, an abstract representation of context properties. (see above III 220 Type I Findings: "We say...... but we do not say...." ((s) use findings) Type II Findings: The addition of type I findings by explanations. Type III Findings: Generalizations.).
III 232
FodorVsCavell: E.g. Baker/Professor: can be understood in two ways: a) what type of information does the Professor require? (Fodor: that would be non-empirical information. But Cavell is not asking for them. b) Cavell asks: if we already know that the language use of the baker is idiosyncratic, does then follow that the professor has no right to his "we" findings?. Cavell: No, that does not follow. Fodor: but you should bear in mind that this is irrelevant to the resolution of conflict between native speakers!
FodorVsCavell: he’s right: the existence of different language use does not exclude the "we" findings. But he says the right thing for the wrong reasons: the finding of the professor is one about the standard use. There could be no generalizations at all if deviating use could not be tolerated in certain dimensions.
III 233
FodorVsCavell: it looks philosophically more impressive if you say: "Your deviating language use shields your view at reality," as if it merely restricted the possibilities of expression. But even that is not necessarily the case if someone uses two non-interchangeable words synonymously.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Coherence Theory McDowell Vs Coherence Theory Esfeld I 185
McDowell: (1996, S 31 32): we are held captive by an oscillation between two positions: 1. a coherentism, that only permits rational relations between convictions.
2. the myth of the given, which confuses a causal relationship with a rational one. That is, it gives us an excuse rather than a justification.
I 186
McDowellVstheory of coherence: lets revolve our convictions in the void, because no rational constraint on the part of the world is allowed. Solution:
Term/world/McDowell: thesis: the conceptual realm is to be perceived of as having no boundaries: it does not end there, where people and their interactions end, rather it includes the entire physical realm.
Content/McDowell: the facts themselves, which make up the world.
To draw a boundary between the conceptual and the non-conceptual would prevent that we could utilize wordly, rational constraints on our convictions.
Esfeld: that could be understood as meaning that this limit is only shifted so that the conceptual includes the experience, but then the relationship between world and experience would still be merely causal.
World/McDowell: is in itself conceptual!
McDowellVsBrandom: Vs inferential semantics.
McDowellVsQuine: Vs confirmation of holism.
I 187
McDowell/Esfeld: opens up the prospect of a comprehensive holism based on a holism philosophy of mind. The holism of persuasion refers to the whole conceptual realm. McDowell's unlimited conceptual realm thus expands the holism of persuasion.
The physical world itself is not outside the realm of intelligibility.

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Devitt, M. Rorty Vs Devitt, M. Horwich I 463
Making True/True Maker/Davidson: the totality of evidence makes sentences or theories true. But no thing, no experience, no surface stimuli, not even the world makes sentences true. Rorty: I interpret this so that the inferential relations between beliefs have nothing in particular to do with the relation of "being about something" (aboutness relation) to objects. ((s) >Holism).
Reference/Empiricism/Evidence/Davidson/Rorty: the lines of the confirmation (evidential force) are not parallel to those of reference. That is due to the epistemic holism. Knowledge of the former is knowledge of the language, knowledge of the latter is an empirical theory about meaning in language use. This is also a story about the causal roles within language behavior in the interaction with the environment.
confirmation/Justification/Causality/Wittgenstein/Davidson/Rorty: linking justification (by confirmation, evidence) with the causal story is the old metaphysical urge Wittgenstein helped to overcome by warning against "meanings" as entities.
I 464
"Meanings" as entities: were then to play a double role as a cause and at the same time as justification. (>Explanation). E.g. sense data, e.g. surface stimuli. ((s) reductionism: question: does every reductionism assume double roles?)
RortyVsDevitt/RortyVsField: Devitt succumbs to the pre-Wittgensteinean temptation if he follows Field by saying that we the "intuitive idea of ​​a correspondence to an outside world" by wanting to make truth dependent on "true reference relations between words and objective reality". (DavidsonVsDevitt, DavidsonVsField, WittgensteinVsField: "real reference" pre-Wittgenstein).
RortyVsDummett: he succumbs to the same temptation if he thinks that a state of the world can verify ((s) make true) a conviction. This corresponds to the idea rejected by Davidson that pieces of the world make beliefs true. ((s) Contradiction to the above: I 461: here relation with inferential relations: "piece by piece", "stone by stone", Davidson pro).
Realism/Semantics/Devitt/Rorty: Devitt is right when he says that if we give up on Dummett's anti-holism, the question of "realism" is de-semanticized.
RortyVsDevitt: it is thus also trivialized. Because then you cannot distinguish realism from the banal anti-idealistic thesis that physical objects exist independently of mind. Devitt thinks that this is an interesting and controversial thesis.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Hempel, C. Schlick Vs Hempel, C. I 91
Context: Schlick: The foundation of knowledge" (1934) HempelVsSchlick). HempelVsSchlick: he was a "metaphysician and poet".
Proposition/reality/HempelVsSchlick: you cannot compare statements with facts!
SchlickVsHempel: you can without being a metaphysician.
I 92
E.g. I compare this sentence in my Baedeker "This cathedral has two towers" with reality: namely simply by looking at the cathedral. If someone has something against it, it may just be that he understands "Proposition" in another sense.
Coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick/HempelVscorrespondence theorie: you can only compare propositions with each other. ((s) Not propositions with reality).
Schlick: we can distinguish between cases where a written, printed or spoken proposition is compared with another written, printed or spoken proposition.
Schlick: and I call that the comparison a proposition with a fact.
HempelVsSchlick: statements can only be compared with other statements. ((s)> coherence, > coherence theory).
SchlickVsHempel: Why? I take out the modest freedom to compare everything with everything. If propositions and facts are to be too far from each other? Too different? Should it be a mysterious property of propositions that they cannot be compared with anything?
Fact/statement/Hempel: the gap between them is only a metaphysical.
SchlickVsHempel: that may be so, but who believes because in such a gap?
I 93
Def Proposition/Schlick: is a string along with the logical rules for their use. ((s) So almost a proposition, along with the importance of rules). Proposition meaning/Schlick: these rules culminate in "deictic" definitions that make up the meaning of the proposition.
Verification/compliance/correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: to verify the proposition, I have to find out if the (meaning-) rules were followed. Why should it be impossible? E.g. I look at the cathedral and then at the proposition and realize that the symbol "two" is used in the proposition in connection with the symbol "towers" and so I will get to the same icon when applying the rules of counting the cathedral towers.
Coherence theory/fact/proposition/Compare/Schlick: sometimes it is said that "in a logical sense" propositions can be compared only with other propositions. That may be so, but I do not know what is meant by a "comparison in a logical way".
Comparison/HempelVsSchlick: we cannot say exactly what a comparison of statements and facts is,
I 94
Because we cannot determine the structure of facts. Fact/structure/SchlickVsHempel: that we cannot determine the "structure of a fact" reminds me of the metaphysics of "things in themselves". If one does not deny the existence of facts, then why deny the possibility to determine their structure?
Structure of a fact: E.g. if I count the towers of a cathedral, I become familiar with the structure of a certain fact. If you wanted to say that it is meaningless to speak of "structures of facts" at all that would be merely a question of terminology. One proposition is also not per se meaningful, but only in conjunction with the rules for its use.
Fact/propositions/Compare/Vscorrespondence theory/SchlickVsHempel: that is what the whole controversy is about, if it should be impossible to compare propositions and facts, Hempel uses the words simply in a different sense. The easiest way to deny that you can compare them would be to say that there are simply no facts! (In formal speech: the rule of the word "fact" is such that it should not be used).
Or maybe the comparison is simply never applied in the sciences? I think this is true for purely logical sciences such as mathematics, but not in experimental sciences.
I 95
SchlickVsHempel: here is the psychological motivation of his criticism: it is about a vision that completely settles within the sciences. Science as a system of propositions. This should be a substitute for reality. Then "protocol statements" are used as a material, without subjecting them to an empirical test. Science/Schlick: But science is not the world! The universe of discourse is not the universe.
It's one thing to ask how their whole system is constructed and why it is generally regarded as true, and another, why I even look at them as true. This is a psychological question. But none of the "cultural subordination". My trust in science and colleagues is that I found them trustful, every time I checked their allegations.
I 96
Def confirmation/Schlick: the final step in the comparison between a statement and a fact. But one should not attach too much importance to the concept.
I 97
Fact/proposition/compare/match/correspondence/HempelVsSchlick: his example for comparison is not quite adequate. (E.g. "The cathedral has two towers"). Hempel: I agree that one can consider propositions as empirical objects that can be compared with any other empirical object. But if we take that literally it leads to something like:
I 98
E.g. "The proposition contains more parts, "the words" referred to" than the cathedral has towers". Correspondence/SchlickVsHempel: There is a different kind of comparison between proposition and fact: Comparison of symbols "two" in the sentence and the counting by looking at the cathedral.
HempelVsSchlick: so by that he compares a proposition in Baedeker with the result of an action by himself.
Coherence theory/Pointe: this result of the action is determined in a second proposition. And these two are compared! That is what I meant with "logical point".
Revision/verification/coherence theory/HempelVsSchlick: it's about whether the propositions contradict each other. This goes even without knowing the meanings of the propositions! (> Carnap: "The logical syntax of the language", "Philosophy and logical syntax"). Example, the above two propositions, both contain an icon that is shaped like "two".

Schlick I
Moritz Schlick
"Facts and Propositions" Analysis 2 (1935) pp. 65-70
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich 1994

Schlick II
M. Schlick
General Theory of Knowledge 1985
Identity Theory Loar Vs Identity Theory I 15
VsType-Identity Theory/Type Identity/Loar: has often been rejected by physicalism in recent years in favor of the weaker token identity. (stronger/weaker). Loar: but there are correlation theories that are even weaker and these are too weak. For example that each mental state corresponds to one or more physical states.
Type Identity (see below chapter 4): relativized to an individual at a certain time, there can be such a thing.
1. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: if there are token identities between propositional attitudes and physical states, then there are also type correlations. I.e. beliefs and desires are among the causes of movements and physical events have only physical causes.
I 16
Systematic Role: but we need it in addition: B is of a type that has a certain position in the system of state types of subject z, which are connected to t by certain counterfactual condition relations. Qualities 2. level: are involved here, a) of the persons, b) of the tokens of belief.
Problem: this is very cumbersome. Can we not accept a weaker theory? With qualities of the 1st level? Example B's systematic role then consists partly in its possible interactions with other attitudes.
Problem: in order to characterize types of attitudes, we have to abstract from their systematic roles.
Abstraction: but does not work with counterfactual properties of the 1st level. ((s) because they are always related to a certain individual).
I 17
Problem: then one should already have the concept of belief (circular). This is exactly the problem of analytical behaviorism. Solution/Loar: we go one level higher: quantification over types of the 1st level. For example, there are state types from z to t, which are organized counterfactually in this and that way.
Token-Identity: here the physical token B must fulfill the predicate: "x is a belief that p" i.e.
Systematic Role: from B to t must correspond to the position of this predicate in the belief-desire theory. However, the sR must be identified with a property of the 2. level! I.e. a property. The one that results from type-type relations for a person at a time t.
Property 2. Level/Loar: here "believe that p".
Mental state: is then identical to state types of the 2. level.
VsIdentity: a correlation, which is not an identity, between mental state types M1...Mn and physical state types 1. level P1...Pn can then have this logical form: z is in Mi power of a state of the 1. level with the systematic role involved in Mi and Pi is that state 1. level.
On the other hand:
State 1. level: can be described by "z's belief that p to t". This has for z this or that systematic role to t.
Identity theory/Loar: with this one can rightly say that mental states are identical with physical states of the 1. level.
N.B.: but one also needs the former sense of "mental state" to be able to express that two living beings are in the same mental state.
2. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: does not require token identities.
Thesis: if belief and desire are causes of behavior, there must be psychophysical type correlations for individuals at certain times.
N.B.: the argument is based on the consideration that no theory is immune to being irrelevant in terms of explanation.
I 18
E.g. by future science. Question: what status should assumed beliefs and desires have to explain behaviour? Are they still relevant? Only justification: that the old theory makes some distinctions that make the new theory true. Loar: Thesis: in any case, we will still need psychophysical correlations, relativized to persons and times.
Revisionism/Loar: for example, suppose one wanted to argue that no scientific finding could ever prove that we have no belief and no desires.
I 19
Question: could anything at all falsify this attitude? Probably only knowledge about behaviour. Belief Desire theory/Loar: for them there are two possibilities, which status they have as theory:
a) its truth logically follows its systematization success (this is instrumentalism with its perverse use of "true").
b) it is to be interpreted realistically, i.e. that its truth does not logically follow from its systematization success. They are then empirical like physical theories.
Problem: we have a dogmatic dualism in which the theory could not be refuted by any degree of success in scientific explanation of behavior.
Worse: with the argument about the conditions for the characteristic(s) it is not clear at all that the theory has a coherent interpretation.
Stronger/Reduction: the requirement that the states are permanent even if not unchangeable and similarly organized in other individuals.
Weaker: only relativization for times. Advantage: we do not need to demand an a priori fitting of our theory to the structure of theoretical psychology.
Reduction: not every theory that explains the success of another theory reduces it. I.e.
confirmation: a theory is not its elimination.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Induction Popper Vs Induction Schurz I 50
Induction/Schurz: 1) methodological induction: from observations. PopperVsInduction: induction is the central method of extraction of hypotheses and theories. Confusion of discovery and context of justification. How hypotheses are derived, perhaps even through guessing, is quite irrelevant for the context of justification. Therefore, methodical induction is dispensable.
2) Logical Induction/Carnap: not of the discovery but of the justification: method of determination of the degree of confirmation.
II 51
PopperVs: one theory may prove to be closer to the truth than another, but that does not show that there is no third theory that is even closer to the truth. I.e. there is no claim to absoluteness for theories. Verisimilitude = probability. There is no limited space of linguistic possibility containing all possible alternative theories.
This only applies for logical hypotheses!
Empirical hypotheses: here it is possible to establish a finite list of all possible alternative hypotheses.
Popper: competing theories can only be evaluated comparatively.
I 52
3) Epistemic Induction/Musgrave/Schurz: if a theory was more successful so far, it is likely that it will be more successful in the future. This is not about object hypotheses, but about an epistemic meta-hypothesis on the degree of corroboration. The epistemic induction is indispensable. Without it, the Popperian method of practical tests would be meaningless. Past success would be irrelevant for future action.
I 14/15
Criterion of Demarcation/Schurz: for metaphysics. Problem: principles which considered separately have no empirical consequences, can have new empirical consequences together with other theoretical propositions.
I 15
Falsification/Asymmetry/Popper: applies with strict (unexceptional all-sentences): they cannot be verified by any finite set of observations, but falsified by a single counter-example. LakatosVsPopper: Theories are never discarded because of a single counter-example, but adapted.
PopperVsInduction/Anti-Inductivism/Popper: Thesis: science can dispense with induction altogether. >Induction/Popper.

Po I
Karl Popper
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959
German Edition:
Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Schu I
G. Schurz
Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006
Popper, K. Rescher Vs Popper, K. I 229
Correspondence is fundamental to definition - coherence is fundamental to criteria. Proposition: can be true or false.
Judgement/Rescher: can be correct, incorrect or undecided.
I 340
According to this distinction there is a correspondence theory of truth and falsity of propositions and a coherence theory of correctness, incorrectness or indecision of judgements. Criterion/Popper: all criterion-related truth theories must be classified as subjective.
I 380f
VsPopper: the epistemic criterion of conditions of acceptability does not raise questions about a way to truth about a "particular state of mind or disposition or belief". A criterion-based approach to accepting does not need to refer to any psychological beliefs or subjective conditions of acceptance. For example, the rule-based calculation test does not depend on psychological mechanisms.
I 341
Rescher: this is not about what is true or false, but about what is justifiably considered to be true. Definitions and criteria are very close here. With some things there is no difference at all. For example, what is a chair? For others, there is a difference: for example, what is an unsolvable problem? Difference guaranteeing criterion - qualifying (authorizing) criterion.
The problem arises with the question: "what is the relationship between corresponds to the criterion for X and is actually an X?
Def guaranteeing criterion: logically excludes the absence of the required characteristics. Decides completely about the characteristics. Example triangularity is a guarantee of the criterion for triangularity.
Def qualifying criterion: if the fulfillment of the criterion represents at best a rational justification. Presumed confirmation.

Resch I
Nicholas Rescher
The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Resch II
N. Rescher
Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010
Positivism Fodor Vs Positivism II 107
Ordinary LanguageVsPositivism: this formalization is only useful where its structure mirrors the natural language. Otherwise, languages ​​can be constructed so that they have any desired property.
II 108
When a system is selected at random, no solutions can be expected. Formal Language/Fodor: there can be as many artificial languages as there are solutions to a problem.
II 109
Most have been formed on the model of Principia Mathematica. This is not the best idea, because everyday language is much more complex. The positivist argues here that many aspects are disregarded, because they are unsystematic.
II 110
FodorVsPositivism: he then asserts that his theory applies except in those cases in which it does not apply.
II 112
Positivism/Language: distinguishes two branches of semantics: 1) The theory of meaning: relations between linguistic units: analyticity, synonymy, meaning. 2) The theory of designation: relations between linguistic units and reality: denoting, designating, truth, scope of concept. With regard to natural languages, ​​semantic theories in which such concepts are unanalyzed basic concepts are empirically empty. Attempt at a solution: determining those basic concepts operationally.
II 113
Vs: that ignores the possibility to construct a systematic theory of the semantic structure of a natural language. In addition, it cannot be expected that the search for operational rules clarifies the elementary semantic concepts if the second path is not taken simultaneously.
II 117
Designation/FodorVsTarski: it is obvious that such systems cannot capture the designation problems in natural languages. E.g. "I want to be the Pope" does not designate the Pope. E.g. "I want to meet the Pope" designates the Pope. E.g. "I shot the man with the gun" may refer to "the man" or "the man with the gun". E.g. "The black blue dress" can refer to a checkered dress or the darker one. FodorVsPositivism: after questioning the positivist theories of designation we do not know more about the relationship between the natural language and the environment than before.
Fodor/Lepore IV 49
Propositions/Fodor/Lepore: if statements are propositions, then they have their contents essentially (because they are individuated through them): IV 49/50 Now, if contents is determined through their its verification method (Peirce’s thesis), then statements have their confirmation methods essentially QuineVsPeirce: the Quine-Duhem thesis says that confirmation conditions are contingent! (It may always turn out to be wrong, nothing follows from the meaning about the confirmation).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Positivism Putnam Vs Positivism Fraassen I 83
Conjunction/theory/science/unified science/Fraassen: Problem: "conjunction-objection" (first probably by Putnam): a conjunction of theories must receive truth, but not empirical adequacy.
Fraassen I 222 FN 5
Conjunction/theories/Putnam: his "conjunction-objection" was an argument for that there is no positivist substitute for the notion of truth. (Reference and understanding, 1978). In another context: Putnam: This argument states that an approach that says that what we are looking for is a kind of acceptability, without the property of deductive unity (deductive closure) to not meet the standards of scientific practice.
Fraassen I 83
Two incompatible theories can each be empirically adequate for themselves. Putnam: this is what the anti-realism needs to take.
Fraassen: it depends on a logical point with regard to truth and adequacy, which needs to be clarified:
Problem: in the scientific practice the conjunction of two believed (accepted) theories does not need to be believed (accepted). E.g. the Bohr-Sommerfeld theory.
Fraassen I 84
could not be put in accordance with the special theory of relativity (SR). One is a correction of the other. Conjunction/logic: of theories. A theory is a corpus of sentences. Each assertion (statement) A can be regarded as little theory, and there is a family of models F(A) in which A is true.
F(T): the family of models in which the theory T is true, consists of precisely these models that exist to F(A) for every statement A, which are part of T.
Definition logic/Fraassen: is the study of the functions that lead from statement (premises) to statements (conclusions) and receive truth.
Truth/theory/Fraassen: because of the intimate relationship between the truth of a theory and the truth of their sentences, the sentence logic, which we all love, leads to a logic of theories.
Truth/Fraassen: is (as opposed to empirical adequacy) no global property of theories ((s) not all sentences must be true. Question: But has the theory as a whole to be empirically adequate?).
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: contrast is (unlike truth) a global property of theories. That is, there is no general pattern of statements (statements) so that when all statements (propositions) of the theory each have this characteristic in themselves, then the theory is empirically adequate.
This can only be explained by the fact that theories are families of models, of which each has a particular family of substructures that correspond to possible phenomena (empirical substructures).
Problem: because empirical meaning (empirical import) of a theory cannot be syntactically isolated, we need to define empirical adequacy directly without empirical detour.
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen. Therefore, it makes no sense to ask about the empirical adequacy of individual statements, or about a logic of syntactical features of premises to conclusions that include empirical adequacy.
Empirical adequacy/Fraassen: from a single statement it can only be determined in relation to a theory: contains F(A) at least one of the models,
Fraassen I 85
which has this privileged status in the world? Problem: unlike with the truth, here the answer "yes" can be in relation to a theory and "no" in relation to another theory.
---
Putnam I (a) 46
PutnamVsPositivism: one can easily construct a positivist theory that leads to successful predictions that no scientist could accept. ---
I (c) 78
RealismVsPositivism: must leave it unexplained, that "electron calculi", "spacetime calculi" and "DNA calculi" correctly predict observable phenomena when there are no electrons, curved spacetime and no DNA molecules in reality.
I (c) 79
The positivist has as a reply reductionist theories and theories of explanation, etc. ---
I (h) 215
Truth/Positivism: what definition of "degree of confirmation" one accepts, is ultimately conventional, a question of purpose.
I (h) 216
Ultimately, then, it is completely subjective. ((s) But not yet, when purposes are social). PutnamVsPositivism: so it ends as relativism. He can only avoid deductive inconsistency by agreeing that judgements are not rational.
He has no response to the philosopher who says:
VsPositivism: "I know what you mean, but positivism is not rational in my system."

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980
Putnam, H. Rorty Vs Putnam, H. McDowell I 175
Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory.
McDowell I 178
RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty.
Rorty I 304
RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning.
I 307
Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism.
3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam.
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness".
I 312
Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory.
I 313
RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end.
2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it.
I 314
In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe.
I 315
Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world.
Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we
a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or
b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.)
I 319
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing.
I 324
Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory.
I 326
Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever.
RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time.
I 327
The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image".
Rorty V 21
Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists.
V 22
Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all?
Rorty VI 75
Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research").
VI 76
Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce!
VI 79
Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image?
VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam).
VI 90
Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric.
Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today).
RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quantum Mechanics Verschiedene Vs Quantum Mechanics Kanitscheider II 108
Quantum ChemistryVsQuantum Mechanics: Weak point of orthodox quantum mechanics: v. Neumann's traditional Hilbert-Space formulation (1929) is limited to closed systems with finite degrees of freedom, which means the neglect of the environment of the quantum system. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 208
Completeness/Quantum Mechanics/QM: the quantum mechanics is complete in the sense that more cannot be said about the locations of the particles than the probability distributions of the quantum mechanics permit. Problem: how can it be that Gretel's unsuccessful search not only creates the reality that it is not with her, but also the reality that it is in Hänsel's area?
Einstein-Podoski-Rosen/EPR: that is impossible! She cannot instantly create reality in the distant territory. Reality must have existed before the first experiment.
EPRVsQM: incomplete as it does not take into account existing realities. Instead, we need a theory that is real, local and causal. It should only concern properties of measurable physical objects.
John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998
III 135
Quantum Electrodynamics/QED: (best confirmed theory of all times) provides information about the interaction of electrons with electromagnetic radiation. It explains everything except gravity and the behaviour of atomic nuclei (e.g. radioactive decay).
III 137
Feynman: we only have three things to take care of: 1. the probability with which a photon moves from one place to another.
2. the probability with which an electron changes location,
3. the probability with which a photon is absorbed or emitted by an electron.
III 138
Feynman realized that we had to take into account every possible route (Fig III 138). A lot of convolutions on the way from A to B. (Feynman diagrams). In the double-split experiment, we added the probabilities with which the light passed one of the columns.
III 139
Feynman: why not cut more slits in the screen until there is no obstacle at all, since all the "slits" now overlap. Now that the screen has disappeared, we have to add all probabilities of all possible paths.
For the complicated paths, the probabilities are very small and usually cancel each other out. Feynman showed with a mirror that their influence is still noticeable!
III 140
The light chooses the most time-saving path.
III 141
Gribbin: it actually happens that the light continues to travel at a different, flatter angle at the same time, other photons hit the eye perpendicularly... That we do not observe this is solely due to the fact that the paths in the vicinity of the shortest path are on the one hand more probable, and on the other hand mutually reinforce each other.
But that is not the end of the story!
III 142
Measurements show that reflected photons actually arrive from the far corner of the mirror, although they cancel each other out!
III 142/143
Although neighboring parts of the mirror corner cancel each other out, you can still find mirror strips where the probabilities add up. How large the distance between the strips must be depends on the wavelength of the light: this is a nice confirmation of the wave particle dualism, since we consider the light here as photons. (diffraction grid).
III 145
Similarly, all optical phenomena can be interpreted as the addition of probabilities, including lenses, diffraction and deceleration of light entering water, Poisson's spot, double-split experiment.
III 150
VsQuantifier-Electrodynamics/VsQED: it is not completely flawless: difficulty in moving an electron: it would cause an endless addition of probabilities, the results would grow into infinity, that would be nonsense.
III 145
Def magnetic moment of the electron: measure of the interaction of an electron with a magnetic field.
III 147
Nature/Physics/Feynman: "The enormous diversity of nature can be derived from the monotonous repetition of the combination of only three basic processes" (see above).
III 148
Feynman-Diagram: bizarre: two electrons interact by exchanging a photon, but we may just as well say that the second electron emits the photon "in the future" and this goes backwards in time so that it is absorbed by the first electron "in the past". It is well known that an electron can change into a pair of particles with positrons. The corresponding equations are symmetrical as usual.
III 149
Feynman now realized that the whole interaction can be described with reference to a single electron: an electron moves from one place to another and interacts with a high-energy photon. Through this interaction, the electron is sent backwards in time until it interacts with another high-energy photon, becoming "reversed" and travelling again into the future.
Three things seem to be involved in both interactions: positron, electron, photon. Similar to when a ray of light bounces off a mirror: two rays of light forming the appropriate angle and the mirror itself.
Analogy: But just as in reality there is only one ray of light reflected back into space, there is also only one electron. Photons can act as "time mirrors" for electrons.
Def Re-Normation: Method to get rid of the infinite. One divides both sides of the equation by infinity. Feynman: "Crazy".
Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VII 275
Re-Normation: unfortunately also has to be applied to the vacuum, because the QED tells us that here the energy density is infinite. If you include the relativity theory, the situation gets even worse: there are still infinite quantities, but they cannot be renormalized anymore.
Twistor theory/Penrose: Try to explain both the particles and the long empty distances within an object with the same theory.
Measure/Length Unit: a universal length unit is obtained by combining the gravitational constant, Planck's Constant and the speed of light: "quantum of length".
VII 276
Planck's Length: about 1035. Planck's time, etc. It is pointless to speak of a time or length that is shorter. Quantum Foam/Wheeler: quantum fluctuations in the geometry of space are completely negligible on the level of atoms, even particles, but on this very fundamental level one can imagine space itself as a foam of quantum fluctuations.
>Twistor theory/Penrose: Thesis: then one could imagine that all matter particles are no more than twisted fragments of empty space.





Kanitsch I
B. Kanitscheider
Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991

Kanitsch II
B. Kanitscheider
Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Quine, W.V.O. Fodor Vs Quine, W.V.O. Esfeld I 62
FodorVsQuine: (and Lepore): the confirmation holism and verificationism refer to different things: Verificationism: refers to linguistic things. Confirmation holism: refers to cross-language entities like propositions. EsfeldVsFodor: However, if we assume beliefs, we can summarize both.
Fodor II 114
Language/Behavior/Meaning/Quine/Fodor: but even if there were an identifiable property, how could we justify the assertion, assuming we had found it? Quine: (The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics): Test for the question of whether S is a grammatical phoneme sequence: whether the expression triggers puzzlement. FodorVsQuine: that will fail in both directions: 1) almost all expressions in everyday language are ungrammatical! 2) Almost every grammatical sentence may cause puzzlement in certain situations! Our intuitions about grammar are often not consistent with grammar as such. On the other hand, intuition in semantics is far less reliable than in grammar.
Fodor/Lepore IV 54
Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: his argument is a fallacy of equivocation! ((s) Between statement and formula). (Namely:
IV 52
Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Def immanence of confirmation: the thesis that, because confirmation is defined through types of entities whose connection IV 53 to a particular theory is essential, it does not have to be possible to construct such questions as if it were about whether two theories match regarding their confirmation conditions.).
IV 76/77
Child/Language Acquisition/Language Learning/Quine: perhaps the child has a background (perhaps innate), E.g. about the character of his dialect? Anyway, in that case it differs from that of the linguist in that it is not a bootstrapping. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: this is totally unjustified. His choice of a WT does not justify true belief and provides no knowledge. But then you cannot attribute any knowledge of the language to the child! Solution: Children know the language in the sense that they can speak it, therefore they have any possible true belief that the speaking may require ((s) and that is compatible with it, i.e. goes beyond that). Not even Quine believes that the epistemic situation of the child is fully characterized by the fact that the observational data are determined. Somehow, even the child generalizes. Problem: the principles of generalization, in turn, cannot have been learned. (Otherwise regress). They must be innate. Solution/Quine: similarity space. Likewise: Skinner: "intact organism" with innate dispositions to generalize in one, but not in the other direction. Hume: Association mechanisms, "intrinsic" in human nature, etc. - - - Note
IV 237
13> IV 157 o
Causal Theory: many philosophers consider causal relationships constitutive of semantic properties, but their examples always refer to specific intuitions about specific cases, E.g. that we need to distinguish the mental states of twins (Twin Earth?). Quine: he has, in contrast, no problem in explaining why that which causally causes consent must be the same that specifies the truth conditions. For Davidson rightly writes that, for Quine, these are the "sensory criteria" which Quine treats as evidence. And as a verificationist, Quine takes the evidence relation (evidence) as ipso facto constitutive of semantic relations. ((s): relation/relation). VsQuine: the price he has to pay for it is that he has no argument against skepticism!.
IV 218
Intuitionism/Logic/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: Quine favors an ecumenical story, according to which the logical connections (connectives) signify different things, depending on whether they are used in classical or intuitionistic logic. Fodor/LeporeVsQuine: as long as there is no trans-theoretical concept of sentence identity, it is unclear how it is ever to be detected.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 162
McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions.
On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview.
I 184
McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects.
I 185
McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine.
I 186
Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema.
I 188
DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning.
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory.
I 189
Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma.

Esfeld I 63
Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system.
VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system?
2. confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"?
Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system!
Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs.
Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors!
Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs).
Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason?
I 64
(S.McDowell I 157ff).

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Quine, W.V.O. Millikan Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 215
descriptive/referential/denotation/classification/Millikan: you can force a descriptive denotation to work referentially, Ex "He said that the winner was the loser." Ex (Russell) "I thought your yacht was larger than it is."
I 216
Solution: "the winner" and "larger than your Yacht" must be regarded as classified according to the adjusted (adapted) sense. On the other hand:
"The loser" probably has only descriptive of meaning.
"Your Yacht" is classified by both: by adjusted and by relational sense, only "your" is purely referential.
Quine: (classic example) Ex "Phillip believes that the capital of Honduras is in Nicaragua."
MillikanVsQuine: according to Quine that's not obviously wrong. It can be read as true if "capital of Honduras" has relational sense in that context.
referential/descriptive/attribution of belief/intentional/Millikan: there are exceptions, where the expressions do not work descriptively, nor purely referential, but also by relational sense or intension.
Ex "the man who us drove home" is someone the speaker and hearer know very well. Then the hearer must assume that someone else is meant because the name is not used.
Rule: here the second half of the rule for intentional contexts is violated, "use whichever expression that preserves the reference". This is often a sign that the first half is violated, "a sign has not only reference but also sense or intension, which must be preserved. Why else use such a complicated designation ("the man who drove us home"), instead of the name?
Ortcutt/Ralph/spy/Quine/Millikan: Ex there is a man with a brown hat that Ralph has caught a glimpse of. Ralph assumes he is a spy.
a) Ralph believes that the man he has caught a glimpse of is a spy.
I 217
b) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. Millikan: The underlined parts are considered relational, b) is more questionable than a) because it is not clear whether Ralph has explicitly perceived him as wearing a brown hat.
Quine:
In addition, there is a gray-haired man that Ralph vaguely knows as a pillar of society, and that he is unaware of having seen, except once at the beach.
c) Ralph believes that the man he saw on the beach is a spy.
Millikan: that's for sure relational. As such, it will not follow from a) or b).
Quine: adds only now that Ralph does not know this, but the two men are one and the same.
d) Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is not a spy.
Now this is just wrong.
Question: but what about
e) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.
f) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.
Quine: only now Quine tells us the man's name (which Ralph is unaware of).
Millikan: Ex Jennifer, an acquaintance of Samuel Clemens, does not know that he is Mark Twain.
I 218
She says: "I would love to meet Mark Twain" and not "I'd love to meet Samuel Clemens". language-dependent: here, "Mark Twain" is classified dependent on language. So also language bound intensions are not always irrelevant for intentional contexts. It had o be language-bound here to make it clear that the name itself is substantial, and also that it is futile to assume that she would have said she wanted to meet Samuel Clemens.
Ralph/Quine/Millikan: Quine assumes that Ralph has not only two internal names for Ortcutt, but only one of them is linked to the external name Ortcutt.
Millikan: Description: Ex you and I are watching Ralph, who is suspiciously observing Ortcutt standing behind a bush with a camera (surely he just wants to photograph cobwebs). Ralph did not recognize Ortcutt and you think: Goodness, Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy ".
Pointe: in this context, the sentence is true! ((S) Because the name "Ortcutt" was given by us, not by Ralph).
referential/Millikan: Solution: "Ortcutt" is classified here as referential.
referential/Millikan. Ex "Last Halloween Susi actually thought, Robert (her brother) was a ghost." ((S) She did not think of Robert, nor of her brother, that he was a ghost, but that she had a ghost in front of her).
MillikanVsQuine: as long as no one has explicitly asked or denied that Tom knows that Cicero is Tullius, the two attributions of belief "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" and "... Tullius ..." are equivalent!
Language-bound intension/Millikan: is obtained only if the context makes it clear what words were used, or which public words the believer has as implicit intentions.
Fully-developed (language-independent) intension/Millikan: for them the same applies if they are kept intentionally:
I 219
Ex "The natives believe that Hesperus is a God and Phosphorus is a devil." But:
Pointe: It is important that the intrinsic function of a sentence must be maintained when one passes to intentional contexts. That is the reason that in attribution of belief one cannot simply replace "Cicero is Tullius" by "Cicero is Cicero". ((S) trivial/non-trivial identity).
Stabilizing function/statement of identity/Millikan: the stabilizing function is that the listener translates "A" and "B" into the same internal term. Therefore, the intrinsic function of "Cicero is Cicero" is different from that of "Cicero is Tullius". Since the intrinsic function is different one can not be used for the other in intentional contexts.
Eigenfunction: Ex "Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy": has the Eigenfunkion to be translated into an internal sentence that has a subject and two predicates. No record of this form can be found in Ralph's head. Therefore one can not say that Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy and not a spy you.

I 299
Non-contradiction/Millikan: the test is also a test of our ability to identify something and whether our concepts represent what they are supposed to project. MillikanVsQuine: but this is not about establishing "conditions for identity". And also not about "shared reference" ("the same apple again"). This is part of the problem of uniformity, not identity. It is not the problem to decide how an exclusive class should be split up.
I 300
Ex deciding when red ends and orange begins. Instead, it's about learning to recognize Ex red under different circumstances.
Truth/accuracy/criterion/Quine/Millikan: for Quine a criterion for right thinking seems to be that the relationship to a stimulus can be predicted.
MillikanVsQuine: but how does learning to speak in unison facilitate the prediction?
Agreement/MillikanVsQuine/MillikanVsWittgenstein: both are not aware of what agreement in judgments really is: it is not to speak in unison. If you do not say the same, that does not mean that one does not agree.
Solution/Millikan: agreement is to say the same about the same.
Mismatch: can arise only if sentences have subject-predicate structure and negation is permitted.
One-word sentence/QuineVsFrege/Millikan: Quine goes so far as to allow "Ouch!" as a sentence. He thinks the difference between word and sentence in the end only concernes the printer.
Negation/Millikan: the negation of a sentence is not proven by lack of evidence, but by positive facts (supra).
Contradiction/Millikan: that we do not agree to a sentence and its negation simultaneously lies in nature (natural necessity).

I 309
Thesis: lack of Contradiction is essentially based on the ontological structure of the world. agreement/MillikanVsWittgenstein/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: both do not see the importance of the subject-predicate structure with negation. Therefore, they fail to recognize the importance of the agreement in the judgment.
agreement: this is not about two people getting together, but that they get together with the world.
agreement/mismatch/Millikan: are not two equally likely possibilities ((s) > inegalitarian theory/Nozick.) There are many more possibilities for a sentence to be wrong, than for the same sentence to be true.
Now, if an entire pattern (system) of coinciding judgments appears that represent the same area (for example color) the probability that each participant reflects an area in the world outside is stupendous. ((s) yes - but not that they mean the same thing).
Ex only because my judgments about the passage of time almost always matches with those of others, I have reason to believe that I have the ability to classify my memories correctly in the passage of time.
Objectivity/time/perspective/mediuma/communication/Millikan: thesis: the medium that other people form by their remarks is the most accessible perspective for me that I can have in terms of time.

I 312
Concept/law/theory/test/verification/Millikan: when a concept appears in a law, it is necessary
I 313
to test it along with other concepts. These concepts are linked according to certain rules of inference. Concept/Millikan: because concepts consist of intensions, it is the intensions that have to be tested.
Test: does not mean, however, that the occurrence of sensual data would be predicted. (MillikanVsQuine).
theory of sensual data/today/Millikan: the prevailing view seems to be, thesis: that neither an internal nor an external language actually describes sensual data, except that the language depends on the previous concepts of external things that usually causes the sensual data.
I 314
Forecast/prediction/to predict/prognosis/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: we project the world to inhabit it, not to predict it. If predictions are useful, at least not from experiences in our nerve endings. confirmation/prediction/Millikan: A perceptual judgment implies mainly itself Ex if I want to verify that this container holds one liter, I don't have to be able to predict that the individual edges have a certain length.That is I need not be able to predict any particular sensual data.
I 317
Theory/Verification/Test/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: is it really true that all concepts must be tested together? Tradition says that not just a few, but most of our concepts are not of things that we observe directly, but of other things.
Test/logical form/Millikan: if there is one thing A, which is identified by observing effects on B and C, isn't then the validity of the concepts of B and C tested together with the theory that ascribes the observed effects onto the influence of A, tested together with the concept of A?
Millikan. No!
From the fact that my intension of A goes back to intensions of B and C does not follow that the validity of the concepts, that govern B and C, is tested when the concept that governs A is tested and vice versa.
Namely, it does not follow, if A is a specific denotation Ex "the first President of the United States" and it also does not follow, if the explicit intention of A represents something causally dependent. Ex "the mercury in the thermometer rose to mark 70" as intension of "the temperature was 70 degrees."
I 318
Concept/Millikan: concepts are abilities - namely the ability to recognize something as self-identical. Test/Verification: the verifications of the validity of my concepts are quite independent of each other: Ex my ability to make a good cake is completely independent of my ability to break up eggs, even if I have to break up eggs to make the cake.
Objectivity/objective reality/world/method/knowledge/Millikan: we obtain a knowledge of the outside world by applying different methods to obtain a result. Ex different methods of temperature measurement: So we come to the conclusion that temperature is something real.
I 321
Knowledge/context/holism/Quine/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: doesn't all knowledge depend on "collateral information", as Quine calls it? If all perception is interwoven with general theories, how can we test individual concepts independently from the rest? Two Dogmas/Quine/Millikan. Thesis: ~ "Our findings about the outside world do not stand individually before the tribunal of experience, but only as a body."
Therefore: no single conviction is immune to correction.
Test/Verification/MillikanVsHolismus/MillikanVsQuine/Millikan: most of our beliefs never stand before the tribunal of experience.
I 322
Therefore, it is unlikely that such a conviction is ever supported or refuted by other beliefs. confirmation: single confirmation: by my ability to recognize objects that appear in my attitudes.
From convictions being related does not follow that the concepts must be related as well.
Identity/identification/Millikan: epistemology of identity is a matter of priority before the epistemology of judgments.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Rey, G. Fodor Vs Rey, G. IV 219
Sentence/Formula/Fodor/Lepore: Georges Rey reads Quine in a way that he reconstructs sentences as formulas, but without semantic holism (SH): 1) sentence means formula!
2) Peirce’s thesis identified sentence meaning with empirical meaning (not with confirmation!)
i.e. the set of observation sentences that confirm them.
Def Empirical Meaning/(s): (according to Fodor/Lepore IV 219): = set of observation sentences that confirm one sentence.
Important argument: an observation sentence is a formula that is conditioned/confirmed by proximal stimuli.
3) The Quine-Duhem thesis (QDT) applies.
Then it follows that no formula has any meaning outside of the overall theory!
Fodor/LeporeVsRey: this is a very strange kind of semantics: for because the meaning of each sentence consists in the observation consequences of the overall theory in which they are embedded, it follows that every sentence in a theory has the same meaning as any other sentence in that same theory!
Def Sentence Meaning/Rey/Fodor/Lepore: consists in the observation consequences of the embedding overall theory.
This implies, in turn, that no theory can contain a contingent conditional (hypothetical) in such that, if a disjunctive sentence is true (false), then both disjuncts true or false, etc.
IV 219
Furthermore, every sentence in a theory translates each sentence from an empirically equivalent theory and there are no relations between sentences from not empirically equivalent theories at all. A Quinean could accept all that and say: "So much the worse for those who insist on a semantics for individual sentences".
Fodor/Lepore: That may be true, but in any case the QDT is trivialized: the only thing you have to hold on to when changing theory is the pronunciation!

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Schlick, M. Ayer Vs Schlick, M. III 101
SchlickVsCoherence theory: beyond the consistency of a system, one can determine the correspondence with reality. Ayer: per Schlick.
AyerVsSchlick: but we have no class of synthetic propositions which are indubitable.
III 103
Def Truth criterion/Verification criterion/Ayer: the criterion by which we test the validity of our synthetic propositions is their conformity with reality (= sensation). I.e. the criterion is the agreement with our observations.
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: unfortunately is not content with that, but asserts that the sentences with which we describe our observation sentences, would be absolutely unquestionable.
III 104
Observation sentence/AyerVsSchlick: the only sense in which a sentence can be absolutely sure is that its negation would be self-contradictory. And it is not self-contradictory E.g. saying "that’s not green" if someone says "this is green". Synthetic sentences are just not true because of their form alone. Observation sentence/Schlick: would say that he never asserted this. But that he only talked about the truth of such a proposition at the moment of perception.
AyerVsSchlick: yet we must distinguish between false and such propositions that are true but trivial.
What Schlick says, is nothing more than p implies p. But it is wrong to say that when I feel pain the sentence that I feel pain is objectively certain. Because that would be a different form:
p implies that (p is objectively certain).
And that is wrong if it is a synthetic proposition.
III 105
Confirmation/Schlick/AyerVsSchlick: that Schlick felt uncomfortable with this himself is due to the vagueness of his concept. "Confirmations", of which he believed they were indubitable. confirmation/Schlick: is nothing that could be identified with something that can be expressed. This suggests that he thinks of actual perceptions, as opposed to the sentences that describe them.
AyerVsSchlick: Dilemma:
a) if confirmations are not entences but perceptions themselves, it makes no sense to say that they are indubitable or not indubitable. Because perceptions are not the sort of thing that can be doubted. It simply occurs.
b) if they are observation sentences, they cannot be indubitable (see above).

Ayer I
Alfred J. Ayer
"Truth" in: The Concept of a Person and other Essays, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Ayer II
Alfred Jules Ayer
Language, Truth and Logic, London 1936
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke

Ayer III
Alfred Jules Ayer
"The Criterion of Truth", Analysis 3 (1935), pp. 28-32
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Theory Ladenness Wright Vs Theory Ladenness I 204
Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/theory:
1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro).
This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different.
I 205
2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all).
WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory.
I 206
Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again.
Theoreticity of Contemplation/theory/Wright:
4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above):
It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs.
I 207
WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between:
Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions.
I 208
Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1.
A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo.
Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1.
I 209
The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability.
I 210
We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory.
If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with!
Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory).
Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable!
Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (Vstheory-ladenness of observation).
I 211
However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a
Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements.
Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid.
((s) As long as nothing else "appears").
Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all?
A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence.
If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law.
I 212
VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem:
Evidence/theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Tooley, M. Armstrong Vs Tooley, M. III 104
Tooley: if relations between universals are truthmakers, then these are "atomic facts". Then the standard principles could ascribe a probability of >0 to the confirmation theory.
III 105
ArmstrongVsTooley: this is an initial possibility or logical possibility of a tautology. Empiricist should have doubts there. ForrestVsTooley: There could be infinitely many possible universals. Would the attributable initial probabilities not be infinitesimally small then? That would be no justification for the induction.
VsInduction/VsBest Explanation: inductive skepticism could doubt that it really would be the best explanation, more fundamentally: why should the regularities in the world ever have an explanation (reg.)?.
Regularity/Berkeley: through God. He could abolish the "laws of nature" tomorrow.
Berkeley/Armstrong: Answering to this already means to concede the possibility. We have no guarantee that the best explanation is the best scheme. But it is informative.
Arm III 120
Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence.
III 121
ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are related with their particulars (part.). E.g. If a rel. between particulars a and b is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other particulars, would there not have to be at least one other relation to relate it to a and b?.
And if this rel. can be uninstantiated itself (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel. is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum. (Bradley’s regress).
One can avoid this only if universals are merely abstract factors of states of affairs (but real).

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Tradition Sellars Vs Tradition I 57
Meaning/Sellars: false: to regard it as a relation between a word and a non-linguistic entity. There is then the danger that one perceives this relation as a type of association. ((s) >tags, Myth of the museum). Meaning/relation/SellarsVsTradition: misleading that predicates would associated with objects. E.g. it is wrong that the semantic statement, ""red" means "rot" in German" would assert "red" would associated with red things. This would mean that this semantic statement would so to speak be a defining symbol of a longer statement on associative connections. That is not the case. (Here: difference of use and mention). (> Association).
I 62
Report/act/Sellars: who supplies a report, does something. (SellarsVsTradition). Epistemology/tradition: a proposition token can play the role of a report,
a) without that this is a public language implementation, and
b) without speaker/listener!
Sellars: here the accuracy of confirmations is supposed to correspond to the correctness of actions. This is not true, moreover, not every Ought is a Doing-Ought.
I 65
Knowledge/SellarsVsTradition: Observational knowledge does not stand on its own two feet! It presupposes language acquisition. (Elsewhere: we cannot perceive a tree, without the concept of a tree.) But at the time of earlier perceptions you do not necessarily have to have had the concept. Long history of acquiring linguistic habits.
Myth of the Factual/Sellars: thesis: that observation is constructed by self-authenticating, not linguistic episodes whose authority is transferred to linguistic and quasi linguistic full executions.
I 84
Thinking/language/tradition: Thesis: Thoughts are possible without verbal ideas.
I 88
SellarsVsTradition: Categories of intentionality are semantical.
I 86
Theory/classic explanation/science/tradition/Sellars: the construction of a theory is to develop a system of postulates that is tentatively correlated with the observation language. SellarsVsTradition: this creates an extremely artificial and unrealistic picture of the actual procedure of scientists.
I 87
Theory/Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are not normally formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model (Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects that behave in the usual way). A model is distinguished primarily by the fact that it is provided with a comment which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors comply with the postulates of the logistical image of theorizing.
SellarsVs logistical image of theorizing: most explanations did not come readily from the theorists' minds. There is a continuous transition between science and everyday life. The distinction between theory language and observation language belongs to the logic of the concepts of inner episodes.

Sellars I
Wilfrid Sellars
The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956
German Edition:
Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999

Sellars II
Wilfred Sellars
Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977
Various Authors Goodman Vs Various Authors I 81
GoodmanVsIntrinsic/Extrinsic: this does apparently not work: because in every classification of properties in extrins./intrins. each image or each object has both internal and external poperties.
II Preamble Putnam IX
GoodmanVsFormalism for the Sake of Formalism. GoodmanVsIdea of ​​an ontological basement independent from our theorizing
II 10
It is not true that science could do without unreal conditional clauses. The tendency to dismiss the problems of unr. conditional clauses as a pseudo-problem or unsolvable is understandable considering the great difficulties (GoodmanVs.) If you drop all problems of disposition, possibility, scientific law, confirmation, etc., then you are in fact giving up the philosophy of science.
II 67
The argument that one should better dispense with the definition of an expression if it was not usually defined by scientists or laymen, is similar to the argument that philosophy need not be systematic, because the reality described by it is not systematic (VsAdorno). You might as well say that philosophy should not be in German, because the reality is not written in German.
II 70
(s) SalmonVsGoodman: Objects do not need to appear at all times, but places must be there at all times! ((s) GoodmanVs: Description dependence for him does not only refer to objects, but to the whole of reality. (VsKant)) Kant: space and time are not reality, but the condition for the possibility to experience reality. III 67 Presentation/Empathy/GoodmanVsEmpathy theory: Gestures do not need to have features in common with music.
III 81
Metaphor: the general question: What does a metaphor say and what makes it true? GoodmanVsMetaphor as abridged comparison: sometimes we say a metaphor is elliptically designed and the metaphorical truth was simply understood as the literal truth of the extended statement. But the comparison cannot just result in the image of the person being similar in one respect or another. In this way, everything is similar to everything.
III 224
GoodmanVs"Special Aesthetic Emotion" - GoodmanVs Theory that it does not depend on the pleasure that one has, but on a certain "objectified pleasure": Goodman: Then the pleasure would be something that the object must have, and indeed rather without causing it; ultimately it would therefore probably have to feel this pleasure itself.
III 228
GoodmanVsDichotomy between the Cognitive and the Emotional. It blocks the insight that emotions work cognitively in the aesthetic experience.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997
Verificationism Stroud Vs Verificationism I 201
Verificationism/Knowledge/Stroud: this draws attention to a little-noticed problem of the relation between the verification principle and traditional skepticism: one usually only sees a one-sided competition between them: the principle implies that the skeptical conclusion is meaningless. Asymmetry: so the whole problem is meaningless.
Verification Principle/VP/Skepticism/Stroud: but in reality have the same task to solve: to explain how our belief is empirically confirmed.
SkepticismVsVerificationism: its standards of confirmation are not fulfilled at all.
Stroud: this is a dispute about what our standards are and if anything fulfils them. No side is in a better position, they share the problem.
I 202
Skepticism/Stroud: is not refuted by the verification principle: if we do not know whether we are dreaming, we also do not know whether the confirmation by evidence does not only take place in the dream. ((s) The argument of empirical verification is something quite different from the argument about the use of language.) confirmation/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: there is already a conflict about how the verification principle (VP) should be formulated at all, or about what can be considered a confirmation. If the verification principle is to be adequate, it must imply that there can be no meaningful difficulty of the kind that the traditional skeptic puts forward.
Problem: when formulating the principle, the principle itself cannot yet be applied to the decisive concept of confirmation. ((s) Otherwise circular).
Empirical confirmation/confirmability/Stroud: their definition would need an explanation of how and why the traditional concept of our everyday practice should be wrong.
I 203
Skepticism/Stroud: cannot simply be rejected without showing the relationship between "internal" and "external" (distanced) access as incoherent. StroudVsVerificationism: in everyday life, the conditions of the verification principle are never completely fulfilled. A successful theory of empirical confirmation must therefore show what is wrong with the concept of confirmation.
It could nevertheless be that verificationism is on the right track.
I 204
Confirmation/Tradition/Stroud: it is generally true that the problem of the outside world (skepticism) is empirically undecidable, no matter what concept of empirical confirmability one chooses. This is the common problem that scepticism and verificationism must share. So it seems reasonable that the verification principle must first be formulated precisely before it can be used.
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism: as long as lack of verifiability is connected with futility, our speech about the world around us will be condemned to futility if skepticism is right.
StroudVsRational Reconstruction/StroudVsCarnap: we can leave the rational reconstruction aside and simply ask how plausible it is to make sense of verifiability. And apparently we cannot do that without trying to assess the plausibility of skepticism ((s) and not dismissing it as meaningless ourselves).
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why Question). Verification Principle/Stroud: to accept it, we need an understandable diagnosis of why and how skepticism is wrong. ((s) quasi circular, one presupposes the other).
StroudVsVerificationism/DescartesVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: Descartes' example "I don't know if I'm really sitting by the fireplace with a piece of paper in my hand" is a perfectly sensible sentence! We understand it well enough to know what would be the case if it were true. And it can be true or false.
It would be nonsense to claim that sentences like "Here is a human hand" or "There are mountains in Africa" would be meaningless.
Verificationism/Stroud: but only claims that they are meaningless in connection with the traditional conclusion that their truth can never be known (skeptical conclusion).
I 206
Verification Principle/Stroud: we would have to show that there is nothing to fear from scepticism.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Indeterminacy Esfeld, M. I 368/369
Indeterminacy/Belief/Holism/Esfeld: it is sometimes claimed that if Quine's Holism - and especially the Quine-Duhem-Thesis - is correct, there are no criteria for accepting beliefs! EsfeldVs: there is no such alleged link between holism and indeterminacy.
Quine's criterion of the slightest change in the knowledge system does not logically belong to confirmation holism.
Esfeld Thesis: As a result of the interlocking of science and metaphysics following Bell's theorem (and Two Dogmas), Quine's criterion enables a precise rational evaluation of the options of the interpretations of quantum theory.
Justification Field, Hartry II 365
Explanation / justification / Field: declarations can only be considered as a justification if they are not too easy to reach! Dummett, Black, Friedman thesis: the use of credible methods initially increased their credibility.
II 367
Rationality / FieldVs coherence theory: I prefer the lower threshold: the good induction and perception rules are a priori weak.
II 371
It is misguided to try to reduce epistemic properties such as rationality to other terms.
Horwich I 431
Confirmation / Field: there is no objective notion of "confirmation degree" or of justification.

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Quine-Duhem-Th. Fodor, J. IV 39
Quine-Duhem-Thesis (sentences are not individually verifiable) Quine-Duhem-Thesis/QDT/Fodor/Lepore: very compatible with realism.
Quine-Duhem-Thesis/QDT/Fodor/Lepore: there are different versions in Two Dogmas, depending on how they are polemically used:
Example a) "you can keep any statement if you are confronted with stubborn data". (Auxiliary hypotheses).
IV 40
that is not the same as (b) the requirement that supporting documents must be a posteriori.
But it's hard to see how the first can be true without the second.
TD/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: in the middle between the two main parts there is this
thesis the unity of meaning is not the proposition but the whole theory
IV 50
Variant of Quine-Duhem-Thesis says: confirmation relations are a posteriori.
Verificationism Fodor, J. IV 44
Confirmation relations are ipso facto semantic (Peirce thesis) - meaning = method of verification).
IV 52
Def Immanence of Confirmation/L: because confirmation is defined about types of entities, their link is
IV 53
essential to a particular theory. Therefore, it need not be possible to construct such questions as if it were a matter of whether two theories agree in relation to the conditions of confirmation.