Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leibniz, G.W. | Strawson Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Hacking I 162 Monads / StrawsonVsLeibniz: the idea of a complete description is at all useless! --- VII 116 StrawsonVsLeibniz/StrawsonVsRussell: both assume that the conventions that apply to existence, must also apply to statements of facts. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Chisholm II 186 SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads. --- Simons I 319 Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything. Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads). Solution/Simons: actually the two are already distinguished in the concept of dependence: Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7"). Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence (notation "7"). This has severe consequences: monads/evidence/Leibniz: (monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity. Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements? If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals: Whole/Leibniz: the whole ceases to exist if a part is lost. Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts. Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him, "always" means "real part". Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independent. That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (or first?) member. monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this: (1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts) (2) every part is essential (3) therefore each composite depends on its parts (4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts (5) but each chain of dependencies is founded (6) therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts (7) therefore, there are simple monads, atoms. SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. VsMereological Essentialism: 2. VsFoundedness-Principle: why should we believe it? Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Solipsism | Leibniz Vs Solipsism | Ber I 221 Solipsism/LeibnizVsSolipsism: Solution: the absence of windows in monads, pre-established harmony. Not discussed by Berkeley, no communication between Berkeley and Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 |
| Tradition | Simons Vs Tradition | I 291 Integrity/connection/individual/tradition/Simons: thesis: integrity belongs to the spatio-temporally continuous objects. SimonsVsTradition: microscopically all things are distributed and no longer connected (> Microstructure, MiSt). Quine: this applies to all things that are not only of a single elementary particle (1960,98). Object/thing/philosophy/Simons: distributed objects are also called objects: e.g. galaxies, e.g. Indonesia. Individual/Leibniz: an individual must be atomic. (>Monads). (Simons: virtually all authors VsLeibniz). I 306 Relational Accident/SimonsVsTradition: a relational accident may very well exist. This applies to accidents that are based in more than one substrate: e.g. the collision between two bodies. It could not have happened with other bodies (modal rigidity) and both bodies must exist at the time (temporal rigidity) even if one or both are destroyed in the accident. Also: e.g. weddings, divorces, football matches. This is nothing mysterious. I 342 Proposition/connection/copula/tradition/Simons: the cohesion of the proposition is delivered according to the tradition of the copula: Copula/VsTradition: the copula occurs in the proposition only as a normal word like the others, so it cannot explain the cohesion. Solution/Frege: a solution is offered by the unsaturated parts of a sentence. Proposition/WittgensteinVsFrege: a connection simply is a common juxtaposition of words (names). That means that there is not one part of the sentence which establishes the connection. Unsaturatedness/Simons: unsaturatedness perfectly matches the ontological dependence (undated): a part of a sentence cannot exist without certain others! |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Various Authors | Vaihinger Vs Various Authors | Vaihinger I 148 Monads/Leibniz/Vaihinger: Maimon thinks they are fictions. VaihingerVsMaimon: Leibniz himself understood his teachings differently: if they had been fictions, they would have been very useless. |
Vaihinger I H. Vaihinger Die Philosophie des Als Ob Leipzig 1924 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism, Logical | Versus | Simons I 320 Atomism: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Leibniz monads - VsAtomismus: Aristotle: prima materia (continualism) BlackVsWittgenstein / BlackVsAtomism: - "metaphysical prejudice": the thesis that not every existence depends on something - SimonsVsatomism. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
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