Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Causal Theory of Reference Rorty IV ~ 41
Causal theory of reference VsRepresentation (according to Rorty) - (causal theory of reference / Putnam).
I 317
Reference/Intentionality/Rorty: the conventional "intentionalist" conception of linking words with the world is wrong and philosophically fateful in individual cases! Against this conventional intentionalist conception there is a new "causal", "realistic" reference theory. (Causal theory of reference).
The conflict owes itself to an ambiguity of "reference".
(a) Relationship of facts
(b) purely intentional relation, where the object does not need to exist.
Let us call a) "reference" (philosophical) and b) "talk about" (common sense).
Ad b) "Talk about": in a world where there are no competing scientific theories, without the criterion of Searle and Strawson we can cheerfully talk about things, even fictions. We would really talk about the things that make most of our opinions true.
I 318
For example, if there were a Mr. Lenz who in reality accomplished 99 percent of Mr. Müller's deeds, then we would want to say that in reality we are talking about Lenz.
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: If you confuse this term "really talk about" with the term of reference, you can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference.
Rorty: In my opinion, the problem doesn't arise at all. The only factual question here is the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Reference Rorty I 96
Reference: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things.
I 317f
RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference. Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies.
I 316ff
Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all.
I 321
For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary.
Horwich I 450
Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference - Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. - RI: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson right when he is understood holistically. - Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. - Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts - then all beliefs can also be wrong - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. - DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. - Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. - I 451 otherwise the term of reference had no content. - (like analytical). RI/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. - RI begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) - then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". - Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: cannot be found out independently of one another.
Rorty I 323
Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: - because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it. >Causal Theory of Reference.
IV 23
Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. - ((s) later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.)

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Speech Act Theory Searle II 25
Sincerity condition: internal to the speech acts. ---
Husted IV 251
Speech act/Searle: rule-determined actions - has always constitutive (not regulatory) rules - Searle: speech act: is key to the meaning - VsSearle: controversial because language rules for e.g. singular term have fundamentally different nature than for actions.
J. Husted "Searle" in: Hügli/Lübke (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993S. 251
---
V 68
Speech act is unequal game. - Explanation must presuppose rules - rules are not equal Convention: speaking rule-governed behavior - rules, not behavior is crucial.
V 207
Traditional speech act theory/Austin/Strawson/Hare: word W is needed to perform speech act A - then e.g. "good" recommends, "true" reaffirms, "knowledge" guarantees something - SearleVs: this only works with performative verbs such as "promise" but not with judgmental ones - does not satisfy the adequacy condition for semantic analysis: a word must mean in all grammatically different sentences the same - it cannot, if the meaning is supposed to be the execution of various acts.
V 213
Wrong: to assume that the conditions for the execution of a speech act follow from the meanings of the words. ( "fallacy of assertiveness") ---
IV 27
Speech act theory/SearleVsAustin: accepts verbs for acts - but one has to differentiate this - E.g. announcement of a command is not the command. ---
IV 78
Speech act theory/Searle: differs from other philosophical approaches in that it gives no set of logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the explicable phenomenon - (E.g. linguistics: structural rules).
IV 86
The illocutionary act is the function of the meaning of the sentence.
IV 86
Fiction/speech acts/Searle: fiction has no other speech acts but is a predetermined act - in literature, no other act than in newspaper - no semantic or syntactic property proves a text as fictional.
IV 204
Speech Act TheoryVsChomsky, VsRules, instead of semantics/pragmatics. ---
VII 99
Speech act/proposition/Searle: difference: from the propositional content does not follow that the assertion conditions are satisfied - the proposition rather implies that the speaker implies within the act that they are satisfied. ---
VIII 435
Speech act/Searle: is hold together by the semantic intentions of the speaker - VsChomsky: does not see the essential connection of meaning and speech acts.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Husted I
Jörgen Husted
"Searle"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted II
Jörgen Husted
"Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted III
Jörgen Husted
"John Langshaw Austin"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993

Husted IV
Jörgen Husted
"M.A. E. Dummett. Realismus und Antirealismus
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Hamburg 1993

Husted V
J. Husted
"Gottlob Frege: Der Stille Logiker"
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chinese Room Pauen Vs Chinese Room Pauen V 150
Chinese Room/Searle/Pauen: (1980) would mean that verbal behavior as a criterion for the attribution of consciousness is fundamentally unsuitable! Significant consequences: not only additional argument VsTuring test.
Can be transferred to all verbal utterances, and eventually to the entire functionalism. Functional features would not guarantee meaning.
VsChinese Room/VsSearle/Pauen: 1) it is possible that computers fulfill other sufficient conditions for instantiating consciousness.
V 151
2) (more important): even his own argument requires the condition which he denies at the same time. When searching for the neural conditions of consciousness, one must first make sure that the organisms studied have consciousness! (Circular!). This security can only be gained through behavior. 3) The situation differs in many aspects not mentioned by Searle from the usual speaker situation.
The occupant has no opportunity to respond to the speaker situation!
He cannot take into account any previous questions.
He cannot detect any repetitions.
Variant: should it be possible to take several steps into account, a combinatorial explosion threatens. Only a much more complex system would have the necessary skills to cope with that. But it is precisely in such a case that it would no longer be plausible that the system has no awareness!
Even then the system would be neither flexible nor trainable.
The slightest deviation or spelling errors have devastating effects.
V 152
Meaning-relevant distinctions are inseparable from irrelevant ones. ((s) These are arguments in the sense of Searle insofar as real consciousness must have just these properties.)
VsSearle/(s): the arguments are directed against Searle insofar as the fiction of the Chinese Room could not go undetected.

Lanz I 296
VsSearle/VsChinese Room: (Lanz): the brain is also a purely syntactic machine. I.e. in the end, the approach taken by cognitive science is the only way: to look out for subpersonal cognitive processes under as many realistic assumptions as possible.

Pau I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

Lanz I
Peter Lanz
Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie
In
Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993
Derrida, J. Habermas Vs Derrida, J. Derrida I 95
Derrida: no distinction between everyday language and specialist languages. (DerridaVsSearle).
I 196
HabermasVsDerrida: there are differences. Derrida over-generalizes poetic language. There has to be a language in which research results can be discussed and progress registered. HabermasVsDerrida: he does not wriggle out of the restrictions of the subject-philosophical paradigm. His attempt to outbid Heidegger does not escape the aporetic structure of the truth events stripped of truth validity.
I 211
Subject-Philosophy/Derrida: Habermas: he does not break with her at all. He falls back on it easily in the style of the original philosophy: it would require other names than those of the sign and the re-presentation to be able think about this age: the infinite derivation of the signs who wander about and change scenes. HabermasVsDerrida: not the history of being the first and last, but an optical illusion: the labyrinthine mirror effects of ancient texts without any hope of deciphering the original script.
I 213
HabermasVsDerrida: his deconstructions faithfully follow Heidegger. Involuntarily, he exposes the reverse fundamentalism of this way of thinking: the ontological difference and the being are once again outdone by the difference and put down one floor below.
I 214
Derrida inherits the weaknesses of the criticism of metaphysics. Extremely general summonings of an indefinite authority.
I 233
DerridaVsSearle: no distinction between ordinary and parasitic use - Searle, HabermasVsDerrida: there is a distinction: communication requires common understanding
I 240
Derrida’s thesis: in everyday language there are also poetic functions and structures, therefore no difference from literary texts, therefore equal analysability. HabermasVsDerrida: he is insensitive to the tension-filled polarity between the poetic-world-opening and the prosaic-innerworldly language function.
I 241
HabermasVsDerrida: for him, the language-mediated processes in the world are embedded in an all prejudicing, world-forming context. Derrida is blind to the fact that everyday communicative practice enables learning processes in the world thanks to the idealizations built into communicative action, against which the world-disclosing power of interpretive language has to prove itself. Experience and judgment are formed only in the light of criticizable validity claims! Derrida neglects the negation potential of communication-oriented action. He lets the problem-solving capacity disappear behind the world-generating capacity of language. (Similarly Rorty)
I 243
HabermasVsDerrida: through the over-generalization of the poetic language function he has no view of the complex relationships of a normal linguistic everyday practice anymore.
Rorty II 27
HabermasVsDerrida, HabermasVsHeidegger/Rorty: "subject philosophy": misguided metaphysical attempt to combine the public and the private. Error: thinking that reflection and introspection could achieve what can be actually only be effected by expanding the discussion frame and the participants.
II 30
Speaking/Writing/RortyVsDerrida: his complex argument ultimately amounts to a strengthening of the written word at the expense of the spoken.
II 32
Language/Communication/HabermasVsDerrida: Derrida denies both the existence of a "peculiarly structured domain of everyday communicative practice" and an "autonomous domain of fiction". Since he denies both, he can analyze any discourse on the model of poetic language. Thus, he does not need to determine language.
II 33
RortyVsHabermas: Derrida is neither obliged nor willing to let "language in general" be "determined" by anything. Derrida could agree fully with Habermas in that "the world-disclosing power of interpretive language must prove itself" before metaphors are literarily absorbed and become socially useful tools. RortyVsHabermas: he seems to presuppose that X must be demonstrated as a special case of Y first in order to treat X as Y. As if you could not simply treat X as Y, to see what happens!
Deconstruction/Rorty: language is something that can be effective, out of control or stab itself in the back, etc., under its own power.
II 35
RortyVsDeconstruktion: nothing suggests that language can do all of this other than an attempt to make Derrida a huge man with a huge topic. The result of such reading is not the grasping of contents, but the placement of texts in contexts, the interweaving of parts of various books. The result is a blurring of genre boundaries. That does not mean that genera "are not real". The interweaving of threads is something else than the assumption that philosophy has "proven" that colors really "are indeterminate and ambiguous."
Habermas/Rorty: asks why Heidegger and Derrida still nor advocate those "strong" concepts of theory, truth and system, which have been a thing of the past for more than 150 years.
II 36
Justice/Rawls Thesis: the "just thing" has priority over the "good thing". Rawls/Rorty: democratic societies do not have to deal with the question of "human nature" or "subject". Such issues are privatized here.
Foundation/Rorty Thesis: there is no Archimedean point from which you can criticize everything else. No resting point outside.
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
Habermas: "the validity of transcendental spaces and times claimed for propositions and norms "erases space and time"."
HabermasVsDerrida: excludes interaction.

Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Kripke, S. A. Rorty Vs Kripke, S. A. I 318
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if we confuse the concept of "really talk about" with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arises. The only question of fact that exists here, concerns the existence or non-existence of certain entities, which are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies was made. Reference is a technical term and therefore we have no intuitions about it at all! Real existential issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
It is not only possible to talk about non-existent entities, but also to find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same. >Reference.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Platonism Searle Vs Platonism V 170
SearleVsPlatonism/SearleVsQuine: simple proof: E.g. "q" is the proper name of the proposition, which is formed by the conjunction of all known true propositions. Then all the knowledge can be symbolized as follows (while for 'p' propositions are to be entered):
(Ep)(p = q . p is true)
According to Quine's criterion therefore the only thing we would have to assume would be one single proposition.
2. VsSearle: These arguments are based on the concept of synonymy that Quine rejects.
SearleVsVs: 1. No, because then the supposedly neutral criterion is drawn into the dispute.
2. More important: No, because the only synonymies here have been introduced by an explicit setting. Thus Quine's objections do not apply here.
3. VsSearle: Such "predicates" as "P" are illogical and nonsensical.
V 170/171
SearleVsVs: Quine himself could not make such an objection. He himself used such means against the modality.
V 245/246
SearleVsPlato: this is the basic error of metaphysics, the attempt to project real or imagined properties of the language in the world. The usual reply VsPlato:
1. That objects are merely complexes of properties. (Distinction between referencing and predicting).
2. Tautology that everything that can be said about an object, can be said in descriptions of the subject.
SearleVs: both are useless. It is absurd to assume that an object is a combination of propertyless being and properties. Equally absurd: group of properties.

IV 80
Fiction/literature/Searle: not all fiction is literature (> Comic), not all literature is fiction. I do not consider it possible to study literature as I'm going to do it with fiction.
IV 81
There is no common feature of all literary forms or works. By contrast, a continuous transition from literary to non-literary. SearleVsPlato: it is wrong to take fiction for a lie. >Fiction/Searle, >Platonism.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Putnam, H. Rorty Vs Putnam, H. McDowell I 175
Coherence Theory/Rorty pro Davidson: Beliefs: can a) be seen from the outside, perspective of the field researcher, causal interactions with the surroundings - b) from the inside, from the perspective of the natives, as rules of action. The inside view is normative, in the space of reasons. RortyVsPutnam: he attempts to somehow think this together. >Exterior/interior, Coherence Theory.
McDowell I 178
RortyVsPutnam: By an "explanation of X" Putnam still understands a synopsis, the synthesis of external and internal position. Representatives of >disquotation believe that people could only be described in a behavioral manner. But why should it be impossible to consider supplements by normative representations? (Putnam's philosophy was ultimately traditional). Causality/Putnam: the desire to tell a story about the causal relationships of human pronouncements and environment does not rule out that a story is invented according to which the speakers express thoughts and make assertions, and try not to make mistakes. But these stories may then be indistinguishable! (PutnamVsRorty) Rorty Thesis: from a causal standpoint we cannot subdue our beliefs to standards of investigation. >Causality/Putnam, >Causality/Rorty.
Rorty I 304
RortyVsPutnam: he provokes a pseudo-controversy between an "idealistic" and realistic theory of meaning.
I 307
Putnam/Rorty: follows 3 thoughts: 1) against the construction of 'true' as synonymous with 'justified assertibility' (or any other "soft" concept to do with justification). This is to show that only a theory of the relationship between words and the world can give a satisfactory meaning of the concept of truth.
2) a certain type of sociological facts requires explanation: the reliability of normal methods of scientific research, the usefulness of our language as a means, and that these facts can be explained only on the basis of realism.
3) only the realist can avoid the inference from "many of the terms of the past did not refer" to "it is very likely that none of the terms used today refers". >Reference/Putnam.
I 308
RortyVsPutnam: that is similar to the arguments of Moore against all attempts to define "good": "true, but not assertible" with reason" makes just as much sense as "good, but not conducive to the greatest happiness".
I 312
Theoretical Terms/TT/Reference/Putnam/Rorty. We must prevent the disastrous consequence that no theoretical term refers to anything (argument 3), see above). What if we accepted a theory according to which electrons are like phlogiston? We would have to say that electrons do not exist in reality. What if this happened all the time? Of course, such a conclusion must be blocked. Granted desideratum of reference theory.
I 313
RortyVsPutnam: puzzling for two reasons: 1) unclear from which philosophical standpoint it could be shown that the revolutionary transformation of science has come to an end.
2) even if there were such a standpoint, it remains unclear how the theory of reference could ever provide it.
I 314
In a pre-theoretical sense we know very well that they have referred to such things. They all tried to cope with the same universe.
I 315
Rorty: We should perhaps rather regard the function of an expression as "picking of entities" than as "description of reality". We could just represent things from the winning perspective in a way that even the most primitive animists talked about the movement of molecules and genes. This does not appease the skeptic who thinks that perhaps there are no molecules, but on the other hand it will also be unable to make a discovery about the relations between words and the world.
Reference/Rorty: Dilemma: either we
a) need the theory of reference as a guarantor of the success of today's science, or
b) the reference theory is nothing more than a decision about how to write the history of science (rather than supplying its foundation.)
I 319
Reference/RortyVsPutnam/RortyVsKripke: if the concept of "really talking about" is confused with the concept of reference, we can, like Kripke and Putnam, easily get the idea that we have "intuitions" about the reference. Rorty: in my opinion, the problem does not arise. The only question of fact that exists here, relates to the existence or non-existence of certain entities that are being talked about.
I 320
Fiction/Reference/RortyVsKripke/RortyVsPutnam: of course there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical and scientific use. But then "reference" has basically nothing to do with "talking about", and only comes into play after the choice between different strategies is made. Reference is a technical term, and therefore we have no intuitions about it! Real existence issues are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson! What then is the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all!
We cannot talk about non-existent entities, but we can also find out that we have actually talked about them! Talking about X in reality and talking about a real X is not the same thing.
I 324
Realism/PutnamVsPutnam/Self-Criticism/Rorty: metaphysical realism collapses at the point where it claims to be different from Peirce's realism. I.e. the assertion that there is an ideal theory.
I 326
Internal Realism/Putnam/Rorty: position according to which we can explain the "mundane" fact that the use of language contributes to achieving our goals, to our satisfaction, etc. by the fact that "not language, but the speakers reflect the world, insofar as they produce a symbolic representation of their environment. (Putnam). By means of our conventions we simply represent the universe better than ever.
RortyVsPutnam: that means nothing more than that we congratulate ourselves to having invented the term lithium, so that lithium stands for something for which nothing has stood all the time.
I 327
The fact that based on our insights we are quite capable of dealing with the world, is true but trivial. That we reasonably reflect it is "just an image".
Rorty V 21
Analytic/Synthetic/Culture/Quine/Rorty: the same arguments can also be used to finish off the anthropological distinction between the intercultural and the intra-cultural. So we also manage without the concept of a universal transcultural rationality that Putnam cites against relativists.
V 22
Truth/Putnam: "the very fact that we speak of our different conceptions of rationality sets a conceptual limit, a conceptual limit of the ideal truth." RortyVsPutnam: but what can such a limit do? Except for introducing a God standpoint after all?
Rorty VI 75
Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation RortyVsPutnam: I cannot see what "idealized rational acceptability" can mean other than "acceptability for an ideal community". I.e. of tolerant and educated liberals. (>Peirce: "community of researchers at the ideal end of the research").
VI 76
Peirce/Terminology: "CSP" "Conceptual System Peirce" (so called by Sellars). Idealization/Ideal/Confirmation/RortyVsPutnam: since forbids himself to reproduce the step of Williams back to approaching a single correct result, he has no way to go this step a la Peirce!
VI 79
Human/Society/Good/Bad/Rorty: "we ourselves with our standards" does not mean "we, whether we are Nazis or not", but something like "language users who, by our knowledge, are improved remakes of ourselves." We have gone through a development process that we accept as rational persuasion.
VI 80
This includes the prevention of brainwashing and friendly toleration of troublemakers à la Socrates and rogues à la Feyerabend. Does that mean we should keep the possibility of persuasion by Nazis open? Yes, it does, but it is no more dangerous than the possibility to return to the Ptolemaic worldview!
PutnamVsRorty: "cope better" is not a concept according to which there are better or worse standards, ... it is an internal property of our image of justification, that a justification is independent of the majority ...
(Rorty: I cannot remember having ever said that justification depends on a majority.)
RortyVsPutnam: "better" in terms of "us at our best" less problematic than in terms of "idealized rational acceptability". Let's try a few new ways of thinking.
VI 82
Putnam: what is "bad" supposed to mean here, except in regard to a failed metaphysical image?
VI 87
Truth/Putnam: we cannot get around the fact that there is some sort of truth, some kind of accuracy, that has substance, and not merely owes to "disquotation"! This means that the normative cannot be eliminated. Putnam: this accuracy cannot apply only for a time and a place (RortyVsPutnam).
VI 90
Ratio/Putnam: the ratio cannot be naturalized. RortyVsPutnam: this is ambiguous: on the one hand trivial, on the other hand, it is wrong to say that the Darwinian view leaves a gap in the causal fabric.
Ratio/Putnam: it is both transcendent and immanent. (Rorty pro, but different sense of "transcendent": going beyond our practice today).
RortyVsPutnam: confuses the possibility that the future transcends the present, with the need for eternity to transcend time.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell
Quine, W.V.O. Searle Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 20
SearleVsQuine: Occasionally mistakes in philosophy entail mistakes in the linguistic philosophy. Beliefs that - when it comes to what linguistic signs mean - there are no facts that go beyond speech pattern behavior. (Quine 1960(1)): it is no question of fact, if anyone, you or I, say the "Rabbit" meaning a rabbit by it or a separate part or a portion of the rabbit story. (> Gavagai).
II 269
Generality/de re/de dicto/representation/SearleVsQuine: he confuses the distinction between particular and general propositional attitudes of re and such de dicto with a distinction between attitudes. No one may have wish for something indefinite, without somehow representing the object itself. (E.g. "General sailboat" as the object of my desire.).
II 270/271
SearleVsQuine: (SearleVs attitudes that are supposedly irreducible de re). Belief in such attitudes is due to a Wittgensteinian diagnostic. Our language provides two ways to report about propositional attitude: with de re-reports or de dicto-reports. E.g. Ralph believes that the man with the brown hat is a spy. (de dicto)
Or: of the man with the brown hat Ralph believes that he is a spy. (De re).
As these two reports can even have different truth values, we believe that there must be also a difference in the phenomena (falsely).
The following dialogue is completely absurd:
Quine: as far as the man with the brown hat is concerned, Ralph, do you believe that he is a spy?
Ralph: no, Quine. You asked me if I have one of the re-conviction, but it is not the case that I believe of the man with the brown hat that he was a spy. Rather, I have the de dicto-belief: I believe that the man with the brown hat is a spy.
SearleVsQuine: the opinion that intentional states are somehow intensional themselves is based on the confusion of logical properties of reports of intentional states with logical properties of the states themselves.
Searle: there is a de re/de dicto distinction, but that is a distinction between different types of report.
V 14
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: some analytical authors: there is no adequate analysis of the concept of analyticity. Therefore, the concept supposedly does not exist: if there is no analysis and no criteria, we cannot understand him. It is illicit. (SearleVs). The definitions of analyticity and synonymy supposedly require the concept of meaning. As criterion then observable behavior is required.
V 15
SearleVsQuine: it is not enough to simply say that we lack the criteria.
V 16
SearleVsQuine: false requirements regarding the relation between our understanding of a concept and our ability to establish criteria for its application.
V 17
Criteria/Searle: how do we know that one criterion is inadequate? Criteria need projective force. They must lead to specific results.
V 18
Analyticity/SearleVsQuine: reversed: instead of proving that we do not understand the concept of analyticity, is our inability to find criteria, rather just requires that we understand what is analyticity. Analyticity/Quine/Searle: Quine chose the example wisely! "I do not know if the statement "All Green is extended" is analytic or not". One can namely deny the extent of sensory data!
V 19
E.g. someone might be unsure whether a glass of chartreuse green. All this is a sign that we understand the concept of analyticity very well.
V 163
Ontology: the main question: are there criteria for ontological conditions?
V 164
Existence/Quine: "to accept something as an entity means to consider it as the value of a variable." Existence/SearleVsQuine: this criterion (value of a variable for existence) is confusing and inane.
Alternative criterion: a theory requires those and only those entities of which it says that they exist. (Does not have to be done intentionally.)
V 165
Ontology/Searle: a notation is as good as another, ontological conclusions should not necessarily be taken from it. It is also possible that no translation method exists, by which it could be determined which statement is the easier or better.
SearleVsQuine: according to Quine's criterion two statements that in reality include the same conditions would include different conditions! (This argument was put forward by William AlstonVsQuine).
V 166
Fictional dialogue Quine/Alston: criteria/existence/AlstonVsQuine: (according to Searle) Q: Instead of saying, "There are four miles from Nauplion to Tolon" one should say: "distance in miles between ... = four."
A VsQuine: the first formulation does not include a condition that would not be included in the second! How could it be? The second is only a paraphrase of the first. Existence assumptions depend on statements, not propositions!
Q: The objection misses the key point: by the translation we show that the condition is made only apparantly and not necessary. The criterion itself is ontologically neutral! Furthermore, no claim to synonymy is connected to the paraphrase.
V 167
A VsQuine: that is confused: according to Quine's criterion, it seems as if every statement could be reproduced in equivalent but in the notation different statements that lead to different results according to Quine's criterion, even though the conditions are the same. Q: The condition of abstract entities in a sentence like
(2) "For the property of being a chair there is at least one example"
is completely unnecessary, since such a proposition can always be represented by a different proposition. Paraphrase:
(1)(E.g.)(x is a chair). This paraphrase shows that we got rid of the unwelcome conditions of being a chair.
V 171
Existence/ontology/AlstonVsQuine: ~ what somebody says is important for his assumptions, not how he says it. (Searle pro). Ontology/ontological condition/SearleVsQuine: so the question arises whether the concept of ontological conditions itself is so clear. Perhaps there is no class of irreducible ontological conditions. There is no abstract problem of ontological conditions. But the problem, how we know those facts which we require in our statements.
V 172
SearleVsQuine: his stilted way of expressing: "to tolerate", "to shun": it is something completely different if I tolerate or shun tobacco than if I endure or shun universals. Universals/Searle: misunderstanding that we imply anything at all: E.g. "None of us has holiness" is just another way of saying that none of us is sacred. This is quite harmless.


1. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, Cambridge 1960

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Russell, B. Searle Vs Russell, B. V 122
Theory of descriptions/Russell/Searle: Russell went as far as to negate that a specific description could ever be used as reference! ((s) This is about fictions) Description/fiction/SearleVsRussell: of course you can refer to literary figures. Condition: they must exist (in the literature). You cannot refer to the wife of Sherlock Holmes, because he was not married.
V 129
Theory of descriptions/Russell/problem: E.g. "The man insulted me" means that one might assume that only one man exists in the universe. SearleVsRussell: actually asserted something like this in the theory of descriptions.

V 245
Names/descriptions/SearleVsRussell: from the supposed distinction between proper names and certain descriptions the metaphysical distinction between objects and properties is derived.
V 131
definite article/reference/SearleVsRussell: there is absolutely no use of the definite article, which implies in itself that only one object can be meant.
V 132/133
definite article: its function is rather to indicate that the speaker intends a singular reference.
V 144
Proposition/Searle: only the expression in a particular context (circumstances) ensures the transmitting of a proposition! SearleVsRussell: no class of logically proper names can exist at all (this, now, there). If their expressions gave no descriptive content (Russell), there is no way to establish a relation between the expression and the object. How could one explain that this term refers to that object?

V 238
Searle: a propositional act can never be identical to the illocutionary act of the assertion, since a propositional act can never occur independently but only as part of an illocutionary act. SearleVsRussell: the attempt to equate the specific reference (propositional act) with the setting up of assertions (illocutionary act) was bound to fail.
V 239
Because Russell used the formal notation, complete statements must be prepared for him, even if there is no object.
V 240
But from the fact that a certain type of acts can be carried out only under certain conditions, does not simply follow that implementation of such an act in itself already represents the assertion that these conditions were met. Searle: The command "Bring this to the King of France" is neither a statement nor does it contain such. (> E.g. "The present King of France is bald.")

IV 113
Sense/Russell: E.g. pointless: "Four-pageness drinking postponement": SearleVsRussell: is read by many authors as a metaphorical statement about the Quadripartite Agreement after WW2. But none of the words occurs here literally!

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Searle, J.R. Derrida Vs Searle, J.R. I 95
Derrida: makes no distinction between everyday language and special languages. (DerridaVsSearle). Dispute DerridaVsSearle: Habermas
I 229 ++
Austin: speech acts by actors: are "hollow and void in a peculiar way". Searle: such cases are parasitical for everyday use.
DerridaVsSearle: how the impossibility of such a distinction between fictitious, and everyday, ordinary and parasitic ways of speaking show.
HabermasVsDerrida: (DerridaVsSearle): a) little plausible connection between quotability and repeatability on the one hand, fictionality on the other: a quote is always only something secondary. Supposedly, every utterance is essentially quoted because it presupposes conventionality, i.e. repeatability according to a rule.
I 230 ++
Derrida thus presupposes what he wants to prove: that every convention has not only a symbolic but also a fictitious character. Austin: everyday language is subject to other restrictions than stage action. DerridaVs. Habermas

Derrida I
J. Derrida
De la grammatologie, Paris 1967
German Edition:
Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993
Wittgenstein Searle Vs Wittgenstein Bennett I 192
SearleVsWittgenstein: At least sometimes what we can say, is a function of what we say. The meaning exceeds the intention, it is at least sometimes a matter of convention.
Searle I 24
Traditional view of materialism/Searle: … 5. Intelligent behavior and causal relations in which they are, are in some way beings of the mind. Significant relation between mind and behavior exists in different versions: from extreme behavioral view to Wittgenstein. puzzling assertion "An internal process requires external criteria".
SearleVsWittgenstein: an inner process such as pain requires nothing! Why should it?
I 156
SearleVsWittgenstein: Wittgenstein asks if I, when I come into my room, experience a "process of recognition". He reminds us that such a process does not exist in reality. Searle: He's right. This applies also more or less to my whole experience of the world.

I 169
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (PU, 1953): bold attempt to tackle the idea of my in 1st person drafted statement on the intellectual were at all reports or descriptions. He suggested to understand such comments in an expressive sense, so that they are no reports or descriptions and the question for any authority was not raised. When I cry out in pain, then no question of my authority is raised.
I 170
SearleVsWittgenstein: that failed. While there are such cases, but there are still many cases in which one tries to describe his own state of mind as carefully as possible and to not simply express it. Question: why we do not mean to have the same special authority with respect to other objects and facts in the world? Reason: we distinguish between how things appear to us to be and stand and how they really are.
Two questions: first, how it is possible that we may be wrong about our own state of mind? What kind of a "form" has the error, if it is none of the errors we make in regards to appearance or reality with respect to the world in general?
I 171
Typical cases: self-deception, misinterpretation and inattention. Self-deception is such a widespread phenomenon that something must be wrong with the proof of its impossibility. The proof goes like this: that xy can deceive, x must have any conviction (p) and the successful attempt to take in y the belief to evoke that not p. However in the case where x is identical to y, it should therefore cause a self-contradictory belief. And that seems to be impossible.
Yet we know that self-deception is possible. In such cases, the agent is trying not to think of certain own mental states.
I 172
As well as one might interpret a text incorrectly by wrongly composing the text portions, so you can also misinterpret one's own intentional states as you do not recognize their relations with each other.
II 76
Rabbit-duck-head: Here we would like to say that the intentional object is the same. We have two visual experiences with two different presented contents but only a single image. Wittgenstein: gets out of the affair by saying that these are various applications of the word "use".
SearleVsWittgenstein: probably we see not only objects (of course always under one aspect) but also aspects of objects.
Bill loves Sally as a person, but nothing prevents him to love also aspects of Sally.

II 192/193
Background/Searle: is not on the periphery of intentionality but pervades the whole network of intentional states. Semantics/knowledge: the knowledge of how words should be used is not semantic! (Otherwise regress) (Vs use theory of meaning, SearleVsWittgenstein).
E.g. To walk: "Move first the left foot forward, then the right and then on and on," here the knowledge is not in the semantic contents.
II 193/194
Because every semantic content has just the property to be interpreted in various ways. Knowing the correct interpretation can now not be represented as a further semantic content. Otherwise we would need another rule for the correct interpretation of the rule for interpreting the rule for walking. (Regress). Solution: we do not need a rule for walking, we simply walk.
Rule/Searle: to perform the speech acts actually according to a rule, we do not need more rules for the interpretation of the rule.

III 112
Game/Wittgenstein: no common features of all games. (> Family resemblance).
III 113
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are some after all: Def game/elsewhere: the attempt to overcome the obstacles that have been created for the purpose that we try to overcome them. (Searle: that is not by me!).
III 150
Reason/action/Wittgenstein: there is simply a way of acting, which needs no reasons. SearleVsWittgenstein: which is not satisfactory because it does not tell us what role the rule structure plays.

V 35
Principle of expressivity/Searle: Even in the cases where it is actually impossible to say exactly what I mean, it is always possible to get there, that I can say exactly what I mean.
V 36
Understanding/Searle: not everything that can be said can also be understood. That would rule out the possibility of a private language. (SearleVsWittgenstein). The principle of expressivity has far-reaching consequences. We will therefore explain important features of Frege's theory of meaning and significance.

V 145
Facts/situations/Searle: misleading: facts about an object. There can be no facts about an independently by situations identified object! Otherwise you would approach traditional substance.
SearleVsWittgenstein: in Tractatus this is the case.
Wittgenstein: Objects could be named regardless of situations.
SearleVsWittgenstein: such a language could not exist! Objects cannot be named regardless of the facts.
V 190/191
Tautology/SearleVsWittgenstein: tautologies are anything but empty! E.g. "Either he is a fascist or is not." - is very different than "Either he is a communist, or is not." - -.-
V 245
SearleVsTractatus/SearleVsWittgenstein: such a false distinction between proper names and certain descriptions can be found in the Tractatus: "the name means the object. The object is its meaning.". (3.203). But from this paradoxes arise: The meaning of the words, it seems, cannot depend on any contingent facts in the world because we can describe the world even when the facts change.
Tradition: But the existence of ordinary objects. People, cities, etc. is random and hence also the existence of the meaning of their names! Their names are therefore not the real names!
Plato: There must be a class of objects whose existence is not contingent. Their names are the real names (also Plato, Theaithet).

IV 50
SearleVsWittgenstein: there are not an infinite number or an indefinite number of language games.
IV 89
Lie/SearleVsWittgenstein: no language game that has to be learned, like any other. Each rule has the concept of the offense, so it is not necessary to first learn to follow the rule, and then separately to learn the injury. In this regard the fiction is so much more sophisticated than the lie.
fiction/Searle: Pretending to perform an illocutionary act is the same as
E.g. pretend to hit someone (to make the movement).
IV 90
E.g. child in the driver's seat of the car pretends to drive (makes the movements).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Bennett I
Jonathan Bennett
"The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979