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Externalism | Davidson Vs Externalism | I (d) 72 VsExternalism: In many cases, it is assumed that the externalism which refers to facts that lie outside the mind and may be unknown to the person concerned, cannot be reconciled with the authority of the first person. Putnam: meanings are not in the head, after all. The same is true for thoughts in general, in his opinion. (likewise Searle) DavidsonVs: This conclusion is not valid, at least not for my externalism. Which are the factors that determine the content of the thought of another person must be found out by the interpreter on the basis of indirect evidence, or suspected correctly. But because these factors determine both the content of this thought as well as the content of the thought that one believes to have, there is no room for errors regarding the content of one’s thoughts in the way they may arise for other thoughts. Frank I 660 DavidsonVsExternalism: those who believe that the contents of our thoughts are often determined by factors of which we know nothing, have of course noticed that if they were right, the Cartesianism of self-assurance and the Fregean notion of the thoughts that are thought completely must be wrong. But they have barely made an attempt to solve the conflict with the strong intuition that we do have the authority of the first person indeed. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Lewis, D. | Putnam Vs Lewis, D. | I Lanz 291 Functionalism/identity theory: common: recognition of causally relevant inner states. But functionalism Vsidentity theory: the substance is not what plays a causal role for the commitment. (PutnamVsLewis). --- VI 437 "Elite classes"/Nature/Natural Reference/world/language/Lewis/Putnam: thesis, there are certain classes of things "out there" (elite classes) which are intrinsically distinguished, whereby it is a "natural condition" for reference, (incorporated into nature), that as many of our concepts as possible should refer to these elite classes. This does not clearly determine the reference of our terms, because sometimes there are other desiderata, but so the language is "tied to the world". Löwenheim/Putnam: from my ((s) Löwenheim-) argument follows that all our beliefs and experiences would be the same and none of my critics has ever contested that. >Löwenheim/Putnam. N.B.: it follows that Lewis "natural conditions" were not brought in by our interests, but that they are something that works with our interests to fix reference. LewisVsLöwenheim/Putnam: Lewis' thesis boils down to that e.g., the class of cats longs to be designated but not the one of cats*. Reference/PutnamVsLewis: his idea of the elite classes does not solve the problem of reference, but even confuses the materialist picture, by introducing something spooky. >Reference/Lewis. PutnamVsLewis: this does not only affect reference but also justification, relations of simultaneous assertibility, (that something could remain true, while something other is no longer true). All this cannot be fixed by something psychological, by something "in the head". PutnamVsPhysicalism: it cannot say that they are fixed, without falling back into medieval speech of a "clear causal order." Physicalism cannot say how it would be fixed, without falling back into medieval speech. --- Schwarz I 149 "New Theory of Reference/PutnamVsLewis/KripkeVsLewis/Schwarz: Did Kripke and Putnam not prove that, what an expression refers to, has nothing to do with associated descriptions? Then it could be that we are referring with "pain" to a state that does not play the everyday psychological role, which is not caused by injuries, etc., but may play the role that we mistakenly attribute to "joy". Then people would typically smile with pain. Typical cause of pain would be the fulfillment of wishes. LewisVsPutnam: thinks this is nonsense. When a state plays the role of joy, it is joy. --- Putnam III 176 Possible Worlds/Lewis: I believe in what is claimed by permissible reformulations of my beliefs. Does one take the reformulation at face value, I believe in the existence of entities that could be called "ways, how things could have turned out". These entities, I call "possible worlds". (Realistic interpretation possible worlds.) PutnamVsLewis: "way" does not necessarily need to be interpreted as a different world. III 177 Possible Worlds/David Lewis: we already know what our world is all about, other worlds are things of the same kind, which do not differ in kind, but only by the processes that take place in them. We call our world, therefore the real world, because it is the world in which we live. Possible world/PutnamVsLewis: a possible "way" of world development could also be perceived as a property, not as a different world. This property could be (no matter how complicated) a feature that could correspond to the whole world. Possible World/PutnamVsLewis: if a "way of possible world development" would be a property (a "state description" of the whole world), and the Eiffel Tower would have a different height, then the property "is a world in which the Eiffel Tower is 150 meters high" must follow from the property that the Eiffel tower in our world is not 150 meters high. Lewis: claims, properties would have to be something simple, and the statement that a property follows from another, boils down to the assertion that there is a necessary relationship between various simple ones, and that is, as Lewis says, "incomprehensible". So the properties would have to be in turn interpreted as complexes. But Lewis is unable to see in how far properties could be complexes, because of what should they be made? III 178 PutnamVsLewis: Lewis has not answered here in the "analytical" style. He did not say normal things. I have no idea what is going on with the intuitive ideas claimed by Lewis, why something works intuitively and something else works incomprehensible. The argument that something simple cannot enter a relationship, is according to my impression far from possessing practical or spiritual significance. I find these intuitive ideas not only alien; I even feel I do not understand what it means. --- Putnam I (g) 187 Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/Lewis: Suggestion: analyze "cause" based on unreal conditional sentences: "If A had not happened, B would not have happened". Counterfactual conditional/PutnamVsLewis: there are situations in which it is simply not true that B would not have happened if A had not happened. I (g) 201 E.g. B could have been caused by another cause. E.g. Identical twins: it is so that both always have the same hair color. But the hair of one is not the cause of the other. Lewis cannot separate this. Counterfactual conditionals/unreal conditionals/truth conditions/Lewis/Stalnaker: Lewis follows Stalnaker and provides truth condition for unreal conditional clauses: for this he needs possible worlds and a similarity measure. Definition truth condition/Lewis: "If X would have happened, Y would have happened" is true if and only if Y, in all closest worlds where X is the case, is really true. PutnamVsLewis: an ontology, which requires parallel and possible worlds, is at least not a materialistic ontology. Besides it also sounds pretty much like science fiction. I (g) 188/189 The notion of an intrinsic similarity measure, i.e. a measure that is sensitive to the fact of what we deem relevant or normal, is again in such a way that the world is like a ghost or impregnated with something like reason. This then requires a metaphysical explanation and is therefore idealism. And objective idealism can hardly be "a bit true". "It is all physics, except that there is that similarity measure makes simply no sense. I (g) 189 Identity/nature/essence/Lewis: Proposal: the aggregation of molecules and "I" are identical for a period of time, similar to Highway 2 and Highway 16, which are identical for some time. VsLewis: but not every property of aggregation is a property of mine. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Metaphysical Realism | Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism | Millikan I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified. Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously. Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex COW Or by holding up another sign e.g. REFERENCES Or maybe CAUSES. To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning: The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head, ((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz). PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Ockham, W. of | Putnam Vs Ockham, W. of | VI 392 Reference/Ockham/Putnam: the problem of whether our words really refer to what we intend, can be traced back to Ockham: Term/Ockham: terms could be mental particulars (ED). That is, when signs particular, are "signs", then any term that we have of relation between sign and object, is in turn a sign. PutnamVsOckham: Problem: this relation cannot clearly be picked out (identified, individuated), by either holding up a sign that says, COW or another sign that says REFERS VI 393 or a sign that says, CAUSES Putnam: On the other hand, if terms are not particulars, then there is the obvious possibility (as long as it is "in the head") that there are ways of use of signs. Use theory/sign/Putnam: (pro) but does not pick out a unique relationship between the terms of T1 and "real objects". ((s) terms are seen here as "usages of signs".) Term/Putnam: if we think that terms are neither particulars (signs), nor ways of use, then we are left with the mysterious "grasping of forms". Brains in a vat/variant "all"/reference/skepticism/Putnam: supposing we are all brains in a vat. Question: how does it come that our term "vat" refers to noumenal vats and not to vats in which the image is shown to us? ((s) noumenal: here "real", "objective", "actual" vats). |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Putnam, H. | Nozick Vs Putnam, H. | II 339 Functionalism/NozickVsPutnam: f in addition we need the biological function of the physical states as realization of functional connections. Putnam: is right in that the defined material base is not important. But it does not follow that nothing is essential about the material basis! E.g. a marble rolling up and down in the head of a Martian would have the same functional connections as joke has for us. It does not follow that the Martian is in pain during this process! VsPutnam: two additional conditions: 1) the respective states under the functional isomorphism must have isomorphic internal structures themselves. 2) (which gives content to the first): these states have to play their role in a way that depends on its (isomorphic) internal structure. Mental State/Pain/Martian/Nozick: for the mental states to be the same as for us, the physical states must not only play the same role, but also be configured the same as ours (internally). (FN 47). If the internal configurations of the Martians are different from ours, although they should explain the same roles, then they are in other mental states. Nozick: nevertheless even Martians for whom all of this applies II 340 are still not in the same mental states if they do not have the same biological function as ours: to identify or bring about the abstract rational relations. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Putnam, H. | Cresswell Vs Putnam, H. | II 70 Meaning/In the head/Putnam/Kripke/CresswellVsKripke/CresswellVsPutnam: both only pretend to have shown that meanings are "not in your head". I myself do not know what does it actually meant by that. Therefore, I also do not know if my approach is incompatible with the two or not. --- II 71 Twin Earth/TE/Putnam: his example fits exactly into my semantics, i.e. it can be solved. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Putnam, H. | Millikan Vs Putnam, H. | I 328 natural kind/Putnam/Millikan: (Meaning of Meaning): thesis: at least in the case of concepts of natural kinds the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions. Meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings can not be in the head. I 329 Putnam/Millikan: his argument here is that of a realist. Meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that may determine the reference or the extension. natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to appearances concepts of natural kinds are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with that. Extension/Putnam: thesis: the extension of "water" and "Gold" is determined by a relation between the token of expression and the extension. MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he thinks erroneously that concepts of natural kinds would be indexical. Thereby no problem is solved, but only named. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Woodfield, A. | Davidson Vs Woodfield, A. | Frank I 672 DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather. I 673 Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself. I 674 DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus![]() |
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Meanings n. i.th. Head | Versus | Cresswell II 56 FodorVsPutnam: meanings are in the head! |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Meaning | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 56 Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: Thesis: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor: Problem: for an attribution of a thought I have to have the same representation in my head - it must be the same belief as the one he has - (see. above: meanings are not representations ). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 |
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