Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Dennett, D. Searle Vs Dennett, D. Dennett I 558
Intentionality/SearleVsDennett: cannot be reached by the composition of equipment or the construction of ever-improving algorithms. DennettVsSearle: this is the belief in sky hook: the Spirit shall not be created, it is not designed, but only (unexplained) source of design.
SearleVsDennett: the view that one can look for "floating grounds" for a selection process for the mind, is a caricature of Darwinian thinking.

Searle I 179
We can understand the concept of an unconscious mental state only so that it was about a real content of consciousness. Def "compound principle": the idea that all unconscious intentional states in principle consciousness are accessible.
1. SearleVsDennett: there is a difference between intrinsic intentionality and as if intentionality. If one wanted to give up this difference, one would have to accept the fact that everything is about something mental, because relative to any purpose can be anything and everything treated as if it were something intellectual.
E.g. Running water could be described as if it had intentionality: it is trying to get down, by visiting clever way the line of least resistance, it processes information, the calculated size of rocks, etc .. (> laws of nature). But if water is something mental, then everything is something mental.
2. Unconscious intentional states are intrinsic.
I 180
3. intrinsic intentional states, conscious or unconscious, always have an aspect shape. Someone may want a glass of drinking water without wanting to drink a glass of H2O. There is an indefinite number of true descriptions of the evening star or a glass of water, but if someone wants a glass of water, this will only happen under certain aspects and not others.
I 181
4. The aspects feature can not be exhaustively or fully characterized alone with the help of third person predicates. There is always an inference gap gape between the epistemological reasons that we can gain from the behavior that the aspect is present, and the ontology of the aspect itself. A person may well create a behavior of the water searching on the day, but each such conduct will also be a search of H2O. There is no way exclude the second.
I 182
E.g. assumed we would have a brain o Skop to look into the skull of a person, and see that she wants water, but no H2O, then still a conclusion would play a part! We then would still have a law-like link that puts us in a position to conclude from our observations of the neural architecture that in this case the desire for water, but not the desire for H2O is realized. The neurophysiological facts are always causally sufficient for any amount of mental facts.
5. But the ontology of unconscious mental states is solely in the existence of purely neurophysiological phenomena.
E.g. we imagine someone fast asleep and dreamless. Now it is so that he believes that the capital of Colorado is Denver. Now, the only facts that may exist while he is completely unconscious are neurophysiological facts.
I 183
That seems to be a contradiction: the ontology of unconscious intentionality consists entirely of objective, neurophysiological third person phenomena, yet these states have an aspect shape. This contradiction is resolved when we consider the following: 6. The concept of an unconscious intentional state is the concept of a state which is a possible conscious thought.
7. The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective characteristics of the brain that are capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
I 184
The existence of causal features is compatible therewith that their causal powers may be blocked in each case due to confounding factors. An unconscious intentional state may be such that it could simply not be brought to consciousness by the person concerned. However, it must be a thing of the kind that, in principle, can be brought to consciousness. Mentalism: the naive mentalism leads to a kind of dispositional analysis of unconscious mental phenomena. The idea of a dispositional theory of mind has been introduced precisely for the purpose of getting rid of the appeal to the consciousness. (> Dispositions/Ryle).

III 156
Rule/VsSearle: one might say, "is it not simply so, "as if" we followed the rules?" As if/intentionality/Searle: "As if-Intentionality" explains nothing if there is no real intentionality. She has no causal power.
SearleVsDennett: it is as empty as the "intentional attitude".

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005