Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Analyticity/Syntheticity Rorty VI 159
Analyticity/Quine/Rorty: quine (according to Rorty) proposes instead: "central position in relation to our system of beliefs." >network of beliefs, >holism.
I 192
Analytical/RortyVsSellars: in Sellars there is still a rest of analyticity: it still tacitly distinguishes between necessary and contingent, structures and empirical.
Analytical/synthetic/necessary/contingent/RortyVsAnalytical Philosophy/Rorty Thesis: Analytical philosophy cannot be written without one or the other of these distinctions. There are neither views that can be dissolved into concepts (as in Carnap) nor internal relations between the concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytical philosophy".

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Carbon Taxation Strategies Fankhauser Fankhauser I 6
Carbon Taxation Strategies /Carattini/Carvalho/Fankhauser: Another defining feature of a carbon tax is how its revenues are proposed to be spent. The literature has explored three revenue recycling strategies in particular: the earmarking of revenues to support emission reduction projects, the redistribution of revenues to achieve a fairer (less fiscally regressive) outcome, and the reduction of other taxes to achieve a revenue-neutral outcome. Using tax revenues for additional emissions reduction reassures voters that the tax will be effective and the environmental objective will be met (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Kallbekken et al., 2011(2); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). 1. Earmarking proceeds: The attractiveness of earmarking carbon tax revenues has been established in a range of contexts (cf. Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Bristow, Wardman, Zannia, & Chintakayalab, 2010(5); Carattini et al., 2017(6); Clinch & Dunne, 2006(7); Deroubaix & Lévèque, 2006(8); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Gevrek & Uyduranoglu, 2015(10); Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010(11); Kallbekken & Sælen, 2011(3); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). The interest in earmarking reflects two voter concerns. The first is a lack of trust in government [.] The second concern is doubt about the effectiveness of carbon taxes (…). Earmarking signals to the public that efforts are being made to make low-carbon options both technologically and commercially more viable and so will reduce the personal cost of changing behavior (Kallbekken & Aasen, 2010)(11). Earmarking is also seen as a potential solution to a perceived underinvestment in low-carbon research and development. It should, however, be noted that earmarking revenues for environmental purposes may not be a universal solution. A Swedish survey conducted by Jagers and Hammar (2009)(14) showed that respondents were unwilling to increase carbon tax rates, as they felt the carbon taxes they paid on transport fuels were high enough already. Respondents preferred alternative
Fankhauser I 7
such as decreasing taxes on clean energy sources, expanding public transport, and increasing information campaigns about vehicles' contribution to climate change. Additional evidence suggests that preferences for revenue recycling may be context dependent. Carattini et al. (2017)(6) found that providing information about the environmental effectiveness of different carbon tax designs reduces the preference for environmental earmarking. 2. Compensating low-income households: Several strategies have been put forward in the literature to address potential adverse distributional effects of a carbon tax, including in the influential perspectives of Speck (1999)(15), Baranzini, Goldemberg, and Speck (2000)(16), and Metcalf (2009)(17). [There are two main options on compensation:] compensation via lump-sum transfers and social cushioning.
Fankhauser I 8
(…) when there is a clear trade-off in the use of revenues between environmental earmarking and socially progressive redistribution forms, people tend to prefer to use revenues for environmental earmarking (Baranzini & Carattini, 2017(1); Sælen & Kallbekken, 2011(3)). In the study by Carattini et al. (2017)(6), the most favored options for using revenue were redistribution through lump-sum transfers, and social cushioning. 3. Cutting other taxes and secur[ing …] full or partial revenue neutrality: Empirical studies show that cutting other taxes is the least popular redistribution strategy among the public (Beuermann & Santarius, 2006(4); Dresner, Jackson, & Gilbert, 2006(9); Klok et al., 2006(12); Thalmann, 2004(13)). This is in contrast to many economists, for whom using tax revenues to reduce distortionary taxes is the ideal solution. By using carbon tax revenues levied on “bads,” such as greenhouse gas emissions, to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, profits, or consumption, which discourage desirable activities, one can hope to achieve higher economic output on top of emissions abatement, and so obtain a “double dividend” (cf. Goulder, 1995)(18). One reason for public opposition is that voters do not necessarily buy into the logic behind the double dividend. They perceive these to be separate problems requiring separate solutions. Another reason for public opposition is a lack of trust in politicians and fiscal authorities (Hammar & Jagers, 2006)(19). Once the policy is implemented, governments could use information devices to increase the visibility of the tax shift. Compensation can be made visible by displaying the amount of income that is rebated on payslips, tax slips, or in contributions to social insurance (Clinch, Dunne, & Dresner, 2006(20); Dresner, Dunne, et al., 2006(21); Hsu et al. 2008(22)).
Below we [Carattini, Carvalho, Fankhauser] offer some concrete design options that appear particularly promising to increase public support.
Fankhauser I 9
1. Phasing in carbon taxes over time: By phasing in carbon taxes gradually, policymakers can take advantage of the fact that aversion tends to abate once people have experienced a policy. A slow ramp-up, or even a trial period, provides individuals with the opportunity to gauge the costs and benefits of the tax. Taxes can then be raised progressively until they reach the level required to meet the environmental objective. Note that this may imply renouncing to allowing the carbon tax rate to fluctuate depending on the business cycle, although this type of flexibility might be welfare improving (cf. Doda, 2016)(23). The risk with this strategy is that carbon taxes may be frozen at a level that is not sufficient to achieve their intended objectives. There are two potential, and complementary, solutions to overcome this risk. The first solution relies on societal learning. The second solution uses commitment devices. 2. Earmarking tax revenues for additional climate change mitigation: Voters have a preference for earmarking tax revenues and using the proceeds for additional greenhouse gas emissions reductions. They are particularly keen on support for low-carbon research and development, along with subsidies to promote deployment. The demand for environmental earmarking may decrease over time as people observe the impact of the tax and update their beliefs. Governments can again support this process by providing effective information about emissions trends, the distributional effects of the tax, and any ancillary benefits. Revenues may then be freed up gradually to address other sources of voter aversion, or to obtain economic gains. Tapering the degree of earmarking can also allay a government's concerns about fiscal management.
3. Redistributing taxes to improve fairness: Carbon taxes can be made more acceptable if tax revenues are used to address important societal concerns.
Fankhauser I 10
While the objective of a carbon tax is to address the climate externality, and not to address the issue of raising inequalities, there may still be the expectation that carbon taxes are designed in a way that at least does not lead to a more unequal distribution. Carbon taxes can be designed to be both revenue neutral and progressive through lump-sum transfers and social cushioning measures to reduce costs for low-income households. Some voters may, however, be suspicious about a government's long-term commitment to redistribution. To allay those fears, governments can use commitment devices, such as explicit plans on how revenues are to be redistributed. 4. Information sharing and communication: A final suggestion applies to all efforts to implement a carbon tax, regardless of the use of revenues, or level of stringency. As soon as policymakers start considering the design of a carbon tax, they should provide detailed information (obtained through analysis and perhaps model simulations) to navigate the process of public consultations and to pre-emptively address voter concerns. This disclosure would ideally occur before voters are called to a ballot, or before lawmakers consider a carbon tax bill in the parliament.
Fankhauser I 11
Communication efforts need to continue once the policy is implemented. Because the effects of carbon taxes are often not visible, governments are encouraged to measure their effects regularly and inform their citizens about them transparently. Communication strategies may need to be adapted to the beliefs and worldviews of the targeted population (Cherry et al., 2017)(24), and also take into account the potential implications of political polarization and bipartisan divides (Hart & Nisbet, 2012(25); Kahan et al., 2011(26)).

1. Baranzini, A., & Carattini, S. (2017). Effectiveness, earmarking and labeling: Testing the acceptability of carbon taxes with survey data. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 19(1), 197–227.
2. Kallbekken, S., Kroll, S., & Cherry, T. L. (2011). Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(1), 53–64.
3. Sælen, H., & Kallbekken, S. (2011). A choice experiment on fuel taxation and earmarking in Norway. Ecological Economics, 70(11), 2181–2190.
4. Beuermann, C., & Santarius, T. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Germany: Handling two hot potatoes at the same time. Energy Policy, 34(8), 917–929.
5. Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zannia, A. M., & Chintakayalab, P. K. (2010). Public acceptability of personal carbon trading and carbon tax. Ecological Economics, 69(9), 1824–1837.
6. Carattini, S., Baranzini, A., Thalmann, P., Varone, P., & Vöhringer, F. (2017). Green taxes in a post-Paris world: Are millions of nays inevitable? Environmental and Resource Economics, 68(1), 97–128.
7. Clinch, J. P., & Dunne, L. (2006). Environmental tax reform: An assessment of social responses in Ireland. Energy Policy, 34(8), 950–959.
8. Deroubaix, J.-F., & Lévèque, F. (2006). The rise and fall of French ecological tax reform: Social acceptability versus political feasibility in the energy tax implementation process. Energy Policy, 34, 940–949.
9. Dresner, S., Jackson, T., & Gilbert, N. (2006). History and social responses to environmental tax reform in the United Kingdom. Energy Policy, 34(8), 930–939.
10. Gevrek, Z. E., & Uyduranoglu, A. (2015). Public preferences for carbon tax attributes. Ecological Economics, 118, 186–197.
11. Kallbekken, S., & Aasen, M. (2010). The demand for earmarking: Results from a focus group study. Ecological Economics, 69(11), 2183–2190.
12. Klok, J., Larsen, A., Dahl, A., & Hansen, K. (2006). Ecological tax reform in Denmark: History and social acceptability. Energy Policy, 34(8), 905–916.
13. Thalmann, P. (2004). The public acceptance of green taxes: 2 million voters express their opinion. Public Choice, 119, 179–217.
14. Jagers, S. C., & Hammar, H. (2009). Environmental taxation for good and for bad: The efficiency and legitimacy of Sweden's carbon tax. Environmental Politics, 18(2), 218–237.
15. Speck, S. (1999). Energy and carbon taxes and their distributional implications. Energy Policy, 27(11), 659–667.
16. Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J., & Speck, S. (2000). A future for carbon taxes. Ecological Economics, 32(3), 395–412.
17. Metcalf, G. E. (2009). Designing a carbon tax to reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1), 63–83.
18. Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the double dividend: A reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance, 2(2), 157–183.
19. Hammar, H., & Jagers, S. C. (2006). Can trust in politicians explain individuals' support for climate policy? The case of CO2 tax. Climate Policy, 5(6), 613–625.
20. Clinch, J. P., Dunne, L., & Dresner, S. (2006). Environmental and wider implications of political impediments to environmental tax reform. Energy Policy, 34(8), 960–970.
21. Dresner, S., Dunne, L., Clinch, P., & Beuermann, C. (2006). Social and political responses to ecological tax reform in Europe: An introduction to the special issue. Energy Policy, 34(8), 895–904.
22. Hsu, S. L., Walters, J., & Purgas, A. (2008). Pollution tax heuristics: An empirical study of willingness to pay higher gasoline taxes. Energy Policy, 36(9), 3612–3619.
23. Doda, B. (2016). How to price carbon in good times ... and bad! WIREs Climate Change, 7(1), 135–144.
24. Cherry, T. L., Kallbekken, S., & Kroll, S. (2017). Accepting market failure: Cultural worldviews and the opposition to corrective environmental policies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 85, 193–204.
25. Hart, P. S., & Nisbet, E. C. (2012). Boomerang effects in science communication: How motivated reasoning and identity cues amplify opinion polarization about climate mitigation policies. Communication Research, 39(6), 701–723.
26. Kahan, D., Wittlin, M., Peters, E., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L., Braman, D., & Mandel, G. (2011). The tragedy of the risk-perception commons: Culture conflict, rationality conflict, and climate change (SSRN Scholarly Paper). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research network.


Stefano Carattini, Maria Carvalho & Sam Fankhauser, 2018: “Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes”. In: Stéphane Hallegatte, Mike Hulme (Eds.), WIREs Climate Change, Vol. 9/5, pages 1-26.

Fankhauser I
Samuel Fankhauser
Stefano Carattini
Maria Carvalho,
Overcoming public resistance to carbon taxes 2018

Categorization Tajfel Haslam I 164
Categorization/Tajfel: Thesis: A network of intergroup categorizations is omnipresent in the social environment; it enters into our socialization and education all the way from ‘teams’ and ‘team spirit’ in the primary and secondary
Haslam I 165
education through teenage groups of all kinds to social, national, racial, ethnic or age groups. (Tajfel et al., 1971(1): 153). >Minimal group/Tajfel. Prejudice/Tajfel: The articulation of an individual’s social world in terms of its categorization in groups becomes a guide for his [or her] conduct in situations to which some criterion of intergroup division can be meaningfully applied. (Meaningful need not be ‘rational’.) An undifferentiated environment makes very little sense and provides no guidelines for action … . Whenever … some form of intergroup categorization can be used it will give order and coherence to the social situation. >Group behavior/Tajfel.
Haslam I 172
VsTajfel: An alternative interpretation of [Tajfel’s] minimal ingroup bias (>Minimal group/Tajfel, >Group behavior/Tajfel, >Social identity theory/Tajfel) was that, rather than categorization driving discrimination, this was simply caused by participants’ perception that other ingroup members were similar to themselves. This meshed with belief-congruence theory (Rokeach, 1969)(2) and similarity-attraction principles, which suggest that we are prone to dislike others (and by extension other groups) who have different views and values to our own. (RokeachVsTajfel). Could ingroup favouritism therefore be explained by the assumed similarity with those in the ingroup (and dissimilarity with those in the outgroup)? This explanation does not necessarily invalidate the effect of social categorization (as Tajfel’s own work had shown, categorization can indeed lead people to accentuate similarities within categories and differences between them). However, it does point to a different mechanism.
Vs: Further experiments by Michael Billig and Tajfel (1973)(3) in which similarity and social categorization were manipulated independently seemed to rule out this idea. These showed that social categorization produces stronger ingroup bias than similarity. >Similarity/psychological theories, >Categorization/psychological theories, >Reciprocity/psycholgical theories, >Egoism/Tajfel.



1. Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M.G. and Bundy, R.F. (1971) ‘Social categorization and intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 1: 149–77.
2. Rokeach, M. (1969) beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
3. Billig, M.G. and Tajfel, H. (1973) ‘Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 3: 27–52.



Russell Spears and Sabine Otten,“Discrimination. Revisiting Tajfel’s minimal group studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications


Haslam I
S. Alexander Haslam
Joanne R. Smith
Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Communication Activity Kranton Kranton I 433
Communication Activity/Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We show that the MCE is Pareto-optimal for the unbiased agents and provides a refinement criterion, referred to as “activity” that distinguishes among equilibria. 1. (…) as in cheap talk games, there are babbling equilibria in which no valuable information is created. Suppose each unbiased agent who has not received the signal takes the same action independent of any message received and votes for 0 according to his prior. In this case, all unbiased agents are indifferent between all actions: creating, or not, true or false messages and transmitting, or not, messages. A simple equilibrium then consists of the following strategies: Unbiased agents never create or transmit any messages, and biased agents always create m = 1 upon receipt of the signal and transmit any m = 1 but no other message. The only messages that are generated are those from the biased agents, and hence they are not informative. These strategies form an equilibrium supported by (consistent) posterior beliefs equal to the prior, except for the agent who has received the signal.
2. Second, there are equilibria where unbiased agents create truthful messages but do not transmit credible messages. These equilibria involve a coordination failure and cannot easily be eliminated using standard selection arguments. The standard perfection argument that generates transmission in a persuasion game does not hold in our model. Because of the presence of biased agents, messages are not perfectly informative, and it may be rational not to transmit message 1.
Kranton I 434
To refine the equilibrium set, consider restricting attention to the following simple strategies: A biased agent is active if and only if she creates message M(s) = 1 and only transmits message 1. An unbiased agent is active if and only if she creates a message that matches the signal and transmits message m if she thinks the probability that the true state is m is higher than 1/2. This refinement allows us to single out the MCE. Conclusion: The MCE is the only equilibrium where all agents are active. In an equilibrium where all agents are active, coordination failures are ruled out at both the message creation and transmission stages. This results in the highest expected payoff for the unbiased agents. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Communication Equilibria/Bayesianism.



Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Communication Equilibria Kranton Kranton I 421
Communication Equilibria/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: Full Communication Equilibrium/FCE: (…) a full communication equilibrium (FCE) [is a state], where all biased and unbiased agents transmit messages and, therefore, spread possibly false rumors. They do so because there is a sufficiently large probability the rumor is true. The equilibrium conditions rely on the number and distribution of biased and unbiased agents in the population. In a network, for any agent, the set of possible senders of a message must contain sufficiently few biased agents.
Kranton I 428
Example: Consider five agents in a line, (…), where the links allow communication in either direction, with four unbiased agents and one biased agent in the middle. Assume that unbiased agents create true messages upon receiving a signal and transmit any message they receive. Can these strategies form an equilibrium? [Yes], strategies in which all unbiased agents transmit all messages form a [full communication] equilibrium [FCE].
Kranton I 429
Strategies: Upon receipt of the signal, every biased agent i creates a message that matches her bias, that is, Mi(s) = 1. Every biased agent only transmits a message if the message is 1; that is,
ti(0) = ∅, ti(1) = 1. Every unbiased agent i creates a true message upon receiving a signal; that
is, Mi(s) = s, and transmits any received message, that is, ti(m) = m.
beliefs: (1) For an agent i who has received a message m = 0 from an unbiased neighbor j, ρi(0(j )) = 0. (2) For an agent i who has received a message m = 1.
These strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium of the network game when the posterior
belief of an agent receiving message m(j) = 1 is willing to pass it on; that is, when ρi(1(j )) ≥ 1/2.
Kranton I 430
Conclusion: Roughly (….), an FCE exists if biased agents are few in number and dispersed through the network.
Kranton I 422
Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: [If the condition for the] full communication [fails], there is an equilibrium, called maximal communication equilibrium (MCE), in which communication is maximized: In any equilibrium, information flows on an edge only if it flows in this MCE. A main feature of this equilibrium is that information can flow from one part of the network to another but not in the reverse direction. Unbiased agents maintain the credibility of messages by blocking those that come from a part of the network that contains too many biased agents
Kranton I 432
[thus] limiting the influence of localized biased agents.
Kranton I 422
This same agent, however, will transmit messages coming from another direction. These MCEs yield the highest expected payoffs of all perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game.
Kranton I 432
In particular, two unbiased agents always communicate to each other in an MCE (…).
Kranton I 431
Strategies: Biased agents, upon receipt of the signal, create a message that matches their bias, that is, M(s) = 1. Biased agents only transmit messages that match their bias, that is, t(0) = Ø , (Ø = message blocked) t(1) = 1. Unbiased agents, upon receipt of a signal, create true messages; that is, M(s) = s. All unbiased agents i transmit message 1 received from agent j if (j, i) ∈ G∗; (>Terminology/Kranton) otherwise agent i
Kranton I 432
does not transmit the message. All unbiased agents transmit messages m = 0 received from any agent. beliefs: The only event for which beliefs need to be specified is when an agent receives a message 0 from a biased agent. As previously, we suppose i’s posterior belief is equal to his prior in this case.
Conclusion: The above strategies and beliefs form an equilibrium of the network game. We call this equilibrium the “MCE” as communication is maximal among all equilibria in the following sense: In any equilibrium, if (j, i) / ∈ G∗ (equivalently (j, i) ∈ W), then j is biased and i does not transmit m = 1 received from j. (>Terminology/Kranton).
Kranton I 434
Agents/Maximal Communication Equilibrium/MCE: (…) biased agents always prefer the MCE to any equilibrium with partial communication and any equilibrium with partial communication to an equilibrium without communication. The expected utility of unbiased agents is more difficult to rank. (…) the expected utility of unbiased agents is the highest in the MCE (i.e., in the FCE when it exists) and is the lowest in an equilibrium without communication.

Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Communication Equilibria Bayesianism Kranton I 427
Communication Equilibria/Beliefs/Agents/Bayesianism: On the equilibrium path, the posteriors are formed by Bayes’ rule; m = 0 is created only by unbiased agents, the probability that the originator of message m = 1 is biased is b, and receiving no message occurs in the event no agent receives a signal and hence the prior is maintained. Off the equilibrium path, no message is received in which case we set the posterior to be equal to the prior. Turning to agents’ strategies to create messages, given these posterior beliefs, no unbiased agent who receives the signal would choose to send an untrue message (…), since this action will decrease the number of agents who vote for the outcome corresponding to the true state. No biased agent has an incentive to deviate and choose m = ∅ or m = 0, (>Terminology/Kranton) since these actions will decrease the posterior belief that 1 is the true state. Consider the possibility that in equilibrium a strict subset of unbiased agents send truthful messages. One of the unbiased agents who does not send a message or an untruthful one would have an incentive to deviate and send a truthful message, since it increases the likelihood of the correct outcome. (…) we see that communication occurs in the public broadcast model if and only if the proportion of biased agents in the population is sufficiently low. This equilibrium maximizes unbiased agents’ expected payoffs. There exists an equilibrium in which no unbiased agents broadcast messages, but there exists no equilibrium in which only a strict subset of unbiased agents broadcast truthful messages.


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.


Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011
Communication Models Economic Theories Kranton I 423
Communication Models/Bloch/Demange/Kranton/Economic Theories: (…) the model [by Bloch, Demange and Kranton] combines two classic elements of information games: “cheap talk” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982)(1) in the decision of the initial receiver of the signal as to whether or not to create a truthful message, and “persuasion” (Milgrom, 1981(2); Milgrom and Roberts, 1986(3)) in the decision of agents who subsequently choose whether to transmit the message, which they cannot transform. In our model, there are multiple equilibria, along the lines of cheap talk games. However, as in persuasion games, at the transmission stage agents have an incentive to pass on credible information to other agents. In our model (Bloch/Demange/Kranton), there is a single unknown source of information and agents are Bayesian, but due to differences in their preferences and the possibility of falsification and blocking, they may end up with different beliefs and choose different actions. >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Communication Models/Kranton.


1. CRAWFORD, V. P., AND J. SOBEL, “Strategic Information Transmission,” Econometrica 50 (6) (1982), 1431–51.
2. MILGROM, P. R., “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics 12 (2), (1981), 380–91.
3. MILGROM, P., AND J. ROBERTS, “Relying on the Information of Interested Parties,” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1986), 18–32.



Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.


Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011
Communication Models Kranton Kranton I 424
Communication Models/Benchmark Models/Agents/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: There is a population of |N| = n agents, and two possible states of nature, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Agents: earn payoffs from a collective decision, or outcome; let x ∈ {0, 1} denote the outcome. There are two types of agents, with different preferences:
a) Unbiased agents: (set U): prefer the outcome to match the state of nature.
b) Biased agents: (set B) prefer outcome x= 1 to be implemented, regardless of the state of nature.
The number of biased and unbiased agents in the population is common knowledge. Agents have a common prior belief that θ = 1 with probability π. We assume π < 1/2 so that agents initially believe the true state is 0 with higher probability. With this initial prior, agents are particularly interested in credible information that the outcome is 1.
Interaction: between agents is divided into three phases: (i) a message creation phase, (ii) a communication phase and (iii) a collective vote phase.
Kranton I 425
Communication/Benchmark Models/Communication Models/Nash Equilibrium/Kranton: We consider two benchmark models of communication (…). In the “public broadcast model”, the recipient agent broadcasts his message directly to all other agents. In the “network communication model”, agents are organized along a social network. Agent i receives a message m(j) from one of his neighbors j and chooses whether to transmit his message to all other neighbors or not. >Broadcasting, >Network Model. After all possible communication has taken place, agents vote between two alternatives, 0 and 1.
Each biased agent votes for
Kranton I 426
outcome 1 regardless of his posterior. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, and votes for outcome 0 if π < 1/2 (…). (…) it is optimal for unbiased agents to vote according to their beliefs. Nash equilibrium: a nash equilibrium of the voting game consists of the following strategies [.] Each unbiased agent i votes for outcome x = 1 if π > 1/2, votes for outcome x = 0 if π < 1/2, and votes for 0 and 1 with equal probability if π = 1/2. Each unbiased agent votes for outcome x = 1.”
(…) we presume that agents reach the collective decision in such a manner and therefore have an incentive to communicate information that influences others’ posteriors and hence their “votes.” Unbiased agents’ prior beliefs are that state 0 is more likely and therefore vote for outcome 0 if there is no possibility of communication. A particular benefit of communication is then learning that 1 is more likely the true state.


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Control Processes Shoda Corr I 479
Control processes/CAPS/Cognitive-Affective Processing System/self-regulation/Shoda/Smith: The cognitive-affective components are interconnected. The >encoding units respond to specific aspects of the situation (producing the psychological situation) and the encodings both influence and are affected by other units (expectancies, goals, affects). The total pattern of activations and inhibitions results in certain behaviours, which may themselves alter the situation. In the CAPS model, the focus is not just on ‘how much’ of a particular unit (e.g., self-efficacy belief, performance anxiety, mastery goal orientation) a person has, but in how these cognitive-affective units are organized with one another within the person, forming a network of interconnections that can operate, in a parallel rather than serial manner, at multiple levels of accessibility, awareness and automaticity. Individuals differ stably and uniquely in this network of interconnections or associations, and such differences constitute a major aspect of personality (Mischel and Shoda 1995(1); Shoda and Mischel 1998(2)).
For a given individual the likelihood that a particular feature of a situation triggers thought A, which leads to thought B, emotion C, and behaviour D may be relatively stable and predictable, reflecting a network of chronically accessible associations among cognitions and affects available to that individual. Thus, the CAPS model posits an internal set of if...then...relations as well the external situation-behaviour if...then...relations (…), and the cognitions and affects that are activated at a given time depend on situations, either internal or external to an individual.
The system that underlies an individual’s cognitive-affective and behavioural dynamics typically contains extensive internal feedback loops, meaning that ‘downstream’ units can activate ‘upstream’ units, generating a flow of thoughts, feelings and even behaviours without necessarily requiring an outside stimulus.
For example, the many beliefs we maintain are not independent of each other, but support one another in a way that helps us ‘make sense’ of the world and constitutes a personal philosophy of life. Further, components of a belief system are related to affective reactions, goals and values, and behaviours in a way that forms a coherent organic whole (Shoda and Smith 2004)(3). >Networks/Shoda/Smith.



1. Mischel, W. and Shoda, Y. 1995. A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure, Psychological Review 102: 246–68
2. Shoda, Y. and Mischel, W. 1998. Personality as a stable cognitive-affective activation network: characteristic patterns of behaviour variation emerge from a stable personality structure, in S. J. Read and L. C. Miller (eds.), Connectionist and PDP models of social reasoning and social behaviour, pp. 175–208. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum
3. Shoda, Y. and Smith, R. E. 2004. Conceptualizing personality as a cognitive-affective processing system: a framework for models of maladaptive behaviour patterns and change, Behaviour Therapy 35: 147–65


Ronald E. Smith and Yuichi Shoda, “Personality as a cognitive-affective processing system“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press


Corr I
Philip J. Corr
Gerald Matthews
The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009
Functionalism Fodor Dennett I 292 ff
Fodor/Dennett: the necessity of an organism to work smoothly at any stage imposes iron restrictions on its subsequent properties.
Fodor IV 127
functionalist: causal role distinguishes desires and beliefs ((s) internal in the mind) - SemanticsVsFunktionalism: Relationship mind-world determining.
IV 127
semantic properties/Fodor/Lepore: functionalism: the semantic properties derived from the functional (causal) role - so beliefs and desires are distinguished by the causal role - on the other hand semantics: the semantic properties are derived from the relation of mind/world.
Frank I 61 ~
FodorVsFunctionalism: does not grasp the qualia, nothing would be a token of the general type of pain, even if it were linked typically with all other psych. states - Arg. of the missing qualia: the organism could behave without them jsut the same - Shoemaker: Failure of qualia unthinkable because of networking.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Castaneda Frank I 159 ff
I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible - entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical - limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person - I criteria-less, content-neutral - I can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: VsI as "Something". (>Guise theory).
I 167ff
I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*).
I 186
Not demonstrative.
I 170
Transcendent/I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experience and therefore associated to the world beyond experience.
I 171
I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka).
I 226f
I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural).
Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness,
in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157


Frank I 378
I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient.
I 430f
I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986


I 470
I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j...

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Kaplan Frank I 412
Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> vivid name/Locke). - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I". ---
I 430
I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim.
John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13
(1979), 3-21
---
I 459ff
I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs.
I 469
Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." - VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion".
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief,
and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327
D. Kaplan
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
I, Ego, Self Rorty IV 67
"Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I": the Def "I" consists of the mental states of a person. >Consciousness.
"I"/Rorty: the "I" does not have, but is beliefs. The brain does not have synapses, but is made of them.
"I think"/Kant:... it has to be able to accompany all my ideas: Rorty: just a method. It means having a conviction or a desire automatically means to have many. No "Synthesis", but simply the fact that they belong to one and the same network.
Frank I 24ff
I/Rorty: can be analyzed away - SB: incorrigible - but not specifically epistemic or specifically ontological - Rorty pro >nominalism: properties are only assigned to the things through linguistic practice, not by themselves! - Like Foucault: "I" could go out of fashion

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Identity Davidson Glüer II 69
E.g. identity: How clear is the idea of the ancient Greeks. - Some ancient Greeks believed the earth was flat? This earth? If anyone believes nothing of what we believe about the earth, to what extent does it refer to the earth?
Glüer II 72
This makes it clear that beliefs must be thought of in a similarly networked way as sentences. Beliefs - like sentences - never occur individually.
Davidson I (b) 21
Identity/Quine: we cannot pick out "the" relationship which is constitutive for the recognition of the identity of an object - any property can be regarded as relevant - Davidson: if the mind always had to establish a clear relation to the object, thinking would be impossible.
Frank I 672
Identity/Davidson: "molecular identical", "tie identical": For example, the same skin redness can be a sunburn on one hand, and something quite different on the other. - Even twin earth twins are molecule-identical.
I 674
DavidsonVsPutnam: but they are not psychically identical. (Anomalous monism).

Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and
Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Language Searle III 78
Language/language-dependent/Searle: some things can be viewed independent of language: E.g. that the man crossed the line - but not that he makes 6 points with this - institutional facts are never language independent - e.g. there is no pre-verbal way to represent the pawn as king - (game) points are not "out there" like men and balls - SearleVsPutnam: > meanings are in the head. ---
III 79
Reasons only work because people accept them as reasons - language independent: are status functions: e.g. one can think that this is a screwdriver because one has seen many times that things are screwed with it. - ((s) QuineVsSearle: Network of our beliefs thoroughly language-dependent.) ---
III 82
Searle: language is necessary if the status changes without a change of the physical state of an object. ---
Perler/Wild I 143
Language/Searle: Language is needed for: 1. Intentional states that deal with language - 2. that deal with facts, e.g. that this is a dollar note - 3. representation of spatially and temporally distant facts - 4. complex states - 5. formulations that contain descriptions, e.g. instead of "today it is warm" the date.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Misinformation Economic Theories Kranton I 423
Misinformation/Fake News/Economic Theories: ((s) the term “fake news” is not used by the cited authors). In one set of models, opinions spread like diseases; that is, individuals become infected (adopt an opinion) by contact with another agent with that disease (see, e.g., chapter 7 of Jackson, 2008)(1). Such diffusion processes are also studied in computer science, statistical physics, and sociology. In such models, biased agents are always better off when there are more biased agents (…). In a second set of models, opinion formation in social networks builds on DeGroot (1974)(2). Agents, with possibly different initial priors, repeatedly “exchange” their beliefs with their neighbors and adopt some statistic (the weighted average, say) of their neighbors’ opinions. Such agents fail to take into account the repetition of information that can propagate through a network, leading to a persuasion bias as referred to by DeMarzo et al. (2003)(3).
Golub and Jackson (2010)(4) find sufficient network conditions under which such a naive rule leads to convergence to the truth—there can be no prominent groups, for example, that have disproportionate influence.
Research on Bayesian learning in networks (e.g., Bala and Goyal, 1998(5); Gale and Kariv, 2003(6); Acemoglu et al., 2011(7)) characterizes convergence or not to common opinions for different network architectures.
A new literature studies individuals’ incentives to communicate private information to others. Niehaus (2011)(8) adds a cost to sharing information; an agent will weigh the benefits to her friends and neighbors against the personal cost.
Other papers study influence in networks; agents all have private information and have an incentive to share their information because, for example, agents benefit when others’ adopt the same action (Hagenbach and Koessler, 2010(9); Galeotti et al., 2013(10); Calvo´ -Armengol et al., 2015(11)).
Chatterjee and Dutta (2016)(12) [are probably the closest to the line of work by Bloch, Demange and Kranton 2018(13)]. [Their paper focuses] on the credibility of messages received by agents in a social network when the message can be false.
Kranton I 424
(…) this article features a situation in which information is not widely held, and unbiased agents strategically spread information so that a correct public decision is taken. A large economic literature also studies the transmission and communication of information through the observation of other agents’ actions. Observation helps discern the true state of the world. Knowledge or information costlessly spreads (Banerjee, 1992(14), 1993(15); Bikhchandani et al., 1992(16)), or spills over, to others, as occurs when people observe others’ use of a new technology (e.g., Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995(17); Conley and Udry, 2010(18)). In these models, though individuals influence others through their actions, they derive no benefit in influencing them and, contrary to [the article by Bloch, Demange, Kranton 2018 (13)], any decision to communicate is not strategic. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Kranton.


1. JACKSON, M., Social and Economic networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
2. DEGROOT,M. H., “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (345) (1974), 118–21.
3. DEMARZO, P. M.,D.VAYANOS, AND J. ZWEIBEL, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3) (2003), 909–68.
4. GOLUB, B., AND M. JACKSON, “Naive Learning in Social networks and the Wisdom of Crowds,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2 (2010), 112–49.
5. BALA, V., AND S. GOYAL, “Learning from Neighbors,” The Review of Economic Studies 65 (3) (1998), 595–621.
6. GALE, D., AND S. KARIV, “Bayesian Learning in Social networks,” Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2) (2003), 329–46.
7. ACEMOGLU, D.,M.DAHLEH, I. LOBEL, AND A.OZDAGLAR, “Bayesian Learning in Social networks,” Review of Economic Studies 78 (2011), 1201–36.
8. NIEHAUS, P., “Filtered Social Learning,” Journal of Political Economy 119 (4) (2011), 686–720.
9. HAGENBACH, J., AND F. KOESSLER, “Strategic Communication in networks,” Review of Economic Studies 77 (3) (2010), 1072–99.
10. GALEOTTI, A., C.GHIGLINO, AND F. SQUINTANI, “Strategic Information in networks,” Journal of Economic Theory 148 (5) (2013), 1751–69.
11. CALVO´ -ARMENGOL,A., J. DEMART´I, ANDA. PRAT, “Communication and Influence,” Theoretical Economics 10 (2015), 649–90.
12. CHATTERJEE, K., AND B.DUTTA, “Credibility and Strategic Learning in networks,” International Economic Review 57 (3) (2016), 759–86.
13. BLOCH, F., G. DEMANGE, AND R. KRANTON, "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2)(2018), pages 421-448, May.
14. BANERJEE, A., “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (3) (1992), 797–817.
15. BANERJEE, A., “The Economics of Rumours,” Review of Economic Studies 60 (1993), 309–27.
16. BIKHCHANDANI, S., D. HIRSHLEIFER, AND I. WELCH, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political Economy 100 (1992), 992–1026.
17. FOSTER, A., AND M. ROSENZWEIG, “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical Change in Agriculture,” Journal of Political Economy 103 (1995), 1176–209.
18. CONLEY, T., AND C.UDRY, “Learning about a New Technology: Pineapple in Ghana,” American Economic Review 100 (2010), 35–69.


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.


Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011
Misinformation Kranton Kranton I 421
Misinformation/Fake News/Kranton: ((s) the term “fake news” is not used by the cited authors). Agents’ individual payoffs depend on a collective decision, such as election of a candidate or authorizing the use of a new technology. Collective decision making is modeled as a stylized “vote” that reflects each agent’s expected utility from the decision. Some agents are unbiased and prefer that the decision correctly matches the true state of the world. (>Terminology/Kranton). Other agents are biased and prefer a particular decision regardless of the true state. (Such agents might personally benefit, say, from the decision.) Agents have prior beliefs as to the true state. One agent, selected at random, possibly receives precise information about the true state. This agent, whose identity is not known, can create a false or true message—a rumor—of the state of the world. Biased agents have the incentive to create a false message. Agents who receive a message make an inference as to the veracity of the message and decide whether or not to pass it along to influence how others will vote on the collective outcome. >Misinformation/Economic Theories.
Kranton I 423
In one set of models, opinions spread like diseases; that is, individuals become infected (adopt an opinion) by contact with another agent with that disease (see, e.g., chapter 7 of Jackson, 2008)(1). Such diffusion processes are also studied in computer science, statistical physics, and sociology. In such models, biased agents are always better off when there are more biased agents (…). In a second set of models, opinion formation in social networks builds on DeGroot (1974)(2). Agents, with possibly different initial priors, repeatedly “exchange” their beliefs with their neighbors and adopt some statistic (the weighted average, say) of their neighbors’ opinions. Such agents fail to take into account the repetition of information that can propagate through a network, leading to a persuasion bias as referred to by DeMarzo et al. (2003)(3).
Kranton I 436
General Networks/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We identify three key simplifying assumptions that render the analysis of the general network similar to the analysis of a tree. 1. If agents transmit a message, they send the message to all their neighbors (except the one from whom they have received a message). Communication is multicast, and agents cannot endogenously choose which route to send the message along.
2. The time it takes a message to travel along a path is proportional to the length of the path. This assumption is needed to guarantee that agents can identify the agents from whom they receive the message the first time as those agents who are at a shortest distance in the network. Absent this assumption, agents would have to make complex computations to identify the set of agents from whom they receive the message the first time.
3. (Most importantly) agents only decide whether or not to transmit the message the first time they receive it; that is, although a message could reach an agent along several paths and an agent could therefore receive several messages, they ignore all messages but the first one. >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton, >Misinformation/Economic Theories, >Terminology/Kranton.



1. JACKSON, M., Social and Economic networks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
2. DEGROOT,M. H., “Reaching a Consensus,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 69 (345) (1974), 118–21.
3. DEMARZO, P. M.,D.VAYANOS, AND J. ZWEIBEL, “Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (3) (2003), 909–68.



Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Network Models Kranton Kranton I 425
Network Model/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: In the “network communication model”, agents are organized along a social network.
Kranton I 426
The “network model” represents an environment where individuals communicate privately to colleagues or friends, such as in texts, e-mails, and phone calls. People know each others’ types and can pass on information, but again the original source of the information is unknown (…). >Public Broadcasting/Kranton.
Kranton I 427
Differences of the network model in contrast to the public broadcast model: 1. Agents communicate pairwise.
2. Agents’ types are common knowledge.
The combination of these two features can allow communication even when no truthful communication is possible in public broadcast. With pairwise transmission of messages and knowledge of where agents of different types are located, agents can judge the veracity of a message transmitted through a particular part of the network and block it from reaching others. This blocking then increases the veracity of other messages that then circulate.
In the network model a pair of agents i and j have a link, denoted by ij, if they have the potential to communicate, and we say agent i is agent j ’s neighbor and vice versa. Although the underlying structure of the social network is undirected, communication could occur in either, both, or neither direction. To indicate the direction of any communication, let (i, j ) denote the directed link from i to j, (j, i) denote the directed link from j to i, and let G denote the set of all directed links. G and individual agents’ types are common knowledge. We assume that the network is connected; that is, every agent has at least one neighbor. (…) agents are connected in such a way that a message can reach any individual through only one route.
Equilibrium/Network Model: an equilibrium in the network model consists of message creation strategies, transmission strategies, and beliefs (Mi, ti, ρi) for each agent i such that each agent’s strategy is sequentially rational given the beliefs and strategies of others, and beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule from the strategies whenever possible. >Communication Equilibria/Bayesianism, >Communication Activity/Kranton.
Kranton I 434
Agent Replacement/Agents/Networks/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We perform a comparative static exercise on the number of biased agents; we replace one biased agent with one unbiased agent and consider the effect of this replacement on individual welfare. The replacement of an unbiased agent by a biased agent j decreases the utility of unbiased agents but could increase or decrease the expected utility of biased agents. There are three effects (…): 1. a direct effect on the number of votes for collective action 1,
2. a direct effect on information transmission because a message m = 1 is always created when the signal is received by agent j , and
3. an indirect effect on information transmission as messages m = 1 are more likely to be blocked by unbiased agents, since the message is less likely to be credible.
For unbiased agents who receive the same message as the unbiased agent whose status has switched, all effects concur to reduce expected utility. For biased agents, there is a trade-off. Both direct effects result in an increase in expected utility, but the indirect effect may induce a decrease in the number of unbiased agents who
Kranton I 435
receive and believe message m = 1. The negative effect of adding biased agents stands in sharp contrast to models of rumors and opinion formation based on fixed laws of diffusion or adoption. In such models, it is always beneficial for biased agents to increase their numbers. Here, where agents strategically transmit messages from others, the introduction of more biased agents can reduce their expected utility, depending on where the agents are located in the network.
Kranton I 436
General Networks/Communication/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: We identify three key simplifying assumptions that render the analysis of the general network similar to the analysis of a tree. 1. If agents transmit a message, they send the message to all their neighbors (except the one from whom they have received a message). Communication is multicast, and agents cannot endogenously choose which route to send the message along.
2. The time it takes a message to travel along a path is proportional to the length of the path. This assumption is needed to guarantee that agents can identify the agents from whom they receive the message the first time as those agents who are at a shortest distance in the network. Absent this assumption, agents would have to make complex computations to identify the set of agents from whom they receive the message the first time.
3. [Most importantly] agents only decide whether or not to transmit the message the first time they receive it; that is, although a message could reach an agent along several paths and an agent could therefore receive several messages, they ignore all messages but the first one.
Kranton I 437
However, we observe that, even under the three assumptions on agents’ behavior, MCEs might not be defined when the network contains cycles.


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Perception Quine Münch III 296
Definition Perception/Quine/Schnelle: getting aware of an irritation.
Münch III 298
Quine, "the animal responds to the semi-circle on the screen" - SchnelleVsQuine: how does he know that? - Maybe it just avoids pain.
Helmut Schnelle, Introspection and the Description of Language Use“, in: Florian Coulmas (Ed) Festschrift for native speaker, Den Haag 1981, 105-126.

Quine VI 2
Perception/Quine: Input: not objects, but activation of our sensory receptors. - We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences. Stimulus influences instead of observation and instead of documents.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: is neurophysiologically recordable in principle - beliefs cannot be recorded.
V 15
Perception/Quine: this is about form, not about stimuli (these fall under reception).
V 18
Perception/Quine: has more to do with consciousness than with the reception of stimuli. But it is also accessible to behavioral criteria. It shows itself in the conditioning of reactions.
V 33
Similarity/perception/ontology/Quine: the transition from perception to perceptual similarity brings ontological clarity: perception (the result of the act of perception) is omitted.
V 36
Perception Similarity/Quine: one is inclined to speak here of similarity in certain respects.
V 37
Quine: this is convenient in practice, but dispensable in theory, if you extend similarity as above by many digits. Learning/Perception/Similarity/Perception Similarity/Quine: in learning, different degrees of similarity must play a role.
N.B.: otherwise any enhanced reaction would be conditioned equally to any future episode, since they would all be equally similar!
N.B.: it follows from this that the standards of perceptual similarity must be innate.
VI 1
Perception/Language/World: our systematic theory about the outside world has evolved over generations. It allows us to predict future sensory stimuli. Thus, amidst the maze of stimuli, we have a theory that helps us to verify predictions.
VI 2
Perception/Observation/Quine: what is observation is not easy to analyze. Our input does not consist in objects, but in the activation of our sensory receptors. We must justify ourselves with stimulus influences, and renounce the objects! (Also on corresponding singular terms).
Def Stimulus Influence/Quine: the temporally ordered set of all perceptual receptors of the subject that are activated at an event.
VI 3
Observation/Quine: this is how we manage to renounce the term "observation" as an independent technical term! (In favour of stimulus influence).
VI 26
Perception/Quine: I have always spoken of neuronal receptors and their stimulation and never of sense data. (>Naturalized Epistemology). Sense Data/Quine: are cartesian! >Cartesianism.
VI 86
Perception/Learning/Language/Quine: two of Otto's perception situations that it is raining will differ not only in time, but also in neuronal terms. They are probably too complicated to be described neuronally at all, since there are many different signs of rain.
But there must still be some common neuronal characteristic for the class of these processes, because after all it was stimulus generalizations that were responsible for Otto learning it.
Then we can transfer this class to a whole population. However, it is even more inaccessible because the nervous systems of different individuals are networked differently.
VI 89
Perception/Criteria/Quine: of things: Example "x perceives that p". Problem: the light in which we see an object always comes from the sun or another source.
VI 90
Can we resort to criteria? No: because we also want to allow a bowl to be perceived by the fact that it is reflected in something.
Solution: focal point: we want to distinguish between seeing a glass and seeing through this glass. But causal relationships and focal point are not yet sufficient. Some part of the surface of our bowl would satisfy this condition no less than the whole bowl itself.
VI 91
So we need whole sentences to get through them to the terms.
VI 92
Perception/Quine: For example "x perceives that p" drives the speech of perceptions to undreamt-of heights. So we should even notice that Newton's laws imply Kepler's! But condition: only on the occasion of the situation in which we take note for the first time that p, they say of us, we noticed that p.
VI 93
Perception/Quine: is only one event in a subject at a time. We register foreign perceptions through the behavior of a subject and our empathy.
VI 94
It is more difficult to empathize with the belief of others: although we understand the belief of the dog that he will get his food, how do we understand that someone believes in transubstantiation during the Eucharist? >Behaviorism.
VI 100
Perception/Quine: we have already seen that a neurological generalization of our perceptions is not possible because of the different situations, viewpoints and different neural networks. Nevertheless, every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms! However, this does not apply to belief.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992
Propositions Perry Frank I 396
Meaning/thought/PerryVsFrege: we must separate the meaning sharply from the thought- the thought is not a mental entity but corresponds to the informational content. - Meaning corresponds with the role of the words - the same role creates in every context another de re-proposition.
Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference,
and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55

James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An
International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians,
Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986
---
I 409f
Proposition/PerryVsTradition: what is missing, is not a conceptual component, but an indexical. - New theory: a kind of proposition is individuated by an object and a part of the old proposition. - VsTradition: limiting the substitutability in quotations with propositional attitudes is not explained. - Tradition: E.g. Dean/Franks neighbor (identical, one and the same person): no variable but term. - Problem: "He" does not provide a concept but a variable. - Solution/Perry: "open proposition": with objects and a conceptual component: "de re" - then the "dean himself" is included and not only the term "Dean". - Then a substitution by "Frank's neighbor" is valid and a quantification meaningful. - Vs: de re does not solve the problem of mess in the supermarket (sugar trail) - (because of "I"). ---
I 455f
Proposition/extra sense//Perry: parabola E.g. early humans who can only eat carrots lying in front of them, are equipped with the ability to believe propositions (to collect and pick up carrots) - nothing happens, because the propositions do not say to humans that they even appear in it. - Castaneda: additional localization in space and time. - Vs: the king of France does not know that he is the King of France and whether the carrot is not in front of the editor of Soul - VsExtra-sense: does not help the thinker embedding himself into a network of mental states - people understand sentences but do not form beliefs. - List of extra senses for everyone: too long - Extra-sense "i" for everyone: validity by decree: solves the carrots problem but maims the language - rule: "I" stands for the user ": makes people to speak of themselves in the "third person": ""I"is doing this" - problem: for truth of such sentences one needs reference (reference), meaning ("user") is not enough - the same meaning cannot perform different references..

Perr I
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Reductionism Rorty I 190
Justification: the traditional concept of justification in epistemology is reductionistic and atomistic. >reduction. Reductionism/Freud: he does not tell us that art is actually sublimation, that philosophical system formation is just paranoia or religion merely misguided memory.

IV 48 ff
"Anti-reductionism": reduction is no relationship between ontological categories, but only between linguistic circumstances. a) Who (linguistically) speaks of X does not necessarily speak of Y.
b) Every description in an X terminology applies only to things to which also a description in a Y terminology refers. But this type of reduction does not mean that "X things are nothing but Y things".
There is nothing that could show this. "An X is what it is, and no other thing." (Buttler).
The only possibility to show that there are no X things would be to show that there are no such sentences! (X and Y are only stylistic variants).
Folk Psychology: will continue to be the most appropriate way to talk about us. We will keep "beliefs" and "desires" in our vocabulary. They are proven tools.
VI 138f
Def Reductionism/Rorty: there is not a single network, but also a single, privileged description of all entities included in the network. The reductionist believes that we do not only need causal unity, but also unity of explanation: A process to make all attempts at explanation commensurable and provide true nomological statements through which all these entities (thoughts, neurons, sins, hormones, actions and movements, persons and organisms) are interlinked. RortyVsReduktionism: we have learned from Davidson to be content with token-token identities between differently described objects.
VI 139
Reductionism/Rorty: believes that there is only one correct description - so that all explanations are comparable.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Relativism Rorty I 304
Relativism: The assertion that truth and reference are "relative to a conceptual system" sounds as if it said more. But that is not the case as long as our system of concepts simply stands for the things which we currently believe.
II (b) 36
RortyVsHabermas: needs an Archimedean point to criticize Foucault for his "relativism".
II (g) 152
Cultural relativism: is not relativistic as long as relativism amounts to the assertion that every moral view is as good as any other. Rorty: our moral conception is much better than any competing view. It’s one thing to make the false assertion that there is no difference between us and the Nazis. A very different thing is to represent the correct assertion that there is no neutral common ground on which a Nazi and I can retreat to discuss.
III 87
Schumpeter: "the insight that the validity of one’s own beliefs is only relative, and yet stand up for them fearlessly, distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian" Berlin: one must not ask for more.
IV 11
Relativism/cultural relativism/RortyVsPutnam: false solution: a transcultural point of view. - That would be just another God point of view: ideal truth as limiting concept.
V 20
Cultures have no axiomatic structures. The fact that they have institutionalized norms actually says the same thing as Foucault’s thesis: that knowledge and power can never be separated. If you do not believe in certain things at a certain place at a certain time, you probably have to atone for it.
VI 74
Relativism/Realism/PutnamVsRealism/PutnamVsRelativism/Rorty: both assume that one could simultaneously be both inside and outside language.
VI 77f
Fascism/relativism/truth/Sartre/Rorty: E.g. tomorrow, after my death, people can decide to introduce fascism - then fascism will be the human truth. - RortyVsSartre: not the truth - the truth would have been forgotten. - Putnam: Truth is a third instance between the camps. - RortyVsPutnam: correctness instead of truth - namely, according to our standards. - According to what other standards, teh ones of the fascists?.
VI 79
Justification of the standards/Rorty: from our self-improvement.
VI 246
Cultural relativism/Rorty: I am of the opinion that our Western culture is more than others. But this kind of relativism is not irrationalism. One does not have to be an irrationalist if one abstains from making one’s own network of beliefs as coherent and transparent as possible. >Cultural Relativism.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Representation Fodor Rorty I 269 ff
Rorty: Fodor s image of the internal representations has nothing to do with our mirror of nature that we have adopted. What is decisive is that with respect to Fodor s "Language of thought" the skeptical question "how exactly do the internal representations (representations) represent reality?" cannot be asked! There is no gap.
Fodor IV ~ 122
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: having a thought is not an action, therefore it is not subject to beliefs like speech acts.
IV 124
Representation/Fodor/Lepore: today: Representations have functional roles qua constituents of propositional attitude - but the content must not depend neither metaphysically nor conceptually on their functional role. -
IV 126
Representation/Tradition/Fodor/Lepore: their explanation does not use beliefs, wishes, etc. - so the causal role is determined only by non-semantic properties. - Representations are not used for anything - Computation/Fodor/Lepore: Thesis: the causal role of representations is governed by the same syntactic properties that affect their compositionality.
V 128
Not representations are interpreted, but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc. - the representations themselves are also inaccessible to RI.
IV 127f
Interpretation: Objects not representations but propositional attitudes, speech acts, etc.
IV 201
Representation/Neurophysiological/Mind/Brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies - the brain represents red things as red as aunts as aunts! - (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties) - otherwise we could find out anything with introspection - there are very different interpretations of its diagrams. - (VsConnectionism).
Newen/Schrenk I 133
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor presumes localizable, specifiable representations - VsFodor: today you rather assume neuronal networks. - Representation: preconceptual - e.g. spatial orientation.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Representation Churchland Fodor IV 189
Representation/Reality/Churchland: Thesis: The brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in a suitable state space. Fodor/Lepore: we only need to be interested in the neurophysiological aspect here.
He refers to Quine's familiar picture of the theory as a network of beliefs: on the edge observation sets, easily revisable, in the center theoretical concepts and logical relations, not easily revisable. Nevertheless, the only fixed nodes are just the observation concepts. They are linked to the observation conditions, while the inferential conditions are linked to one another. (causal/associative).
---
IV 191
Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: also seems to be guilty of the illusion that ultimately there might be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could eventually be reduced to relations between concepts of observation. ---
Fodor IV 200
Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. The brain represents red things as red and aunts as aunts! (Not as objects with certain psychophysical properties).
Otherwise we could figure it all out with introspection.
Introspection/Fodor/Lepore: would work if the brain represented colors as frequencies, but it represents red things simply as red and aunts as aunts.

Churla I
Paul M. Churchland
Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013

Churli I
Patricia S. Churchland
Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014

Churli II
Patricia S. Churchland
"Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996


F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Rumors Sunstein Kranton I 421
Rumors/Sunstein/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: (Def) Rumors, in the dictionary definition, are opinions spread from person to person with uncertain veracity and possibly no discernible source(1). In a prominent book Cass Sunstein (2009)(2) documents the pervasiveness of rumors, their public benefits, and their perils. Rumors abound concerning the efficacy of vaccines, the birthplace of presidential candidates, the propriety of politicians, the fabrication of data in academic research, and the integrity of local and national elections. Rumors/Agents: Agents’ individual payoffs depend on a collective decision, such as election of a candidate or authorizing the use of a new technology. Collective decision making is modeled as a stylized “vote” that reflects each agent’s expected utility from the decision. Some agents are unbiased and prefer that the decision correctly matches the true state of the world. Other agents are biased and prefer a particular decision regardless of the true state. (Such agents might personally benefit, say, from the decision.) Agents have prior beliefs as to the true state. One agent, selected at random, possibly receives precise information about the true state. This agent, whose identity is not known, can create a false or true message—a rumor—of the state of the world. Biased agents have the incentive to create a false message. Agents who receive a message make an inference as to the veracity of the message and decide whether or not to pass it along to influence how others will vote on the collective outcome. >Misinformation/Economic theories, >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton.


1. Webster’s English dictionary and Oxford English dictionary.
2. SUNSTEIN, CASS R., On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017


Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011
Rumors Kranton Kranton I 421
Rumors/Sunstein/Bloch/Demange/Kranton: (Def) Rumors, in the dictionary definition, are opinions spread from person to person with uncertain veracity and possibly no discernible source (1). In a prominent book Cass Sunstein (2009)(2) documents the pervasiveness of rumors, their public benefits, and their perils. Rumors abound concerning the efficacy of vaccines, the birthplace of presidential candidates, the propriety of politicians, the fabrication of data in academic research, and the integrity of local and national elections. Rumors/Agents: Agents’ individual payoffs depend on a collective decision, such as election of a candidate or authorizing the use of a new technology. Collective decision making is modeled as a stylized “vote” that reflects each agent’s expected utility from the decision. Some agents are unbiased and prefer that the decision correctly matches the true state of the world. Other agents are biased and prefer a particular decision regardless of the true state. (Such agents might personally benefit, say, from the decision.) Agents have prior beliefs as to the true state. One agent, selected at random, possibly receives precise information about the true state. This agent, whose identity is not known, can create a false or true message—a rumor—of the state of the world. Biased agents have the incentive to create a false message. Agents who receive a message make an inference as to the veracity of the message and decide whether or not to pass it along to influence how others will vote on the collective outcome. >Misinformation/Economic theories, >Network Models/Kranton, >Communication Models/Kranton, >Communication Filters/Kranton.


1. Webster’s English dictionary and Oxford English dictionary.
2. SUNSTEIN, CASS R., On Rumors: How Falsehoods Spread (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).


Francis Bloch, Gabrielle Demange & Rachel Kranton, 2018. "Rumors And Social networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(2), pages 421-448.

Kranton I
Rachel E. Kranton
Francis Bloch
Gabrielle Demange,
Rumors And Social Networks 2018

Kranton II
Rachel E. Kranton
George A. Akerlof
Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being Princeton 2011

Theories Davidson I 42 ff
Theories/Davidson: science shows that we have no reasons to assume that our theory of the world is better than that of our neighbors, although we might be able to show that the theory of our neighbors is fundamentally wrong, if our own is true.
Glüer II 74
Errors/Theory/Davidson/Glüer: Errors at the beginning of a theory are more important than those that occur during the construction. Theory/Significance Holism/Holism/Glüer: The relations between theory construction and meaning holism are reciprocal, such a structure has no beginning, it resembles a three-dimensional network.
Meaning constitutive is always only a certain number of logical relations of a questionable proposition, otherwise we could never be of divided opinion about one and the same object, otherwise we would have no possibility to talk about the same thing.
II 74/75
Even if it seems plausible that the set of meaningful beliefs is not clearly delineated, the moderate holist, if he generally tries to regard certain beliefs as essential, runs the risk of smuggling in an unexplicit analytically synthetic distinction. Which are relevant and which are not, but changes with the context.
II 76
Errors and mistakes will only be tolerated if they can be explained with good reason and their scope is locally limited.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Davidson, D. Brandom Vs Davidson, D. I 268
Objectivity/error: it is claimed that social practices suffice to impart objective representational content on allegations! These are then objective truth conditions. Even the entire community may be wrong with such an assessment! Universal error only possible with standards, not with concepts). (BrandomVsDavidson).
I 931
Davidson: wants to derive all action from reasons. Therefore, irrational acts constitute a problem for him.
I 932
 BrandomVsDavidson: he confuses a global condition of intentions with a local one, because he makes no distinction between determination and authorization.
I 383
VsDavidson: it may be that only the score keeper (not the actor) can demonstrate the practical justification. Even in such cases, the reasons would not act as causes. I 383 In addition, you can act on the grounds that you have or not. Davidson: intentions are comprehensive judgments in the light of all beliefs and desires.
I 954
BrandomVsDavidson: unsatisfactory because desires and beliefs are treated as unanalyzed basic concepts. He did not explain the practices according to which those contents can be transferred. BrandomVsDavidson: Davidson does not distinguish between interpretations between languages ​​and within a language. The interpretation at Davidson requires explanatory hypotheses and inferences from sounds which are emanated by another person. This was rightly countered with the argument that if you speak a common language, you do not hear sounds but meanings! This is about the necessary subcompetencies.
I 692
Objectivity of conceptual standards: not only can we all individually (each of us) be wrong about it, but also all together! (electron, mass in the universe). Error about proper use. > BrandomVsDavidson: collectively false beliefs possible.
I 957
Davidson: even if the powder had been wet, she would have managed to bend her finger. So there is something in every action that the actor intended and that he succeeded in doing.
I 958
BrandomVsDavidson: our approach does not require such a theoretical definition. Citing RDRD is enough to solve the problem with the nervous mountain climbers (Davidson). This is a concrete alternative to Davidsons’ proposal of the "causation in the right way."
I 729
Brandom: it does not matter whether the usually reliable ability fails in individual cases. If I spill the wine while reaching for the bread, there does not need to be anything that I intended to do and also succeeded in doing, according to our approach.
I 747
Problem: the substitution in the field of "that" does not receive the truth value of the whole attribution. Solution: the sentence tokening in this field does not belong to the actual attribution!  Davidson: reference and truth value changed with attribution.
I 961
BrandomVsDavidson: he does not consider the possibility of considering the relationship between "that" and the following sentence tokening as an anaphoric one instead of a demonstrative one.
II 48
BrandomVsDavidson: establishing prior request! Action/BrandomVsDavidson: we started elsewhere. Three distinctions: II 126 Acting intentionally: recognition of a practical definition b. Acting with reasons: be entitled to a definition. c. Acting for reasons: here, reasons are causes in cases where the recognition of a definition is triggered by suitable reflection.
NS I 166
Reference/Brandom: is not a fundamental concept for him. But he has to explain it, because it is still a central concept. Solution/Brandom: formation of equivalence classes of sentences whose position in the network of inferences is preserved when terms are exchanged by co-referential terms.
Truth/BrandomVsTarski/BrandomVsDavidson: he has to bend their definition in such a way that instead of truth characterizing the concept of inference ("from true premises to true conclusions"), conversely the concept of inference characterizes that of truth. To this end, Brandom considers the position of sentences beginning with "it is true that..." in our inference-networked language game.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Davidson, D. Quine Vs Davidson, D. Davidson I 42
QuineVsDavidson: answered in "Der Kerngedanke des dritten Dogmas" (Th. and things): Davidson's account of his dualism of scheme and content involved a separation of conceptual schemes and language, but he did not think of separation but the concept of uninterpreted content is necessary to make conceptual relativism comprehensible.
Davidson II 92
Quine: privileged access - Davidson Action/QuineVsDavidson: "well-swept ontology": not more than physical objects and classes. ((s) I.e. act not an object, but event) (>ontology).
II 97
An identity statement "a = b" for events is true iff. a and b have identical causes and consequences.
II 98
Idea: that the causal nexus of all events opens up a kind of system of coordinates similar to that of material things in space and time in which each event is unique.
QuineVsDavidson: the criterion presupposes already that we know what it is yet to tell us. Causes and consequences are in turn events, and each event has exactly one place in the network. Infinite recourse. Thereupon Davidson rejects his idea. He takes over Quine's identity criterion for material objects: An identity statement "a = b" for material objects is only true if a and b have the same space-time coordinates.

Quine II 56
Empiricism/Quine: stimuli do not make true, but lead to securitized beliefs. Quine: Davidson is right in that there is nothing to be added to Tarski when it comes to the concept of truth.
QuineVsDavidson: However what I feel to be a fusion of truth and belief is that Davidson, when he speaks of "the totality of experience" and "surface irritation", makes no difference between these and the "facts" and the "world".
Quine: Experience and surface irritation should not be the basis of truth, but the foundation of the securitized conviction.
Empiricism: If empiricism is interpreted as a theory of truth, it is right that Davidson claims the third dogma to him and rejects it, fortunately this causes empiricism to go overboard as a truth theory.
Empiricism: Empiricism remains a theory of evidence. However, minus the two old dogmas.
Quine: the Third Dogma remains untouched: now, however, with respect to securitized beliefs! It has both a descriptive and a normative aspect. And in none of these aspects it seems to me like a dogma. This is what partially makes scientific theory empirical, not merely a quest for inner coherence.

VI 57
Proximal/Distal/DavidsonVsQuine: the stimulus should rather be localized in the common world than at the private external surfaces of the object. The world should be the common cause. Rather a common situation than a rabbit or any object. We should make an ontology of situations our own.
VI 58
Proximal/Distal/QuineVsDavidson: I prefer to stick to determining our stimuli by neural input. I#m particularly interested in the issue of transport of perception evidence from the nerve endings to the proclamation of the sciences. My naturalism would allow me (if not the interpreted individual) to relate freely to nerve endings, rabbits or any other physical objects.
VI 59
"Common situations" are too vague for me.
VI 62
Private Stimulus Meaning/QuineVsDavidson: I locate them still on the outer surfaces of the individual (proximal): hence its stimulus meanings also remain private. I would be completely indifferent if they turned out to be as idiosyncratic as the internal nervous structures of the individuals themselves!
VI 63
      In any case, outside in the open air we are dealing with our generally accessible language which each of us internalizes neurally in our own way.
VI 136
Theory/Empirical Equivalence/Empirically Equivalent/Quine: we now restrict our consideration to global world systems to avoid the question of the integration of both theories in a general context. Ex So we imagine an alternative global system that is empirically equivalent to ours, but is based on exotic terms.
VI 137
If this theory is as simple as ours, we eliminate all the exotic terms like "phlogiston" or "entelechy", since they have no predictive power. Here, then, in fact coherence considerations materialize! (>Coherence Theory).
In fact, there are cases where we have recourse to elements foreign to the theory: Ex computers to solve the four-color problem, e.g. additional truths of the numbers, theory by digressions into analysis.
Assuming the alternative theory is just as simple. But the exotic terms do not cover any newly added observable facts.
VI 138
Quine: recommends the "secessionist" position: we should reject all the contexts in which exotic terms are used. With this unequal treatment we do not justify that our own theory is the more elegant one, but we can claim that we have no access to the truth beyond our own theory. The reverse position would be ecumenical: both theories would thus be simultaneously true.
VI 139
Davidson: Variant: let both theories apply and understand the truth predicate so that it operates in an encompassing and theory-neutral language in which both theories are formulated quote-redeemingly. QuineVsDavidson: which raises questions with regard to the comprehensive language. The variables would have to extend further, but how much further? How about the truth? We must stop this at some point. We did not want a third theory.
The secessionist position may as well recognize the same right of the competing global theories. It can still award the label of entitlement, if not the truth, impartially.
VI 140
It can also switch between the two theories, and declare the terms of the other theory pointless for the time being while declaring their own to be true.
XI 156
Event/Identity/QuineVsDavidson/Lauener: the identity of events is a pseudo-problem.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Fodor, J. Brandom Vs Fodor, J. I 731
BrandomVsNarrow Content: it is not easy at all to tell a coherent story here. Narrow states should be the same for similar individuals. However, because of different contexts there are also some that are distinct for different individuals. These can be identified as copies of each other only by restricting the permissible distinction in their language. This restriction can not be justified without a circle.
II 12
Criteria / BrandomVsDretske, VsFodor, VsMillikan: not semantic continuity to the non- or pre-conceptual, but strict discontinuity.
II 144
Semantic Theory: Dretske, Millikan, Fodor.   BrandomVs: the theory is weakest where they ask of what distinbguishes representations that deserve to be called beliefs, from other index states.
Esfeld I 71
FodorVsSemantic holism: compositionality principle (words contribute to the meaning of the sentence): a semantics of the inferential role cannot account for the KP. BrandomVsFodor: compositionality is neutral with respect to an explanation that starts from below.
NS I 161
Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: reverses conventional semantics. Instead of assuming, as semantics does, that the correctness of the conclusion "If Princeton lies east of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh lies west of Princeton" is justified by the meaning of "east" and "west",
NS I 162
he carries out a Copernican turn: Brandom: Thesis: "west" and "east" get their meaning precisely because they occur in such subsequent relationships. The whole network of sentence utterances in which the words occur and also the corresponding actions constitute the conceptual content of the words.
Inferentialism/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: does not see truth and reference as fundamental units constituting meaning.
Correctness/Chance: which conclusions from which utterances are correct is determined pragmatically by social practice guided by implicit rules.
Meaning/Holism/Brandom: the meaning of terms and expressions arises from their inferential roles to other terms and expressions, therefore they are not atomistic but holistic. (BrandomVsFodor).

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Fodor, J. Newen Vs Fodor, J. NS I131
Language/Thinking/Newen/Schrenk: two main currents: 1) Thesis of the primacy of language: only beings gifted with language are able to think. The way of thinking is also influenced by the nature of the language: >Sapir-Whorf thesis
2) Thesis of the primacy of thought over language: Fodor, Descartes, Chisholm.
Mentalese/Language of Thoughts/Thought Language/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: (Literature 9-8): Thesis: the medium of thought is a language of the mind ("language of thought"). Many empirical phenomena can only be explained with assumption of mental representations, e.g. perception-based beliefs.
NS I 132
Language/Fodor: it includes compositionality and productivity. Thinking/Fodor: Thesis: thinking is designed in a way that it has all the key properties of natural language already (from intentionality to systematicity). Thinking takes place with mental representations. E.g. gas gauge, fuel gauge, causal connection. Mental representations are realized through brain states.
Language of the Mind/Mentalese/Fodor: is as rich as a natural language, but it is a purely internal, symbolic representation that is modified only with syntactic symbol manipulation. It is completely characterizable through its character combination options (syntax).
It is only assumed to explain the dealing with propositional attitudes, it plays no role in the more fundamental mental phenomena like sensations, mental images, sensory memories.
VsFodor: a) Recourse: imminent if you want to explain the properties of natural language by assuming a different language.
NS I 133
b) the supporters of the thesis of the primacy of thinking cannot explain the normativity of thought with the help of social institutions such as the language. c) there can also be beliefs without an assignable mental representation. E.g. chess computer. They are nowadays programmed with statistical methods so that there is no fixable representation for the belief e.g. "I should take the queen out of the game early."
Representation/Fodor/Newen/Schrenk: Fodor still assumes localizable, specifiable representations.
VsFodor: nowadays, neural networks are assumed.
Representation/Today/Newen/Schrenk: pre-conceptual: e.g. spatial orientation, basic cognitive skills.
- -
NS I 160
Conceptual Atomism/Fodor: E.g. "pet fish": typical pet: Dog, typical fish: trout, typical pet fish: Goldfish. I.e. no compositionality. Thesis: the availability of a concept does not depend on the fact that we have other concepts available. In other terms: Thesis: concepts have no structure. ((s) contradiction to the above: Fodor called concepts compositional.
Extension/Predicate/Fodor. Thesis: the extension is determined by which objects cause the utterance of a predicate.
VsFodor: Problem: with poor visibility it is possible to confuse a cow with a horse so that the predicates would become disjunctive: "horse or cow."
NS I 161
Solution/Fodor: the correct case is assumed as the primary case.
VsFodor:
1) the problem of co-extensional concepts. E.g. "King"/"Cardioid" - E.g. "Equilateral"/"Equiangular" (in triangles). 2) The problem of analytic intuitions: even though there is no absolute border between analytic and non-analytic sentences, we have reliable intuitions about this. E.g. the intuition that bachelors are unmarried.
FodorVsVs: does not deny that. But he claims that knowledge of such definitional relations is irrelevant for having a concept!
Concepts/Meaning/Predicate/Literature/Newen/Schrenk: more recent approaches: Margolis/Laurence. Cognitive Science.

New II
Albert Newen
Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005

Newen I
Albert Newen
Markus Schrenk
Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008
Lewis, C.I. Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. Schwarz I 31
Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory.
Schwarz I 60
Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a,1983b,1986e:231 233).
SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts".
Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself.
Schwarz I 100
Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (> Supervenience reduction).
Schwarz I 102
Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e:, 61,63,67 1984b:66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties.
PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there.
Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition).
Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c, 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23".
Schw I 103
Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c: 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b,§16.2,§21, 1989b: §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs.
Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a:§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is.
Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness.
2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today.
SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same.
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)> Mosaic).
Schwarz I 122
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis.
SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this.
So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them (!).
Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural.
Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they").
Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL):
a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically.
b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms.
Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL.
Schwarz I 134
Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region.
Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d,247): classes of counterpieces – versus:
LewisVsLewis: (2003) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds.
HorwichVsLewis: (1987,172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence.
Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events.
Schwarz I 139
Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished.
Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a, 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person.
Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195).
SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?.
Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind.
I 142
Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon.
Schwarz I 160
Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently.
Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above:> Quidditism).
SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information.
Schwarz I 178
Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b, 375, Fn2, 1986e, 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments.
Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it.
Schw I 179
E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture.
Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information.
Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations.
SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well.
Schwarz I 186
Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)> cognitive deficiency/Wright).
LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible.
Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b, 90 94).
Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them.
Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b, 73f).
Schwarz I 232
Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true.
Schw I 233
Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29).
Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ".

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Quine, W.V.O. Brandom Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 577
E.g. Gavagai: sentences are the smallest units that can make a move in the language game. Therefore, there remains a margin for dividing the responsibility between the subsentential linguistic units.
I 578
BrandomVsQuine: sentences about rabbit parts predict pruned properties, namely by reference to the merged objects to which they belong!. If you want to use singular terms for parts, there must be predications of them which they do not only address through the entities in which they occur.
I 579
Some symmetrical SMSICs must be essential for the use of sentences as translated ones - allow substitutions from one rabbit-part term to another - and exist on a finer distinction than that they belong to the same entitiy. If "Gavagai" is to be a real sortal, then language must be able to individuate objects which it sorts. There must be a concept of ​​"the same Gavagai". (In derived scheme).
The native language cannot have expressions for rabbit molecules without absurd pullups.
I 580
VsQuine: because no natural language can be non-autonomous to that effect - only an artificial language whose use is established in a richer metalanguage can be that - the way towards a non-circumstantial translation is preferable. Unqualified proposal for solution: "re-individuating translations": speaking of "integral parts of rabbit" instead of talking about rabbits, or even coarser individuations: "Rabbitness": not enough.
BrandomVsQuine: here it comes to the accuracy of inferences, not to Quine’s dire basis of superficial stimuli.
I 601
Gavagai: how do you decide whether the rabbit fly or a flash of the bright stub tail triggers the expression? You cannot know, the RDRDs and the corresponding causal chains do not matter, but their inferential role. It can, for example, specify whether it is about something flying or something flashing.
I 666
BrandomVsQuine: fluctuates constantly whether his "networks of beliefs" or "general theories" are of an individual or communal nature. Therefore, it is not clear whether he sees our communication in general from this perspective.
II 217/218
The significance of a belief depends on what else one convinced of. (Holism).
II 224
BrandomVsQuine: but then two interlocutors refer to different things if they have different beliefs. (With the same utterances). So it is not clear how the communication can be made understandable as a matter of sharing of meanings.
BrandomVsQuine: stuck too much to his dislike of singular terms, grappling with the question of when the "exportation" is legitimate.

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
Quine, W.V.O. Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. I 191
Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist:
I 192
"Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated.
I 222
Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology.
I 223
Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in?
I 225
RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences:
1) There is such a thing as an ontology.
2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status.
3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning.
4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point.
5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference.
RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism.
I 226
Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles.
I 231
RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of ​​the idea" than necessary.
I 250
Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants.

IV 24
RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network.

VI 212
RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania.

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Subjectivism Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism Stegmüller IV 177
VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words.
IV 178
VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness.
IV 216
Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation.
Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable.
VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones:
1. Hierarchy of objective norms
2. The impossible changeability of human nature.
IV 242
ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case:
SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles.
The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all!
1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions?
2. How are they maintained?
IV 304
VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls).
IV 305
VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists.
Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands.
IV 306
Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time.
IV 307
Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations,
from the outside they are causes.
Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework.





Carnap V
W. Stegmüller
Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis
In
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987

St I
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989

St II
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987

St III
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987

St IV
W. Stegmüller
Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989
Tradition Peacocke Vs Tradition I 4
Perception/Peacocke: Thesis: sensation concepts (sensory perception, sensations) are indispensable for the description of any perception. VsTradition: against the view that sensations are not to be found in the main stream if the subject is to concentrate on its own perception, I 5 or when sensations occur as a byproduct of perception. Perception/Sensation/Tradition/Peacocke: historical distinction between perceptions (perceptual experience) that have a content, namely being propositionally (representational) about objects in the surroundings that appear in a certain way, and sensations: that have no such content, e.g. the sensation of smallness, which can be determined nonetheless.
Content/Peacocke: I only use it for the representational content of perceptions. Never for sensations. PeacockeVsTradition: it used to be reversed and "object" or "meaning" were used for representational content.

I 10
Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: the adequacy thesis is obliged. Because if the adequacy thesis is wrong, there are intrinsic properties of visual perception that are not covered by the representational content. Representatives: Hintikka. Hintikka: the right way to speak about our spontaneous perceptions is to use the same vocabulary and the same syntax that we apply to the objects of perception. We just need to determine the information! Information/Hintikka: unlike here: no informational content, but information given by the perception system. I 11 extreme theory of perception: main motivation. If the adequacy thesis is false, then there are intrinsic properties of an experience that can never be known by the person who makes the experience! PeacockeVs: this may be strengthened by the following argument that superficially seems correct: we can tell what experiences someone makes if we know which are his desires or intentions. Or if he is so and so predisposed. Or his behavior: E.g. if he suddenly swerves, he may have perceived an obstacle. Point: this can only ever discover representational content! I.e. never the intrinsic (perhaps sensory) portion of the experience. Peacocke: there must be a gap here. Three counter-examples are to show this. (see below).
Perception/Peacocke: is always more differentiated than the perception concepts!
Qualia/Criterion/Goodman: identity conditions for qualia: >N. Goodman, The Structure of Appearance, 1951 p.290
Extreme Theory of Perception/Peacocke: claims that the intrinsic properties of a visual experience are exhausted in determining the representational content along with a further-reaching determination of the properties mentioned there.
PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Three counter-examples: 1) E.g. road straight to the horizon with two trees. We perceive the trees as different in size, but we know (or assume) that they are the same size and at different distances from us. Both versions are equally properties of the experience itself! For this we do not need concepts like perception field (visual field), which is more or less cut out by the tree. You simply have the experience. VsAdequacy Thesis: no true-making experience can represent one tree as larger and farther away or the other as a smaller and closer. Problem of additional characterization. Form of thought: added second or third. VsTheory of Perception: the challenge for the perception theorist is that has to hold on to the adequacy thesis (all intrinsic characterization given by "appears to the subject that...") even if he has to admit these facts about the size of trees. I 13 2) Additional characterization: can vary even if the representational content remains constant: E.g. seeing with one eye closed or with both eyes open: the difference in perception is independent of the double images of binocular perception. I 14 Depth Perception/Peacocke:
a) It would be incompatible with our view to say that there is an additional way in which the depth is represented, with this additional feature being purely representational. b) The difference between monocular and binocular vision is both representational and sensory. (Peacocke pro). Vs a): here it would be unthinkable that there are cases where the alleged sensory property exists, but the representation of certain objects was not present behind others in the surroundings. pro b): according to this version that is conceivable. I 15 Peacocke: and it is also conceivable. E.g. TVSS: a system that "writes" information from a TV camera on the back of blind persons: idea of depth and spatial perception. Intrinsic!
"Depth"/Peacocke: dangerous ambiguity: it is true that whenever the additional property is present that distinguishes monocular of binocular vision, then a sense of depth is present, but depth is a sensational property! I 16 I.e. the difference between monocular and binocular vision is precisely not purely representational! (Peacocke pro: in addition to representational there must be sensory content). Depth/Perception/Concepts/O'ShaughnessyVsPeacocke: depth is never a sensational property: concepts play a causal role in the creation of depth: 1) every depth perception depends on you considering your visual sensation of depth as a contribution to the color of physical objects at any distance. 2) monocular vision: two visual fields of sensations might be indistinguishable, and yet, thanks to different concepts and different beliefs of their owners, evoke different veridical visual "depth impressions". But: binocular vision: here the three-dimensional visual field properties cannot be compared with different sensations of depth, at least not with regard to the three-dimensional distribution of the actually viewed surface. PeacockeVsO'Shaughnessy: that is indeed confirmed by the optical facts, but he only considers the beams that fall into a single eye! In fact, monocular vision is insufficient for depth perception. Binocular vision not only explains the sensation of depth, but also why this property decreases at large distances.
PeacockeVsTheory of Perception:
3) E.g. tipping aspect, wire cube, first seen with one eye, and then without any modification of the cube with reversed front and rear: Wittgenstein: "I see that it has not changed"! Peacocke: another example of non-representational similarities between experiences. The problem for the extreme perception theorist is to explain how these non-representational similarities came to pass without abandoning the adequacy thesis. He could simply introduce a new classification of visual experience, I 17 that refers to something before the event of experience, for example, the fact that the surroundings have not changed. PeacockeVs: but this is based on the character of successive experiences! Then we would still have to say on which properties of these experiences this "new property (classification)" is based. This does not work with memory loss or longer time spans between experienced: because this does not require the sensation that the scene has not changed. Nor does it explain the matching non-representational experiences of two different subjects who both see the other side of the cube as the front.
Rabbit-Duck Head/Peacocke: why do I not use it as an example? Because there is nothing here that is first seen as a rabbit and then as a duck, but rather as a representation of a rabbit than as a representation of a duck, while nothing changes in the network of lines! So this example cannot explain that there may be non-representational similarities between experiences. Because someone who denies them can simply say that the component of the representational content that relates to the lines remains constant thus explaining the similarity. E.g. wire cube: here this explanation is not possible: because the network of lines looks quite different afterwards than it did before!
I 17/18
Translation/Theory of PerceptionVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements which seem to be in conflict with the adequacy thesis could be translated into statements that add no properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. E.g. "to cover the nearer tree, a larger area would have to be put between the tree and the viewer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsTheory of Perception/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this is supposed to work against the second type of example. But is it effective against the first one? What should the translation explain? 1) It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and for the field of vision. That is also sufficient for "above" or "next to". But the adequacy thesis needs more than that! It needs an explanation for why something is bigger than something else in the field of vision. Therefore:
2) Problem: as approach which introduces meanings the approach of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. E.g. disturbances in the visual field, curved beams ...+... counterfactual: problem: whether an object is bigger in the visual field of a subject is a property of its experience that in the real world counterfactual circumstances are what they want to be. One approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the reference and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: E.g. we could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by the fact that demanding that he should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: E.g. Julius, the inventor of the zipper). Point: yet the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the nearer tree in the field of vision is bigger is consistent with the fact that a larger area has to be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the experience type does not satisfy the condition! Just like Bright would not have needed to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: Translation: provides no access that leaves open the possibility that the experience type that actually meets the conditions of the translation, might as well fail.

I 22
Sensational Content/PeacockeVsTheory of Perception: these points refer to the first counter-example against the adequacy thesis, but they also apply to the second one: for that purpose, we introduce the asterisked predicate behind*: it refers in terms of physical conditions that normally produce this sensational quality binocular seeing of objects at different depths. ad 3): non-representational similarity of experiences should consist in sameness or equality of sensational properties. Reversible Figures: in all standard cases, successive experiences have the same asterisked sensational properties: namely, those that can be expressed by the presented interposed coverage area. E.g. suppose someone wakes up in unfamiliar surroundings: initially he has a minimal representational content: he perceives all objects as surfaces with different angles. I 23 Suddenly everything shifts into place and he has a rich representational content. But in the scene nothing has changed in the sense in which something changed in the wire cube.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976