Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dretske, F. | Pauen Vs Dretske, F. | V 230 Meaning/Naturalization/Mental Representation/Dretske/Pauen: (1994.1995): tries, like Fodor, to explain the origin of meaning purely naturalistically. But extends this also to non-human beings. Four aspects: 1) Causal relationship between object and representation 2) Representational function for the organism 3) Evolution of earning 4) Possibility of change. Sign/Meaning/Causality/Dretske/Pauen: (ad 1) a purely causal relationship can only cause a natural sign ("signs"). The normative aspect has no place here. ad 2) The normative distinction between right and wrong of the mental representation comes into play when a device or an organ is assigned the function of displaying a different state of affairs. ad 3) e.g. magnetotactic bacteria pursue deeper, low-oxygen water layers. Suppose these bacteria were brought to the northern hemisphere, they would head for shallower water layers with higher oxygen content! Here it would be unclear what exactly is the object of representation: the magnetic fields or the oxygen concentration? V 232 Dretske: acknowledges that this is difficult to decide. Solution: most organisms have multiple approaches to a situation. If a representation normally occurs in the presence of an enemy, one can speak of a representation of the enemy. ad 4) Only the objection that not the enemy, but the disjunction of all stimuli is the subject of the representation seems possible. E.g. odor or silhouette, or sound. Here, the ability to learn is important. Higher organisms can learn new stimuli, which means that a complete old disjunction could even be absent. Thus, the disjunction cannot be considered as a representation. VsDretske/Pauen: a causally determined sunburn is still not a representation of the sun. V 233 Indigestion are no representation of spoiled food. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Lewis, D. | Block Vs Lewis, D. | I 188 Lewis: Pain can be characterized functionally. fodorVsLewis: thus seems to be set to an identity theory of functional properties. In my view, this amounts to an identity theory of functional states. (I 213) Solution: Lewis: Proposal: not conjunction of all banalities, but "a bunch of them through a disjunction of conjunctions of most of them (in that case, it does not matter if some are wrong) BlockVsLewis:. But that can exacerbate the problem of distinction (1), as there may be pairs of different mentalities, which are the same with respect to most of the banalities. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Lewis, D. | Fodor Vs Lewis, D. | Block I 163 Pain/FodorVsLewis: if you say that pain in humans and Martians is different, you are not stating on the basis of which properties both of them perceive pain. Any disjunction of physical conditions which used to mean pain in the history of the universe, is not a solution. Because that does not cover what the individuals have in common. I 215 Pain/FodorVsLewis: since the property of having the state is a functional one - and not only a functionally characterized property, Lewis is still bound by the functionalism discussed here. Pain/VsLewis: the functionalism presented here asserts a state Z that is defined as a state with such and such a causal role, and the functionalist assertion becomes: "Pain = Z". Here, Z itself is not a functional state (> Ramsey-functional Correlate). I 217 FodorVsLewis: the contrast to Lewis (functional characterization of a state rather than a functional state) can be made clearer: e.g. assuming, a condition type is a specific type of property. Namely, the property which each token of this condition has because it is a token of this type. Then, the pain condition would be identified with the property of being a pain (not of being in pain). I.e. in terms of the pain and not of the organism. Lewis: defines pain as the state that has a certain causal role ("ix"). Functionalism/Block: pain as the property of playing a certain causal role ("lx"). --- Fodor/Lepore IV 107 Radical Interpretation/RI/Lewis: the radical interpretation is governed by fundamental principles that tell us how belief and meanings are usually related to each other, as well as to behavior and sensory input. IV 108 These fundamental principles are nothing but a lot of platitudes of common sense. E.g. that most of the beliefs of the speaker are true. But that can only be true if the speaker has several propositional attitudes. Holism/Fodor/Lepore: then holism can be derived from the conditions for the intentional attribution! Fodor/LeporeVsLewis: (he might perhaps agree): it is not clear that anything metaphysically interesting follows from the fulfillment of conditions for the intentional attribution. IV 114 Meaning Holism/MH/belief/Fodor/Lepore: if according to Lewis’ thesis belief has primacy over the attribution of the intentional, then it must itself be holistic. If meaning holism is to follow, for example, the following would have to be assumed: Def Thesis of the "Primacy of Belief"/PT/Lewis: thesis: "the conditions of intentional attribution include the conditions of belief attribution. Therefore: if the former is holistic, so must be the latter." Semantic Holism/SH/fodor/Lepore: we concede that semantic holism might follow from this thesis (belief holism seems plausible). Primacy of Belief/fodor/LeporeVsLewis: the thesis is so strong that semantic holism emerges even without the principle of charity. Even without any theory of interpretation! But we do not believe that the thesis is true. RI/Lewis/fodor/Lepore: his version of radical interpretation does not endorse the thesis of the primacy of belief (PT) and we do not say that he accepts it at all. We believe that the PT is not true. Holism/Lewis/fodor/Lepore: but if Lewis does not represent the primacy thesis, his arguments in favor of holism are limited. They can show that belief qua belief is holistic, but not that they are holistic qua intentional. IV 121 VsLewis: the primacy thesis is implausible. IV 131 Fodor/LeporeVsDavison/VsLewis: it could be said: because the semantics of representations is atomistic, it follows that intentional attribution as such is not determined by constitutive principles like the principle of rationality! Allowing the attribution of irrational propositional attitudes would simply be a "change of subject". That would be no intentional states! I.e if we attribute irrational things to the speaker, we change our opinion on the content of his mental states. Vs: 1) It could be made stronger, not only epistemically, by saying that even God would change the content of his attribution, before violating rationality. IV 132 2) Assuming the point was metaphysical and not only epistemic: nevertheless it does not follow from the atomistic approach to mental semantics that the principle of rationality could be ignored in the attribution. You cannot believe simultaneously that p and that not p. These principles are constitutive of belief, and also for wishes, etc. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Mentalesese | Peacocke Vs Mentalesese | I 212 PeacockeVsMentalese: E.g. Suppose a creature whose brain is composed of layers of spatially organized "maps": here you do not need Mentalese, either. disjunction/Belief/Peacocke: could be realized as something that can be explained with the theory of circuits. Then there could be a third state, that would be equivalent to the acceptance of both alternatives. [Fa or Gb]. (>circuit algebra). There might be reasons to believe the whole disjunction without reasons for one side alone! Our model also allows to explain why a person does not always draw the disjunctive consequences of their beliefs! It is possible that a component of S Fa is not always present. "Not always present" means that the component can be implemented quite differently. It could be a concentration of substance in an set of neurons or a question of the distribution in them. Deduction/Mentalese/Peacocke: because of the single requirement that it must take care of analog syntactic structures of the lines, the thesis of Mentalese is obvious. I 213 Vs: but it is not true that it is indispensable. A physical unit could register that the state S Fa v Gb is a disjunction, because it is suitably connected to two belief states. One side could be negated. (e.g., S ~Gb), then the unit could cause the system to go into the state S Fa. In this case, no information about the contents of either of the two sides is required! There is only the modus tollendo ponens. PeacockeVsMentalese: therefore, we can ask in any situation where the language of the brain seems indispensable at first glance: can supposed syntactic operations be replaced by relational operations? If so, we do not need the thesis of Mentalese. Mentalese/Peacocke: as far as I know none of the proponents asserts that except for an assumed Mentalese sentence S that is supposed to be stored if a subject believes that p, also another Mentalese sentence S' is to stored, which means: "I believe that p." ((s) recourse). It is generally believed that it is sufficient for belief that a stored sentence is based on perception, other states and behavior appropriately. Peacocke: but that is exactly my replacement tactics. (Relations instead of syntax). I 213/214 Replacement Tactics/Peacocke: can also be used to show how actions can easily be explained by states with content. Mentalese would have to adopt an additional translation module. Peacocke: an intention that Gb may partly have its propositional content by the fact that the corresponding action is determined by the fact that the subject is in the unstructured state S Gb which has its contents by its relations to other states. This also applies to the practical inferring: ((s) "content from relations rather than language.") The relational model seems to conceive Mentalese as a special case among itself. I 215 Computation/PeacockeVsMentalese: if we can be in mental states with content (by relations), without having to store sentences, then there can also be computation without internal brain language. Because Def Computation/Peacocke: (calculation) is a question of states with content that emerge systematically from each other. This requires certain patterns of order and causal relations, but no syntactic structure. PeacockeVsfodor: it does not necessarily apply: "No representation, no computation". |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Putnam, H. | Dennett Vs Putnam, H. | I 571/572 Meaning/Function/Evolution/Dennett: the meaning is like the function at the moment of their creation still nothing definite. Twin Earth/t.e./Putnam/DennettVsPutnam: it requires a leap in the reference, a jump in the intentionality. Dennett: you could now tend to think that inner intentionality has a certain "inertia". I 573 Twin Earth/Dennett/VsPutnam: you cannot tell a story assuming that tables are no tables, even though they look like tables and are used like tables. Something else would be a "living being that looks like Fury" (But is not Fury). But if there are "twin earth horses" on the Twin Earth which are much like our horses, then twin earth horses are horses, a non-terrestrial kind of horse though, but after all horses. ((s), therefore, in Putnam the Twin Earth water has a different chemical formula: YXZ.) Dennett: of course you can also represent a more stringent opinion according to which the non-terrestrial horses are a separate species. Both are possible. I 575 Indeterminacy/Twin Earth/Dennett: Their idea of what "horse" for really means suffers under the same indeterminacy like the frog’s idea of the fly as a "little flying edible object". Indeterminacy/DennettVsPutnam: E.g. "cat", "Siamese cat": Perhaps you simply find one day that you must make a distinction that was just not necessary previously, because the subject did not come up for discussion. This indeterminacy undermines Putnam’s argument of the t.e. Münch III 379 Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: he tries to close the gap by saying that we are referring to natural types, whether we know it or not. Dennett: But what types are natural? Races are as natural as species or classes! ((s) VsDennett: There is also the view that only the species are natural). DennettVsEssentialism: E.g. Vending Machine has dissolved into nothingness. Equally: E.g. Frog: he would have caught food pellets in the wild just the same if they had come in his way. disjunction: in a way "flies or pellets" are a natural type for frogs. They do not distinguish between the two naturally. On the other hand, the disjunction is not a natural type: it does not occur in nature!. Twin Earth/DennettVsPutnam: "natural type" twin earth horse/horses/disjunction: E.g. Assuming someone had brought twin earth horse to the Earth unnoticed, we would have readily referred to them as horses. Meaning/Dennett: Vending machine and the information of the frog’s eye derive their meaning from the function. Where the function does not provide a response, there is nothing to investigate. The meanings of the people are just as derived as those of a venidng machine. This proves the t.e. Otherwise you have to postulate essentialism. Explanation/DennettVsPutnam: an explanation on microphysical level is not inconsistent with an explanation on rational grounds. Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 Putnam III 31 DennettVsPutnam: according to Putnam’s conception the mind something chaotic. Dennett and fodor: Both authors have an unspoken premise in mind, and this is reductionist. There is also cognition without reductionism. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
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