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Externalism | Davidson Vs Externalism | I (d) 72 VsExternalism: In many cases, it is assumed that the externalism which refers to facts that lie outside the mind and may be unknown to the person concerned, cannot be reconciled with the authority of the first person. Putnam: meanings are not in the head, after all. The same is true for thoughts in general, in his opinion. (likewise Searle) DavidsonVs: This conclusion is not valid, at least not for my externalism. Which are the factors that determine the content of the thought of another person must be found out by the interpreter on the basis of indirect evidence, or suspected correctly. But because these factors determine both the content of this thought as well as the content of the thought that one believes to have, there is no room for errors regarding the content of one’s thoughts in the way they may arise for other thoughts. Frank I 660 DavidsonVsExternalism: those who believe that the contents of our thoughts are often determined by factors of which we know nothing, have of course noticed that if they were right, the Cartesianism of self-assurance and the Fregean notion of the thoughts that are thought completely must be wrong. But they have barely made an attempt to solve the conflict with the strong intuition that we do have the authority of the first person indeed. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Fodor, J. | Rorty Vs Fodor, J. | I 245 Representation/RortyVsFodor: he confuses a meaning of "representation", which may be accurate or inaccurate, with a different meaning for which this would not apply. I 256 Compliance/Seeing/Correspondence/Behavior/Ryle: here, you have to be satisfied with the phrase "he sees it". Nothing "para-mechanical" can improve our understanding of perceptual recognition. FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectation system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent from the physical uniformities of stimuli among themselves! RyleVsVs/Rorty: might answer that it is this complexity that makes it look as if there is a problem here. Maybe it's just the idea of the little man in the head, which makes us ask the question: "how is it done?". I 257 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for recognizing similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe ever be abstract? Presumably, that we need to be able to find out similarities. But then we do not need the notion of a "not abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this! Infinite: E.g. Rorty: the potential qualitative variations of the contents of a pack of chocolate chip cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: So if we talk about "complicated expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires postulating additional control systems, or they are not learned! Either 1) infinite recourse, because what applies to recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back with Ryle: people have an innate ability. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".) I 277 Mentalese/A Priori/Fodor/RortyVsFodor: Fodor's thesis that the discovery of the language of thought will be a lengthy empirical process, implies that we can at any time be wrong about it, i.e. we may be wrong about something a priori. (>contingent a priori/Kripke). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Fodor, J. | Cresswell Vs Fodor, J. | II 53 Meaning/CresswellVsFodor: Cannot be a representation of any kind. Although this is a strong tradition in linguistics, cognitive psychology, and AI (artificial intelligence research). propositional attitude/Fodor (Fodor, 1981, 177-203, 177): These propositional attitudes must be understood as relations between organisms and internal representations. Cresswell: This can be construed in two ways. For this I use the attitude verb "to say". --- II 54 CresswellVsFodor: his focus on belief may have obscured his view to the fact that there are two different problems with propositional attitudes Object/Fodor/Cresswell: when Fodor speaks about objects of propositional attitudes he does not say that in the semantic sense (meaning as an object) but rather in the sense that the objects of indirect speech are the sentences that have been expressed if the whole sentence is true. CresswellVsFodor: interpreted semantically, his thesis is wrong. Fodor/Cresswell: but he is right in that if (1) Is true, there is a relation that exists between an organism and a representation. But that’s then an external one, not an internal one. Fodor: for him it is about psychology, not to semantics. I.e. it is about what goes on in the activity of discourse (parallel to the speech act theory). In particular, he is concerned with beliefs and desires. --- II 55 Paul ChurchlandVsFodor: (1981) Fodor/Cresswell: so for him it is so about how the expression is related to the rest of the behavior. That’s a very different approach than that of semantics. Semantics/Meaning/that sentence/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: (semantic approach) to learn the meaning of an attribution of propositional attitudes it’s not about the behavior nor about what is going on in Ambrose’s head. If this were the question, it would have to be about the spirit of the speaker of the whole sentence (1). Vs: but even that is not plausible, because we want the meaning of (1), Regardless of who uses it! CresswellVsFodor: because it is so much about the subject for him, he obscures the distinction between the semantic question of the meaning and the psychological one of the organism that has an attitude. Contents/Object/propositional attitudes/Cresswell: the distinction between content and object of an attitude is important, because there may be many different objects (sentences) whose content is the same. ((s) a belief may be expressed differently than in indirect speech). Mentalese/propositional attitudes/Fodor: Thesis: a belief is a sentence in the thought language of the speaker. CresswellVsFodor: Problem: then the original speaker and the speaker of the the attribution would have to have the same sentence in Mentalese in their internal system; E.g. (2) Beatrice believed what Callum said Causal role/Fodor/CresswellVsFodor: Fodor is interested in the causal role that faith and desires play in behavior. This understands in terms of the manipulation of formulas in a mental code. Patricia ChurchlandVsFodor: (1980) this does not account for semi-conscious and unconscious attitudes. --- II 56 Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: What entities would that be that would have to occur in a causal explanation? Mentalese/CresswellVsFodor: Suppose meanings were internal representations. Problem: (3) Can be said by different people on different occasions, but must then have the same meaning! If we do not assume this, there is no problem at all with propositional attitudes/Cresswell: Problem: how the meaning of an attribution sentence of propositional attitudes is based on the embedded sentence. ((s) That means how the original meaning is preserved with non-verbal substitutions and different contexts). CresswellVsFodor: If meanings were really in your head (as representations), then e.g. the same representation that Fodor has when he says (4) meanings are in the head and must also be in my head when I utter (3) ((s) the total set). Then Fodor’s object of belief is in my head! That would not have to be a problem, but: Causal role/CresswellVsFodor: Problem: How can the representation in my head play a causal role in Fodor’s head? VsVs: you could say that’s unfair. Because his object is still in his head. CresswellVsFodor: But that does not help, because if (3) Is really true, then the belief that I attribute to him must be exactly the same as the one he has. --- II 159 Content/Representation/CresswellVsFodor: I’m not at all convinced that representations are involved in content of propositional attitudes. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Leibniz, G.W. | Millikan Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 261 VsLeibniz/VsLeibniz' law/principle/identity/indistinguishability/the indistinguishable/Millikan: the classic objection VsLeibniz is to point out the possibility that the universe might be perfectly symmetrical, in which case there would be a perfectly identical ((S) indistinguishable) individual at another place. ((S) That is, there would be something indistinguishable from x, which would still not be identical to x, against Leibniz principle). Variants: Ex a time-repetitive universe etc. Ex two identical drops of water, two identical billiard balls at various locations. Property/Leibniz: thesis: a reference to space and time leads to a property that is not purely qualitative. Millikan: if one disregards such "impure" properties ((S) does not make a reference to space and time), the two billiard balls have the same properties! VsLeibniz' principle/law/R. M. Adams/Millikan: thesis: the principle that is used when constructing such symmetrical worlds, is the principle that an individual can not be distinguished (separated) from themselves, therefore, the two halves of the world can not be one and the same half. Leibniz' law/VSVS/Hacking/Millikan: (recent defense of Hacking): The objections do not respond to the fact that there could be a curved space instead of a duplication. Curved space/Hacking/Millikan: here emerges one and the same thing again, there is no duplication as in Euclidean geometry. MillikanVsHacking: but that would not answer the question. I 262 But there are still two interesting options: Leibniz' law/principle/identity/ indistinguishability/Millikan: 1. symmetrical world: it could be argued that there is simply no fact here, which determines whether space is curved or doubled. ((s)> Nonfactualism). Pointe: this would imply that Leibniz's principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary, and that its validity is only a matter of convention. 2. Symmetrical world: one could say that the example does not offer a general solution, but rather the assumption of a certain given symmetrical world: here, there would very much be a fact, whether the space is curved or not. Because a certain given space can not be both! Pointe: then the Leibniz principle is neither metaphysical nor logically necessary. Pointe: but in this case this is then no matter of convention, but a real fact! MillikanVsAdams/MillikanVsArmstrong/Millikan: neither Adams nor Armstrong consider that. Curved space/Millikan: what is identical is then necessarily identical ((S) because it is only mirrored). Here the counterfactual conditional would apply: if one half would have been different, then the other one, too. Here space generally seems to be double. Duplication/Millikan: when the space is mirrored (in Euclidean geometry) the identity is random, not necessary. Here one half could change without the other half changing. ((S) No counterfactual conditional). Identity: is given when the objects are not indistinguishable because a law in situ applies, but a law of nature, a naturally necessary agreement. I 263 Then identity of causality applies in the second option. (X) (y) {[NN (F) ⇔ Fx Fy] ⇔ x = y} Natural necessity/notation: naturally necessary under naturally possible circumstances. MillikanVsVerifikationismus: if my theory is correct, it must be wrong. Truth/world/relationship/Millikan: thesis: ultimately, meaningfulness and truth lie in relations between thought and the world. I 264 Therefore, they can not be in the head, we can not internalize them. I 268 Properties/Millikan: thesis: Properties (of one or more parts) that fall into the same area, are properties that are opposites of each other. Certainly, an area can contain another area. Ex "red" includes "scarlet" instead of excluding it and Ex "being two centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" includes "being 2.05 centimeters plus minus 1 millimeter" rather than excluding this property. The assumption that two properties may be the same only if the complete opposite regions from which they come coincide, implies that the identity of a property or property area is linked to the identity of a wider range from which it comes, and therefore is bound to the identity of their opposites. Now we compare Leibniz' view with that of Aristotle: Identity/Leibniz/Millikan: all single properties are intrinsically comparable. However, perhaps not comparable in nature, because God has just created the best of all possible worlds - but they would be metaphysically comparable. complex properties/Leibniz/Millikan: that would be properties that are not comparable. They also include absences or negations of properties. They have the general form "A and not B". ((S) Comparison/comparability/comparable/Millikan/(S): composite properties are not comparable Ex "A and not B".) Of course, it is incompatible with the property "A and B". Pointe: thus the metaphysical incompatibility rests on the logical incompatibility. That is, on the contradiction. I 269 Necessity/Leibniz/Millikan: then God has first created logical necessity and later natural necessity. ("In the beginning…"). opposite properties/opposite/property/Leibniz/Millikan: according to Leibniz opposite properties are of two kinds: 1. to attribute both contradictory properties to one thing then would be to contradict oneself ((S) logically) or 2. the contradiction between the properties would lie in their own nature. But that would not lie in their respective nature individually but would be established by God, which prevented the properties from ever coming together. MillikanVsLeibniz. Identity/Properties/Aristotle/Millikan: opposite properties: for Aristotle, they serve to explain that nothing can be created from nothing. Def opposite property/Aristotle: are those which defy each others foundation, make each other impossible. The prevention of another property is this property! Alteration/transformation/change/Aristotle/Millikan: when a change occurs, substances acquire new properties, which are the opposites of the previous properties. Opposite/Aristotle is the potentiality (possibility) of the other property. Then, these opposites are bound at the most fundamental level (in nature) to each other. Millikan pro Aristotle: he was right about the latter. In Aristotle there is no "beginning" as in Leibniz. Properties/Opposite/Leibniz/Millikan pro Leibniz: was right about the assertion that two opposite properties that apply to the same substance is a contradiction. But this is about an indefinite negation, not the assertion of a specific absence. Or: the absence is the existence of an inconsistency. Ex Zero/0/modern science/mathematics: is not the assertion of nothing: Ex zero acceleration, zero temperature, empty space, etc. Zero represents a quantity. Non-contradiction/law of non-contradiction/Millikan: then, is a template of an abstract world structure or something that is sufficient for such a template. Epistemology/epistemic/Leibniz/Aristotle/Millikan: the dispute between Leibniz and Aristotle appears again at the level of epistemology: I 270 Ex the assertion "x is red" is equivalent to the statement "x looks red for a standard observer under standard conditions". Problem: from "x is red" follows that "x does not look red for ... under ...". ontologically/ontology: equally: not-being-red would be an emptiness, an absence of red - rather than an opposite of red. But it is about "x is non-red" being equivalent to "x does not look red under standard conditions" is either empty or incorrect. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Metaphysical Realism | Millikan Vs Metaphysical Realism | Millikan I 329 Correspondence/Putnam: it is incoherent to suppose that truth was a correspondence with the WORLD. Projection/representation/Putnam: mathematical projections are omnipresent, representations are not omnipresent. Problem: a correspondence theory, which is based on a projective relation between a complete collection of true representations and the world is empty. I 330 Solution: there must first be a distinction between projections and representations. Solution: there must be an additional condition for reference, namely that an intended interpretation is identified. Causal theory/Putnam: would not help here. Because it is equally uncertain whether the "Cause" references unambiguously or the "Cat" references unambiguously. Concept/signs/Ockham/Putnam: Problem: a concept must not simply be a "mental individual thing", otherwise each sign merely refers to a different sign repeatedly. PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsMetaphysical Realism: it is incomprehensible how a relation between a sign and its object could be singled out, either by holding up the sign itself, Ex COW Or by holding up another sign e.g. REFERENCES Or maybe CAUSES. To mean/meaning rationalism/Putnam/Millikan: this is the rationalism of meaning: in order to mean something, we need to know what we mean, namely "know" it with a very specific clarity informed by rationalism of meaning: The relation between the head and the world must be reflected in full in the head, ((s)> the "overarching general"/Leibniz). PutnamVs: That could only work if there was a mysterious "direct capture of the shape" ((s) platonic). Then the relation would not have to be mirrored again. I 331 Correspondence/to mean/meaning/reference/MillikanVsPutnam/Millikan: thesis: the relations between the head and the world are actually between the head and the world. Understanding these relationships contributes nothing to the explanation of meaning and reference. They don't have to be intended in order to make a reference. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 |
Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Putnam, H. | Searle Vs Putnam, H. | Searle passim Core thesis: (VsPutnam): meanings are in the head! Because perception is self-respect and delivers the performance conditions itself. Propositions, characters are also only objects in the world. But their power representation is not intrinsical! It is derived from the intentionality of the mind. I 34 SearleVsFunctionalism/SearleVsPutnam: the actual mental phenomena, however, have nothing to do with attributes but are subjective first-person phenomena. II 91 Twin Earth/Putnam: the world takes command. II 92 SearleVsPutnam: that is not enough. Tradition: two mistakes: 1. assumption, any intentional content is an isolated unit. 2. assumption, causation is always a non-intentional relation. Intentionality/causality/Searle: there is a relevance of causality. 1. Network and background affect fulfilling conditions. 2. intentional causation is always in an internal relation to the fulfilling conditions. 3. a person stands in indexical relation with their own intentional states, network, and background. (Each with its own background). II 93 Causality: occurs as part of the intentional content. Previously Bill must have identified Sally as Sally, so it belongs to the fulfillment of conditions, it must be caused by Sally and not by Twin-Sally. His current experience has to make reference to this earlier identification. Indexicality: the experience is not merely an experience that someone has. It is the experience of someone with the specific network and the special background. (...) Twin Earth (TE) Example's interchange of the two Sallys in childhood. How may it be that both express the same proposition and have identical qualitative experiences and yet mean something different? II 97 TE/Searle: Experiences are in fact "qualitatively identical" but have different content and different fulfillment conditions. Recognition: one has the ability to recognize somebody here on earth but this ability itself does not need to include representation yet to exist in them! The difference between the two twins is that their experiences refer to their own background skills. (Indexicality). II 250 SearleVsPutnam: all the arguments have in common that according to them the inner intentional content of the speaker is not sufficient to determine what he refers to. II 251 SearleVsPutnam : the thesis that the meaning determines the reference can hardly be falsified by the consideration of cases where speakers do not even know the meaning! Intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects! To mean/tradition: Intension is an abstract entity, which can be more or less detected by individual speakers. But it is not enough to show that the speaker does not like or have recorded only incompletely the intension, because such a speaker also had no relevant extension! SearleVsPutnam: this one would have to suggest that the totality of intentional states of speakers (including experts) does not determine the correct extension. Searle: it is for the experts to decide. Elms/beeches/Searle: I know that beeches are no elms. How do I know that? Because I know that there are different species of tree. I have thus formulated conceptual knowledge. II 257 SearleVsPutnam: a murderer is not defined by the microstructure. II 257/258 SearleVsPutnam: Another point: Putnam makes certain assumptions: never anyone came up with the idea to extend the traditional thesis that intension determines the extension to these indexical words. Example "I have a headache" (Twin Earth). But the extension of "I" is another. It has in two different idiolects two different extensions. Searle: But it does not follow that the concept, I have of myself, is in any way different from the concept that my doppelganger has of himself. SearleVsPutnam: Putnam assumes that the tradition cannot be applied to indexical expressions. 2. that fulfillment conditions must also be identical with the doppelganger. Searle: both is wrong. Searle: if we understand intentional content under "intension" it just yet determines the extension. In addition, two persons may be in type identical mental states and yet their intentional contents may be different. They can have different truth conditions. II 259 Searle: suppose Jones christens 1750 water indexically on Earth and Twin Jones on Twin Earth. Type identical intellectual content and visual experiences Putnam: because they now give the same definition, Putnam assumes that we cannot explain with drawing on their mental content that they are two different extensions. Searle: simple answer: they do not have type identical intentional contents. Because these contents are self-referential. The fulfillment conditions are set. Different things are meant in both cases. (> to mean; >meaning/intending). III 173 SearleVsPutnam: confuses two logically independent theses under his label "metaphysical realism": 1. reality exists independently of our representations. 2. there is exactly one correct conceptual schema for the description of reality (privileged scheme: PS). Searle: Putnam sees quite truely that the external realism refutes the privileged scheme. The metaphysical realism is the conjunction of these two. SearleVsPutnam: but you do not refute both by refuting one of the conjunction members. The falsity of the privileged scheme lets the external realism untouched. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Putnam, H. | Cresswell Vs Putnam, H. | II 70 Meaning/In the head/Putnam/Kripke/CresswellVsKripke/CresswellVsPutnam: both only pretend to have shown that meanings are "not in your head". I myself do not know what does it actually meant by that. Therefore, I also do not know if my approach is incompatible with the two or not. --- II 71 Twin Earth/TE/Putnam: his example fits exactly into my semantics, i.e. it can be solved. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Putnam, H. | Millikan Vs Putnam, H. | I 328 natural kind/Putnam/Millikan: (Meaning of Meaning): thesis: at least in the case of concepts of natural kinds the intension does not determine the extension. Reason: it is possible that such concepts have identical intensions but different extensions. meaning/Putnam: whatever has different extensions must have different meanings. Therefore, meanings can not be in the head. I 329 Putnam/Millikan: his argument here is that of a realist. meaning/Millikan: if meanings are not intensions, there must be something else that may determine the reference or the extension. natural kind/solution/Putnam: contrary to appearances concepts of natural kinds are indexical. And tradition has always had its difficulties with that. Extension/Putnam: thesis: the extension of "water" and "Gold" is determined by a relation between the token of expression and the extension. MillikanVsPutnam: that is the reason why he thinks erroneously that concepts of natural kinds would be indexical. Thereby no problem is solved, but only named. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Woodfield, A. | Davidson Vs Woodfield, A. | Frank I 672 DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather. I 673 Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself. I 674 DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus![]() |
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Meanings n. i.th. Head | Versus | Cresswell II 56 FodorVsPutnam: meanings are in the head! |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Meaning | Fodor, J. | Cresswell II 56 Meanings / Fodor / Cresswell: FodorVsPutnam: Thesis: meanings are in the head - CresswellVsFodor: Problem: for an attribution of a thought I have to have the same representation in my head - it must be the same belief as the one he has - (see. above: meanings are not representations ). |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 |
Meaning | Stalnaker, R. | I 204 Meaning / Stalnaker: this is uncontroversial: they are not in the head! Neither wide narrow content, no A-intensions, C-intensions, two-dimensional intensions - none of this is in your head. This was first detected by Frege. |
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