Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Convention T Davidson Glüer II 37
Convention T/Davidson: says that a theory must be translating (translational). ((s) Problem: sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" are equivalent.)
Glüer II 38
Convention T allows only extensional language.
II 22
Def " Convention T " /Tarski/Glüer: "A definition of "true" formulated in the metalanguage is factually correct if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema follow from it.
S is true, just when p

is obtained by inserting a name of any sentence in the object language for the symbol "S" and the translation of this sentence into the meta language for the symbol "p".
The convention T tests whether a definition of truth for a language L correctly determines the extension of the predicate "true in L".
Neither the convention T nor the "T-equivalences" may be confused with the definition of truth itself.
II 28
Def T-equivalence/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer : simply true exactly when the linked propositions have the same truth value under all circumstances. The right side does not have to be a translation of the left side. If, on the other hand, a translation would be required, then
1. the circumstances under which the W-equivalences are true are not arbitrary, and
2. the searched meaning would already be presupposed.
Def Convention T*/new/Davidson/Glüer:
A T-theory formulated in the meta language for an object language L is appropriate if all the sentences that can be derived from the schema
(T) S is true gdw. p
is obtained by using for the symbol "S" a designation of any proposition of the object language and for the symbol "p" a proposition of the meta language, which is true exactly when S is it.
Glüer: here are equivalences, which are not required to translate the sentence on the right the sentence on the left, true iff.
II 29
the linked sentences have the same truth value under all circumstances. DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: Whoever wants to apply Davidson's reinterpreted convention T* must therefore know when T equivalences are true.
TarskiVsDavidson: with Tarski, you need to know the meaning of both object and meta-language sentences.
((s) To be able to judge whether there is a correct translation).
T-predicate/Davidson/Glüer: for Davidson, on the other hand, the T predicate must be interpreted.
Davidson/Glüer: thus presupposes a prior understanding of the concept of truth.
Truth/Interpretation/Translation/DavidsonVsTarski/Glüer: a G-theory that fulfils the (new) convention G* can be read as an interpretation theory: it implies for each proposition S of the object language L a T-equivalence derived from its structure, the right side of which indicates the truth conditions under which S is true.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Correspondence Theory Searle III 163
Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with correspondence theory. Realism is not at all a truth theory and does not imply any truth theory.
III 211
Correspondence/Searle: we need a verb to name the variety of ways in which sentences refer to facts. And this verb is "corresponding" among others. Correspondence theory/Searle: the correspondence theory is not an attempt to define "true".
III 211
Correspondence theory/StrawsonVsAustin: Strawson is considered to have won this debate. Strawson: the correspondence theory does not have to be purified, it has to be eliminated.
III 212
It gave us a false picture of the use of the word "true" and the nature of facts: that facts are a kind of complex things or events or groups of things and that truth represents a special relationship of correspondence between statements and these non-linguistic entities. (This goes back to the Tractatus image theory.)
III 215
StrawsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the correspondence theory makes the false assertion that facts are non-linguistic entities.
III 216
Deflationist truth theory/deflationism/minimalist truth theory: "true" is not a property or relation. The entire content of the concept of truth consists in quoting. Def redundancy theory: there is no difference between the statements "p" and "it is true that p". (SearleVsRedundancy Theory). >Deflationism, >redundancy theory.
III 217
These two theories are usually considered incompatible with correspondence theory.
III 220
Correspondence theory/citation cancellation: because of the definitory connections between fact and true statement, there can be no incompatibility between the correspondence criterion of truth and the citation cancellation criterion. The citation simply indicates the form of what makes any statement true, simply by repeating the statement (Tarski). We do not need additional correspondence as confirmation.
Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege, was used by Quine against modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory. >Slingshot argument.
III 230
Slingshot argument: if a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact. Therefore, the concept of correspondence is completely empty. Example final form: "the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green. SearleVs: this is ultimately irrelevant.
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Counterfactual Conditionals Fodor IV 84
Truth theory/Equivalence/problem of extensionality/Fodor/Lepore: Problem: snow is white iff grass is green) - this T-sentence does not support counterfactual conditional: if grass were not green, snow would not be white.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Deflationism Wright I 26ff
Deflationism: is directed against the "inflation" by creating more truth predicates: legitimate assertibility next to truth (> redundancy theory). Thesis: truth is no property, only a means of disquotation. ---
I 46
Deflation/Ramsey: was here first. (Recently: Horwich: "minimalism"): Truth assertorical - claiming, but not supported by adoption of metaphysical objects or situations. - Tarski: disquotation is sufficient. Truth is no substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "Grass is green" have nothing in common.
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content. One can "truly" "approximate" the predicate. (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism thesis: the content of the truth predicate is the same as the claim, which makes its assertoric use.
Deflationism: E.g. Goldbach's conjecture: the deflationism recognizes that there must be said more beyond Tarski. Also, cf. e.g. "Everything he said is true".
VsDeflationism: not a theory but a "potpourri". There is no clear thesis.
---
I 47 ff
Inflationism: a) "true" is merely a means of affirming, only expresses attitudes towards sentences. It does not formulate a standard. b) The disquotation scheme contains a (nearly) complete explanation of the meaning of the word. ("True").
---
I 293
Deflationism: every meaningful sentence (i.e. a sentence with truth-condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsity. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must to refer to a substantial property of statements.
(Deflationism: truth is no property).
---
I 27
Deflationism/Wright: truth is no substantial property - disquotation is enough - "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common - content of the truth-predicate is the same as the claim which raises its claiming use - thesis the truth predicate is prescriptive and descriptive normative. ---
I 33 ~
Deflationism: the only standards of truth are the ones of legitimate assertibility (Assertibilität). ---
I 51
WrightVsDeflation: "minimalist", > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/search.php?erweiterte_suche_1=minimalism&erweiterte_suche_2=Wright&x=0&y=0">"minimalism". ---
I 97
Vs (classical) Deflationism: no norm of truth-predicate may determine by itself that it is different from assertibility because the normative power of "true" and "assertible" coincides, but may diverge extensionally - then the disquotation scheme can play no central role - therefore statements may be true in a certain discourse, without being super-asserting - then truthmakers must be independent of our standards of recognisability (>realism/Wright). ---
Rorty I 38ff
Disquotation/Wright: the deflationist thinks through the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate would be completely determined.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Extensionality Brandom I 499
Extensionality/Homogeneity: a context is extensional if the possible world equivalent relation does not have to be divided more finely than the designation equivalent relation: (Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green") - therefore, the relationship between designated inferences and inferetial role of freestanding sentences is not homogeneous - it is not sufficient to know whether the sentences are true inferences - (because sentences are no inferences at all) - therefore we need a different extensionality at the top level: a sentential context with embedded phrases is extensional in the sense of being part homogeneous iff the substitution of statements with the same inferential role never changes the inferential role of the contained sentence. ---
I 500
This is not always the case: E.g. the role of the expression "S claims that p" does not depend on the role p has for the speaker, but on the role he has for S.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Extensionality Fodor IV 62
Def Extensionality problem/Fodor/Lepore: the problem that a meaning theory can not only be postulated only from the set of truth sentences of a truth theory, as extensional adequacy is not enough (Problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green") - Solution: material instead of extensional adequacy, >translation). - problem: what is a "translation"? - IV 63 Truth theory must be able to recognize the truth conditions so that the left side he interprets the right one - problem also with compositionality: from the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" arise false truth conditions.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Folk Psychology Schiffer I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously - SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows #(that snow is = white Bel T #(that grass is green). - Then both have the same T# -correlated functional role. ---
I 276
N.B.: here the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition - it is not sufficient for that one is in a particular belief state that is linked to them: - E.g. "If p is true, one believes that p" - N.B. "p" exists inside and outside the belief context - Therefore, the theory will say something clear about p - Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. ---
I 34
All that does not distinguish the belief that dinosaurs are extinct from the fact that fleas are mortal. - Problem: there are not enough input rules that are not based on perception. ---
I 38
BurgeVsFolk Psychology BurgeVsIntention based semantics/BurgeVsGrice/Schiffer: famous example: Alfred believes in w that he has arthritis in his thigh. - But he also covers all proper cases. - In w he has a correct use of "Arthritis"- then, he has in w not the believe that he has arthritis in his thigh - (because this belief is false). - N.B.: in w he is in exactly the same T* -correlated states (T* = folk psychology) as in w. - Therefore, he would have to express the same belief. - But he does not - hence the common sense functionalism must be false.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Functional Role Schiffer I 21
Functional Property/Schiffer: is derived from the notion of a functional role - Definition functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2. order, its possession means that the possession of this Z-type is causal or counterfactual to other Z-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties - 1. a given physical Z type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. - 2. Two different physical Z-types may have the same functional role - Definition functional property/Schiffer. Each functional role uniquely determines a functional property - if F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a Z-type which has F -((s). The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role) - Type here always "physically") - properties belong to tokens - rolls to types, e.g. the neural Z-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) ---
I 23
Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property - for every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. ---
I 26
The criterion that a Z-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a Z-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of BelT p. ---
I 29
Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ---
I 30
Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves - 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) - 3. output conditions for actions - problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. ---
I 33f
SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously - SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. ---
I 276
N.B.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition - it is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: - E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p" - N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p - problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. ---
I 34
All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal - problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". ---
I 35
Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. - E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats) - therefore twin earth Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role - twin earth Ralph is in the same neural Z-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth Ralph - N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology) - Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat" - wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth - VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". ---
I 38 f
Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (is not about twin earth, but wrongly used terms). ---
I 286f
Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) - whose functional roles are determined by the theory: problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot - Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine-field argument is settled.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Homophony Homophony, philosophy: The special meaning of the concept of homophony in the philosophical discussion about the theory of truth by Tarski is that there must be an additional condition that excludes irrelevant cases. The example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white, but it is also true if on the right side of equivalence stands "... if grass is green". This is due to the weak norm of equivalence ("if and only if") which merely requires that both sides are true or both sides are false. The condition of the homophony now requires (a) that the sentence of the left-hand side is repeated on the right-hand side, and (b) that the sentences on both sides come from the same language. See also Theory of truth, truth conditions.

Interpretation Davidson Glüer II 28
Interpretation Theory/Glüer: must not assume that their theorems were derived with the help of a translation (circle) - therefore DavidsonVsTarski: presupposing truth to explain meaning.
Glüer II 29/30
Def interpretative/Glüer: is a theory if all theory equivalences are to be obtained from the schema T are true. Because truth conditions are given in the recursion to the structure of the sentences -> Meaning holism: a sentence only has meaning in the context of the language - Thus the problem is "Snow is white iff grass is green is excluded, because such a theory could not imply at the same time a true T-equivalence for the sentences "This is white" or "That is snow". (See Meaning Holism.
Glüer II 117/8
Interpretation/action/explanation/Davidson/Glüer: an action is only interpretable if it can be described as part of a rational structure - this also applies to speech action - therefore, actions are linked to propositional attitudes - each action is an interpreted action - N.B.: therefore it is no empirical question whether an acting person is rational - ((s) because it is presupposed) - An event that cannot be described in the language of the propositional attitudes is not an action - (because it is not interpretable).
Frank I 645
Mental states/proposition/self-attribution/external-ascription/Davidson: we have to start from sentences or utterances instead of propositions or meanings - otherwise, different types of sources are suggested - instead: relationships between actors and utterances - no different knowledge and no different criteria - solution : If someone knows that I think of a sentence as correct, he knows what I believe - it would be circular to explain the basic asymmetry by an asymmetry of certainty -> interpretation.
I 648
Interpretation/mental states/external-ascription/Davidson: also the speaker can problematize his sentences - he can also be wrong about the meaning of his words - he also needs the Tarski-theory - asymmetry: N.B.: the listener/interpreter cannot be sure that the Tarski-theory is the best method for external attribution. - The best thing the speaker can do is to be interpretable.
Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111
- - -
Graeser I 167
Interpretation/Davidson: utterances are verifiable, without the individual propositional attitudes of the speakers being known. - Radical interpretation: equality of meaning cannot be assumed, otherwise there is circularity > Truth conditions/Davidson.
Davidson V 139
Truth/Interpretation/Davidson: the contrast between truth and falsity can only occur in the context of interpretation.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Grae I
A. Graeser
Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002
Meaning Lewis II 197
Meaning/Name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds in truth value - of generic names: function from worlds to quantities. ---
II 213
Putnam: meanings not in the head - Lewis pro: mental state does not determine the meaning - meaning cannot be found out through mental state - mental state contains too little information about causation and situation. ---
II 213/14
Carrier of meaning: speech acts - not sounds or characters! -> Intentionality, > meaning (intending). ---
IV 194
Meaning/Lewis: Here’s a function that provides as output an appropriate extension for given combinations of factors provides as time, place, context, speaker, world - intension/Lewis: function that leads from indices (time, place, speaker, world) to appropriate extensions for a name, sentence, or general term - intensions are extension-determining functions - Carnap’s intension: provides truth value for sentences or things, for names and quantities, for general terms. ---
IV 200
Intension/meaning/Lewis: E.g. "Snow is white or not" differs finely in the meaning of "Grass is green or not" - because of the different intensions of the embedded sentences. - (Intension: Function of indices on extensions). - Meaning/Lewis: semantically interpreted phrase markers minus the top nodes of the structure treeS - synonymy: sameness of intension. Meaning/BenacerrafVsLewis: how can you ever "choose" meaning? - Lewis: this is a general objection Vs quantity-theoretic approaches.
---
IV 202
Definition phrase structure rules/Lewis: = semantically interpreted phrase markers - Definition meaning: a structure tree ... - we often talk about meanings as if they were symbolic expressions, although they are not - the category meaning is simply the top node - intension: is the second component of the top node. ---
Schwarz I 216
Meaning/object/word/Lewis: thesis: our words are merely linked to conditions to be fulfilled by a potential reference - so it may be that something fulfills them of which we did not think beforehand that it would fulfill them.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Meaning Loar II 144
meaning / Loar: a sentence in a community is a function of psychological and social role - other sentences in other languages do not belong to the point - (Davidson ditto) – whatever is important, it is not something that is generally available in translation relative to the sentence.
II 144
Meaningfulness (significance?) / Loar: regardless of language: e.g. unstructured signals have conventional meaning in a community - > problem: the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" - accidental equivalences can not be ruled out.
II 149
meaning / sentence meaning / Loar: what a sentence means is always relative to a language - ((s) it is not language-independent proposition)..

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Meaning McDowell I 160ff
Meaning/Quine: New: "empiricist meaning": is intellectually prestigious, because it can be explained completely by the lawful operations of the receptivity. On the other hand, the old concept of meaning stands on the wrong side of this duality. (See also >content/McDowell). Meaning/Quine: the joke in Quine is that meaning in the intuitive sense cannot be determined by exogenous factors.
I 184/5
McDowell: if we drop the Third Dogma (>distinction schema/content), it is not surprising that the meaning is now underdetermined by the "empiricist meaning".
I 185
McDowell: the "empiricist meaning" cannot be a real meaning anyway, since, as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty," it can have nothing to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not show that meaning is at all underdetermined. We would have to show that we have an indelible leeway if we are looking for a kind of understanding that brings us out of the field of "empiricist meaning". An understanding that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of justification, the space of reason. This cannot be learned from Quine.
I 119
Meaning/McDowell: we must not construct it "socially-pragmatic" or "communitarian". (Wittgenstein did not do that either).   Otherwise it is no longer autonomous. Uninhibited Platonism would be a tendency to the occult.
  Wittgenstein: has not asserted that meaning is nothing but approval or rejection by the community.
I 119
Kripke's Wittgenstein/McDowellVsKripke: comes to the conclusion that there is nothing that constitutes the receptiveness for the claim that makes the meaning to us; instead, we must understand the role of thought in our lives through our participation in the community.
I 121
Thesis: Meaning/McDowellVsDualism: Solution: second nature. The idea of education assures that the autonomy of meaning is not inhumane. This leaves no real questions about norms. ---
II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: we need additional psychological concepts.
II XV
Problem: then the propositional settings must be as fixed as the meanings. -> Radical Interpretation.

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell

Meaning Theory Loar Avramides I 27
Meaning Theory/m.th./Loar : can not be drawn as a purely extensional truth theory: - problem: 1st The equivalence of "snow is white" and "grass is green"
2nd Hesperus is bright iff Phosphorus is bright,
3rd "snow ist white and 2+ 2 = 4" - solution/Fodor/Lepore :the right hand side must be a translation from the left.
Meaning Theory/Avramides: Thesis: the problems disappear when it comes to the big picture: how sounds turn to speech acts? - Only then the truth conditions will come up, because the meaning theory must fit into a theory of power. - Lewis sounds have truth conditions only relative to a language . - Psychology comes into play only when it comes to favoring one language in a population.

II 139f
Meaning Theory/Loar: a) extensional (Quine, Davidson ) - b) Loar : intensional: semantic concepts are located within a larger framework of propositional attitudes - Davidson intermediate position.
II 141
Meaning Theory/Davidson: main problem: how to avoid: " Snow is white " is true if grass is green - if one accepts this as extensionally right ( correct) , then there is not more than that in the idea of the meaning.
II 142
Meaning Theory./Loar: a list does not work: "x is camel1 , or camel2 ... ": No understanding of a sentence. Wrong solution: simplicity: "x is a camel " is only satisfied by y, if y is a camel - Vs : too strong and too vague - for someone who knows nothing of a language that meaning theory does not work that way. The Tarski schema " S is true ... " ( equivalence scheme) does not give the meaning. - We also need at least " an expression x is S and ... " - Problem: we then have a metametalanguage.
II 143
Solution/Loar: when entities were meanings ( propositions?) they could distinguish sentence meaning from anything else , what else is true in the sentence.
II 149
Meaning Theory/Loar: Thesis: a meaning theory is a theory of mind, not vice versa.

Loar I
B. Loar
Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981

Loar II
Brian Loar
"Two Theories of Meaning"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989
Possible Worlds Adams Stalnaker I 32
Possible worlds/Robert Adams: if there are true propositions that speak of the existence of nonactual possible worlds, they must be able to be reduced to sentences in which only things from the actual world are mentioned which are not identical with non-actual possibilities. StalnakerVsAdams: I do not see why this should be necessary.
Possible worlds/Stalnaker: Two questions:
1. Are they really so obscure?
---
I 33
2. Does the belief in possible worlds and the indexical analysis of actuality oblige us to extreme realism? Certainly not. World stories/world-story/Possible worlds/Robert Adams: Thesis: a world-story is a maximally consistent set of propositions. The concept of a possible world can be given in a contextual analysis in terms of world stories.
Proposition/Truth/Adams/Stalnaker: a proposition is true in some or all possible worlds if it is an element of some or all of the world-stories.
StalnakerVsAdams: in his approach, there are three undefined terms: Proposition, consistent, and contradictory.
Proposals/Adams/Stalnaker: proposals can be presented as language-independent, abstract objects. They have truth values.
Consistency/Adams/Stalnaker: consistency is a property of sets of propositions. One can define them in terms of possible worlds in which all propositions are true.
---
I 34
Two conditions for consistency: (W1) The set of all true propositions is consistent
(W2) Each subset of a consistent set is consistent.
Contradiction/Adams/Stalnaker: contradiction could be defined in terms of consistency:
A and B are contradictory, iff.
{A, B} is not consistent
And for each consistent set of propositions Γ is either
Γ U {A} or Γ U {B} consistent.
The theory presupposes:
(W3) Each proposition has a contradiction.
Proposition/Adams/Stalnaker: this is a minimal theory of propositions. It does not impose any structure on propositions, except for what is needed for compatibility, implication, and equivalence. And to ensure that e.g. the right kind of implication is present. E.g. implication:
Definition Implication/Proposition/Stalnaker: (here): A implies B iff. a set consisting of A and a contradiction of B is not consistent.
(W1) and (W2) ensure that our implication has the right properties.
---
Stalnaker I 36
Proposition/Possible World/Stalnaker: an analysis of propositions as worlds provides definitions of consistency, etc., in concepts of set-theoretical relations between sets of worlds. World Story Theory/Adams/Stalnaker: the theory of world stories is weaker because it leaves open questions that clarify the analysis of propositions as worlds.
The following two theses are consequences of the possible-worlds-theory but not of the world-story theory:
(W5) Seclusion condition: For any set of propositions G there is a proposition A such that G implies A and A implies every element of G.
Stalnaker: i.e. that for any set of propositions there is a proposition which says that every proposition in the set is true.
Proposition/Seclusion/Stalnaker: whatever propositions are, if there are any, there are also sets of them. And for any set of propositions, it is definitely true or false that all their elements are true.
And of course this is a proposition.
So I assume that the world-story theorist wants to add (W5) to his theory.
(W6) Equivalent propositions are identical.
Problem: the problems of (W6) are known. ((s)> hyperintensionalism/hyperintentionality: sentences that are true in the same worlds are indistinguishable, equivalence of "snow is white" to "grass is green", etc.).


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Slingshot Argument Searle III 229ff
Slingshot Argument/Searle: the slingshot argument originates from Frege; it was used by Quine against the modal logic and revived by Davidson against the correspondence theory.
III 230
If a true statement corresponds to a fact, then it corresponds to any fact, hence the notion of correspondence is completely empty. The proposition that snow is white, corresponds to the fact that grass is green. Analysis: there is a difference between co-referential singular terms and equivalent sentences, e.g. "x is identical with Diogenes and snow is white".
III 231
Solution/Searle: 1. There is irrelevance: "...Diogenes", 2. Logical equivalence of sentences does not mean identity of the relevant facts. Conclusion/Searle: the slingshot argument does not refute the correspondence theory. >Correspondence theory, >facts.
III 230
Step 1: The statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that snow is white. Step 2: a) The whole statement remains true when replacing co-referential singular terms.
b) The whole statement remains true when replacing logically equivalent sentences.
(Def logically equivalent: in each model the same truth value).
Step 3: we assume: the sentence a) "snow is white" is logically equivalent to the sentence:
b) "The x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)".

Step 4: we assume: the proposition: "grass is green" is logically equivalent to the proposition:
"The x such that ( x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green).
III 231
Step 5: we assume: the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white)" refers to the same object as the expression "the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green)". Step 6: (is derived from step 1): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and snow is white). (From 2b)
Step 7: (from 2a together with the reference from 5): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes) is identical to the x such that (x is identical to Diogenes and grass is green).
Step 8: (from 2b): the statement that snow is white corresponds to the fact that grass is green.
SearleVsSlingshot Argument: an argument of this kind can at most show the falseness of its assumptions. These are contraintuitive consequences.
III 232
Irrelevance: the statement that snow is white does not correspond to any fact concerning Diogenes. Even Diogenes' own identity (or the fact that 2+2 = 4) has nothing to do with what makes the statement that snow is white true. Correspondence theory: some authors accuse her of petitio principii.
III 233
The accusation may be returned. It is a petitio principii to assume to the correspondence theory that it is subject to principles like 2b, if no argument for the applicability of this principle is given. Logical equivalence: the substitutability of logically equivalent propositions does not mean identity of facts! Example "The statement that a corresponds to the fact that b". Here one can replace b by c only if: the fact that b, is identical to the fact that c.
Intensionality/Searle: the expression: "The fact that ...." is completely non-extensional. (In contrast, "X corresponds Y" is completely extensional).
"The fact that..." does not preserve the selfhood of the reference by replacing logically equivalent propositions. But why should you? Why should facts concerning snow be identical to facts concerning Diogenes or anyone else?
III 235
Slingshot argument: Searle: conclusion: it does not refute the correspondence theory.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Tarski Field I 33f
Tarski/Field: According to him the following two sentences are a contradiction because he needs quantities for his definition of implication: a) "snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green". - b) There are no mathematical entities (m.e.) like quantities. - ((s) Therefore, Field must be independent of Tarski.) Solution Field: Implication as a basic concept. ---
II 124
Tarski/Truth: unlike disquotational truth: only for a fragment. - Unrestricted quantifiers and semantic concepts must be excluded. Problem: we cannot create infinite conjunctions and disjunctions with that. - (Tarski-Truth is not suitable for generalization). DeflationsimVsTarski/QuineVsTarski. - Otherwise, we must give up an explicit definition. - Deflationism: uses a generalized version of the truth-schema. - TarskiVsDeflationism: pro compositionality. (Also Davidson) - Tarski: needs recursion to characterize e.g."or".
---
II 125
Composition principle/Field: E.g. A sentence consisting of a one-digit predicate and a referencing name is true, iff the predicate is true of what the name denotes. - This goes beyond logical rules because it introduces reference and denotation. - Tarski: needs this for a satisfying Truth-concept. Deflationism: it is not important for it. - (> Compositionality). ---
II
Truth-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate Truth-theory if we take only all instances of the schema as axioms. - This does not give us the generalizations we need, e.g. that the modus ponens receives the truth. ---
II 142
Deflationism/Tarski/Field. Actually, Tarski's approach is also deflationistic. ---
Soames I 477
FieldVsTarski/Soames: hides speech behavior. - Field: introduces primitive reference, and so on. -> language independence. - SoamesVsField: his physicalist must reduce every single one of the semantic concepts. - For example, he cannot characterize negation as a symbol by truth, because that would be circular. E.g. he cannot take negation as the basic concept, because then there would be no facts about speakers (no semantic facts about use) that explain the semantic properties. - FieldVsTarski: one would have to be able to replace the semantic terms by physical terms.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994


Soames I
Scott Soames
"What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Soames II
S. Soames
Understanding Truth Oxford 1999
Truth Definition Davidson Glüer II 29
Truth Definition/Tarski-Schema/Contents/Interpreting/Translation/Tarski/Davidson/Glüer: E.g. "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green. - Such a theory would not be interpretive. - The right side truth conditions have nothing to do with the truth conditions from the left - Problem: the equivalence is purely formal because the truth value is always the same. (Equivalence) solution: menaing holism: a sentence has only meaning in the context - Solution/Davidson: truth predicate three-digit: for sentence, speaker, point of time.
Glüer II 37f
DavidsonVsTarski: should be empirical instead of formal - empiricism excludes false additions of law (Goodman) ("falsified theory") - The convention truth is not sufficiently empirical - ((e) because it's only providing equivalences.)
Glüer II 65
Truth-equivalences/Davidson/Glüer: equate belief content with belief cause.
Glüer II 40/41
E.g. (TR") for all speakers x, for all t: "It is raining" expressed by x to t is true iff it is raining at t in the surrounding of x. - ((s) That specifies the truth conditions).
Glüer II 67
Truth/Davidson: intuitive - meaning: non-intuitive - truth: unanalysable basic concept.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993
Truth Theory Fodor IV 60
Theory of truth / Davidson / Fodor / Lepore: a theory of truth is extensionally adequate when all of its T-sentences are true. - Problem: this is not sufficient E.g. the equivalence of "Snow is white" and "Grass is green" - solution:. materially adequate instead of extensionally adequate. - That is, that P must be a translation of S - This is Tarski s Convention T. - problem: "Translation" - "adequate", "synonym", etc. unclear. - Problem: when radical interpretation would be defined by material adequacy, it would be impossible. - Solution / Davidson: truth as the fundamental concept.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Compositionality Fodor Vs Compositionality IV 64/65
Truth Conditions/tr.cond./Holism/Fodor/Lepore: (Fodor/LeporeVsCompositionality as a solution:) "Snow is white", has the truth condition it has, because it belongs to a language that contains "This is snow" and "This is snow", and an indefinite number of other sentences with "is white" and "snow". Semantic Holism/SH: Now, of course, it would be a good argument for semantic holism if only compositionality were really necessary to exclude sentences such as W.
Problem: if it’s really only because of the structural similarity between "snow is white" and "This is snow" that the former means that snow is white (and not that grass is green), then it would look like an a priori argument against the possibility of non-compositional language! I.e. the expressions of such a language could not have truth conditions! But:
Non-Compositional Language/Non-Recursive/Recursive/Fodor/Lepore: E.g. Suppose a child has mastered the entire non-recursive apparatus of German. It can say things like
It’s raining, snow is white, grass is green, that’s snow, that is frozen, everybody hates me, I hate spinach etc., but not:
"snow is white and grass is green" or
"Everyone hates frozen spinach", etc.
We assume that the dispositions of the child towards the sentences that it has mastered are exactly the same as those of a normal adult who uses these sentences.
It is very plausible that this child, when it says "snow is white", it actually says that snow is white.
So far, the compositionality principle of holism is not in danger if we assume that the child has "snow is white" and "this is snow" in its repertoire (idiolect).
IV 66
E.g. Suppose a second child who uses the unstructured expression "Alfred" instead of "Snow is white". For "This is snow": "Sam", and for "This is cold": "Mary".
1st child: infers from "this is snow" to "this is cold"
2nd child: infers from "Sam" to "Mary".
We assume that the translated verbalizations of child two do not differ from the verbalizations of child 1.
Nevertheless: if compositionality were a necessary condition for content, then there would be an a priori argument that child 2 could not mean anything specific with his statements.
Meaning/Vs: what someone means with their statements depends on their intentions! ((s) and not on the sound chains.)
Which a priori argument could show that the child could not make its statement "Sam" with the intention to express that snow is cold?
T-sentence: perhaps the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. snow is white is to be preferred over the T-sentence
"Alfred" is true iff. grass is green.
Important argument: but this cannot be a consequence of the compositional structure of "Alfred", because it has none.
It can also be doubted that compositionality is sufficient for the solution of the extensionality problem:
 IV 178
QuineVsKant/QuineVsAnalyticity/QuineVsCompositionality of Inference: (external): it must be possible for inferences to turn out to be wrong.
IV 178/179
VsFodor/Lepore: then one might make do with a reformulated CRT: compositional meaning, but inferential role not compositional, only within analytical conclusions? Fodor/LeporeVsVs: risk of circularity: If you assume analyticity at all, compositionality, analyticity and meaning spend their lives doing the work of the others. Quine would say: "I told you!"
Inferential Role/Fodor/Lepore: the present proposal also threatens their naturalisability. ((s) that they are ultimately explained in physiological categories): Originally, their attractiveness was to provide a causal role as a basis for the solution of Brentano’s problem of irreducibility to the neurophysiological. (>Computation).

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Davidson, D. Fodor Vs Davidson, D. IV 68
Problem: the logical apparatus which the meta-language needs to produce correct T-sentences automatically also produces an indefinite number of incorrect T-sentences. Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: Currently, there are no suggestions as to what a theory-neutral concept of canonical derivation should look like!
IV 69
Therefore, no one knows what to consider a canonical derivation if the syntax varies from truth theory to truth theory. "Canonical Axiom"/Fodor/Lepore: such a thing would certainly not make sense: Also the issue of the attached logical truth would immediately identify this axiom as well.
Q: does not depend on the logical truth being attached behind, i.e. to the right side.
QuineVsDavidson: shows that it can also be smuggled in earlier: E.g. (x)(x satisfies "is white" iff. (x is white and LT).
could be taken as an axiom, then the derivative of Q would be a "canonical proof".
This shows once again that compositionality is not a sufficient condition to exclude the extensionality problem.
E.g. Assuming the difficulties had been solved so far, then we would have an argument that a WT, which includes W and WT, which includes T can be distinguished then (and perhaps only then) if the language L includes sentences with "snow", "white", "grass", and "green" in structures with demonstratives.
That seems to be a holistic consequence.
Vs: but that’s premature.
Language/Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Quine: Thesis: nothing can ever be a language if it is not accessible to radical interpretation!
I.e. it must be possible to find out a correct WT by that evidence which observation allows.
Fodor/Lepore VsQuine/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: it is not reasonable to establish this principle: on the contrary, if radical interpretation is understood like this, it is conceivable that a perfectly kosher language like English is not a language at all!
Then there are two possible ways to justify equating the evidence for the selection of a truth theory with proof about the speaker behavior:
1) that the child and the field linguist are successful with it. A fortiori it must be possible.
IV 74
Vs: but this is deceptive. There is no reason to assume that the choice of is determined only by the available behavioral observation, along with something like a canon. Linguistics/Fodor/Lepore: the real linguistics always tries to exploit something like the intuitions of its informants, is therefore not in the epistemic situation of radical interpretation.
It has a background of very powerful theoretical assumptions.
From the perspective of radical interpretation, this background is circular: the evidence of the acceptance of these assumptions (background) is the current success of the linguist. (> hermeneutic circle).
These include assumptions about cognitive psychology, universals, etc.
IV 84
Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: his idea that T-sentences themselves could be laws is not plausible. Even if they were, there would be no guaranteed inference from the lawlikeness of the T-sentences to the content holism. W sentences are not laws. How could they be, given the conventionality of language!
IV 98
"Sam believes that snow is white" is true iff. Sam believes that snow is F. Principle of Charity/Fodor/LeporeVsPoC/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the principle of charity does not help here at all! If we interpret Sam as believing that snow is white, and believing that snow is F, both makes Sams belief true!.
IV 100
Principle of Charity/Radical Interpretation//RI/Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: we have only seen one case where the principle of charity could be applied to the radical interpretation: if there are expressions that. 1) do not occur in token reflexive expressions
2) are syntactically atomistic.
The interpretation of such expressions can not be fixed by their behavior in token reflexive expressions, it cannot be recovered by the compositionality of the interpretations of its parts.
IV 101
we do not know whether such forms exist. E.g. Maybe "proton". In such cases, the principle of charity would be un-eliminable.
> Behavior/wish IV 120ff.

Fodor IV
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992
Deflationism Wright Vs Deflationism I 26
Truth: is there a concept of truth that is free of metaphysical obligations and yet assertoric? Deflation/Deflationism/Deflationary Approach: Ramsey was the first here. (Recently: Horwich: "Minimalism"): Truth assertoric (asserting, but not supported by assumption of metaphysical objects or facts). Tarski's quoting is sufficient.
Truth is not a substantial property of sentences. True sentences like "snow is white" and "grass is green" have nothing in common!
Important: you can use the disquotation scheme without understanding the content! You can "approach" the predicate "true". (Goldbach's conjecture).
Deflationism Thesis: the content of the predicate of truth is the same as the claim its assertoric use makes.
WrightVsDeflationism: instead "minimal truth ability", "minimal truth" here "minimalism": core existence of recognized standards.
I 35
Legitimate Assertiveness/Assertibility/Negation: Example "It is not the case that "P" is T then and only if it is not the case that "P" is T.
This is not valid for legitimate assertiveness from right to left! Namely, if the level of information is neutral (undecidable). (But for truth)(neutrality, >undecidability).
It is then correct to claim that it is not the case that P is assertible, but incorrect to claim that the negation of P is justifiably assertible.
Therefore, we must distinguish between "T" and "assertible". "("assertible": from now on for "legitimate assertible"). (VsDeflationism that recognizes only one norm.)
I 47
VsDeflationism: not a theory, but a "potpourri". There is no unambiguous thesis at all.
I 48
InflationismVsDeflationism: (uncertain) DS' "P" is true(E!P)("P" says that P & P) (! = that which exists enough for P)
I 53
Minimalism/Wright: recognizes, in contrast to deflationism, that truth is a real property. The possession of this property is normatively different from legitimate assertiveness. (VsDeflationism).
I 97
WrightVsDeflationism Thesis: the classical deflationary view of truth is in itself unstable. No norm of the predicate of truth can state that it differs from legitimate assertiveness. With this consequence, however, the central role ascribed to the quotation scheme - and thus also to negation equivalence - is not compatible.
The normative power of "true" and "justifiably claimable" coincides, but can potentially diverge extensionally.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008
Dennett, D. Field Vs Dennett, D. II 70
Representation/Measuring/Dennett/Field: (Dennett 1982) alternative representational theorem: Here, numbers are not attributed to physical objects, but to monadic mass properties, the property of having a particular mass. Analogy to Intentionality: no objects or incidents with Boolean or sentence structure, but properties with such a structure.
Field: does that commit us the less internal structure?
Intentional Properties/Dennett/Field: perhaps these Dennettian properties are to be attributed to an organism as a whole? An organism could have many of these at the same time. Then all we need in terms of structure are relations, which are suitable for propositions that exist between simultaneous states of a whole organism. But that is not what most people understand to be an "internal system of representation".
2) (more important, in connection with nominalism): not every image of representations on propositions that preserves the Boolean or sentence structure satisfies the explanation claims we make on propositions:
II 71
We could easily find some that preserve the Boolean or sentence structure, and attribute the proposition that grass is green to the mental state "snow is white". Proposition/Field: for them (other than for numbers) structure is not sufficient.
FieldVsDennett: hence his analogy is limited. The role of propositions is quite different from that of numbers.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Prosentential Theory Verschiedene Vs Prosentential Theory Horwich I 344
Quote/VsProsentential Theory/Camp, Grover, Belnap/VsCGB: one accuses the prosentential theory of ignoring cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences is stated. Example (27) "snow is white" is true.
CGB: we could say here with Ramsey that (27) simply means that snow is white.
CGBVsRamsey: this obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become clearer when we use a foreign-language translation. Example
(28) If „Schnee ist weiß“ is true, then…
Why (28) instead of
If it’s true that snow is white, then
Or
If snow is white, then…
CGB: there are several possible reasons here. We may want to make it clear that the original sentence was written in German. Or it could be that there is no elegant translation, or we do not know the grammar of German well enough. Or example: "snow is white" must be true because Fritz said it and everything Fritz says is true.
I 345
Suppose English* has a way of formally presenting a sentence: E.g. „Betrachte __“ („Consider____").
(29) Consider: snow is white. This is true.
CGB: why should it not work the same as "snow is white is true" in normal English?
VsCGB: you could argue that it requires a reference to sentences or expressions because quotation marks are name-forming functors.
Quotation marks/CGB: we deviate from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. ((s) not for CGB).
Quote/CGB: should not be considered as a reference to expressions in normal English. But we do not want to follow that up here.
I 346
VsCGB: one has accused the prosentential theory of tunnel vision: Maybe we overlooked certain grammatically similar constructions? Example (30) John: there are seven legged dogs
Mary: that's surprising, but true.
(31) John: the being of knowledge is the knowledge of being
Mary: that is profound and it is true.
Ad (30): of course the first half is "that is surprising" in no way prosentential. It is a characterization!
VsCGB: Ad (31) "is profound" expresses a quality that Mary attributes to the sentence. Why shouldn't "true" be understood in the same way?
CGB: it makes sense to take "this" here as referring to a sentence. But that would make things more complicated because then we would have to treat "that" and "it" differently in "that's true" and "it's true".
CGBVsVs: 1. it is just not true that the "that" in "that's surprising" refers to an utterance (in the sense of what was said, or a proposition).
What is surprising here? Facts, events or states of affairs.
Statement/Surprise/CGB: a statement can only be surprising as an act.
I 347
The surprising thing about the statement is the fact reported. ((s) But then the content rather than the act of testimony.)
CGBVs(s): it is not the fact that there are seven legged dogs claimed to be true in (30), because that fact cannot be true!
Proposition/CGB: (ad (31) Propositions are not profound. Acts can be profound. For example insights or thoughts.
Truth/Act/Action/Statement/CGB: but statements in the sense of action are not what is called true. ((s) see also StrawsonVsAustin, ditto).
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: even if we consider "that's surprising, but it's true" as referring, the two parts don't refer to the same thing! And then the theory is no longer economic.
Reference/Prosentential Theory/CGB: are there perhaps other cases where it is plausible that a pronoun refers to a proposition? Example
(32) John: Some dogs eat grass.
Mary: You believe that, but it's not true.
Proposition: is often understood as a bearer of truth, and as an object of belief. (CGBVs).
I 348
However, if "that" is understood here as a referencing pronoun, then the speaker must be a proposition. CGBVs: we can interpret "that you believe" also differently: as prosentential anaphora (as above in the example "that is wrong", with preceding negation prefix). Then we have no pronominal reference.
N.B.: the point is that no property is attributed. Truth is not a property.
VsCGB: another objection: it is also a "tunnel vision" that we only have "that is true" but not "that is right" in view. Or the example "exaggerated" by Austin.
Example: a child says
I've got 15 logs
That is right.
I 349
Question: should this (and e.g. "This is an exaggeration!") be understood prosententially? CGBVsVs: "that is right" is here the statement that the child counted right, that it did something right. Sometimes this can overlap with the statement that a statement is true. The overlap must exist because there is no clear boundary between language learning and use.
I 349
Anaphora/Prosentential Theory/VsCGB: could not one split the prosody and take the individual "that" as an anaphora? CGBVsVs: then one would also have to split off "is true" and no longer perceive it as referencing, but as characterizing ((s) And thus attributing it as property).
CGBVs: then we would have to give up our thesis that speech about truth is completely understandable without "carrier of truth" or "truth characteristic".
Moreover:
Reference/CGB: it is known that not every nominalization has to be referencing ((s) E.g. Unicorn).
Predication/CGB: also not every predication has to be characterizing.
Divine Perspective/outside/PutnamVsGod's point of view/Rorty: Putnam amuses himself like James and Dewey, about such attempts.
Rorty: But he has a problem when it comes to PutnamVsDisquotationalism: it smells too reductionist, too positivist, too "behaviorist" ("transcendental skinnerism").
Truth/Putnam: when a philosopher says truth is something other than electricity because there is room for a theory of electricity but not for a truth theory,
I 456
and that knowledge of the truth condition is all that could be known about truth, then he denies that truth is a property. So there is also no property of correctness or accuracy ((s) >Deflationism, PutnamVsDeflationism, PutnamVsGrover.) PutnamVs: that is, to deny that our thoughts are thoughts and our assertions are assertions.
Theory/Existence/Reduction/Putnam/Rorty: Putnam here assumes that the only reason to deny is that you need a theory for an X is to say that the X is "nothing but Y" ((s) eliminative reductionism).
PutnamVsDavidson: Davidson must show that claims can be reduced to sounds. Then the field linguist would have to reduce actions to movements.
Davidson/Rorty: but this one does not say that claims are nothing but sounds.
Instead:
Truth/Explanation/Davidson: other than electricity, truth is no explanation for something. ((s) A phenomenon is not explained by the fact that a sentence that claims it is true).





Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Tarski, A. Davidson Vs Tarski, A. Glüer II 28
Tarski tests his definitions through that they only imply -equivalences where the sentence on the right side translates the one quoted on the left. The T-predicate used may remain uninterpreted. Because: Def T-predicate: every predicate that provides correct translations is a T-predicate. Tarski assumes meaning in order to explicate the truth. Davidson: vice versa! It is not required of T-equivalences that the right side translates to the leftd.
Glüer II 29
Def T-equivalence: true iff. the linked sentences have the same truth value in all circumstances. Those who want to apply Davidson’s "Convention T" need to know when T-equivalences are true. With Tarski, one must know the meaning of both object-language and meta-language sentences. Davidson’s T-predicate, however, must be interpreted.
Glüer II 29
Vs: Why should T-equivalences indicate truth conditions if there needs to be no substantive connection between the linked sentences? Translation: E.g. "snow is white" is true iff. grass is green.
How could T-equivalences be prevented from implying such equivalences?.
Answer: Such a theory would not be too interpretive. Right has nothing to do with the truth conditions of left.
DavidsonVsTarski: empirical rather than formal - empiricism excludes false law amendments (> Goodman).- Convention T insufficiently empirical.
Glüer II 50 ff
Tarski-like T-theories include no reference to meanings in the sense defined clearly assignable entities. Davidson: two radical consequences: 1) Understanding: for understanding it’s basically irrelevant which language the speaker speaks (DavidsonVsTarski).
Glüer II 51
Every language is accessible via the causal relationships. 2) It is considered trivial that meaning is conventional. What words and sentences mean is a matter of social practice.
DavidsonVs: the thesis of the conventional character of language has to be abandoned in the radical interpretation.
Glüer II 122
DavidsonVsTarski: The radical interpreter can only develop a T-theory for his L if he uses an interpreted T-predicate for the construction of his T-equivalences, i.e. his own, intuitive concept of truth. While Tarski’s T-predicates provide a structural description of a language whose translation is known, and precisely do not make a contribution to a truth theory, because for that it would be interesting to see what T-predicates in different languages have ​​in common.

Dummett I 25
DavidsonVsTarki: presumes, however, that the concept of truth must already be understood! If we knew nothing about it, except that it applies to sentences of the language concerned, according to the definition of truth, we cannot learn anything about the meaning of a sentence by stating the truth conditions. Therefore, you need a previous understanding of the concept of truth. - But not of the conditions! because this knowledge will be determined by the truth theory.
Frank I 633
Truth/Meaning/Interpretation/DavidsonVsTarski: without interpretation the assertion that a particular physical entity has truth conditions or meaning remains an empty presumption.

Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica38 (1984),
101-111

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Tarski, A. Field Vs Tarski, A. Brendel I 68
T-Def/FieldVsTarski: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions. (Field 1972). Semantic concepts and especially the W concept should be traceable to physical or logical-mathematical concepts. Tarski/Brendel: advocates for a metalinguistic definition himself that is based only on logical terms, no axiomatic characterization of "truth". (Tarski, "The Establishment of Scientific Semantics").
Bre I 69
FieldVsTarski: E.g. designation: Def Designation/Field: Saying that the name N denotes an object a is the same thing as stipulating that either a is France and N is "France" or a is Germany and N is "Germany"... etc.
Problem: here only an extensional equivalence is given, no explanation of what designation (or satisfiability) is.
Bre I 70
Explanation/FieldVsTarski/Field: should indicate because of which properties a name refers to a subject. Therefore, Tarski’s theory of truth is not physicalistic. T-Def/FieldVsTarski/Field/Brendel: does not do justice to physicalistic intuitions - extensional equivalence is no explanation of what designation or satisfiability is.
Field I 33
Implication/Field: is also in simpler contexts sensibly a primitive basic concept: E.g. Someone asserts the two sentences.
a) "snow is white" does not imply logically "grass is green".
b) There are no mathematical entities such as quantities.
That does not look as contradictory as
Fie I 34
John is a bachelor/John is married FieldVsTarski: according to him, a) and b) together would be a contradiction, because he defines implication with quantities. Tarski does not give the normal meaning of those terms.
VsField: you could say, however, that the Tarskian concepts give similar access as the definition of "light is electromagnetic radiation".
FieldVsVs: but for implication we do not need such a theoretical approach. This is because it is a logical concept like negation and conjunction.
Field II 141
T-Theory/Tarski: Thesis: we do not get an adequate probability theory if we just take all instances of the schema as axioms. This does not give us the generalizations that we need, for example, so that the modus ponens receives the truth. FieldVsTarski: see above Section 3. 1. Here I showed a solution, but should have explained more.
Feferman/Field: Solution: (Feferman 1991) incorporates schema letters together with a rule for substitution. Then the domain expands automatically as the language expands.
Feferman: needs this for number theory and set theory.
Problem: expanding it to the T-theory, because here we need scheme letters inside and outside of quotation marks.
Field: my solution was to introduce an additional rule that allows to go from a scheme with all the letters in quotation marks to a generalization for all sentences.
Problem: we also need that for the syntax,... here, an interlinking functor is introduced in (TF) and (TFG). (see above).
II 142
TarskiVsField: his variant, however, is purely axiomatic. FieldVsTarski/FefermanVsTarski: Approach with scheme letters instead of pure axioms: Advantages:
1) We have the same advantage as Feferman for the schematic number theory and the schematic set theory: expansions of the language are automatically considered.
2) the use of ""p" is true iff. p" (now as a scheme formula as part of the language rather than as an axiom) seems to grasp the concept of truth better.
3) (most important) is not dependent on a compositional approach to the functioning of the other parts of language. While this is important, it is also not ignored by my approach.
FieldVsTarski: an axiomatic theory is hard to come by for belief sentences.
Putnam I 91
Correspondence Theory/FieldVsTarski: Tarski’s theory is not suited for the reconstruction of the correspondence theory, because fulfillment (of simple predicates of language) is explained through a list. This list has the form
"Electron" refers to electrons
"DNS" refers to DNS
"Gene" refers to genes. etc.
this is similar to
(w) "snow is white" is true iff....
(s)> meaning postulates)
Putnam: this similarity is no coincidence, because:
Def "True"/Tarski/Putnam: "true" is the zero digit case of fulfillment (i.e. a formula is true if it has no free variables and the zero sequence fulfills it).
Def Zero Sequence: converges to 0: E.g. 1; 1/4; 1/9; 1/16: ...
Criterion W/Putnam: can be generalized to the criterion F as follows: (F for fulfillment):
Def Criterion F/Putnam:
(F) an adequate definition of fulfilled in S must generate all instances of the following scheme as theorems: "P(x1...xn) is fulfilled by the sequence y1...yn and only if P(y1...yn).
Then we reformulate:
"Electron (x)" is fulfilled by y1 iff. y1 is an electron.
PutnamVsField: it would have been formulated like this in Tarskian from the start. But that shows that the list Field complained about is determined in its structure by criterion F.
This as well as the criterion W are now determined by the formal properties we desired of the concepts of truth and reference, so we would even preserve the criterion F if we interpreted the connectives intuitionistically or quasi intuitionistically.
Field’s objection fails. It is right for the realist to define "true" à la Tarski.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Bre I
E. Brendel
Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Meaning Theory McDowell, J. Avramides I 11
Meaning Theory/McDowell: Problem: if meaning is explained in terms of something else, this other must again be explained - thesis: indirect access via understanding - via general linguistic behavior - without the concept of analysis - instead representation of the relations between terms which we already presume to be understood - the concept of meaning does not occur.
I 12
Meaning/McDowell: instead of analysis: a clear representation (mapping) of the relations between terms that we assume have already been understood.
I 17
Understanding/Evans/McDowell: Thesis: Understanding should be perception of meaning, and a matter of conclusion. (63). Avramides: the alternative that Evans/McDowell offer is highly interesting. But as long as we have no argument against Grice, his position remains an option.
EMD II XIV
Meaning/McDowell: a truth theory is not sufficient for a meaning theory because of the possible equation of "snow is white" with "grass is green". - This is true, but not meaningful. - McDowell: Thesis: We also need psychological terms.
EMD II XV
Problem: then the propositional attitudes must be fixed as well as the meanings - >Radical interpretation.
EMD II XVI/XVII
Truth Theory/Meaning Theory/Evans/McDowell: if the thesis that truth in a truth theory is sufficient for meaning is to be upheld, then Radical Interpretation cannot be more than a way of saying whether a truth theory is true. (Nothing more!).

Avr I
A. Avramides
Meaning and Mind Boston 1989