Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Kuhn, Th. | Feyerabend Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 375 Incommensurability/FeyerabendVsKuhn: his ideas are more inclined toward psychology and suggest that every scientific change leads to a) a shift of meaning and therefore b) to incommensurability. Feyerabend: in my opinion, changes in the perception of the world are to be determined through research; they are not a foregone conclusion. Kuhn: an understanding between different paradigms is not possible. Feyerabend: scientists from different paradigms can understand each other very well. II 174 FeyerabendVsKuhn: the boundaries of traditions and disciplines on which Kuhn and Polanyi base their thesis of the untouched vagueness of science are temporary stages of the historical process. Science today is business which inadvertently strengthens the totalitarian tendencies of society. That takes care of Kuhn’s objection. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Putnam Vs Kuhn, Th. | V 155 VsKuhn/Putnam: his smart aleck readers have accused him that he had claimed such a thing that rational justification would not exist in science, only shape change and conversions. Kuhn has rejected this interpretation and introduced a new term: "non-paradigmatic rationality". Putnam: possibly the same as the above-mentioned "criterial rationality". --- I (c) 84 PutnamVsKuhn: E.g. electron: there are entities, that we call now "electrons", that behave in many ways like Bohr's "electrons". We should only say that we have a different theory of the same entity. So Bohr's term referred. I (c) 85 Reference/theory/semantic change/PutnamVsKuhn: we can only say that because the current theory asserts the existence of entities that satisfy many of the roles that should satisfy Bohr's "electrons". Question: What if we accept a theory that sees electrons as something like phlogiston? Then we would have to say that electrons do not exist. Question: What if all the entities do not exist from the standpoint of the later theory? We need to concede trust to secure reference at all. But this must not be unreasonable confidence: We cannot concede phlogiston. If Boyd's two assumptions would be wrong trust would always turn out to be unreasonable and reference would collapse. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Kuhn, Th. | Verschiedene Vs Kuhn, Th. | I 186 VsKuhn: it is argued that he makes a subjective and irrational business from science. He greatly appreciates the unanimity of the scholars in their binding to a paradigm. Other authors doubt that the revolutions really are preced by crises and the awareness that something was wrong. II 506 VsKuhn: it is very well conceivable that phenomena that are anomalies relative to the original paradigm, only then can ever be revealed when at the same time research is being conducted from the standpoint of an alternative paradigm. |
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| Kuhn, Th. | Scheffler Vs Kuhn, Th. | Rorty I 352 Kuhn/Rorty: for Kuhn there can be no algorithm for the course of science, unless from a winning perspective in retrospect. VsKuhn: he has often been accused of idealism. He gave his critics a point of attack by saying that there could be no "neutral language of observation" because scientists "see different things" or "live in different worlds". I 353 Rorty: that is completely harmless. I 354 Kuhn/Rorty: the dispute between competing standards can only be decided within the framework of criteria that lie outside normal science. I 355 SchefflerVsKuhn: Kuhn speaks of a second discursive level. Second order standards. Accepting a paradigm means not only accepting theories and methods, but also guiding standards and criteria. I 356 Kuhn: Choice between theories not according to rules, but according to values. Theory/criteria: "Conformity with facts, consistency, scope, simplicity and fertility". |
Schef I I. Scheffler Science and Subjectivity Indianapolis 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Popper, K. | Kuhn Vs Popper, K. | Hacking I 400 Messen/KuhnVsPopper: It almost never happens that theories are contradicted by precise measurements. Ex. Cavendish has not tested the theory of gravity but determines the value of G. Experiments are generally rewarded when the approximate numbers which were previously assumed come out. Kuhn I 90 Falsification/KuhnVsPopper: In the history of science, no example of falsification because of a comparison with nature! For those who decided to use Newton's theory, his second law is a purely logical statement that cannot be contradicted by observations. I 157 KuhnVsPopper: Anomalous experiences cannot be compared with falsified ones! I believe that the latter do not exist at all! If every single mismatch would be a reason for rejecting a theory, all theories would always need to be rejected. If, on the other hand, only a serious discorrespondency were to count, Popper's followers would need a "criterion of improbability "or the "degree of falsification". I 158 KuhnVsPopper: Falsification: Is a later and separate process, which could very well be called verification, since it represents the triumph of a new paradigm over an older one. Correspondence theory: For historians at least there is no much sense in the statement that verification is determining the correspondence between facts and theory. All historically significant theories corresponded to those facts, however only up to a certain point!(> Theory/Kuhn). However, it is quite reasonable to ask which of two competing theories fits better with the facts. |
Kuhn I Th. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago 1962 German Edition: Die Struktur wissenschaftlicher Revolutionen Frankfurt 1973 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Rorty Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 191 Instrumentalism/RortyVsQuine: Quine's concept of science is still remarkably instrumentalist: I 192 "Stimuli" and "settlements". Nevertheless, Quine transcends both distinctions by acknowledging that stimuli of the sensory organs are "settlements" in equal measure as all the rest. >Instrumentalism. RortyVsQuine: But he is not quite able to dispense with the distinction between what is given and what is postulated. I 222 Reference/Rorty: if we can do without reference, then we can do without an ontology as well. Quine would agree to that. >Reference, >Ontology. I 223 Clarity/Quine: eliminate any ambiguities (indirect speech, propositional attitudes, etc.). RortyVsQuine: there's a catch: how do we know what "darkness" and "clarity" consist in? I 225 RortyVsQuine: if conventionality depends on a special indeterminacy of translation, we cannot - as Quine earlier - say that physical theory is a "conventional matter that is not dictated to us by reality." RortyVsQuine: Differences: 1) There is such a thing as an ontology. 2) No sentence has a special, independent epistemological status. 3) There is no such thing as direct acquaintance with sense-data or meaning. 4) Accordingly, epistemology and ontology do not touch at any point. 5) Nevertheless a distinction can be made between the parts of our opinion network, expressing the facts to those who do not. And ontology ensures that we are able to uncover this difference. RortyVsQuine: if Quine wanted to represent also (5) together with (1) to (4), he must give sense to the distinction between the "Actual" and the "Conventional". >Holism. I 226 Quine can only do this by picking out the elementary particles as the paradigmatic "Actual" and explaining that different opinions do not change the movement of the particles. RortyVsQuine: his decision for physics and against psychology is purely aesthetic. Moreover, it does not even work, since various biochemical theories will be compatible with the movement pattern of the same elementary particles. I 231 RortyVsQuine his conviction that symbolic logic would need to have some "ontological implications" repeatedly makes him make more of "the idea of the idea" than necessary. I 250 Def Observation Statement/Quine: a sentence about which all speakers judge in the same way if they are exposed to the same accompanying stimuli. A sentence that is not sensitive to differences in past experiences within a language community. RortyVsQuine: excludes blind, insane and occasional deviants. IV 24 RortyVsQuine: if we undermine the Platonic distinction between episteme and doxa with Kuhn, we also turn against the holism of Quine. We will no longer try to delineate "the whole of science" against "the whole of the culture". Rather all our beliefs and desires belong to the same Quinean network. VI 212 RortyVsQuine: the problems are not posed by dichotomies of being, but by cultural imperialists, by people like Quine and Fichte who suffer from monotheistic megalomania. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Why-Question | Fraassen, B. van | I 112 Why-Question/Theory/Fraassen: Thesis: not everything in a theory is a legitimate object for why questions. (This corresponds to Kuhn's paradigms). And what is one is not a priori fixed. I 134 Def Explanation/Fraassen: Thesis: an explanation is not the same as a proposition or list of propositions, not an argument either, but an answer to a why-question. Even if explanations are propositions, of course. A theory of explanation must therefore be a theory of why-questions. I 139 Question/C. L. Hamblin: (1958). Thesis: A question is clearly identified by its answers. Fraassen: this can be seen as a simplistic hypothesis similar to the propositions. Then a Def question/Hamblin/Fraassen: is the set of possible answers. |
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| Paradigm | Kuhn, Th. | I 133 Paradigm shift / Kuhn: with his move the scientist did not change the world, but the scientists live now in a new world - the data now collected by the scientists are inherently different. |
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| Perception | Kuhn, Th. | I 124 Kuhn: for perception something similar to a paradigm must be provided. |
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