Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Beginning Sandel Brocker I 672
Beginning/Initial State/Criteria/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: what is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of a initial state for a society to be built in Rawls? Problem: there is already a certain philosophical anthropology underlying it, which presupposes that social relations, that intersubjectivity is not constitutive for the identity of subjects at all.(1)

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Difference Principle Rawls I 75
Difference principle/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: the difference principle eliminates the uncertainty of the efficiency principle (>Efficiency/Rawls, Pareto-Optimum/Rawls) by defining a position from which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure ((s) of a society to be built) can be assessed. Assuming the institutional framework of Liberal equality (see Equality/Rawls) and fairness of opportunity, the expectations of the better-offs are fair if and only if they are part of a scheme that improves the expectations of the most disadvantaged members.
I 76
The difference principle states that equal distribution of goods is preferable, as long as a different distribution does not favour both sides (better and worse) at the same time.
I 77
RawlsVsUtilitarianism: Classical utilitarianism is indifferent to how a constant sum of benefits is distributed. It only calls for equality up to a certain threshold.
I 78
Difference Principle/Special Cases/Rawls: 1. Special Case: If the expectation of the worst-off person cannot be improved, no change in the income situation of a better-off person can bring about an improvement in the situation of the worse-off person.
2. Special case: occurs when the expectations of all those who are better off at least contribute to the prosperity of those who are worse off. This means that when their expectations fall, those of the less well-off fall as well. However, the maximum has not yet been reached.
I 79
Inequality/Rawls: how unfair a (distribution) scheme is depends on how excessive the expectations of the better-offs are and to what extent they depend on violations of the other principles of justice and fair equal opportunities. Difference principle/Rawls: is a maximization principle. We must make a strict distinction between cases where it works and cases where it does not (see Special Cases 1 and 2 above).
The difference principle is compatible with the principle of efficiency.
Democracy/Rawls: a democratic constitution is not consistent with the efficiency principle alone, if it is understood in such a way that only changes that improve the situation of all people are allowed. Reason: Justice...
I 80
...requires some changes that are not efficient in this sense. Difference principle/justice: since the distribution in an initial state can never be exactly determined, it does not play a decisive role if the difference principle is applied.
Chain connection/prosperity/company/Rawls: we assume a chain connection, i. e. if the expectation of the worst-offs is raised by a measure, then this will also apply to all positions between these and the best placed persons. However, if there are breakages, those who are in such a position have no right of veto against the improvements for those who are worse off.
I 82
Difference principle/Rawls: does not depend on contingent actual deviations from the chain connection, which rarely works perfectly anyway. Problem: we assume close-kitness of the chain connection, but in many cases an improvement of the better-offs may have no effect at all on the situation of the worse-off. More entries on >Difference principle.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Fairness Rawls I 108
Fairness/Principles/Rawls: our principles of justice concerned institutions and the basic structure of a society. When it comes to individuals, the principle of fairness is relevant. ---
I 110
Individuals/Principles: this is, among other things, about what obligations we have. However, a certain basic structure of a company to be established is assumed from the outset. Rawls: here it can be interpreted without major distortions in such a way that the duties and tasks presuppose a moral conception of institutions, and that the content of equitable institutions must therefore be determined before demands can be made on individuals.
---
I 111
Right/legality/conformity/Rawls: intuitively, we can say that the notion of being right is synonymous with one's being consistent with those principles which, in a society's initial state, would be recognised as being applied to the relevant problems. If we accept that, we can equate fairness with rightness.
Individuals/fairness: first of all, we must distinguish between obligations and natural duties.
Principle of fairness: requires a person to fulfil his obligations as established by an institution, under two conditions. 1) The institution is fair, i. e. the institution fulfils the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls).
---
I 112
2) The arrangement has been voluntarily approved. This means that those who have agreed have a right to expect this from others who benefit from this arrangement(1). It is wrong to assume that justice as fairness or contract theories would generally follow that people have an obligation to unjust regimes.
VsLocke/Rawls: Locke in particular was wrongly criticized for this: the necessity of further background assumptions was overlooked(2).


(1) See H.L.A. Hart „Are There Any Natural Rights?“, Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, (1955) p. 185f.
(2) See Locke's thesis that conquest does not create justice: Locke, Second treatise of Government, pars. 176, 20.)

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Generational Justice Rawls I 128
Generational Justice/Rawls: it is a question of whether the persons in an assumed initial state of a society to be established have duties and obligations towards third parties, in particular their direct descendants. However, the principle of justice as fairness does not want to derive its principles from such considerations. Nevertheless, I assume that although the individuals do not consider their own life span in continuity, their goodwill will extend over at least two generations. ---
I 208
Generational Justice/Rawls: since the members of society have an interest in securing equal rights of freedom for their descendants, there is no conflict over the choice of the principle of equal freedoms. For example, a son could not argue that the father neglected his interests if he accepted the principle of equal freedoms. The father would have to argue to the detriment of others if they departed from it that these other benefits would arise when they grow up. ---
I 284
Generational Justice/Rawls: this question challenges every ethical theory. It depends on how the minimum social standards are defined. ---
I 286
Social minimum standards/Rawls: there are two problems here: a) there is not enough to save or b) taxation gets too strong when the minimum is raised. Then the situation of the worst-off starts to deteriorate. The question of the savings rate has often been discussed(1)(2)(3)(4)(5).
---
I 287
Generational Justice/Rawls: The conclusion is that the greater benefits of future generations will be sufficiently great to compensate for the present victims. This can be true simply because future generations have better technology at their disposal. RawlsVsUtilitarianism: this forces us to impose greater sacrifices on the poorer people for the later ones, who may be better off as a result of other circumstances.
However, this counting up between generations does not make as much sense as between contemporaries.
Contract theory/contract doctrine/Rawls: it considers the problem from the perspective of the initial situation of a society to be established. Here, the participants do not know to which generation they belong if they are to decide on the form of the company and its structure. Now they should ask themselves how much they are prepared to save if everyone else does the same. In doing so, they should establish a principle of fair saving that applies to all.
---
I 288
Only the relatives of the very first generation do not benefit from this, but no one knows to which generation they belong. ---
I 289
However, the principle of fair saving does not force us to continue saving forever. Details have to be clarified at a later point of time. Each generation has its own appropriate goals. Generations are no more subject to each other than individuals. No generation has special demands.
---
I 290
Savings/Savings Rate/Prosperity/Rawls: the last stage does not have to be one of abundance. The principle of justice does not require previous generations to save money so that later generations will have more. Rather, saving is about enabling a fair society and equal freedoms to become more effective. If more is saved, it is for other purposes. It would be a misunderstanding to think that the realisation of a good and fair society must wait until a high standard of living has been achieved. ---
I 291
Generational Justice/Alexander Herzen/Rawls: Herzen thesis: human development is a kind of chronological unfairness, because the later ones benefit from the work of the former without paying the same price(6). Generational fairness/Kant: he saw it as strange that earlier generations would bear their burden only for the benefit of later generations and that they would be the only ones who would be lucky enough to be allowed to live in a finished building(7).


(1) See A. K. Sen „On Optimizing the Rate of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 71, 1961.
(2) J. Tobin, National Economic Policiy, New Haven, 1966, ch. IX.
(3) R.M. Solow, Growth Theory, New York, 1970, ch. V.
(4) Frank P. Ramsey, „A Mathematical Theory of Saving“, Economic Journal, Vol. 38, 1928, reprinted in Arrow and Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics.
(5) T.C. Koomans, „On the Concept of Optimal Economic Growth“ (1965), In: Scientific Papers of T. C. Kopmans, Berlin, 1970.
(6) Quote from Isaiah Berlin’s Einführung zu Franco Venturi, Roots of Revolution, New York, 1960 p. xx.
(7) Kant: „Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose“, quoted from Hans Reiss (ed.) Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge, 1970, p. 44.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Indeterminacy Rawls I 201
Indeterminacy/form of society/political process/Rawls: in the initial state of a society to be established, it is not necessarily clear which constitutional form is to be preferred. Then justice itself is, in a way, indeterminate. Institutions within a certain range of possibilities are equally fair, including laws and policies. This indeterminacy is not a deficiency. We should be expecting it. Solution: the theory of justice as fairness/Rawls.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Law Kant Brocker I 670
Law/Justification/Kant: Kant's conception of the law is based on the assumption of a transcendental subject whose capacity for moral autonomy lies in the fact that it is not part of the world of appearances determined by natural laws and can therefore orient itself on the idea of generalizability, instead of acting on the basis of its tendencies, urges and desires. Transcendental Subject/Kant: has a purely formal character in that it neither pursues certain content purposes nor has preferences.
Subjectivity/Kant: this subjectivity is free and yet individualized, as each transcendental subject relates purely to itself as a being of freedom.
RawlsVsKant: Rawls tries to reformulate Kant without these "metaphysical" (more precisely transcendental philosophical) prerequisites.
Brocker I 671
SandelVsRawls: Rawls's attempt fails because Rawls implicitly has to base his theory on a theory of the "self" that is not substantially different from Kant's theory. Kant's theory and deontological liberalism cannot be saved from the difficulties that the Kantian subject brings with it (1) Transcendental Subject/Rawls: Rawl's "veil of ignorance" in an assumed initial state of a society to be established, in which people do not know what role they will play later, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 14.


Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018



Höffe I 304
Law/Ultimate Justification/Kant/Höffe: [Kant declares] metaphysical convictions themselves indispensable for a theory of law and state, if it wants to be philosophical.
Höffe I 306
Kant divides his moral system, the metaphysics of morals, into two parts: the doctrine of law as the epitome of what humans owe one another, and the doctrine of virtue as the epitome of meritorious extra work. For both he represents a general law of moral rank. In contrast to the general law of virtue, the general law of rights does not depend on the inner motive force, which is why one must obey the law of rights, but not make obeying it the maxim of one's action. The external action is sufficient for morality of the right, provided that it is considered in relation to the external actions of other persons, that is, for Kant: other sane beings.
What counts for the law is only the external cohabitation, which in moral terms must submit to a strictly general law: "Act outwardly in such a way that the free use of your arbitrariness with the freedom of everyone according to a general law could exist together"(1).
Coercion/Law/Kant: To the mere concept of law, Kant shows conclusively, belongs a power of coercion. Here, in contrast to a philosophical anarchism, Kant denies the view that there should be any coercion between people.
KantVsLocke: The morally permissible coercion does not, however, include the right to punish as in Locke's natural state; it is only the right to defend oneself against injustice. One may, for example, prevent a theft or retrieve the stolen goods, but one may neither injure the thief nor take more than what was stolen. >Property/Kant, >Rule of Law/Kant, >State/Kant.


1.Kant, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre § C
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Racism Rawls I 149
Racism/theory of justice as fairness/Rawls: in the theory of justice as fairness, a hypothetical initial state of a society to be established is assumed, in which the persons are behind a veil of ignorance that does not allow them to know what positions they will take in the structure later on. In this situation it is clear that racism and sexual discrimination are not only unfair but also irrational. Not only are they not moral conceptions, but they are simply a means of oppression. ---
I 150
However, this is not a question of definition, but rather a consequence of the conditions of the initial situation of a society to be established, in particular from the conditions of rationality. The fact that legal concepts have a certain content and exclude arbitrariness is a consequence of the theory.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Rationality Rawls I 143
Rationality/Rawls: our view here is broadly in line with the standard model in social theory(1)(2). The rational person/Rawls: be a person with a coherent set of preferences between options open to him/her. The person assesses the options with a view to his/her purposes. The person follows the plan that fulfils most of his/her wishes and has the better chances of success. Rawls: in addition, I rule out resentment.
---
I 145
Initial state of a society to be established/Rawls: here we must assume that the persons involved have a sense of justice and the compliance of their principles and can expect this from others. They will know that agreements are not in vain. ---
I 418
Rationality/Rawls: the duration of a rational consideration must be taken into account, so that it becomes irrational at some point to look for the best plan. It is rational to follow a satisfactory plan if the expected results of further consideration do not compensate for the disadvantages of the loss of time. This assumes that a person has a certain decision-making competence with regard to his or her own situation when making rational decisions. ---
I 422
The guiding principle for a rational individual in the pursuit of his or her plans should be that he or she will never have to blame himself or herself for the way in which these plans are ultimately realized. As an identical individual in time, it must be able to say that it has done in every moment what requires or at least allowed a weighing of the reasons(3)(4).

(1) Cf. Amartya Sen, Cellective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco, 1970.
(2) K. J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd. Ed. New York, 1963.
(3) See Charles Fried, Anatomy of Values, (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 158-169.
(4) Th. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford, 1970), esp. ch. VIII.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Rawls Sandel Brocker I 673
Rawls/Subject/Individual/Metaphysics/Subjectivity/Individuality/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Sandel criticizes Rawl's conception of an assumed starting point for a society to be built (see Veil of Ignorance/Rawls, Reflective Equilibrium/Rawls, Veil of Ignorance/Sandel): 1. Rawls fails to achieve his own goal of reconstructing Kant's practical philosophy free of metaphysics and without reformulating the subject's specific theory. On the contrary, Rawls presupposes a specific theory of the subject ("mutual disinterest", subjectivity and identity independent of the subject's goals and purposes). (1) (See Subjectivity/Sandel).
2. this leads to an impoverishment of the possibilities of human self-conception in the political community. (2)
3. with this, the approach of Rawls is simply wrong, because people cannot understand each other in this way at all. (3)
4. The concept of Rawls' initial state is in contradiction to other elements of his theory, especially to the principle of difference (see Difference Principle/Rawls) and to his contract theory. (See Contract Theory/Rawls). See also Difference Principle/Sandel, Rawls/Nozick.


1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), S. 65
2. Ibid. p. 177
3. Ibid. p. 65.

Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Roles Rawls I 96
Roles/social positions/society/Rawls: the roles in a community to be established will necessarily result in unequal opportunities for shaping. We use our two principles to prevent injustice:
I 61
1. everyone must have the right to fundamental freedom 2. inequalities must be managed in such a way that they are to everyone's advantage, different positions must in principle be capable of being held by everyone.
I 96
Positions: in most cases: 1. equal civil rights, 2. the position defined by income and prosperity. Representative members are then those who represent different levels of prosperity.
I 97
Roles: the > href="https://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=1039282&a=$a&first_name=John&author=Rawls&concept=Difference%20Principle">difference principle helps us to establish representative roles for income classes. Problem: the least privileged groups. Here we have to proceed arbitrarily, for example accepting unskilled workers. Or people who have less than half of the median income at their disposal(1).
I 99
In cases of conflict, the interests of a more general viewpoint outweigh the interests of a more individual position. This also applies, for example, when the advantages and disadvantages of free trade are weighed against protectionism. ---
I 100
The relevant social positions then specify the general standpoint from which the two principles of justice are judged on the basic structure ((s) the initial state of a society to be established, in which the roles are not yet distributed according to Rawls). The principles ensure that no one benefits from natural coincidences except for the benefit of others.

(1) See M. J. Bowman about the Fuchs criterion in "Poverty in an Affluent Socienty", in: Contemporary Economic Issues, ed. N. W. Chamberlain, Homewood, Illinois, 1969.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Social Goods Rawls I 92
Public goods/social goods/Rawls: primary social goods are rights and freedoms, opportunities and powers, income and prosperity. These goods are social because of their connection with the basic structure of a society; freedoms and powers are defined by the rules of the larger institutions; income distribution and prosperity are regulated by them. Rawls: The theory of common goods goes back to Aristotle and is shared by such diverse authors as Kant and Sidgwick. It is also controversial between utilitarianism and contract theory.
---
I 93
Goods/Rawls: a good is the fulfilment of a rational interest. We can assume that a rational individual has a plan that can fulfill different desires without mutual interference. Defining rational plan/Rawls: be a plan that cannot be improved. I. e. there is no other plan that is preferred.
Definition primary goods/Rawls: are those that all need, even if their plans differ.
For example, intelligence, prosperity and opportunities are means of achieving goals that a person could not achieve by other means. In the initial state (of a society to be established), where people do not yet know what role they will play, these goods are what they know they are striving for.
Problem: to create an index of available primary social and natural resources. Our principles, when processed in lexical order (see Principles/Rawls), help to do this.
---
I 266
Public goods/Rawls: are above all indivisible and open to the public(1). If citizens want to benefit from this, it must be set up in such a way that everyone benefits to the same extent. National defense, for example. ---
I 267
This means that public goods have to be steered by the political process and not by the market. Problems: special problems arise for public goods:
1. the free-rider problem(2): There is a temptation not to do one's own part of the duties, because this amount does not have a noticeable effect on the overall result. For the individual, the contribution of others always appears to have already been made. Therefore, the state must take over the regulation of the corresponding public goods(3).
---
I 268
2. Characteristic of public goods: Externality. The production of these goods is also at the expense of those who never profit from them. Not all wishes are taken into account. For example, someone who gets vaccinated helps others as well as himself, even if he will never be exposed to this infection. For example, environmental damage is not normally regulated by the market. For example, raw materials may be produced at a much lower cost than their marginal social costs. Here there is a difference between private and social accounting that the market does not register. In this case, the indivisibility of public goods (e. g. infrastructure, freedoms, etc.) requires the state to take over the regulation. Problem: even in a society of fair people, the isolation of individual decisions does not lead to the fulfilment of the general interest.
---
I 270
Economic form: the proportion of public goods in the economy as a whole is independent of the economic form - be it socialist or private - because the proportion of social resources spent on their production is independent of the question of the ownership of the means of production.

(1) See J. M. Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Chicago, 1968, ch. IX.
(2) Buchanan, ch. V; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, MA, 1965, ch. I, II.
(3) See W.J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State, London, 1952, ch. I, VII-IX, XII.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Terminology Rawls I 10
Justice as Fairness/Rawls: that is what I call the assumption that free and rational people pursuing their own interests would accept a starting point of equality that determines the basic conditions of their community. ---
I 11
Definition Veil of Non-Knowledge/Rawls: One of the essential features of the initial situation is that one does not know one's place in society, one's social status, one's assets or talents, intelligence, strength, etc. We assume that the parties do not know their terms of good or their specific psychological tendencies. Behind this veil the principles of justice are laid down. This ensures that nobody is favored or disadvantaged by naturally given or social coincidences when choosing the principles. This is to ensure the symmetry in the relations of all against all others and also that the initial state is recognized by all as fair.
---
I 18
Definition Reflexive Equilibrium/Principles/Rawls: we begin with as weak a premise as possible, which should however be so strong as to provide a suitable (significant) set of principles(1). Then we go back and forth until premises and principles are curtailed and adapted. This equilibrium is not necessarily stable. ---
I 19
Principles: I do not claim that the proposed principles are necessary truths, the premises are not self-evident. They derive their justification from mutual support through a variety of considerations.

(1) This is not limited to Moral Philosophy: see N. Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast, Cambridge, Mass., 1955.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Veil of Ignorance Rawls I 136
Veil of Ignorance/society/Rawls: this is about excluding contingent peculiarities when establishing a new form of society. To this end, the parties are to remain behind a veil of ignorance in the >initial situation of a society to be established, with regard to alternatives concerning their own individual case.
I 137
This is intended to ensure that the principles in question are chosen on the basis of general considerations. Certain facts are said to be unknown: No one knows their place in society, class affiliation or social status, or their endowment with goods, intelligence, strength, and so on. Even his individual psychology, such as his propensity to optimism or pessimism, risk appetite or affiliation to a certain generation.
On the other hand, general facts about human society should be known: people understand political problems and economic theory, social organization and the laws of the human psyche.
I 138
There should be no restrictions on general information, i. e. on general laws and theories. ((s) Rawls assumes here that there are psychological laws, especially laws of moral psychology. (DavidsonVsRawls: VsPsychological Laws: see Anomalous Monism/Davidson). Initial Condition/problems/Rawls: it must be clarified that proposals belong to the range of permissible alternatives and general consequences of proposed principles must be known.
I 139
The initial state is not a general assembly, that would be too much of a strain on the imagination. On the other hand, it is important that it does not matter who accepts the perspective of the initial state or when he does it. This is what the veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee: the information available should be relevant but always the same. VsRawls: one can argue that the veil is irrational. RawlsVsVs: it is about ensuring that everyone can be convinced by the same arguments. Then people's points of view can be picked out by chance, the other people will behave in the same way. In addition, it is possible to accept an arbitrator who declares a ban on coalition, but this is superfluous if one assumes that the consultations of the parties are the same. Since no one has any further information, he cannot adjust the situation to his personal advantage.
I 140
The only exception: an egoist could basically refuse to make his savings available to posterity. He could decide to do that without having any further information. The question of intergenerational justice must therefore be tackled elsewhere.
I 141
Unanimity/conformity: in the initial state it is not a matter of agreement on concrete random facts (which are not known anyway). Otherwise, only trivial problems could be solved.
I 142
Through the veil of Ignorance, the two principles of justice (see Principles/Rawls) are preferred to the criterion of usefulness.
I 143
Rationality/Initial state: even in the initial state, where individuals have only general information, we assume that they strive to have more of it than less in relation to primary public goods (e. g. freedoms, infrastructure, etc.).
I 166
Veil of Ignorance/Rawls: there is no problem with the assumption that newcomers arriving at the initial situation, which of course have less information. The veil of ignorance erases every basis for distinguishing different levels of information.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Veil of Ignorance Sandel Brocker I 672
Veil of Ignorance/SandelVsRawls/Sandel: Rawl's "Veil of Ignorance" in an assumed >initial state of a society to be built, in which people do not know what role they will later play, is an attempt to reconstruct Kant's transcendental subject without metaphysical assumptions. See Veil of Ignorance/Rawls. SandelVsRawls: Problem: How do the conditions of the original state come about if they are not the result of transcendental philosophical reflection on the non-empirical conditions of the possibility of freedom, as in Kant?
Rawls: assumes a "mutual disinterest" of people in their original state.
Sandel: Question: What is the criterion for "plausibility" or "reasonability" that underlies this construction of an initial state? (1) See Beginning/Sandel, Intersubjectivity/Sandel.
Brocker I 675
SandelVsRawls: behind the veil of ignorance there is no negotiation at all, since the subjects assumed by Rawls have no different interests at all. The "conclusion of a contract" is therefore not based on a free agreement but - in the Kantian sense of the word - on the realization that implies such a conceived practical subjectivity in terms of principles of justice from the outset. (2) See Contract Theory/Sandel.

1. Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge/New York 1998 (zuerst 1982), p. 48.
2. Ibid. p. 130, 132.
Markus Rothhaar, “Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018

Sand I
Michael Sandel
The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 1984


Brocker I
Manfred Brocker
Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018