Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behaviorism | Sellars Vs Behaviorism | I 89 Behaviorism/Sellars: does not analyze existing psychological concepts but constructs new concepts. Also does not deny the privileged access. Also does not deny that these mental states can be adequately described with everyday words such as "Belief", "Doubt", "Desires" and so on. It also does not deny that there is such a thing as introspection, nor that it is at least halfway reliable. (However, not according to the image of perception). It works on the basis of everyday mental concepts. I 90 Besides that behaviorism recommends to start all over again with the conceptualization. The scientific behaviorism does not defend the thesis that folk psychological concepts can be attributed to behavioral concepts ("Philosophical" behaviorism). It rather says: maybe not mentalistic concepts, but the concepts used by me can be attributed to behavior. SellarsVsBehaviorism: e.g. just as little as chemistry was calculated on the basis of concepts that can be explicitly defined by recourse to the observable properties and behavior of chemical substances. I 91 That concludes that some behaviorist concepts must be introduced as theoretical concepts! Theoretical Termini/Sellars: are not only not defined in behaviorist psychology in terms of open behavior but also just as little in terms of nerves, synapses, neurons irritation, etc.! A behaviorist theory of behavior is not already as such a physiological explanation of behavior. So that a structure of theoretical concepts is suitable to provide explanations for behavior, the theoretical concepts do not have to be identified with the concepts of neurophysiology. However, it operates under a certain regulative ideal, the ideal of a coherent system. The behavioral theory is not fixed from the start to a physiological identification of all their concepts. I XXIX Methodological Behaviorism/Sellars: VsLogical Behaviorism. I XXX Logical Behaviorism/Sellars: is essentially a thesis on the importance of mental terms. Carnap, Hempel: they concentrated mainly on "pain" as a psychological predicate. PutnamVsLogical Behaviorism: e.g. "Superspartans" who never express their pain in any form. I XXXI Ryle: tried to analyze all mental predicates as the expressions of behavioral dispositions. However, as theoretical concepts disposition expressions cannot easily be identified with the conditions for verification of a disposition. Carnap: intelligence test: someone may fail without us denying him at once any intelligence. Carnap here VsLogical Behaviorism: otherwise you would indeed be forced to define the intelligence through test conditions as the logical behaviorism had assumed. Def Methodological Behaviorism/SellarsVsRyle/Sellars: admittedly introduces mental terms in reference to the observable behavior but does not hold onto the fact that these terms should be defined in reference to the behavior. (Or, what is the same: that psychological statements must be fully translated into statements about observable behavior). |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Blackmore, S. | Pauen Vs Blackmore, S. | Pauen I 244 I/Blackmore/Pauen: beliefs are merely accumulations of memes that are constantly changing. VsMinsky, VsDennett: The self has no pragmatic value either. Unencumbered by this, we can have a more unbiased approach to the presence. (NagelVs.) I 245 I: no source of our desires, but a function of bundling. PauenVsBlackmore: how should continuity be maintained then? Vs: individuals can behave very differently to desires, even if they belong to the same social group (controlled by memes). |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Block, Ned | Schiffer Vs Block, Ned | I 40 Psychofunctionalism/Block: (naming by Block 1980a): is supposed to be a scientific cognitive psychological theory (BlockVsFolk psychology. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism/SchifferVsBlock: 1. If there is such a scientific theory that identifies each belief characteristic of a functional property, then this theory is neither known nor formulated yet devised. So Block has to say that there must be a theory Ts that nobody ever thought of so that Bel = BelTs. This theory could not define belief, but discover its reference. The idea would be: Def belief that p/Ts: be a token of the Z-type, having the Ts correlated functional role of BelTs.(p). I.e. the role that will be indexed by (the proposition) p in Ts. Schiffer: this would be a necessary truth, but one that would be only a postieriori knowable after the theory Ts would be brought up. SchifferVsBlock: why on earth must the reference or extension of a belief E.g. that bugs are mortal, be revealed by a theory that no one knows? VsSchiffer: one could argue, in the same way, E.g. as it was eventually discovered that dogs have this and that genotype (set of genes). ((s) meaning empirically) SchifferVsVs: 1. scientists cannot discover this! Science/Philosophy/Schiffer: thesis: Scientists cannot discover that to be a dog = to be from a particular genotype (set of genes). Science: might only determine all phenotypic (appearancewise) and behavioral features of the past, present and future, with which we identify dogs, but to derive a property-identity with the genotype from this, we need a philosophical theory that a) contains a completion from to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype, if... and b) contains in connection with the scientific discovery that I 41 to be a dog = to be from this and that genotype. ((s) no additional condition). SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: if there were a philosophical theory of this strength, it is unknown to me. It could take the form of a meaning theory for "dog". Problem: the theories that have been developed by Kripke/Putnam for natural-.species terms, are unsuitable for belief predicates. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: has no more credibility than the credibility that there is a correct semantic theory of belief predicates that contains, along with a scientific psychological theory Ts Bel = BelTs. Problem: There is not the slightest reason to assume that such a semantic theory for belief predicates exists. 2. VsBlock: that a psychological theory can determine the extension for "believes", it has to be able to use the word! Problem: it is unlikely that the ultimately correct cognitive theory will work with folk psychological concepts! ((s) But it must be translatable into everyday language (> universalism of everyday language). The functional architecture may simply be too rich and fine. (Churchland 1981, Stich 1983, Dennett 1986). SchifferVsUniversalism of everyday language: the everyday language concepts may be too blunt. Some authors/Schiffer: might be inclined to say: "then there is just nothing, which corresponds to belief." SchifferVs: it misses the ultimate in our everyday language psychological terms. (see below 6.4). I 42 3. SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: even if a scientific theory on functional states of belief has to quantify, we have to probably not construct it as a relation to propositions. Psychology / Schiffer: a scientific psychological theory (cognitive) is quantifying over functions of external indices for functional roles on internal physical states, external indices: do not have to be propositions but can also be phrases or formulas. Even uninterpreted formulas! (see below) 1. Thesis: if propositions are good indices for a functional theory, then phrases or interpreted formulas of a formal language could be it just as well. (Field, 1978, Loar 1981). 2. Content/cognitive psychology/attribution/belief/Schiffer: the psychological theory probably needs nothing more than uninterpreted formulas, not even sentences (not propositions anyway). ((s) belief or belief attribution could be explained scientifically without the use of content). Psychology/belief/Field: (1978, 102): if psychology describes the laws that lead from input to belief and from belief to action, then semantic characterizations of belief are superfluous. (see also Field 1986b, Fodor 1980, Loar 1981, Schiffer 1981a, Stich 1983). I 44 4. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: it is absurd to assume that there is a single theory about beliefs and desires that is weak enough that is applicable to all kinds of believers, and at the same time strong enough to establish a functional property for each belief. Such a theory would have to uniformly explain the belief settings of such diverse people as normal adults, children, natives and disabled. Problem: for this a necessary condition to believe something would be needed ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): strong theory: defines details. Weak: is applicable to many). 5. SchifferVsBlock/SchifferVsPsychofunctionalism: E.g. Twin earth, E.g. Arthritis: to explain these cases we need a sufficient condition to believe something. Twin Earth/TE/Arthritis/Schiffer: we need sufficient conditions for belief, so that the Ts-correlated functional roles are held by Ralph but not by Twin Earth Ralph and by Alfred in w but not in w’ where the use of "arthritis" is correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Field Vs Brentano, Fr. | Field II 30 Materialism/Mental Objects/Properties/Field: Materialism must also deny irreducible mental properties (E.g. beliefs, desires). 1) Problem: the experience properties, E.g. the property of feeling pain. 2) Problem: Intentionality: how can materialism explain it. Mental Properties/Field: seem to be relational: between a person and something. Materialism: must show that they are not irreducibly mental. Can materialism VsBrentano show that beliefs and desires can be explained adequately? Field: It can!. II 259 Reference/Uncertainty/FieldVsBrentano: if reference is indeterminate, we can only accept a naturalistic answer, not a Brentanoian one of an irreducible mental connection. Naturalism/Field: but must admit that reference is indeterminate, (because he cannot assume any mental facts here). Solution/Field: Naturalism, however, can assume naturalistic facts that partially define the reference. E.g. Facts about our use that show that a word does not stand for something else. Problem: with that it is never ensured that the found reference is the only one. (This is already due ton the normal uncertainty, not the radical one). Def Partial Reference/Field/(s): the same as "vague reference". That is, a word refers to an object, but perhaps also on others. (see above). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| ceteris paribus | Schiffer Vs ceteris paribus | I 287 ceteris paribus/SchifferVsceteris paribus-condition: it is simply nonsense to speak of p.c., if at all it is not clear what these "other things" should be or what it is for them "to be "equal". I 160 E.g. the baseball hits the window and "ceteris paribus" it would break. This leads to completions that let the phrase seamlessly pass into laws. The interesting question is why anybody would expect a completion here. Probably because the commonsense explanations for belief would otherwise not be valid. Blame it on the covering laws by Hempel. SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. reason, why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al is flying to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there. covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts which make up a complete explanans and contain the fact that is to be explained. Schiffer: it is clear that Carla does not need to know it! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be polished with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification"(Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxatic representation of complete laws. We don’t need any of this. I 161 For sure Carla does not know any "probalistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story contains the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no belief and desires! "because"/explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as a declaration because of interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Still one could wonder if such "because"-statements are analyzable. Probably no analysis has ever been given. That does not mean, however, that nothing has been said. Solution: Counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone, if he had not had the desire... etc. "because"/Schiffer: I especially doubt that the knowing of such "because" facts is calling for law-like generalizations. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Churchland, P. | Searle Vs Churchland, P. | I 77 Churchland/Searle: thinks that "beliefs" and "wishes" have the same status in the theory of folk psychology, that "phlogiston" had in physics. Cf. >neurophilosophy/Churchland. SearleVsChurchland: this analogy has failed: unlike phlogiston beliefs and desires were not postulated as components of a specific theory, they are experienced as parts of our mental life. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Davidson, D. | Brandom Vs Davidson, D. | I 268 Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson). I 931 Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him. I 932 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization. I 383 VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires. I 954 BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies. I 692 Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible. I 957 Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing. I 958 BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way." I 729 Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach. I 747 Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution! Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution. I 961 BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one. II 48 BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection. NS I 166 Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms. Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Davidson, D. | Newen Vs Davidson, D. | Newen I 201 Behavior/DennettVsCausal Explanation/Explanation/Explanation of Behavior/Dennett/DennettVsDavidson/Ryle/Newen: Dennett (like Ryle): behavior cannot be explained causally, but by desires and beliefs as intentional attitudes, not causes. (DennettVsDavidson). I 205 Belief/Intentionality/Intentional Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Dennett's explanation does not include the thesis that desires and beliefs even exist. DennettVsDavidson/VsCausal Explanation/Dennett/Newen: Thesis: the levels (intentional, physical, functional) are isolated and must not be linked. Mental Phenomena/Dennett/Newen: can only be detected by the attribution of intentional attitudes. I 206 VsDennett: E.g. toothaches are a mental state. Then Dennett has to assert that the state depends on whether it is useful for someone to attribute toothache to this person. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Dennett, D. | Stalnaker Vs Dennett, D. | II 180 DennettVsSententialism/Dennett/Stalnaker: Vs propositions as belief objects. (relation theory). Solution/Dennett: "Organismic contribution" of the believer. Neutral with respect to the manner in which it is represented. Def notional attitude-Psychology/not. att./Dennett: (instead of propositional attitude) neutral in terms of the manner of representation. Defined in concepts of possible worlds (poss.w.), "notional worlds". Def prop att-psychology/Dennett: describes attitudes in concepts of wide content. Def sentential attitudes/sent. att./Dennett: syntactic, assumes Mentalese. Def notional world/Dennett: a fictional world that is constructed from a theorist as an external observer, II 181 to characterize the narrow attitudes of a subject. That means my twin on Twin Earth and I have the same notional world. Def narrow content/Dennett: is defined by a set of notional worlds that is the way in which a person who had actual world. notional world/Stalnaker: seem to be exactly the poss.w. that characterize the wide content in the psychology of propositional attitudes. StalnakerVsDennett: all poss.w. except one are fictitious – how can notional attitudes be different propositional attitudes. Why should not. att. be narrow and prop. att. wide? Narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: are then according to Dennett simply propositions. The difference is neither to be found in the worlds themselves nor the nature of the content if both are just sets of poss.w.. The difference lies in the different responses of the two theories to the question by virtue of which fact someone has a conviction with this content. Propositional atitude-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: according to it contents are a function of relation to the actual world although the Twin-Earth-Example shows that they cannot be purely internal. Notional attitudes/not. att.-psychology/Dennett/Stalnaker: shall explain how purely internal (intrinsic) properties can pick a set of poss.w. that is different than the set that is picked by propositional attitudes. Wide content: e.g. O'Leary (correctly) thinks that there is water on the ground floor. This is wrong in the twin earth (tw.e.) because it is not water but XYZ. narrow content/solution: "water-like stuff". Dennett/Fodor/Stalnaker: we can compare both approaches: II 182 Narrow content/Fodor/Stalnaker: he changes the nature of the belief object, narrow contents are no longer propositions but functions of context on propositions. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: is for Dennett of the same kind as further content: both are propositions - function of poss.w. (=notional worlds) to truth values (tr.v.). What changed compared to the wide content is the relation between a believer in a proposition by virtue of which the proposition correctly describes the conviction. StalnakerVsDennett: but in addition he still has to explain how the purely internal (intrinsic) properties of the subject determine the narrow content. Solution/Dennett: e.g. Suppose we know all about the dispositions and skills of a subject but nothing about its causal history. Then that is similar as if we find an ancient object and ask what it was good for ((s)Cf. > Paul Valéry, find on the beach, objet ambigu). Dennett: then we imagine what it was ideally created for. In the notional world of an organism we imagine how the environment looks like to which it is best suited. Solution: propositions that are true in such possible worlds (poss.w.) will be the narrow content of the convictions of these subjects. StalnakerVsDennett: which is now not what we want: those poss.w. look more so that the desires and needs of the organisms in them are fulfilled and not that their propositions are true in them. E.g. it is not clear that the antelope with its properties to respond to lions is better off in a world of lions or in one without. It could then do a better job in terms of survival and to reproduce. Ideal/ideal environment/Dennett: could also be a very ugly poss.w. in which the organisms are, however, prepared to survive in it. II 183 StalnakerVsDennett: that is better, surely we try to cope with the world in which we think we live. But something is missing: a) many properties that enable organisms to survive, have nothing to do with their convictions, b) the fact that some counterfactual skills would help us to survive in a counterfactual poss.w. is not sufficient for saying that such a counterfactual possibility is compatible with the poss.w. which we believe to be the actual world. E.g. Suppose there are no real predators of porcupines in the actual world, they carry their spines simply like that. Then it would be unrealistic to artificially populate their notional world with predators. E.g. Suppose a poss.w. with beings who would like to eat us humans because of our special odor. Then we should not use such a poss.w. to characterize our convictions. Solution/Stalnaker: a belief state must serve in any way to be receptive to information from the environment and the information must have a role in determining behavior. StalnakerVsDennett: if we understand him like that we are still dealing with wide content. II 184 Representation system/Stalnaker: is then able to be used in a set of alternative internal states that are systematically depending on the environment. S1, S2,.. are internal states Ei: a state of the environment. Then an individual is normally in a state Si if the environment is in state Si. Representation: then we could say that the organism represents the environment as being in state Ei. Content: we could also say that the states contain information about the environment. Assuming that the states determine a specific behavior to adequately behave in the environment Ei. belief state/BS: then we can say that these representations are likely to be regarded as a general type of BS. That is like Dennett understands narrow content. Problem/StalnakerVsDennett: 1. the description of the environment is not ascribed to the organism. 2. Information is not distinguished from misinformation (error, deception). That means if it is in state Si it represents the environment as in Ei being no matter if it is. Problem: the concept which originates from a causal relation is again wide content. Important argument: if the environment would be radically different the subject might otherwise be sensitive to it or sensitive to other features ((s) would reverse everything) or it would not be sensitive to the environment at all! narrow content/StalnakerVsDennett: problem: if the skills and dispositions of the organism are included in the descriptions of the content the actual world is initially essential. ((s) problem/Stalnaker/(s): how should we characterize their skills in a counterfactual poss.w.?) II 185 Dennett: if organisms are sneaky enough we might also here ascribe a narrow ((s) counterfactual) content. StalnakerVsDennett: I see no reason for such optimism. You cannot expect any information about virtual poss.w. expect when you do not make any assumptions about the actual world (act.wrld.) (actual environment). Ascription/content/conviction/belief/Stalnaker: in normal belief attributions we ignore not only fairytale worlds but in general all possibilities except the completely everyday! E.g. O’Leary: distinguishes only poss.w. in which the ground floor is dry or wet, II 186 not also such in which XYZ is floating around. Question: Would he then behave differently? Surely for olive oil but not for XYZ. Twin earth/tw.e./ascription: even if the behavior would not change in twin earth-cases, it is still reasonable not to ascribe tw.e.-cases. Context dependence/revisionism/Stalnaker: could argued that it is not twin earth but normal world which makes it unsuitable for scientific ascriptions. Dennett: stands up for his neutral approach (notional world). StalnakerVsDennett: nevertheless causal-informational representation is substantially relative to a set of alternative options (poss.w.). internal/intrinsic/causality/problem: the system of causal relations cannot itself be intrinsical to the representing. Theory: has admittedly a scope to choose between different possibilities of defining content II 187 StalnakerVsDennett: but there is no absolute neutral context without presuppositions about the environment. Narrow content/Dennett/Stalnaker: binds himself a hand on the back by forbidding himself the information that is accessible to wide content. StalnakerVsDennett: I believe that no sensible concept of content results from this restriction. II 238 Language dependency/ascription/belief/Stalnaker: this third type of language dependence is different from the other three. II 239 People must not be predisposed to express belief that type of language dependency at all. It may be unconscious or tacit assumptions. The content must also not involve any language. Dennett: e.g. Berdichev: we should distinguish simple language-specific cases - whose objects are informational states - from those, so propositions are saved - E.g. approval or opinions. StalnakerVsDennett: we should rather understand such cases as special cases of a more general belief that also non-linguistic beings like animals might have. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Dogmas (Quine) | Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) | Brandom I 854 DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma"). I 85 The idea of a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme. We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data." I 89 Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content. I 91 If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective. DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Emotivism | Newen Vs Emotivism | New I 137 VsRelativism/Ethics/Newen: Solution: Non-descriptivism: it searches for new ways. Emotivism: denies that properties are attributed in moral statements. I 138 emotional statements: have no truth conditions! Rationality: a rational dispute is not possible then. VsEmotivism/Newen: it is precisely the dispute over values that is part of the political discourse in democratic societies. Non-Descriptivism/Hare/Newen: New variety: universal prescriptivism. (Literature: The Language of Morals). I 139 Universal Prescriptivism/Hare/Newen: the link between should-sentence and instruction is to be thought as narrow as possible conceptually. Conceptual contradiction: E.g "You should do X, but don't do it anyway". Moral/Imperative: E.g. "Get me a beer!" is not a moral statement. Moral Statement/Hare: for that, it must be possible to apply the statement universally. Universalizability/Newen: was first recognized by Kant as an essential characteristic of moral statements. Hare: Thesis: in the logic of should-sentences a universalizability is implicitly contained. I.e. you cannot say of two individuals that a should perform a certain action in a given situation, which is described in universal terms, but individual b should not. Should-Sentence/Hare: implicitly contains a principle according to which the statement is applicable to all similar situations. HareVsVs/Newen: there are three misunderstandings to be avoided here: I 140 1) the similarity includes similarity of desires and beliefs. I.e., there may be people with different desires and beliefs in similar situations. 2) Universalizability does not mean that the rules have to be simple 3) They can also refer to a single individual. E.g. "You should take care of your mother." |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Fodor, J. | Cresswell Vs Fodor, J. | II 53 Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say". --- II 54 CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. --- II 55 Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said Causal role/Fodor/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) Meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then Fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in Fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsFodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has. --- II 159 Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Frankfurt, H.G. | Pauen Vs Frankfurt, H.G. | Pauen I 277 Second Order Volitions/Frankfurt: (1993) Act of Will/Frankfurt: conscious action-effective desires, where no veto is presented. Second Order Volition: special kind of wishes, which in turn refer to wishes. E.g. the will to fast despite being hungry. I 278 Frankfurt: It is about the question whether the will that someone has is the will he wants to have. Def Freedom to Act/Frankfurt: free is an action when the second order volition matches the first-order volition. This does not nee to be the end. However, Frankfurt believes that a person could be completely sure of the second order volitions so that the question of the third and fourth order does not arise. VsFrankfurt: the regress is nevertheless possible, and thus the original unambiguous criterion abandoned. I 279 If that were to be precluded, the second order volitions would be induced from the outside and therefore not free. Despite the dilemma Frankfurt succeeds in making clear a central difference between standards and affect-bound behavior. I 291 PauenVsFrankfurt: the judgment whether an act is free, does not rely on the formal feature of the compliance of the second order volition with a first order volition, but more specifically on the central beliefs of a person. VsFrankfurt: it is not clear why emotions should not have an impact on second-order volitions. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Freud, S. | Verschiedene Vs Freud, S. | Derrida I 101 Analogy/Artaud: it cannot teach us what her counterpart is. (ArtaudVsFreud). Derrida I 101 ArtaudVsFreud: the interpretation would deprive the theatre of its holiness, which belongs to it, because it is an expression of life in its elementary powers. Lacan I 41 LacanVsFreud: against the rule of the (wrong) me. - Not where "it" was, should become "I", but the "it" is to be revealed and opened up, so that the subject can understand and experience itself from this eccentricity as a being and saying. I 122 LacanVsFreud: not "I" instead of "it", but to reopen the horizon of "It speaks" and let the truth emerge behind the false objectivism. (BarthesVsLacan: there is no "behind"). Rorty V 42 Freud/RortyVsHume: in contrast to Hume, Freud has actually reshaped our self-image! If the ego is not master in its own house, it is because there is actually another person! The unconscious of Freud is actually effective. V 43 But it does not seem like a thing that we can claim, but like a person that claims us. The I is populated by counterparts of people we need to know in order to understand a person's behaviour. DavidsonVsFreud/Rorty: Splitting is always perceived as disturbing by philosophers. But: (pro Freud) there is no reason to assume "you unconsciously believe that p" instead of "there is something in you that causes you to act as if you believed that p". (Unconscious/unconscious/(s): "something in you..." then there are several brain users.) V 62 Rorty: Freud's greatest achievement is the gratifying character of the ironic, playful intellectual. V 63 MacIntyreVsFreud/Rorty: the abandonment of the Aristotelian "functional concept of the human" leads to "emotivism": to the annihilation of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Rorty: he was right, insofar moral concepts like "reason", "human nature" etc. only make sense from the Aristotelian point of view. Def Emotivism/MacIntyre/Rorty: value judgements nothing more than the expression of preferences, attitudes or feelings. V 64 "Ability"/Freud/Rorty: (according to Davidson): Freud drops the idea of "ability" at all and replaces it with a multitude of beliefs and desires. V 65 RortyVsMacIntyre: this criticism only makes sense if such judgements could have been something else (e.g. expression of a rational knowledge of nature). Freud/Rorty: if we take him seriously, we no longer need to decide between a "functional" Aristotelian concept of the human, which is decisive in matters of morality, and the "terrible freedom" of Sartre. V 66 We can track down psychological narratives without heroines or heroes. We tell the story of the whole machine as a machine, without central, privileged parts. V 67 Dignity/Machine/Human Dignity/Rorty: only if we believe we have to have reasons to treat others decently, we lose our human dignity by proposing that our stories were about mechanisms without a centre. V 67/68 Rationality/Traditional Philosophy/Tradition/Rorty: actually believes that there is a core of rationality in the deepest inner (even of the tormentor) to which I can always appeal. Freud: calls this "the pious world view". V 69 Ethics/Morality/Psychology/Rorty: such a striving results in nothing more than the continued oscillating pendulum between moral dogmatism and moral skepticism. V 70 What metaphysics has not been able to accomplish, psychology (no matter how "deep" it may be) cannot accomplish it either. Freud does not explain "moral motives" either. |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Functionalism | Field Vs Functionalism | II 43 Belief/Functionalism/Stalnaker/Lewis/Field: the thesis that belief is a functional state. (Regardless of the physical realization). Important argument: this involves no relation to a sentence or sentence analogue in a system of internal representations. II 44 Stalnaker: E.g. beings from other planets: ...Here we look at sensory inputs and assume that they are correlated with their survival. ...Then we manipulate the environment. belief/Martians/Stalnaker: then we would not only attribute analogues of beliefs and desires, but them themselves. But we do not need to assume any language, not even Mentalese. (Stalnaker 1976, p. 82). Representation/FieldVsStalnaker: that does not allow us to distinguish whether such a functional theory of belief requires a system of internal representations. 1) We have not observed the entire behavior. 2) Even if: an assertion about behavior is not simply an assertion about behavior, it is an assertion about how the behavior is caused. FieldVsStalnaker: we need knowledge (or reasonable belief) about how behavior is produced in order to know (or believe) that a being has belief. Functionalism/Inner State/Field: an assertion about internal states of an organism is an assertion about those and not reducible to behavior. II 49 Functional Relation/Field: the functional relation psi is not itself a physical relation. FieldVsFunctionalism: Problem: even if we consider belief to be a functional relation, it does not solve Brentano’s problem, because here we would have to show that there could be physical relations between people and propositions. The only thing functionalism says is trivial: that my relation to propositions may differ from that of dogs or of myself 20 years ago. II 50 Def Orthographic Coincidence/Predicate/Single-Digit/Multi-Digit/Belief/Field: Thesis: all the various attributions E.g. "X believes Russell was bald", E.g. "X believes Russell was bald or snow is white", etc. should be regarded as primitive single-digit predicates. Then we could drop all two-digit predicates like E.g. "X believes that p" entirely. Orthographic coincidence: then the fact that the expression "believes that" occurs in both (supposedly) single-digit predicates would be without meaning, a mere orthographic coincidence. Likewise, the fact that both contain "Russell was bald". FieldVs: that cannot be taken seriously. But suppose it was serious, what would follow? FieldVsOrthographic coincidence: it would follow that there does not have to be a physical relationship between people and propositions. Because since we did not speak of a psychological relation, it is clear that there is no realization in which a physical relation would be needed. ((s) then there must be an infinite number of single-digit predicates that reflect the most complicated attitudes.) Field: although the error is so crude, it occurred to me myself (in the first paragraph of this section) when I tried to explain that functionalism makes representations superfluous: I said: "A state of an organism is a state of belief that p, if this state plays the right (appropriate) role in the psychology of the organism." II 51 Vs: in order for this to make sense the letter "p" must be understood here as an abbreviation for a particular sentence, E.g. "Either Russell was bald or snow is white". Field: I’m not saying that it is meaningless. But "appropriate role" suggests that we can define this particular state in a directly functional way. And that in turn suggests that the procedure that we need for "pain" could also be applied to "Russell was bald or snow is white". ((s) and that it is only an orthographic coincidence that we are not doing it). And that the corresponding simple expression represents a property. Solution: in order to avoid the "orthographic coincidence","X believes that p0" should not be considered as functionally definable for certain sentences p0, in such a way as that which is right for "X is in pain". ((s) as a function, no (too) specific sentence should be assumed, but something more general). Solution: It should be non-functionally defined from a relational predicate "X believes that p", which is functionally defined by (3). N.B.: then we need physical properties and quantities of possible worlds. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Grice, P.H. | Loar Vs Grice, P.H. | I 1 Language/everyday language/concept/theory/explanation/pragmatic/Loar: all pragmatic concepts are ultimately based on belief. Loar: Thesis: my approach (chapter 9) is reductionist: 1. Semantic characteristics are based on beliefs and desires. (Similar to Grice). LoarVsGrice: my approach is not only communication theoretical: LoarVsAll: the theories of beliefs can serve as a basis for the semantic theory of "language of thought" (most authors: the other way around!) 2. My explanation of belief and desires is not based on I 2 Propositions or semantic concepts. Meaning/Loar: propositional attitudes can therefore serve non-circularly as a basis for meaning. belief/Conviction/Wish/Desire/Loar: Thesis: can be explained without assuming everyday semantics. Thinking/Language/Loar: but this should not assume thinking without language, i.e. language as a mere vehicle of communication: belief/Loar: Thesis: is not a linguistic state. Content/Loar: even if belief were a linguistic state, its content could be analyzed independently of its linguistic aspects. Solution/Loar: explanation through behaviour and perception. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Hempel, C. | Schiffer Vs Hempel, C. | I 160 SchifferVscovering law/SchifferVsHempel/SchifferVsFolk psychology: 2. Reason why the folk psychology is wrong that the covering laws are wrong. E.g. Al flies to Key West, Bob asks why and Carla explains that he wants to visit his sister there. covering law: Carla knows a general psychological law and a conjunction of individual facts that add up to the full explanans and contain to explanatory fact. Schiffer: it is clear that the Carla did not need to know! And certainly not as a child. This also does not need to be refined with "probabilisations" or "maximum specification" (Hempel 1965). Or by subdoxastic representation of complete laws. We do not need any of this. I 161 Surely Carla does not know any "probabilistic completion". There is also no reason to assume that the whole story uses the terms "belief" and "desire"! But that does not mean that one should conclude that there is no faith and desires! "Because"/Explanation/Schiffer: E.g. Carla. Al went to Key West, because he wants to visit his sister. This true statement works in these circumstances as an explanation because of the interests and assumptions that Bob had when he asked. Nevertheless, one can ask whether such "because"-statements are analyzable at all. Probably no analysis was ever given. This does not mean that nothing has been said. Solution: counterfactual conditional: Al would not have gone if he had not had the desire ... etc. "Because"/Schiffer: I doubt above all that the knowledge of such "because"-facts requires law-like generalizations. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Identity Theory | Loar Vs Identity Theory | I 15 VsType-Identity Theory/Type Identity/Loar: has often been rejected by physicalism in recent years in favor of the weaker token identity. (stronger/weaker). Loar: but there are correlation theories that are even weaker and these are too weak. For example that each mental state corresponds to one or more physical states. Type Identity (see below chapter 4): relativized to an individual at a certain time, there can be such a thing. 1. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: if there are token identities between propositional attitudes and physical states, then there are also type correlations. I.e. beliefs and desires are among the causes of movements and physical events have only physical causes. I 16 Systematic Role: but we need it in addition: B is of a type that has a certain position in the system of state types of subject z, which are connected to t by certain counterfactual condition relations. Qualities 2. level: are involved here, a) of the persons, b) of the tokens of belief. Problem: this is very cumbersome. Can we not accept a weaker theory? With qualities of the 1st level? Example B's systematic role then consists partly in its possible interactions with other attitudes. Problem: in order to characterize types of attitudes, we have to abstract from their systematic roles. Abstraction: but does not work with counterfactual properties of the 1st level. ((s) because they are always related to a certain individual). I 17 Problem: then one should already have the concept of belief (circular). This is exactly the problem of analytical behaviorism. Solution/Loar: we go one level higher: quantification over types of the 1st level. For example, there are state types from z to t, which are organized counterfactually in this and that way. Token-Identity: here the physical token B must fulfill the predicate: "x is a belief that p" i.e. Systematic Role: from B to t must correspond to the position of this predicate in the belief-desire theory. However, the sR must be identified with a property of the 2. level! I.e. a property. The one that results from type-type relations for a person at a time t. Property 2. Level/Loar: here "believe that p". Mental state: is then identical to state types of the 2. level. VsIdentity: a correlation, which is not an identity, between mental state types M1...Mn and physical state types 1. level P1...Pn can then have this logical form: z is in Mi power of a state of the 1. level with the systematic role involved in Mi and Pi is that state 1. level. On the other hand: State 1. level: can be described by "z's belief that p to t". This has for z this or that systematic role to t. Identity Theory/Loar: with this one can rightly say that mental states are identical with physical states of the 1. level. N.B.: but one also needs the former sense of "mental state" to be able to express that two living beings are in the same mental state. 2. Argument for psychophysical correlations/Loar: does not require token identities. Thesis: if belief and desire are causes of behavior, there must be psychophysical type correlations for individuals at certain times. N.B.: the argument is based on the consideration that no theory is immune to being irrelevant in terms of explanation. I 18 E.g. by future science. Question: what status should assumed beliefs and desires have to explain behaviour? Are they still relevant? Only justification: that the old theory makes some distinctions that make the new theory true. Loar: Thesis: in any case, we will still need psychophysical correlations, relativized to persons and times. Revisionism/Loar: for example, suppose one wanted to argue that no scientific finding could ever prove that we have no belief and no desires. I 19 Question: could anything at all falsify this attitude? Probably only knowledge about behaviour. belief Desire Theory/Loar: for them there are two possibilities, which status they have as theory: a) its truth logically follows its systematization success (this is instrumentalism with its perverse use of "true"). b) it is to be interpreted realistically, i.e. that its truth does not logically follow from its systematization success. They are then empirical like physical theories. Problem: we have a dogmatic dualism in which the theory could not be refuted by any degree of success in scientific explanation of behavior. Worse: with the argument about the conditions for the characteristic(s) it is not clear at all that the theory has a coherent interpretation. Stronger/Reduction: the requirement that the states are permanent even if not unchangeable and similarly organized in other individuals. Weaker: only relativization for times. Advantage: we do not need to demand an a priori fitting of our theory to the structure of theoretical psychology. Reduction: not every theory that explains the success of another theory reduces it. I.e. Confirmation: a theory is not its elimination. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Instrumentalism | Field Vs Instrumentalism | II 30/31 FieldVsInstrumentalism: it is inappropriate: belief attributions can be literally true and are not just useful tools that we use for various purposes. The usefulness of the attribution of beliefs and desires does not imply that Brentano’s problem is solvable. (> Quine 1960, § 45). |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Instrumentalism | Loar Vs Instrumentalism | I 14 Attribution of Belief/Instrumentalism/Loar: for instrumentalism these attributions have no truth conditions. Problem: then one can also describe the behaviour of a pencil by desires and beliefs. I.e. the theory is too weak ((s) it explains too much). LoarVsInstrumentalism: belief and desires are right causes and not mere patterns of systematization. InstrumentalismVsVs: "Cause" itself is used instrumentalistically here. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Lewis, D. | Schiffer Vs Lewis, D. | I 30 Covering Law/Solution/Lewis: they are implicated in the attribution of individual belief, while the mechanism of this implication is revealed by the definition of belief and desires in terms of folk psychology. Covering Law/SchifferVsLewis: I still believe that we cannot find the covering laws. Then the corresponding explanatory model can also not be correct. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Loar, B. | Avramides Vs Loar, B. | Avramidis I 29 Meaning theory/M.Th./Pragmatics/Semantics/Loar/Avramidis: (Loar 1976 p.150f) (close to Lewis, VsMcDowell, VsWiggins, pro Grice) Thesis Semantics and pragmatics should not be separated. Acccording to Loar Grice is not only on the side of pragmatics. Semantics cannot be used without psychological terms. Grice: for Loar, Grice is working on the first level (see above). Loar: the line between semantics and pragmatics is difficult to draw. Def Pragmatics/Loar: must be negatively determined: all facts about language use in a community that are not semantic facts. AvramidesVsLoar: this definition of pragmatics is not the standard definition, this comes from Morris: (Foundations of the Theory of Signs) Def Syntax/Morris: the study of the relation of the characters to each other Def Semantics/Morris: the study of the relation of signs to things denominated by them Def Pragmatics/Morris: the study of the relationship between the signs and their interpreters. Thus, for Morris, any investigation involving the speaker would fall into the field of pragmatics. Also Grice’ work. I 30 On the other hand: the model of Wiggins/McDowell (sense/power theory) makes it necessary for the two of them to choose Morris’ definition of pragmatics and Loar’s. That may be why Loar rejects their model and tends to Lewis. Loar: seems to consider the distinction between the possible and actual languages within the semantics possible. Then pragmatism is something that hovers above it. AvramidesVs: one can see Lewis’ model also differently: Thesis The distinction of actual/possible languages is parallel to the distinction semantics/pragmatics by Morris. (And does not bring many new aspects either) AvramiesVsLoar: misinterpretation: he seems to believe that if we accept a layer model of the theory of meaning, we have to keep the levels isolated. Then he fears that Grice would solely be attributed to pragmatics. (Loar 1927, p.149). McDowell/Avramides: according to his interpretation it would not be like that. Here we have an overall picture that includes semantics and pragmatics. Layer Model/M.Th./Avramides: allows a reconciliation of Grice’ approach with the formal M.Th. by Frege/Davidson. I 31 Problem: the reconciliation must be acceptable to both sides. Anyway, according to Loar the distinction pragmatics/semantics is anything but merely terminological: M.Th./Philosophy of mind/Loar: M.Th. is part of the theory of mind, and not vice versa. Loar/Avramides: that means that Loar can only understand the fundamental nature of semantic concepts by reference to psychological terms. (> camp). Therefore he takes a reductive position. Grice: is part of semantics according to Loar. And semantics must be reduced to psychology. I 78 Reduction/Avramides: the question is whether we may use psychological concepts in the analysans that do not rely on just the semantic terms that we first wanted to analyze. Reductive Interpretation/Grice/Avramides: the reductive one has yet another claim: if successful, it should show that our notion of meaning is secondary to our psychological concepts in the overall scheme (overall scheme). I 79 AvramidesVsSchiffer/AvramidesVsLoar: a reduction of the semantic on the psychological does not work because of the second form of circularity. I 110 Cartesianism/Loar: he sees his rejection above all in the rejection of what he called "non-naturalism". AvramidesVsLoar: but those who have the intuition that belief and intentions are primarily linguistic states could reject more than just non-naturalism. I 111 Loar: the view that belief, desires and their content could be explained without assumptions about the natural language, runs the risk of drawing a picture of thinking without language. (Loar 1981 p.2) AvramidesVsLoar: Thinking is not impossible without language. ++ I 137 |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Materialism | Nagel Vs Materialism | III 30 Objectivity/Reality/Nagel: with the accepted restriction that we can only detect the specific quality of every experience perspective from the inside, we do not give up the idea of a world as it is created in reality regardless of the appearance for any of us. Nagel: the world as it is also contains appearances and there is no privileged perspective to grasp them. This is the negation of idealism with respect to consciousness. The world is neither my world nor is it ours (this does not even apply to the mental world)! NagelVsMaterialism: ultimately based on a kind of idealism: the idealism of objectivity Objectivity/Nagel: is not reality, it's just a way of understanding reality. ((s) >Searle: realism as method and condition for forming hypotheses). III 31 But it is still useful, because the search for an objective understanding is the only way to expand our knowledge. Otherwise we would have to dispense with mathematics, because it cannot be complete. Rorty IV 64 NagelVsMaterialism/Rorty: ignores the "consciousness", i.e. the way things look viewed from inside the person. RortyVsNagel: the "view from the inside" allows to see some, but do not all the internal causes of behavior. These causes can be identified under "mental" descriptions. The ego of people are not organs and particles, but mostly their beliefs and desires. IV 65 Introspection/Rorty: the ability to report does not depend on something being "present to the consciousness", but on that the use of words can be taught! (e.g. you need to know what fever is to find out whether you have it). "Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I" Def "I"/Rorty: consists of the mental states of a person. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Positivism | Loar Vs Positivism | Avramides I 137 Attribution/Propositional Attitude/Theory/Loar: Thesis: the epistemology of attribution of belief and desire must be separated from its explanation. LoarVsPositivism: without the separation one succumbs to the errors of positivism, phenomenalism, behaviorism and semantic instrumentalism in relation to science. (Loar 1981 p.128). LoarVsPositivism/Avramides: his mistake: to try to formulate truth conditions in terms of document conditions. AvramidesVsLoar: Thesis: now "a priori constitutive connections between attribution of attitudes (propositional attitudes) and language behavior" are exactly what I propose. (Loar 1981 p.128). In addition, I have proposed not to separate precisely between the epistemology of the attribution of desires and beliefs from their explanation. ((s) Well, so not after all!). Do I now fall into the "positivist trap" of Loar? I do not think so. AvramidesVsLoar: his mistake is to think that only positivism can combine an approach to psychology with semantics. |
Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Property Dualism | Field Vs Property Dualism | Avramidis I 98 Physicalism/Reductionism/Field/Avramides: Field is an extreme reductionist: FieldVsProperty Dualism (PD): an interesting version of materialism requires not only that there are no irreducible mental objects, but also no irreducible mental properties. Field/Avramides: with that he rejects not only the Cartesian dualism, but also the property dualism. Such a thoroughbred reductionism asserts that we can, at least in principle, I 99 read the individual beliefs, desires and intentions, etc. from the physical properties of the individual (and its environment!). That, of course, includes detailed knowledge of the brain and its function, as well as its correlation with the mental. Def Property Dualism/Avramides: there are authors that are less strict than Field, and allow the PD: i.e Objects and events are probably always physical, but there are also both physical and irreducible mental properties. Important argument: This changes the expectations that we may have of the possible results of a physical theory of the world. The physical theory will then be the theory of all things, but not of all properties. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Reductionism | Lewis Vs Reductionism | IV 76 Def Person State/p.s./State/Lewis: is a physical object, just like the person! (If persons had ghostly parts, their conditions would also have some). The state does many of the things a person does: it walks, talks, thinks, has a belief and desires, size and spatial location. The only difference: the state begins and ends abruptly. So it can't do everything a person does, namely things that take more time. 1. it is possible that a person state exists 2. it is possible that two person states follow each other directly, but do not overlap. The properties and location of the second can be exactly the same as those of the first. IV 77 Patchwork principle of possibility: if it is possible for X to occur intrinsically in a space-time region and Y in the same way, then it is also possible for X and Y to occur in two separate but subsequent regions. There are no necessary exclusions. Everything can follow everything. 3. there may be a possible world that is exactly like ours in terms of distribution of intrinsic local qualities in time and space. ((s) > Humean Supervenience; > Humean World). 4. such a possible world could be exactly like ours in terms of causal relations, for causality is determined by nothing but the distribution of local qualities. (But maybe this is too strong). 5. such a world of states would be just like our simpliciter. There are no properties of our real world, except those supervening on the distribution of local qualities. 6. then our actual world is a world of states. In particular, there are person states. 7. but persons also exist and persons are (mostly) not person states. They take too long! Nevertheless, persons and person states, such as tables and table legs, are not present twice in regions. That can only be because they are indistinguishable! They are partly identical. Person states are parts of persons. LewisVsReductionism: my definition of person as maximum R correlated aggregates of person states is no reduction! This saves me from circularity when I say that these in turn consist of even shorter ones. Part/Lewis: by this I simply mean a subdivision, not a well-defined unit that could occur in a causal explanation. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Reductionism | Searle Vs Reductionism | II 325 SearleVsReductionism: there are actually mental processes that cannot be reduced to others. (Similar to Putnam, Quine, etc.) E.g. tickling, itching, pain, hopes, beliefs, fears, desires, experiences of action, thoughts, feelings, etc. All the more astonishing that this is denied by the majority of philosophers! II 326 Pain/Searle: pain is irreducible. Nobody ever came through a thorough phenomenological study to the belief that e.g. his own agonizing pain does not exist. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Reductionism | Peacocke Vs Reductionism | Avramidis I 92 Reductionism/Peacocke/Grice/Avramides: Peacocke seems to have equated the failure of superficial epistemic asymmetry (eA) with the failure of the reductive interpretation of Grice's analysis: But he is more cautious than Platts. PeacockeVsReductionism: Grice is more interesting without. "Actual Language Relation"/Peacocke: it is a misleading idea that there is simply a kind of reductionism that can bring the motivation for a search for the "actual language relation", the uses no semantic vocabulary. This is wrong. Suppose we could very precisely attribute certain beliefs and desires before we could translate the language of an individual: even then, simultaneous attribution of propositional attitudes and locutions would be necessary. And to achieve this, it is not necessary that exactly certain propositional attitudes are ascribable before understanding the language. (Peacocke 1976, p. 167). Avramides: Peacocke seems to connect reductive interpretation and oeA here. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Ryle, G. | Sellars Vs Ryle, G. | I XXXIII Propositions/thoughts/RyleVs "category mistake": as beliefs, desires or motives thoughts are no space temporally localized events or states. Therefore, they cannot occur as antecedents or causes of actions. SellarsVsRyle: he suggested to understand mental predicates like "to be convinced", "to believe" etc. as expressions of dispositions but without acknowledging that again there is an explanation like in the way of the Freudian ego or super-ego . belief/Ryle: to be convinced means to behave in a certain way. I XXXIII Disposition/explanation/to appear/Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how once can also explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. His tie seller John developed a kind of theory, which specifically refers to the language behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. I 77 Inner episode/category mistake/SellarsVsRyle: inner episodes are by no means a category mistake, they can even be very well "speak" with the means of intersubjective discourse. And in fact through a critical examination of inner episodes of a different kind, namely with thoughts. I 79 Episode/tradition: modern empiricism: a) thoughts are verbal or linguistic episodes. SellarsVs: there is not enough language behavior to explain all thoughts. b) To think/tradition: be any form of "intelligent behavior" both linguistically not linguistically. RyleVs: actually no episodes but hypothetical or mixed-hypothetical-categorical facts about this or other behavior. ((s) This seems to be by Ryle, but Ryle is not explicitly mentioned here by Sellars). SellarsVs: Problem: whenever we refer to a component of non-habitual behavior as intelligent, we seem then to think it necessary to thereby refer to a thinking. (hidden circle. VsRyle). I 88 Category Mistake/Sellars: e.g. to assume that the combustibility of wood is so to say latent burning. SellarsVsRyle: nevertheless, not every non-observable episode is the consequence of category mistakes. |
Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Tradition | Searle Vs Tradition | II 28 Belief/conviction/SearleVsTradition: it is simply not a kind of image! It is simply a representation, that means it has a propositional content, which determines the fulfillment of conditions and a psychological mode, which defines the orientation. II 49 SearleVsTradition: Convictions and desires are not the basic intentional states. One can also ashamed of his desire or his convictions. II 160 Tradition: one never has a causation experience. SearleVsTradition: one not only often has causation experience, but every perception or action experience is indeed just such causation experience! SearleVsHume: he looked at a wrong spot, he looked for strength. II 190 Example skiing: traditional view: first: word on world causation direction. You follow the instruction to put the weight on the downhill ski. II 191 This changes with increasing dexterity. The instructions appear unconscious, but still as a representation. To make conscious will become a hindrance in the future as with the centipede. SearleVsTradition: the rules are not internalized, but they are less important! They are not unconsciously "hardwired" but they become ingrained. II 192 They might be realized as nerves and simply make the rules unnecessary. The rules can retreat into the background. The beginner is inflexible, the advanced flexible. This makes the causal role of representation superfluous! The advanced does not follow the rules better, he skis differently! The body takes command and the driver's intentionality is concentrated on the winning of the race. II 192/193 Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality, but pervades the whole network of intentional states. II 228 Name/subject/direct speech/quote/tradition/Searle: E.g. the sheriff spoke the words "Mr. Howard is an honest man. " II 231 According to the traditional view, the direct speech here includes no words! (But names.) II 232 SearleVsTradition: Of course we can talk about words with words. Also here no new names are created, the syntactic position often allows not even the setting up of a name. II 233 E.g. Gerald said he would Henry. (Ungrammatical). II 246 de dicto/intensional/SearleVsTradition: E.g. "Reagan is such that Bush thinks he is the president." Searle: the mistake was to conclude from the intensionality of de dicto reports to the intensionality of the reported states themselves. But from the presence of two different types of reports simply does not follow that there are two different kinds of states. III 165 Realism/tradition/Searle: the old dispute between realism and idealism was about the existence of matter or of objects in space and time. The traditional realism dealt with the question of how the world really is. Realism/SearleVsTradition: this is a profound misunderstanding! Realism is not a thesis about how the world actually is. We could be totally in error about how the world is in its details, and the realism could be still true! Def realism/Searle: realism has the view that there is a way of being of things that is logically independent of all human representations. It does not say how things are, but only that there is a mode of being of things. (Things are here not only material objects). V 176 Predicate/meaning/Searle: but is the meaning of the predicate expression a linguistic or non-linguistic entity? Searle: it is a linguistic entity in an ordinary sense. Can the existence of a non-linguistic entity follow from the existence of a linguistic entity? Existence/language/universals/SearleVsTradition: but the claim that any non-linguistic entities exist, can never constitute a tautology. IV 155 Background/Searle: what means "use" of background assumptions? The meaning concept shall perform certain tasks for us. Now the same object can at different times be understood relatively to various coordinate system of background assumptions without being ambiguous. ((s) It is unambiguous in the respective situation). IV 156 SearleVsTradition: here it is also not about the distinction performance/competence. IV 157 There is no sharp distinction between the competence of a speaker and his knowledge of the world. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Tradition | Peacocke Vs Tradition | I 4 Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless. Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content. I 10 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below). Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts! Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290 Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke: a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic! "Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: 3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front. Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before! I 17/18 Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore: 2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail. I 22 Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Intentionality | Dennett, D. | I 281 Meaning/Dennett: Origin, birth of meaning: thesis: the nucleotide sequences, at first purely syntactic, assume "semantics". "Quasi meaning": e.g. mode of action of macromolecules - SearleVsDennett: only as-if-intentionality. DennettVsSearle: you have to start somewhere. But the first steps are not to be recognized as steps towards meaning. I 282 We also have parts that have only half-intentionality. II 147 Person/Intentionality/Dennett: Thesis: Becoming a person is the transition from a system of 1st order (beliefs and desires, but not about beliefs and desires) to a 2nd order intentional system (beliefs about own and foreign beliefs). Intentional 3rd order system: is able to want someone to believe it wants something. |
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| Interpretation | Dennett, D. | Fod / Lep IV 139 Def Interpretation Theory / Dennett: Thesis: there are beliefs, desires, etc. but they are not really (ontologically). They exist only as epistemically useful concepts. |
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| Meaning | Grice, P.H. | Avramides I 10 Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Thesis: We begin with speaker meaning in a situation and deliver an analysis in terms of psychic states of the speaker and listener. We then reconstruct these terms as timeless meaning, word meaning and sentence meaning. I 11 The following sentence form is assumed as fundamental: "S means in a situation that p". To mean/Avramides: Grice has sufficiently clarified the concept of "meaning". I 43 Meaning/Speaker-Meaning/Grice: Thesis: "x means something" (in a situation) is roughly equivalent to: "S means something (in a situation) with x". (Grice 1957). I 46 Non-natural meaning/Grice: thesis: is never sufficient for an utterance to have a tendency to evoke a specific response. The utterance must be produced with a certain intention. I 95 Def Meaning/Grice/Avramides: Grice's access to meaning is precisely that that thesis meaning is a particular configuration of belief and intentions. Fod/Lep IV 166 Grice: thesis: meanings are inherited from contents of propositional attitudes. Meggle I 7 Thesis Grice: x means something (time-independent), S means something with x (time-independent). In explication from "means the same" follows "understands". I 19 Thesis: The speaker-situational meaning can be explained with recourse to speaker intentions. Time independent meaning and applied meaning can be explained with recourse to the concept of speaker-"situation"-meaning. Newen/Schrenk I 77 Meaning/Grice/Newen/Schrenk: Thesis: the crucial feature is the speaker's subjective meaning (intention). He does not elaborate on the background assumption that this can ultimately be reduced naturalistically to brain states. 5 stages of the treatment of speech behavior: 1. A description of the behaviour of the members of a linguistic community. 2. Psychological theory about the members, attribution of desires, beliefs, etc. thus a theory of propositional attitudes. I 78 3. Theory of subjective meanings a) for the listener, b) for the speaker. This leads to an interpretative meaning theory. 4. Intersubjective meaning, the so-called conventional meaning of utterance. Problem: Grice has no theory about conventions. I 79 5. Sentence meanings of complex sentences are deduced from the meanings of the parts. (>Compositionality). |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Satz-Bedeutung | Lewis, D. | Grover II 158 Meaning / Lewis / Grover: (Lewis 1972): truth conditions that are mapped by the pictures of circumstances (possible worlds) and contexts to truthe values, grasp the sentence meaning. Schw I 161 mental content / Lewis: is determined by the causal role, through the typical causes and effects. Content / DavidsonVsLewis: the content depends on the language that we speak. (Davidson 1975) Meaning / LewisVsDavidson: what sentences of public language mean depends on the content of our expectations, desires and beliefs. |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Belief | Loar, B. | Schiffer I 15 Belief/Loar: (1981): ingenious theory according to the thesis belief is a relation to a sentence in the public language of the attributor, but in which the semantic properties that determine the content are not defined in the public language, but in the Tarski style. I 275 Tarski-Style/Truth-Def/Schiffer: does not prescind from any role that the expression can have in communication: if "T" is defined for a language, then [s is T] contains nothing about the use of s in any population of speakers. (Tarski 1956). I 15 Individuation/Belief/Loar/Schiffer: Loar's view makes it necessary to individuate beliefs on the basis of interpersonal attributable functional states. ((s) So actually incompatible with Tarski). I 19 Functionalism/Schiffer: Thesis: what makes a physical state token a belief that makes it so and so is that it is a token of a physical state type, with a certain functional role. ((s): Believe: Token - Role: belongs to Type. belief/Loar: as a function (in the set-theoretical sense) that maps propositions to internal physical states. These inner physical states have functional roles indicated by these propositions, in a way indicated by a psychological theory in which belief, desires etc. are theoretical constructs. (Loar 1981). |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Propos. Attitude | Loar, B. | Avramides I 137 Attribution / propositional attitudes / theory / Loar: the epistemology of attribution of beliefs and desires must be separated from their explanation. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Propos. Attitude | Schiffer, St. | Avra I 24 Propositional Attitudes/Schiffer: ("Meaning", early): Thesis: Psychological states such as beliefs and desires should not be analyzed as attitudes towards sentences. But this does not mean that Grice's approach is wrong - at most that the meaning of the speaker is not logically superior to the meaning of the utterance. Schi XV Propositional Attitude/Schiffer: late: thesis cannot be reduced or explained! I 184 Propositional Attitudes/truth/truth conditions/Schifer: Thesis: Verbs for propositional attitudes cannot be attributed to suitable semantic values. |
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