Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
[german]

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffes

 

Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.

Enhanced Search:
Search term 1: Author or Term Search term 2: Author or Term


together with


The author or concept searched is found in the following 32 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
A priori Mill Höffe I 346
A priori/Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German idealism, there is no such thing as a pre-empirical insight, but only an empirical, i.e. a posteriori insight. Even mathematics and logic should be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. However, because of the extraordinarily large amount of evidence for mathematical statements, the appearance of necessity is said to arise.
Höffe I 347
A priori thinking also supports false doctrines and poor institutions. Practice/Theory: With this argument, Mill puts all theoretical philosophy, including the theory of science and epistemology, at the service of practice. One can speak here of epistemological liberalism.
Politics: In any case, the uncompromising primacy of the empirical standpoint acquires a political meaning, the rejection of the a priori a therapeutic, or more precisely, preventive purpose.

Mill I
John St. Mill
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843
German Edition:
Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Mill II
J. St. Mill
Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Causal Relation Armstrong Martin II 134
Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure.

II (d) 154
Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change).
Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke.
Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated.
II (d) 155
Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Causal Relation Place Martin II 134
Necessary Causal Relation/Martin: E.g. square pegs do not fit into round holes in the same way round pegs fit. Contingent causal relation: E.g. freezing water expands. Not defined by volume, but by microstructure.

Armstrong II (d) 154
Humean View/Place: Logical Relations like Necessity or contingency exist only between propositions. - Causal relation is only between actual and individual situations. Situation: a) States (properties do not change) b) Event: (properties change).
Causal necessity: is a matter of counterfactual conditionals. - In nature there is no logical necessity (de re, HumeVsKripke). >Necessity a posteriori/Kripke.
Causal necessity is a special case of logical necessity. - Statements about causal necessity are always contingent if their denial does not make them contradictory. - Situations are separated.
Armstrong II (d) 155
Dispositional Properties/Place: are needed, because we speak about sentences with causal relations, not about their truthmakers - the dispositional statement provides the premise - the truth of a proposition depends on the situation as truthmaker, but truthmaker cannot simply consist in juxtaposition of cause and effect. >Truthmakers/Armstrong. Otherwise, precisely the necessary connection that provides the counterfactual conditional would be omitted - the contingency refers to causal statements, not to relations between situations.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Causes Armstrong II 58
Cause/Place (all others ditto): their effects are contingent. - ((s) a posteriori (empirically) found.) And the cause may be conceptually nothing more than the cause of an effect.
HumePlace: he was aware that the sentences that attribute necessity between tokens of situations, in turn, are contingent. >Effect.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Causes Place Armstrong II 58
Cause/Place (all others ditto): their effects are contingent. - ((s) a posteriori (empirically) found.) And the cause may be conceptually nothing more than the cause of an effect.
HumePlace: he was aware that the sentences that attribute necessity between tokens of situations, in turn, are contingent. >Effect.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983
Centered Worlds Chalmers I 133
Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H2O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world.
ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness.
Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H2O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Conceivability Chalmers I 73
Conceivability/Idea/Chalmers: when two worlds resemble each other in terms of all micro-physical conditions, there is no room for the notion that they differ in terms of higher-level properties such as biological phenomena. This unimaginability is not caused by any cognitive limitations. It is rather logically impossible that these worlds differ.
---
I 98
Imagination/Conceivability/argument/proof/VsChalermers: some may argue that conceivability is not an argument - there may always be details which have not been taken into account. ChalmersVsVs: but then one would have to specify somehow which details these are.
Chalmers: the only way in which conceivability and possibility are disjointed is connected to necessity a posteriori: e.g. the hypothesis that water is not H2O seems conceptually coherent, but water is probably H2O in all possible worlds.
necessity a posteriori/Chalmers: however, necessity a posteriori is irrelevant to the problem of whether our conscious experience is explainable.
---
I 99
Conceivability/Chalmers: one might think that one could imagine a situation in which Fermat's last sentence is wrong. But it would turn out that the situation was described wrongly. As it would turn out, the terms were misapplied. ---
I 130
Idea/Conceivability/VsDescartes/Chalmers: Descartes' argument from the mere conceivability is considered as rejected. From the fact that it is conceivable that A and B are not identical does not follow that they are not. VsChalmers: Is that not true to the same extent for the zombies' example?
---
I 131
ChalmersVsVs: the difference is that it is not about identity here, but about supervenience! If one can imagine the existence of all physical properties without the existence of conscious properties, then it is simply that the physical facts do not exhaust everything. This is something completely different. Supervenience is also much more fundamental here.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Identity Kripke I 53
Identity: Arbitrary criteria (only math required) - not for objects or people Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive.
I 62
A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables.
I 116
Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: Through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements.
I 63f
Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths necessary: E.g. heat = molecular motion - but no analogy to mind-brain identities.
I 117
Ruth Barcan Markus: Thesis: Identities between names are necessary. ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions.
I 120f
Designation does not create identity: same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies - is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity - we use them as names in all possible worlds.
I 124
Identity: A mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: Those are not names at all, but rather variables.
I 125
Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation is only to exist between an object and himself. Kripke: quite okay and useful.
I 175
That the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. ---
Frank I 114
Identity/Kripke: If an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules - Cicero/Tullius - Water/H20 - compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori - but according to Leibniz: Not conceivable that one occurs without the other. ---
Frank I 125
Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body - i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A) - this is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid - analogue: Statue is dissimilar to molecule collection.

Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Metaphysics Jackson Stalnaker I 201
Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed.
Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,...
---
I 202
...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori.
Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics.
---
I 203
Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998, 67-84, Chalmers 1996, 136-8).
---
I 204
Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Metaphysics Inwagen Schwarz I 27
Metaphysics/Being/Essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing about contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY.
Important Argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2).

a posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. You can learn e.g. that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star.
LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: other cases (which cannot be empirically found) do not exist.
LewisVsStrong necessity: has no place in his modal logic. >LewisVsTelescope Theory: worlds are not like distant planets of which one can learn which ones exist.


1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84.
2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory
Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46

Inwagen I
Peter van Inwagen
Metaphysics Fourth Edition


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Microstructure Armstrong Place I 29
Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers.
Place I 30
The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional.
Place I 29
Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions.
II (b) 39
Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori.
Place II 58
Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure.
Place II 60
Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties.
Place II 62
PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Microstructure Place Place I 29
Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers.
Place I 30
The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional.
Place I 29
Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions.
Armstrong II (b) 39
Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori.
Place II 58
Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure.
Place II 60
Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties.
Place II 62
PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Mill Höffe Höffe I 346
Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German idealism, there is no such thing as a pre-empirical insight, but only an empirical, i.e. a posteriori insight. Explanation: Scientific explanations, which are also possible in the human sciences (moral sciences), consist in the subordination of individual events to suitable laws.
Mathematics: Even mathematics and logic should be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. That the mathematicians
Höffe I 347
argue with another method, is acknowledged by the philosopher. However, he considers the corresponding view to be an illusion that the necessity of mathematical statements is merely psychological. Because of the extraordinary amount of evidence for mathematical statements, however, the appearance of necessity arises. Theory/Mill.
Höffe I 348
Utilitarianism/Ethics/HöffeVsMill: Problem: Since Mill rejects any kind of a priori statements, he cannot allow them for ethics. An inexperienced justification of moral obligations remains impossible for him. The alternative, a consistent empiricism, joins - in contrast to any "a priori" or "intuitionist school" - an "inductive school" of ethics. But since the utilitarian guiding principle is supposed to guide all action, it forms its presupposition, which Mill does not base on experience, so that it is likely to assume the ostracized pre-empirical character.

Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016

Morals Chalmers I 83
Moral/Aesthetics/Chalmers: it is often said that there is no conceptual connection between physical properties and moral or aesthetic properties. This does not mean, however, that moral and aesthetic properties are as problematic as conscious experiences. 1. Is a possible world conceivable, which is physically indistinguishable from ours, but morally different?
2. Are moral facts not phenomena that impose themselves upon us? We can deny them. This is done by moral antirealists such as Blackburn (1971)(1) and Hare (1984) (2).
---
I 84
Moral/Supervenience/Boyd/Brink/Chalmers: Boyd (1988)(3) and Brink (1989)(4) Thesis: moral facts supervene on natural facts with an a posteriori necessity. That is, they suprvene on the secondary, not the primary, intension of moral concepts. (> Horgan and Timmons, 1992a (5), 1992b (6)).



1. S. Blackburn, Moral realism. IN. J. Casey (Ed) Morality and Moral Reasoning, London 1971.
2. R. M. Hare, Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.58, 1984: pp. 1-16
3. R. N. Boyd, How to be a moral realist. In G. Syre-McCord (Ed), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY 1988
4. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 1989.
5. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992.
6. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Trouble on moral twin earth: Moral Queerness revived. Synthese 92, 1992: pp. 223-60.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Necessity Armstrong III 77
Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity.
III 96
Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory.
necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness.
III 163
Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds.
Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity)
III 166
Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope).
III 164
ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals.
Place II 59
Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not.
Place II 59
Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change.
II (c) 95
Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial).
Martin II 135
Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Necessity Evans Chalmers I 63
Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: e.g. "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. in relation to the actual world (the world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980). It may turn out that the reference is different. (i.e. that it was different all the time).
Definition "deep need"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations.
These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds.
Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary, > secondary intension/Chalmers).

EMD II
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Evans I
Gareth Evans
"The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Evans II
Gareth Evans
"Semantic Structure and Logical Form"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Evans III
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989


Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Necessity Kripke I 116
Necessary/Not a priori: E.g. Goldbach’s conjecture: It will turn out, then with necessity I would suggest, however, that it is not a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum of the properties which are usually attributed to him.
Kripke (VsTradition): Molecular motion: necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not have been otherwise.
Physical truths necessary:
E.g. heat = molecular motion - but has no analogy to mind-brain identities.
I 116
Definition Necessity/Kripke: Such identity assertions in which both expressions designate rigidly. E.g. »Water is H20". Water could not have been something else. It is essential for water that it is this material with this atomic structure. Where there is no H20, there is no water.
Frank I 121f
Necessary/Kripke: Compounds formed with two or more rigid designation expressions - E.g. that pain simply feels like pain - contingent/Kripke: e.g. the fact that there are living beings on this planet (namely us) who feel heat a certain way - E.g. That heat feels to us as it feels - Tradition: brain condition could also occur without pain
I 122
Necessary/essential properties/KripkeVsTradition: The type of picking out pain (by experience) and the brain state (configuration of molecules) in both cases is essential and not accidental - the brain state could be singled out through contingent facts, but not the pain.
Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann
(eds.) (1972), 253-355
---
Kripke I 144
Necessary properties do not have to belong to the meaning. (Periodic Table later discovered). Scientific discoveries do not change the meaning. Meaning does not arise from properties.
---
Stalnaker I 188
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: Typical cases: statements that contain names e.g. Hesperus = Phosphorus (see below: they were determined by different causal chains) - statements about natural kinds: e.g. "the atomic weight of gold is 79".

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Necessity Lewis IV 37
Causally necessary/Lewis: is a sentence if it is true in all possible worlds in which the same laws of nature apply. ---
Schwarz I 156
Necessary a posteriori: "Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because first of all you have to find out that the material that fills our streams and lakes is H2O.- necessary: in all possible worlds the substance that fills our streams is H2O - Discovery is contingent (chemical, not modal) - therefore, the H2O truths imply a priori the water truths. ---
Rorty II 123
LewisVsWittgenstein: distinctions between essence and accidence or between necessity and contingency are an artificial product that changes with the description. ---
Schwarz I 226
A posteriori necessary/Schwarz: e.g. the sentence "Everything is the way it really is" necessarily implies all truths, but only for the actual world - >Quidditism, >Panpsychism.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Necessity Logic Texts Read III 67
Necessity: the classical criterion of logical concluding does not mention necessity!
III 140
Necessity a posteriori (empirical): Kripke: believes in the necessity of the origin - Margret Thatcher could not have been Stalin's daughter - naturally the KGB could reveal a gigantic conspiracy that the baby had been foisted at the time - but this is an epistemic possibility - metaphysical, there is no possibility.
III 141
Necessary/a priori/Kripke/Read: the separation between the necessary and the apriori: surprising consequence: every statement a priori is equivalent to a contingent statement - distinction with rigid designator for truth value: not "the truth value of A" but "the actual truth value of A"- truth is not a property.
Logic Texts
Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988
HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998
Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983
Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997
Necessity Stalnaker I 18
Necessary a posteriori/Jackson: thesis is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts - it results from optional descriptive semantics that happen to ​​characterize natural languages: a mechanism of establishing references - StalnakerVsJackson: the reference-defining mechanisms are not optional as part of meta-semantics - they are part of the presentation of why internal states can be representational at all.
I 53
Necessary proposition/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, there is only one necessary proposition: the set of all possible worlds - in order to know that it is true - i.e., that the real world is within this set - for that you do not need to know any facts about the modal reality. - Necessary truth is not made true by the facts.
I 64
Metaphysical necessity/Metaph. possibility/Lewis/Louis/Stalnaker: it means: if you have a range of all possibilities, you can quantify about it - the modal operators are then just the quantifiers. - Error: one can then still be wrong, but only about how one to understand a sentence - not about how a possible situation would have to be.
I 189
Necessary a posteriori/Contingent a priori/Stalnaker: Assuming the inventor’s name was Judson - then both sentences, both "Judson invented the zipper" and "Julius invented ...", are necessary and both are contingent - both contingent: because the statement about Judson is a priori equivalent to the one about Julius. - Necessary: ​​because the statement "Julius is Judson" is a statement with two rigid designators - although the reference is determined by various causal chains.
I 201
Necessity/N/Quine/Kripke/Stalnaker: before Quine and Kripke, all N were considered to be verbal or conceptual - Quine: one must ever be skeptical about N, analyticity and a priori. - Kripke: he was the first to move empiricism and terminology apart - by finding examples for contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori - thereby separatation epistemic/metaphysical.
I 202
Def Nomologically necessary/Stalnaker: (in possible worlds x) means true in all possible worlds that have the same laws as the possible world x - ((s) relative to ppossible world x) - Natural Laws/Laws of Nature/LoN//Staln: Thesis: Laws of Nature are contingent - they do not apply possible worlds - Some authors: LoN are metaphysically necessary. - Logic/Stalnaker/(s): Cannot show what is metaphysically possible.
I 204
Necessity/Conceptual/Metaphys/Stalnaker: the entire distinction is based on a confusion of a property of propositions with a property of linguistic and mental representations. - Proposition: their contingency or necessity has nothing to do with our terms and their meanings. - Possibilities: would be the same, even if we had never thought of them - conceptually possible: are simple metaphysical possibilities that we can imagine.
I 205
Necessary a posteriori/Kripke/Stalnaker: the need stems from the fact that the secondary intension is necessary - the a posteriori character from the fact that the primary intension is a contingent proposition.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Necessity Chalmers Schwarz I 27
Definition strong necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: In addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: For example, Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999(2)).
---
Schwarz I 208
A posteriori/Necessity/Lewis/Schwarz: here the secondary truth conditions are generally fulfilled, but not the primary ones! The first circumstance makes the sentences necessary - secondary truths reflect the behavior in modal embeddings - the second makes them a posteriori. But not because primary conditions of truth would be determined by embedding in epistemic operators (as in (Chalmers, 2003)(3)), but because, according to our language conventions, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" may not always be expressed, but only when certain conditions are available about which we must first inform ourselves.
1. [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. In [van Inwagen 2001]
2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory
Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46
3. [2003]: “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Manuskript. Online verf¨ugbar
unter http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html


---
Schwarz I 209
E.g. if the astronomers announce tomorrow that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star, then they have real news, but they do not violate our language conventions. This has something to do with Lewis' description theory of the reference. ---
Chalmers I 63
Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979 (1)): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: E..g "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. related to the actual world (The world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980 (2)). It may turn out that the reference is different. (I.e., that it was different all the time).
Definition "deep necessity"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations.
These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds.
Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary,> Intensions/Chalmers).
---
I 13
Strong metaphysical necessity/Chalmers: would be one that assumes that it would be metaphysically impossible for a world to be identical with ours in regard to the physical facts, but not for all positive facts. ---
I 137
This is stronger than Kripke's metaphysical necessity, which we may call weak metaphysical necessity. Conceivability/Chalmers: then worlds are conceivable that are not possible at all. Strong metaphysical necessity goes beyond the limitations we have described as "wrongly described worlds". Then "Zombie world" could correctly describe a world that we imagine, even with regard to a secondary intension. It is only the case that such a world would not be metaphysically possible.
1. Vs: there is no reason to believe that there is such a modality of metaphysical necessity. There are no analogies to this of how they are provided by examples such as water/H2O or Hesperus/Phosphorus, since they require only one possible world.
a posteriori Information: always affects only our own world! This can help to locate our world in the space of possible worlds.
2. Vs: If we allow this kind of metaphysical necessity, we open the door for further ad hoc modalities.
---
I 138
Zombie World: someone who believes that a zombie world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, cannot answer the key question: Why could not God have created a Zombie world? If he had created it, it would still be metaphysically impossible. This is too arbitrary.


1. G. Evans, Reference and contingency. The Monist 62, 1979: pp. 161-89.
2. M. K. Davies and I. L. Humberstone, Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 38, 1980: pp. 1-30.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Necessity Jackson Schwarz I 226
A posteriori NotwendigkeitenJackson /Schwarz: folgen a priori aus kontingenten Wahrheiten über die aktuelle Situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). ---
Stalnaker I 18
Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality.
Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context.
---
I 19
But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space.

1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Necessity Sidelle Stalnaker I 201/2
Necessity/Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: one can still assume that necessity has its root in the language. - Solution: two-dimensional semantics: shares e.g. necessary a posteriori on in necessary truth that is a priori knowable (through conceptual analysis) and a part which is only a posteriori knowable. Metaphysical necessity/all authors: is in any case no special kind of necessity.


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Necessity Place Armstrong III 77
Logical Necessity/Armstrong: ist the strongest form - physical necessity: is weaker, because it is contingent! - Even weaker: universal quantification (is a mere regularity.) - Important Argument: it is impossible to infer from a law to universal quantification. - Law: physical necessity.
Armstrong III 96
Necessity/Universals/Armstrong: now we can clarify the concept of necessity between universals. - We translate "N(F,G)" (the assertion of a state, which is at the same time a relationship) as follows: the F-ness of something makes the G-ness of the same thing necessary by virtue of the universals F and G. That is not simply: universal quantification: for all x, x". F-ness makes it necessary that x is G - that would regularity theory. >Regularity Theory.
necessity/Armstrong: exists rather between types than between tokens: the F-ness of something, not a"s F-ness.
Armstrong III 163
Necessity/Possible Worlds/Armstrong: possible worlds do not need "possibilia" themselves. - Necessity: does not have to be equal in all possible worlds! In some possible worlds the necessity might not apply. A law of nature can have different status in different possible worlds.
Notation: "square" N": necessity in all possible worlds - (strong necessity)
Armstrong III 166
Weak necessity: not all possible worlds - Notation:"necessary (square) ("Socrates exists > Socrates is human)" (operator before the entire conditional. (>Range/Scope).
Armstrong III 164
ArmstrongVsStrong N: requires U to be necessary - but Universals are contingent - III 165 VsStrong Necessity in possible worlds where there are no Fs and Gs it is obliged to uninstantiated universals.
Place II 59
Necessity/Place: (conceptualist): only de dicto! - Only type of de re: causal necessity: but contrast here is not contingency, but independence - whether causal need is present, is observed a posteriori (therefore contingent) - contingent: i.e. the dependence was causal or it was not.
Place II 59
Necessity/de dicto: (a priori): can something be denied without contradiction? (Linguistic question) - according to this criterion: token identity: typically contingent - type identity: typically necessary - Conceptualism/Place: contingent hypotheses of type-identity become a necessary truth, when the conventional criteria of attribution of universals change.
Armstrong II (c) 95
Necessity/Armstrong: stems only from identity! - Logical possibility: is not possible between separate entities (E.g. cause/effect) - (This is controversial).
Martin II 135
Necessity/Contingency/Quine/Martin: puts both on the same level (like many precursors). Quine, early: seemed to tip towards the side of contingency, Quine, late: according to the necessity: Figures for physics, or principle of identity of empirically isomorphic theories.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Necessity de re Armstrong Place II 59
Necessity de re/Kripke/Place/Armstrong: a posteriori, de re logically necessary: what is true in all poss. worlds - Armstrong ditto. Conceptualism/Place: the only kind of de re which it accepts: causal necessity - that something is contingently dependent on something. - It means that the relation is causal or not causal. >Conceptualism, >de re, >de dicto.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004
Pain Chalmers I 17
Pain/Chalmers: pain is an example for the fact that concepts have a double meaning a) as a psychological concept for the explanation of behavior, (> Functional role) - b) as a phenomenal concept of the first person (> Qualia/Chalmers). Both aspects naturally tend to occur together. But that is not a conceptual truth about pain!
---
I 18
Everyday Language/Chalmers: everyday language brings psychological and phenomenal aspects together, although these are actually separated. This applies to many mental concepts. Learning: Here, the psychological aspect may be stronger.
---
I 19
Emotions: the phenomenal aspect is probably predominant here. Belief: here the case is more complex because intentionality plays a role, e.g. whether one believes a proposition and at the same time has a hope about it. At the same time, beliefs are used to explain behavior.
Contents/Searle/Chalmers: (Searle 1990a)(1): Thesis: the content of a belief depends entirely on the connected consciousness state. Without consciousness, everything is as-if-intentionality. (Searle: See Chalmers I 360).
---
I 146f
Pain/Knowledge/phenomenal/physical/identity/Kripke/Chalmers: Kripke's argument is based on identity, which is always necessary identity accordingto him. Pain/Kripke: it is pointless to say that there is something pain-like that is shown as a pain in the course of an examination, unlike in the case of water/H2O:
Water has somehow been exposed as H2O. This identity is a necessity a posteriori after the discovery.
---
I 147
ChalmersVsKripke: Kripke's argument, unlike mine, is based on a certain essentialism in relation to different states. With me, it is never about disembodiment. Nevertheless, there are many similarities between Kripke and me. Both of us are concerned with modal arguments with necessity and possibility. ---
I 148
Brain State/Pain/Kripke: Thesis: You could have that particular brain state without feeling that particular pain, because for pain, only feeling is essential. (See also Feldman (1974)(2), McGinn (1977)(3)). Materialism/Pain/Boyd: (Boyd 1980)(4): the materialist does not have to assume that mental states in all possible worlds are physical states, as long as this is the case in the actual world.
---
I 149
Pain/Intension/Kripke/Chalmers: if Kripke says you cannot imagine a situation in which the feeling of pain but not the pain itself is absent, that means that the primary and secondary intensions are collapsing.
ChalmersVsKripke:
1. The possibility of disorganization is inconsistent as an argument against materialism, but in our case is not decisive. 2. The same applies to the arguments based on identity.
3. An essentialist metaphysics is not decisive (for our purposes), apart from the fact that the feeling of pain is essential for pain - but it is about the meaning of "pain".
4. Kripke's apparatus of the rigid designators (> cross-world identity) is central to our problem, but has a deep core in the failure of the logical supervenience we have established.



1. J. R. Searle, Consciousness, explanatory inversion and cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain Scineces. 13, 1990: pp.585-642.
2. F. Feldman, Kripke on the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy 71, 1974: pp. 665-76
3. C. McGinn, Anomalous Monism and Kripke's Cartesian intuitions. Analysis 2, 1977: pp. 78-80
4. R. N. Boyd, Materialism without reductionism: What physicalism does not entail. In: N. Block (Ed) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology. VOl. 1. Cambridge 1980.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Theories Millikan I 332
Theory/Truth/Knowledge/Millikan: in a rationalistic sense, we can never know whether a theory is true.


Höffe I 346
Theory/Mill/Höffe: MillVsKant: According to Mill's empiricism, in contrast to Kant and German idealism, there is no such thing as a pre-empirical insight, only an empirical, i.e. a posteriori insight. Even mathematics and logic should be based on experience and its inductive generalizations. However, because of the extraordinarily large amount of evidence for mathematical statements, the appearance of necessity is said to arise.
Höffe I 347
Recognition/Mill: According to Mill, not only scientific-theoretical reasons speak against the possibility of strictly experience-free statements, but also the epistemological and at the same time ideology-critical interest in freeing thinking from the blinkers of dogmatic metaphysics. A priori thinking also supports false doctrines and bad institutions. Practice/Theory: With this argument, Mill puts the entire theoretical philosophy, including the theory of science and epistemology, at the service of practice. One can speak here of epistemological liberalism.
Politics: In any case, the uncompromising primacy of the empirical standpoint acquires a political meaning, the rejection of the a priori a therapeutic, or more precisely, preventive purpose.

Millikan I
R. G. Millikan
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987

Millikan II
Ruth Millikan
"Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


Höffe I
Otfried Höffe
Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016
Truth Kripke I 47/48
"Necessary and a priori are not obviously synonymous. They are not even coextensive: there are both necessary truths from posteriori and probably contingent truths a priori! Many people have thought that these two things should mean the same thing because they imagine we would go through all possible worlds in our minds and then be able to recognize them a priori. But that is not so clear!
I 50
Description: If we call Nixon "the man who won the 1988 election", it will of course be a necessary truth.
I 66
Prototype meter/standard meter: Someone who thinks that everything you know a priori is necessary might think,"This is the definition of a meter. This is a necessary truth." Kripke: however, he does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference.
I 68
Rigid: meter ((s) "rigid" means that the reference is the same in all possible worlds) Non-rigid: length of S at time t.
The "definition" does not say that the two expressions are synonymous, but rather that we have determined the reference of the expression "one metre" by fixing that it is to be a rigid expression of designations, which in fact has the length S. The term "one metre" is not synonymous with the term "one metre". So no necessary truth! And that is because under certain circumstances it would not have been one metre long. One expression is rigid and the other is not.
The truth he knows is contingent. So I prefer not to call them "analytical."
I 77
E.g. A thesis may be true because it is simply a definition.
I 153ff
Reference of proper names: Definition of the reference: A priori (contingent) - this is not the same as synonymy.
Meaning: analytical (necessary)
Definition: defines reference and expresses truth a priori.
I 156
E.g. necessary truth: "Cats are animals ".
I 175
The phrase "heat is the movement of molecules" expresses a truth a posteriori.
I 181
A posteriori: one can experience a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. The philosophical analysis tells us that it was not contingent and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity. ---
III 409
Truth/Formal Languages​​: Understanding the meta language > explicit truth-definition > truth conditions > understanding of the language examined.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984

Twodimensional Semantics Jackson Stalnaker I 204
Two-dimensional framework/Jackson/Stalnaker: with the two-dimensional framework one can reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. This solves the problem of intentionality. (> Metaphysics/Jackson).   Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret this framework:
A) semantically
B) metasemantically.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000


Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Universals Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation.
III 88
Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation).
2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker.
III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.

Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102).

Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983


Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Universals Place Armstrong III 82
Universals/Armstrong: Universals must be instantiated, but not necessarily now: Def Universal/Armstrong: the repeatable properties of the spatio-temporal world. - False: to assume that to every general predicate corresponds a universal: then we need also uninstantiated universals (ArmstrongVs). - What universals there are is not semantically (a priori) determined. - But a posteriori: from discovery, - There are no disjunctive or negative universals - but certainly conjunctive and complex ones. >Instantiation.
Armstrong III 88
Order//Levels/Universals/Particulars/Armstrong: 1st order universals: Relation, 2nd order: Necessity? - 2nd order individuals: = 1st order universals - State: E.g. Fa or aRb. Likewise, N(F,G). 1st order: aRb. includes 1st order individuals covered by a 1st order universal (relation).
2nd order: N(F,G) involves 2nd order individuals (namely 1st order universals!) covered by a 2nd order universal.
Armstrong III 99
Principle of Invariance of the Orders: when a U of stage M is in an instantiation, it is of the stage M in all instantiations.
Armstrong III 118
Universals/Armstrong: there can be no uninstatiated universals - VsTooley: His example of a particle that reacts idiosyncratically with all others with an unknown simple property emerging, which never happens, makes in this case a single uninstantiated universal necessary as truth-maker, because the contents of the corresponding law is completely unknown. >Truthmaker.
Armstrong III 120
UiU logically possible, but disaster for theory of universals: can then not be excluded that none are instantiated at all and they still exist (>Plato) - possible solution: deny that there are absolutely simple U ((s) because of simple emerging properties). Armstrong: I do not want that - I do not know if they exist.

Place II 57
Universals/PlaceVsPlato: instead of shared properties in the case of similarity of several individuals: property is a criterion of attribution of instances. - The kind of "property" has an instance. - Place pro universals in this sense. MartinVsArmstrong: not "distributed existence" of the universal across different and interrupted instantiations - truth maker of counterfactual conditionals is the single instantiation, not a consistent universal between the instantiations - otherwise, he must be a realist in terms of forces and trends "in" the properties.

Martin I 77
"Busy World"/MartinVsArmstrong: the obvious possibility that a single universal instantiation lasts only briefly, makes it logically necessary that other individuals exist that hold the manifestations distributed throughout the spacetime together. - But it seems obvious that the world does not have to be so busy. Solution: the truth maker is the individual instantiation itself. (-> 96 II, II 102).

Martin II 129
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: the fact that it is supposed to be the same counts little as long as the relation may still be necessary or contingent.
Martin III 179
Universals/MartinVsArmstrong: mysterious: the numerically identical universal is nothing more than and consists only in the numerically different and non-identical instantiations.

Place I
U. T. Place
Dispositions as Intentional States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place II
U. T. Place
A Conceptualist Ontology
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place III
U. T. Place
Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both?
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place IV
U. T. Place
Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Place V
U. T. Place
Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004


Armstrong I
David M. Armstrong
Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Armstrong II (a)
David M. Armstrong
Dispositions as Categorical States
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (b)
David M. Armstrong
Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (c)
David M. Armstrong
Reply to Martin
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Armstrong II (d)
David M. Armstrong
Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996

Armstrong III
D. Armstrong
What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983

Martin I
C. B. Martin
Properties and Dispositions
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin II
C. B. Martin
Replies to Armstrong and Place
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin III
C. B. Martin
Final Replies to Place and Armstrong
In
Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996

Martin IV
C. B. Martin
The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010
Zombies Chalmers I 94
Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. ---
I 95
Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do.
2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior.
Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences.
---
I 96
Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. ---
I 97
Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical.
---
I 131
Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H2O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O.
VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism.
ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself).
---
I 132
ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H2O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. ---
I 180
Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014


The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Chalmers, D. Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. I 194
Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w..
Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context)
I 195
defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token).
Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference.
StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device.
Difference:
a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning,
b) not as meaning.
Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth.

I 202
Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but
Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages.
I 210
Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended
b) meta-semantically.
I 211
Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference
StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently.
Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts.
Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has?

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Hume, D. Kripke Vs Hume, D. Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume).
E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45
a posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Jackson, F. Schwarz Vs Jackson, F. Schwarz I 226
A posteriori necessity/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsJackson: but from that does not follow that if the physical truths imply anything necessary - if they constitute a metaphysical basis for all truths about the situation on the actual situation that this implication then must be also a priori. It could be that the metaphysical basis only implies a posteriori: E.g. the phrase "everything is as it actually is". Implies necessary all truths, it is only in the actual world (actual world) true. A priori it implies nothing! ((s) it is not true for any possible world, but in every possible world itself). > Panpsychism: Panpsychism/Panprotopsychism/Chalmers/Schwarz: (Chalmers 2002) takes this gap as an advantage: The starting point is a kind.
Def Quidditism (see above 5.4): Thesis: our physical theory describe how physical things and properties relate to each other, what they are, but they leave their intrinsic nature in the dark.
Def Pan(proto)psychism: Thesis: this intrinsic nature of things and properties is mental. E.g. what we know from the outside as a charge -1, turns out to be from the inside as pain. ((s)> Two Aspects teaching). Now, if our physical vocabulary is rigid (that means that it always applies in the field of modal operators on what plays for us the causal structural role (that means to pain), then the physical truths imply necessary the mental, but the implication does not need to be a priori.
Problem: the physical truths are not sufficient to tell us exactly in what situation we are in, particularly with regard to the intrinsic nature of physical quantities.

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Kant Kripke Vs Kant I 135Kant: "All analytic judgments are based entirely on the principle of contradiction and by their nature are a priori knowledge, the definitions on which they are based on may be empirical or not. Since the predicate has been thought of in terms of the subject, it cannot be negated by the first."
I 181
That is precisely why all analytic propositions are a priori judgments even though their terms are empirical. E.g. gold is a yellow metal. In order to know this, I need no further experience beyond my definition of gold. If that makes up my definition, I am only able to segment my definition, I cannot look anywhere else for it. Kripke: Kant seems to say that gold means simply yellow metal.
KripkeVsKant: Is Kant right? According to scientists, it is very difficult to define what a metal is. We also need to know the periodic table. One might think that there are actually two definitions, a phenomenological and a scientific one, where the latter replaces the former. Phenomenological: Stretchable, deformable, scientific: Periodic table. (KripkeVs).
a posteriori: one can learn a mathematical truth a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician. (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent, and therefore any empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant)

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Kripke, S. A. Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. V 251/252
Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description.
Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent).
What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world).
You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event.
1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r".
2. partly by cause or effect
3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check
4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above).
5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later
6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted.
7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls.
8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army.
V 253
Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke):
Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth.
Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement.
Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow.

Schwarz I 55
Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it?
Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa:
Schwarz I 56
For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay.
Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for
Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world.
Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246)
I 57
KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42).
The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world?
Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence.
Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions.
Schwarz I 223
Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily.
Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22).
((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless.
Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light.
If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out.
This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world.
I 224
Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f)
I 225
A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties.
a posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation,
Schwarz I 226
which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. a posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2)


1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65:
113–126.
2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and necessity. Oxford: Blackwell
5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193
7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431
9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342
10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Lewis, D. Inwagen, Vs Lewis, D. Schwarz I 227
Metaphysics/Being/Essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing about contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY.
Important Argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2).


1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84.
2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory
Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Quine, W.V.O. Stalnaker Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 71
Essentialism/today/VsQuine: most modal logicians today contradict Quine and accept the connection between modal logic (ML) and essentialism and accept the essentialism. Instead of, like Quine back then, saying: "so much the worse for quantified ML" they say, "so much the better for the essentialism".
I 72
Essence/essentialism/essential property/LeibnizVsQuine/Stalnaker: contradicted Quine in the first way: thesis: each property of each individual constitutes his nature and only the existence of the thing as a whole is contingent. today: David Lewis with his counterpart theory is a modern successor of Leibniz.
Counterpart/Lewis: things of the actual world have counterparts in other possible worlds (poss.w.). Things that resemble them more than any other thing. Therefore, no individual can have accidental properties, properties that they are lacking in another poss.w..

I 201
Quine/Stalnaker: taught us to be skeptical about the idea of necessity, analyticity and knowledge a priori. However, he did not question the empiricist assumptions that these concepts stand and fall with each other. KripkeVsQuine/Stalnaker: only Kripke pulled apart these concepts by finding examples of truths that are necessary although they are only a posteriori knowable and those that still are contingent but still a priori knowable.

II 24
Belief/Mentalese/Field/Stalnaker: his thesis was to reinterpret the intentional-psychological relation into a psychological but non-intentional and a semantic but not psychological relationship - between a sentence and the expressed proposition.
Belief ascription/Quine/Stalnaker: his goal was to generalize the ascription. By this an obligation to singular propositions should be avoided.
StalnakerVsQuine: but the project changes its character when it comes to the general case.
De re-ascription/Stalnaker: should better not be regarded as indirect and vague,
II 25
but simply as examples that show the essential characteristics of the intentional: Ascription: if we ascribe intentional states, the types, properties and relations to which we refer here, we see the world and with them we characterize the world as someone sees it.
Important argument: that is just not an indirect but a direct way to get to the content.

II 160
Def singular proposition/Stalnaker: here e.g. a singular proposition ascribes Ortcutt to be a spy. Structured singular proposition/Stalnaker: (for those for whom propositions are structured entities): then singular propositions are those which have an individual as a constituent. (StalnakerVsStructured propositions).
Singular proposition/poss.w.-semantics/semantics of possible worlds/Stalnaker: for those for whom the propositions are sets of poss.w., (Stalnaker pro)): then a singular proposition is a proposition whose truth depends on the properties of a particular individual.
Singular proposition/Stalnaker: the identity of a singular proposition is a function of an individual instead of a concept or givenness of an individual.
StalnakerVsQuine: this semantic approach is simpler and less ad hoc than that of Quine.
II 161
De re/ascription/belief de re/singular proposition/sing Prop/StalnakerVsQuine/Stalnaker: the semantic approach understands the ascription of a belief de re then as ascription of a particular faith (unlike Quine). What it means to believe a singular proposition? How is it to believe that Ortcutt himself is a spy? And not only that the person fulfills the description or a belief subject that is given in a certain way?
Problem: suppose Ralph knows Ortcutt in two different ways (beach, brown hat). Which singular proposition about Ortcutt does he believe?
bad solution: many authors think that there would have to be a special relation of acquaintance here.
Acquaintance/Stalnaker: problem: to provide a semantic relation for them.
1. the first strategy makes belief de re then too easy: e.g. Poirot believes that it was the butler simply due to the two facts that 1. the butler was it and 2. Poirot believes that it was the person who was it.
2. the second strategy makes belief de re too difficult: then Ralph, who knows Ortcutt, has two contradictory convictions.
Solution: a) to strengthen the relation of acquaintance so that misidentifications are impossible.
Vs: such mistakes are almost always possible! Then you could have only de re-convictions about yourself.
b) the "divide-and-conquer" argument: we tell the story of Ralph in two parts.
1. Ralph sees Ortcutt with a brown hat
2. Ralph sees Ortcutt at the beach.
II 162
Then it is quite natural that in Ralph believes in one story that Ortcutt is a spy, and not in the other story. There is no reason to assume that Ralph would have had to change his mind in between.
II 163
De re/ascription/belief de re/StalnakerVsQuine/StalnakerVsKaplan/Stalnaker: thesis: we assume instead propositions as sets of poss.w.. Pragmatic Analysis/pragmatics/Stalnaker: has in common with the semantic that certain convictions are ascribed but - unlike the semantic - it does not assume a particular type of propositions and also does not require an increased acquaintance relationship.
That means the individuals of which something is believed are not constituents of the proposition.
Proposition: its purpose is to pick out a subset of the relevant context set.
Ascription/de re/Stalnaker: (all authors): the way how the ascribing formulates its ascription is independent of the way the believer would formulate his conviction or the way how he thinks about the individual
Pragmatic approach/Stalnaker: (…+…)

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Reductionism Physicalism Vs Reductionism Schwarz I 156
Physicalism/Vs Reductionism/VsLewis. other authors: Physicalism is not at all fixed on the a priori derivability of mental from physical truths, only on supervenience of mental on physical facts. But this does not have to be a priori. It can be a posteriori necessity. For example, the relationship between H2O-truths and water truths. (This is non-reductive physicalism). LewisVs: this is a misunderstanding about a posteriori necessity: e.g. Assuming that "water is H2O" is necessary a posteriori: this is not because there is a modal fact, a necessity that we can only discover a posteriori, but rather because the meaning of certain words depends on contingent, empirical factors: according to our conventions, in all possible worlds "water" picks out the substance that fills our lakes and streams.
"Water is H2O" is a posteriori, because you first have to find out that the material that fills streams and lakes in our country is H2O. This is a contingent fact that usually requires chemical analysis, no excursions into modal space. The H2O-truths therefore a priori imply the water truths.
If pain a posteriori is identical with a physical state, then this must also be due to the fact that the reference to "pain" depends on contingent facts, on what kind of state plays the and the role with us ((s) not what kind of linguistic convention we have). (see 1994b(1),296f).


1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Stalnaker, R. Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. Read III 101/102
Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102)
According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability.
III 108
Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian.
and
If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian.
Stalnaker: one or the other must be true.
Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality.

Lewis IV 149
Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se.
Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones.
Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability.
Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions.
Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation.
Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world).
Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world!
For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or
b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs.
The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities:
The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world.
In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.)
V 145
Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision).
Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive.
The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals.
LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently.
V 148
Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs,
2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency
3. decide if the consequence is true.
Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping.
V 148/149
LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed.
Schwarz I 60
Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world.
LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World).
Schwarz I 62
Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured).
Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent.
Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent.
Schwarz I 63
Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36).
Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge).
Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers).
Schwarz I 207
"Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions.
Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary).
Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community.
Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar.
Note:
Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.).
Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions
Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f).
Newer terminology:
Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions
Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions
Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65)
Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions.
Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention".
Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things:
Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions.
Schwarz I 227
A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined).
LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist.


1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies
in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112
2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003]
3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a]
4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P.
Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003]
5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University
Press
7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a]
8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy
and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a]
9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy
of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a]
10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press
11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277
12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97
13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press
14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d]

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Re III
St. Read
Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Kripke Chalmers, D. Staln I 201
Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with them,
I 202
that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori.
Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984
Kripke Jackson, F. Staln I 201
Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: theses of Kripke can be reconciled with them,
I 202
that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori.
Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Two Dimensional Sem. Stalnaker, R. I 201/202
Two-Dimensional Semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: Thesis: I think this shows something about the nature of mental representation and not just about the contingent functioning of languages.
I 204
Two-dimensional Frame/Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret it. a) semantic,
b) metasemantic.
Thesis: with this distinction I would like to reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. Thus the problem of intentionality can be solved.