Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hume, D. | Kripke Vs Hume, D. | Apriori: Some philosophers modify the modalities in this characterization somehow from "may" to "shall". They think that if something belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge it is impossible to recognize it empirically.(Hume). This is wrong! (KripkeVsHume). E.g. The computer can give an answer to the question of whether particular Numbers are primes. Nobody has calculated or proved this, but the computer gave the answer. I 45 A posteriori: A mathematical truth can be known a posteriori by looking at a computer or by asking a mathematician (e.g. naturally a posteriori). The philosophical analysis tells us that it could not be contingent and therefore all empirical knowledge of its truth is automatically an empirical knowledge of its necessity.(KripkeVsHume, KripkeVsKant) I 181 |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fictionalism | Field, Hartry | I 3 Field: the meaning in which "2+2=4" is true, is rather the meaning in which "Oliver Twist lived in London" is true: namely according to a well-known story, respectively in relation to standard mathematics. I.e. he does not literally believe that "2+2=4"! Field pro fictionalism: this view is the correct one. I 5 Def strong fictionalism: weak fictionalism plus the doctrine that weak fictionalism and platonism must be distinguished. Field pro strong fictionalism: Thesis: weak fictionalism and platonism do not coincide. I 22 Solution/Wagner: (1982): we have a good story about natural numbers and a good story about amounts etc. Within these stories it is completely unimportant whether you identify numbers with quantities or with something else. II 323 Fictionalism/Mathematics/Objectivity/Field: Thesis: there are no mathematical objects at all. a) This leads to the same limitation of mathematical objectivity: "anything goes", as long as it satisfies consistency in the above (broad) sense. II 324 b) Modal Interpretation/Fictionalism/Field: could say a non-direct view of mathematical language according to the example "There are primes greater than a billion" does not claim the existence of anything, but only makes a modal assertion. III 2 Instead: Thesis: Understanding mathematics as fiction. |
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