Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| McDowell, J. | Evans Vs McDowell, J. | McDowell I 85 Judgment / Evans: thinks that intuition and concept must be divided among experience and judgment. (McDowellVs). information system / Evans: its states are independent of beliefs. Beliefs cannot explain the contents of a perceptual experience, because it could be that you have no beliefs with an appropriate content! Belief / EvansVsMcDowell: should be understood in a more demanding way, namely as a judgment with reasons. This does not mean that they always explicitly arise in an active opinion-forming process. Beliefs are dispositions to judgments and judging is an act of spontaneity. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Shoemaker, S. | Evans Vs Shoemaker, S. | Frank I 540 Memory/Evans: There is also memory activity on a non-conceptual level: that of the information system (perception state). E.g. It seems that something was the case in this or that way. These are no freely floating images whose reference to the past is read into them by the subject. I 542 ShoemakerVsEvans: the impression that memory-based judgments about oneself are free of identification is based on a linguistic triviality: we would not say of a person whose information comes from someone else "he remembers". EvansVsShoemaker: but it is not true that the freedom of identification is a mere illusion: EvansVsStrawson: rather, he exposes himself to the accusation. Fra I 543 Of taking advantage of the linguistic phenomenon, when he tries to prove the freedom of identification in question looking at the extraordinary utterance "I remember clearly that this memory took place, but did it take place in me?". Memory/Shoemaker: Memory-based judgments depend on identification and are therefore not immune to misidentification: E.g. we can imagine that the apparent memories of a person were in reality causally derived from other people (false memory). E.g. complete duplicate of a person (clone). (s) too absurd to be a convincing example. Fra I 544 Shoemaker: "Quasi Memory": "Q memory". E.g. if there are such false memories, then it seems to make sense to say "someone stood before a burning tree, but was it me?" EvansVsShoemaker: even if this is possible, it does not follow that normal judgments must be based on an identification! It’s not about distinction: "someone stood ... I was the one". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 |
Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Information System | Evans, G. | McDowell I 72 Information System / Evans: Thesis: the system of abilities that we exercise when we gather information about the world through the use of our senses. (Non-conceptual.). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| |||