Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Forgeries Searle III 42
Forgery/Searle: everyone might end up believing that a forged bill is real but this is about a type of thing: "money". Regulative rules: regulative rules regulate already existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities. >Rules/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Institutions Rawls I 55
Definition Institution/Institutions/Rawls: an institution is a public regulatory system that defines administrative bodies and roles together with their rights and obligations, powers of attorney and inviolabilities, etc. The rules include certain penalties and defensive measures, etc. As examples of institutions or, more generally, social practices, we can consider games and rituals, court proceedings and parliaments, markets and property systems. An institution can be considered in two different ways: a) as an abstract control system
b) as realization in thinking and acting of certain persons at certain times and places.
When it comes to finding out whether an institution is in law or not, it is best to look at the concrete action.
---
I 56
We assume that those who act within an institution are aware of the rules and results of their practice and assume that other participants have this awareness as well. Although not always true, this is a plausible generalization. There is then a common basis for determining common expectations. For contract theory, it is important to assume that the principles are public and known. rules/strategies: we need to distinguish between the rules of an institution and the strategies that the institution may use to achieve its objectives(1).
Strategies: Strategies based on mutual assumptions about each other are not part of the institution. Rather, they belong to the theory of the institution, e. g. Parliament.
Theory: adopts the valid rules as given and analyzes the way power is distributed in the system...
I 57
...and how the parties involved use their opportunities. Behavior: the behaviour of individuals should be coordinated as far as possible so that the results are the best from the point of view of social justice, even if the individuals may not be aware of them.
J. Bentham: sees this as an artificial identification of interests(2).
Adam Smith: understands this as the work of the Invisible Hand(3).
We must distinguish the institution from the rules and these rules from the social system, because each of them can be unfair without the others being unfair. Inequalities can also only arise from the combination of these elements.
---
I 58
Rituals/Rawls: however, are not called unfair. Formal law/Rawls: let us assume that there is a valid system of rules that are reliably applied by the institution, even if we ourselves do not accept the rules. Then we can speak of a formal right. The law and the institution are then inseparable from each other.


(1) See also J. R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1969, pp.33-42.
(2) See E. Halévy, La Formation du radicalisme philosophique, vol. 1, Paris 1901, pp.2-24.
(3) See A. Smith The Wealth of the Nations, (Ed. Edwin Cannan) New York, 1937.

Rawl I
J. Rawls
A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005

Language Rules Searle J. Husted "Searle" in: A.Hügli (Ed.) Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, Reinbek, 1993, p. 253

Language rules/Searle: language rules are doubted by many authors. They are actually rules for speech acts. In any case rules for singular terms are of a very different kind. VsSearle: then the relations between the analysis of speech acts and of the meaning are not clarified at all.
---
IV 84
Language rules/Searle: e.g. someone who makes an assertion, commits himself/herself to the truth. ((s) > Commitment/Brandom).

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rule Following Searle I 257
Brain/Consciousness/Searle: there are the blind neurophysiological processes and there is consciousness, but there is nothing else - no rule following, no mental information processing, no unconscious reasoning, no mental models.
I 267
Intentional phenomena like rule-following are true causal phenomena. Functional explanations: are only bare physical facts, causality arises only by interest-based description. Rules are not causes of actions. >Rules/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Rules Searle III 42
Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules.
III 39
Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule?
III 54
Constitutive rules/Searle: X counts as Y in K: e.g. X (piece of wood) counts as Y (chair) in the convention (context) K, after which sitting on it has become established. The term Y must assign a new status to the object, which it does not already have because it suffices for the term X. The object must be assigned a new status by the term Y.
III 55
The physical properties alone are not enough. The formula "X counts in Y as K" is needed. This formula can become a constitutive rule.
V 59
Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules.
V 64
Rules/Searle: rules represent obligations. Unequal conventions play a role in the context of translation. Convention/translation/Searle: saying "je promets" in French and "I promise" in English is a convention.
rules/Searle: the things specified by rules are not natural products. Pain can be created without rules.

I 217
Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system.
I 269
Rules: people drive right because they follow a rule, but they do not drive for that reason alone. You also do not speak just because you want to follow the rules of language. These rules are often practically inaccessible to consciousness, although they have to be, in principle, if they really exist.

IV 252
Rules/Searle: example promise: Rule I: "I promise to perform the action" may only be spoken if the listener would prefer the action to be performed.
Rule II: may only be pronounced if it is not clear from the outset that the action will be performed anyway.
Rule III: the speaker must have the intention to.
Rule IV: with the statement, the obligation to perform the act is deemed to have been accepted.

VsSearle: the concept of a semantic rule ("rules of language") has so far proven to be so recalcitrant that some have concluded that there are no such rules at all.
IV 253
Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005


The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Brandom, R. Searle Vs Brandom, R. Searle III 153
Background: There is a parallelism between the functional structure of the background and the intentional structure of social phenomena. >Background/Searle. Rule/Searle: 1. the rules never interpret themselves
2. they are never exhaustive
3. actually we just know in many situations, what to do, how to deal with the situation. We apply the rules of neither conscious nor unconscious!
(SearleVsBrandom: Rules here also not unconsciously!) >Rules/Searle.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Dodwell, P.C. Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C. I 258
Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model.
I 259
VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware.
The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine.
I 259
Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value.
I 260
The idea of ​​a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them.
DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements!
Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom).
Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual.
Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs).
I 261
Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway)
Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls.
Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside.
Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology:
As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character.
I 262
No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology!
Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain.
(Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.)
RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea:
I 263
if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement:
Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain.
The latter is doubtful.
RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself.
Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs.
Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle.
I 263/264
It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?").
I 265
Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid.
I 266
For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills:
RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations.
At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs).
Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature.
Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes.
Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious.
I 267
Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the ​​"irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)

Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Foucault, M. Searle Vs Foucault, M. I 217
Cognitive theory: here it is claimed that we would have drawn the conclusion, when we look at a tree from one and then know that he has a back. SearleVsCognitive theory: on the contrary, what we do is simply this: we see a tree as a real tree. >Background/Searle.
The background is not a control system.
SearleVsFoucault: that was the weakness of Foucault's concept of discourse formation (Foucault 1981)(1). He believed just as Bourdieu that rules are of such phenomena, as we discuss here.
Searle: the rules interpret not themselves, to function they really need a background. >Rules/Searle, >Cognition/Searle.


1.M. Foucault Archäologie des Wissens, Frankfurt/M. 1981

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005