Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Bivalence Quine II 48
Bivalence/Dummett: according to Dummett, bivalence is the hallmark of realism. Quine: I do not care much about bivalence, mainly it is good for simplification. In addition to the undecidable facts of the realists with regard to physical objects, the vagueness of the terms must be taken into account. Here, too, there are problems due to bivalence:
Sorites: Example, if a heap always remains after removal of a single grain from a sand heap, it follows by means of complete induction that a heap remains after removal of all grains. Bivalence seals the paradox, since it demands that in every phase the heap must be either true or false. Solution: the paradox is generally brought about by vague terms.
II 50
Thinking as if our terms were precise does not seem to be further complicated as long as we see that they can be clarified by arbitrary definitions.
II 52
Bivalence: Bivalence is nevertheless a fundamental feature of our scientific world. This is not a problem in the liberal sense. Frege: every general term applies or not. All terms are vague by ostension. It is not a matter of convention, nor of inscrutable but objective facts. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid seeing the table as one and not another. That is how it is with bivalence.
II 53
Bivalence is a basic feature of our classical scientific theories. True/False Dichotomy. In accordance with our scientific theories, we consider all such propositions as if they had a factual content. And even if it is so far from observation. This is in the interests of simplicity.
II 54
The concept of the physical object in the liberal sense does not entail any embarrassment, since it understands all candidates indiscriminately as a "table".
X 115
Trivalent logic: cancels the classic bivalence. Negation/multi-valued logic/Quine: could we defend it so that we define it to be true exactly when the negated sentence is not true?
Vs: this gives it the desired meaning, but is based on a circle: we use the classic "not", which the dissenter rejects.
X 115
Bivalence/multi-valued logic/Quine: doubts about bivalence are often weakly justified. 1. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle/VsSaD: worst justification: that there are always intermediate stages.
2. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: otherwise there would be a confusion of knowledge and truth:
X 116
Quine pro extreme realism: we can take the view that each of the sentences of which we do not know the answer is either true or false. 3. Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: to take it more seriously: justification from the antinomies of set theory and semantics:
Russell's Antinomy/Bovcar: (1939): middle truth value for "~(x e x)".
QuineVs: this violates the "principle of minimal mutilation": the antinomies come from set theory and semantics, let's try to solve them there, and not paralyse the functioning of complete logic.
4. Quantum Mechanics Vs Sentence of the excluded middle: uncertainty relation. Certain quantities cannot be measured simultaneously. Thus it seems superfluous and misleading to maintain the classical logical apparatus.
Birkhoff/v.Neumann: (1936): weakened replacement for the truth-functional logic; it is not a multi-valued logic but a not truth function.
PopperVs: that does not do what it is supposed to do.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Conservativity Quine X 86
Definition Conservativity/substitution/variables/Harman/Quine: substitutions must be conservative - grammatical structure and logical truth shall be preserved: i.e. the variable or lexicon word used in the object language must not already occur elsewhere in the context.
V 189
Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look best? We want as many and good predictions as possible. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservativity.
V 190
A great simplification can justify a relatively great deviation. We need a compromise between the two. Conservativity/Quine: among other things due to our lack of imagination. But also wise caution against hypotheses.
simplicity/Conservativity: both are already at work in language learning.
Language learning/Quine: does jumps and is always oriented towards similarities and analogies.
V 191
Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def relative empiricism/Quine: do not venture further away from the sense data than necessary. Quine pro: this keeps the theoretical changes low.
QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope of reducing the speech of the body to the speech of sense data.
N.B.: this requires sticking to the substitutional quantification of abstract objects. That appeals to the nominalistic mind. It is expressed in relative empiricism, because both are the same.
Nominalism: must not, however, overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of substitutional quantification. In general, one can say that the values of variables make up the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Metaphysics Fodor IV 107
Metaphysical: is the assumption: that if there is a fact about the intentional state, then it is this fact that makes the attribution match the physical facts best.
IV 110
Metaphysical/Fodor/Lepore: not metaphysical: the finding that a suitable property is assumed as defining - metaphysical: e.g. the assumption that rationality is constitutive of intentionality - e.g. that explanatory force and simplicity are constitutive of the nomological - is transcendental. E.g. Davidson s assumption: the PdN is to be rooted in the epistemic situation of the interpreter. - LewisVsDavidson: intentional attribution must not be understood with reference to the epistemic situation of the RI - Lewis instead: the principle of charity is part of our concept of the person.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Necessity Quine I 344/45
Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal logic) - only more or less important properties. ---
II 143 ff
"Nec." predicate in laws, extensional, no quote, but unclear - "Q" (functor) modal logic, intensional de re: out of range: x = planets, x = 9, 9 odd - predicate applies to value of the variable, not to the name. - De Re: Referencing position.
De dicto: the term that is meant is in the sentence: "nec." planets odd: is wrong.
De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong) - not a belief de re (essential prop).
Modal logic/Quine: entire metalanguage is context-dependent - what role does someone or something play? - Same level as essential properties.
Necessity/(Quine: the whole concept only makes sense in the context!
propositional attitude/Quine: is preserved! - But not de re.
---
VII (h) 152
Necesity/Quine: works only for intensional objects, they should necessarily be like this or like that (s) conceptually. ---
X 133
Necessity/principle/Quine: the principle of minimum mutilation is what underlies the logical necessity: it can explain the nature of the necessity which is connected to the logical and mathematical truth. - ((s) > Simplicity). ---
Rorty IV 60
Necessary/contingent/Quine: no distinction between necessary and contingent truths.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Physical/Psychic Chalmers I 42
Psychological/Physical/Law/Law-like/Chalmers: Thesis: It is natural to assume that my principles of coherence between consciousness and awareness that is, that consciousness is always accompanied by awareness, and vice versa, are the same in all human organisms, and are therefore a law-like correlation. We can argue that this coherence is a natural law. That is, that it applies to all systems. ((s) If a system has any kind of consciousness at all). Chalmers: this also applies to the remarkable correlation between the structure of consciousness and the structure of awareness. It is too specific to be a coincidence.
---
I 243
Chalmer's thesis: for every system the structure of consciousness ((s) phenomenal) is mirrored and reversed by the structure of consciousness somewhere (awareness, psychologically). Then we can say that consciousness arises from the functional organization of a system that is necessary for awareness. Then the structure of consciousness is determined by the structure of attention (psychological awareness).
This, of course, is not a fundamental psychophysical law. This would have to link more basic structures than something like "consciousness".
---
I 244
Can we rule out that there must be some additional X-factor, so we can talk about consciousness? ---
I 245
Solution/Chalmers: if we accept consciousness as an additional non-physical fact - in addition to the physical - as well as independent psychophysical laws, an "X-factor", no matter how it is structured, becomes superflous. ---
I 246
Best explanation/simplicity/Chalmers: my approach is the simplest and therefore a conclusion on the best explanation as it is often practiced in physical theories. ---
I 276
Psychological/physical/Chalmers: how simple can the organization of a system with conscious experiences become before experience disappears? ---
I 277
We will need a lot of psycho-physical laws. ---
I 284
Physical/psychological/Information/Chalmers: whenever we receive a phenomenal information, we will also find this information physically realized: ---
I 285
We do not know exactly how the phenomenal information is encoded, so we do not know exactly how the information space is physically realized, but we know that it has to be realized. The physical information does not have to be realized locally. Psychological/phenomenal/Chalmers: it is natural to suppose that this double live of information spaces corresponds to a duality on a deeper level.
We might even assume that this double realization is the key to a fundamental link between physical processes...
---
I 286
...and conscious experiences. We need a kind of construct here and information seems to be as suitable as anything. Thesis: It could be that principles of the double realization of information can be developed into a system of fundamental laws for a combination of the physical and the phenomenal domain.

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Predicates Wittgenstein II 80
Predicates/Wittgenstein: the use of predicates is always misleading in logic, since it indicates different "types" of terms, etc., which are differentiated by predicates, for example: "formally confirmed", "internal relations". The description by predicates must have the possibility that it is different!
II 82
Experience/Wittgenstein: is not distinguished by predicates from what is not experience. It is a logical term, not a term like "chair" or "table".
II 157
Individual/Atom/Atoms/Wittgenstein: Russell and I, we both expected to come across the basic elements ("individuals") through the logical analysis. Russell believed that in the end subject-predicate sentences and double-digit relations would result. WittgensteinVsRussell: this is a mistaken idea of logical analysis: like a chemical analysis. WittgensteinVsAtomism.
II 306f
Predicate/WittgensteinVsRussell: For example "man" should not be used as a predicate - otherwise the subject would become a proper name. "Man" as a predicate: at best for a disguised woman.
II 307
"Man" as a predicate cannot be denied to its wearer.
Hintikka I 64
Colour predicates/Colour Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at first glance, their incompatibility violates Wittgenstein's principle of independence from elementary propositions.
I 65
Hintikka: but from the logical simplicity of the colours does not follow that they do not have a "logical form" that allows only some connection possibilities and others do not. The problem is only to design an appropriate symbolism that reflects the scope.
I 71
Def Existence/Wittgenstein: a predicate of higher order is articulated only by the existential quantifier. (Frege ditto).
I 72
Hintikka: Many philosophers think that this is only a technical implementation of the older idea that existence is not a predicate.
I 156 et seqq.
Phenomenology/Atomism/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there is often the view that a phenomenalistic or phenomenological interpretation of the Tractatus is made impossible by the phenomenon of color incompatibility and also otherwise by any other apparent dependence between simple phenomenalistic predicates of the same kind. (HintikkaVs) Colours/Predicates/Colour Incompatibility/Hintikka: In this view, "red" and "green" cannot refer to simple objects, because otherwise the two elementary propositions "this is red" and "this is green", which are mutually exclusive, would not be independent of each other.
But this is not possible according to 2,062: "The existence or non-existence of one fact cannot be taken as an indication of the existence or non-existence of another.
I 170
Form/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein understands form as something that can be illustrated by a suitable logical notation. For example, the difference between a two-digit and a one-digit predicate. In 5.55 ff Wittgenstein argues that such differences in form cannot be predicted a priori.
I 172
Colour/colour words/Colour concepts/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is clear that he insists that colour attributions have no subject-predicate form.
VI 70
Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Schulte: are not ordinary sentences, they are characterized by the fact that they cannot contradict each other. (Tractatus4.211). 1. This is the first time said that they do not contain any logical particles, otherwise they would have to contradict each other!
2. Their components do not have any complexes, otherwise it would be possible to derive an objection.
Accordingly, there are no predicates ("table", "left of") in elementary propositions!
What does remain?
"The elementary proposition consists of names." (Tractatus 4.22).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960


Hintikka I
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
Investigating Wittgenstein
German Edition:
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

Hintikka II
Jaakko Hintikka
Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
Presentism Parfit Norgaard I 339
(Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the
Norgaard I 340
weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6).
Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions.
VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity.
VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics.
VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’
PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will
Norgaard I 341
continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16).

Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born.
VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18).
VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20). >Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism.



1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4.
2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7.
5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4.
7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32.
9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7.
10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102.
11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59.
13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80.
14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507.
15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19.
16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8.
17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179.
18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge.
19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74.
20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40.



Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parf I
D. Parfit
Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986

Parf II
Derekt Parfit
On what matters Oxford 2011


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Principles Quine VII (f) 107f
Principles/Quine: are given in the following form, ex: (1) [(x)(Fx > Gx) . (Ex)Fx] > (Ex)Gx - "Fx" could be: "x swims" or "x is a whale" (general term) - the form (1) and the like can easily be regarded as schemes that take the form of different true statements -E.g. x has mass > x is extended... - it is not necessary to assume that "has mass" etc. is the name of classes or anything else - just as "F" and "G" from (1) must not be considered to be something else than values for the classes or anything else. ---
IX 119
Substitution principle/Quine: guarantees the existence of all classes that are equal to an ordinal number. ---
X 90
Principle/Quine: E.g. utilisation of all possibilities.
X 133
Necessity/Principle/Quine: the principle of minimum mutilation is what underlies the logical necessity: it can explain the type of necessity which is connected to the logical and mathematical truth. - ’((s)> Simplicity).

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Regularities Lewis II 198
Regularity: there is always an alternative regularity that could have fulfilled the same function if the whole process had only started differently.
II 224
Regularity/Lewis: rules of syntax and semantics are not even regularities.
II 234
Communication depends not only on truthfulness, but also on principles of usefulness and relevance. However, these regularities are not independent language conventions. They are by-products.
V XI
Natural Laws/Lewis: at least they are regularities without exception. Not all regularities are laws, of course. Def Natural Laws/Ramsey: Laws are those that enter into the truth systems (buy into) that are unsurpassed in severity and simplicity. This is enough for the Humean Supervenience.
simplicity/Lewis: what is simple is certainly not contingent. And the regularities (or candidates for truth systems) are supervised on the arrangement of qualities.

V XIII
Probability/Lewis: Probabilities are in play from the beginning. If Ramsey says that laws are regularities that enter into the best systems, the question is: what kind of systems?

V 70
Zeit/Lewis: in the life of ordinary people there is a regularity: For example, hair grows, relative to the external time. Time traveller: no regularity at external time, but there is a way of assigning coordinates to his or her travel stages and only one, so that the regularities, as they correspond to his or her attribution, match with those normally assumed in relation to external time:
This is the personal time of the time traveler: for example his hair grows, etc. but it is not really time, it only plays the same role in his life as the role it plays in the life of a normal person. (functional, not operational).

V 122
Law/natural law/Lewis: this is a kind of regularity theory of lawfulness, but a collective and selective one at the same time: collective: because regularities do not acquire their status as a law from themselves, but through a system within which they are either axioms or theorems,
selective: because not every regularity is worthy of being called a law.
Laws should have at least the following characteristics (based on chance).
V 123
(1) Simplicity, rigour and their balance can only be determined in the light of competing hypotheses. But I don't want to make lawfulness dependent on the kind of access. Nevertheless, our laws would be different if our approach were different, at least in the sense that we can keep our standards fixed and ask what the laws would be like in counterfactual situations. (2) With this approach, it is not possible to say whether certain generalisations are lawful, whether they are true or false, and whether the laws are the true lawful ones.
Three possibilities: something can be wrong, randomly true, or lawfully true.
(3) I do not say that the competing systems of truths must consist entirely of regularities. Nevertheless, the regularities in the best systems should be laws.
Laws: should not mention indiviuals, not even the Big Bang, but such laws should not be excluded a priori.
(4) simplicity: in order to be able to compare them, we must not allow our theories to be simply formulated with particularly trivial terms.
V 124
This means that the theory must not make all properties the same! Really simple systems may only be called those that integrate real natural characteristics as simply as possible. But then it is also useless to say that natural properties are those which occur in laws ((s) that would be circulatory).
(5) What about a regularity that occurs in some but not all systems? Three options:
1. it is not a law, (you can take the average)
2. it is a law (association),
3. It is uncertain whether it is a law.
Lewis pro 1, but I hope that nature is kind enough to show us the right system in the end.
I also hope that some systems are completely out of the question. Then it will not matter whether the standards themselves are unfounded.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991


The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Best Explanation Fraassen Vs Best Explanation Field I 15
Principle of the Best Explanation/Field: Suppose we have a) certain beliefs about the "phenomena" that we do not want to give up
b) this class of phenomena is large and complex
c) we have a pretty good (simple) explanation that is not ad hoc and from which the consequences of the phenomena follow
d) one of the assumptions in the explanation is assertion S and we are sure that no explanation is possible without S.
Best Explanation: then we have a strong reason to believe S.
False: "The phenomena are as they would be if explanation E was correct":
As If/Field: As-if assertions that are piggyback passengers on true explanations may not be constructed as explanations themselves (at least not ad hoc).
Then the principle is not empty: it excludes the possibility that we accept a large and complex set of phenomena as a brute fact.
(van FraassenVsBest Explanation: 1980)
Best Explanation/BE/Field: the best explanation often leads us to believe something that we could also test independently by observation, but also to beliefs about unobservable things, or unobservable beliefs about observable things.
Observation: should not make a difference here! In any case, our beliefs go beyond what is observed.
I 16
Important argument: if no test was done, it should make no difference in the status of the evidence between cases where an observation is possible and those where no observation is possible! A stronger principle of the best explanation could be limited to observable instances of belief.
FieldVs: but that would cripple our beliefs about observable things and would be entirely ad hoc.
Unobserved things: a principle could be formulated that allowed the inference on observed things - that have been unobserved so far! - while we do not believe the explanation as such.
FieldVs: that would be even more ad hoc!
I 25
VsBenacerraf: bases himself on an outdated causal theory of knowledge.
I 90
Theory/Properties/Fraassen: theories have three types of properties: 1) purely internal, logical: axiomatization, consistency, various kinds of completeness.
Problem: It was not possible to accommodate simplicity here. Some authors have suggested that simple theories are more likely to be true.
FraassenVssimplicity: it is absurd to suppose that the world is more likely to be simple than that it was complicated. But that is metaphysics.
2) Semantic Properties: and relations: concern the relation of theory to the world. Or to the facts in the world about which the theory is. Main Properties: truth and empirical adequacy.
3) pragmatic: are there any that are philosophically relevant? Of course, the language of science is context-dependent, but is that pragmatic?
I 91
Context-Dependent/Context-Independent/Theory/Science/Fraassen: theories can also be formulated in a context-independent language, what Quine calls Def "External Sentence"/Quine. Therefore it seems as though we do not need pragmatics to interpret science. Vs: this may be applicable to theories, but not to other parts of scientific activity:
Context-Dependent/Fraassen: are
a) Evaluations of theories, in particular, the term "explained" (explanation) is radically context-dependent.
b) the language of the utilization (use) of theories to explain phenomena is radically context-dependent.
Difference:
a) asserting that Newton’s theory explains the tides ((s) mention).
b) explaining the tides with Newton’s theory (use). Here we do not use the word "explains".
Pragmatic: is also the immersion in a theoretical world view, in science. Basic components: speaker, listener, syntactic unit (sentence or set of sentences), circumstances.
Important argument: In this case, there may be a tacit understanding to let yourself be guided when making inferences by something that goes beyond mere logic.
I 92
Stalnaker/Terminology: he calls this tacit understanding a "pragmatic presupposition". (FraassenVsExplanation as a Superior Goal).
I 197
Reality/Correspondence/Current/Real/Modal/Fraassen: Do comply the substructures of phase spaces or result sequences in probability spaces with something that happens in a real, but not actual, situation? ((s) distinction reality/actuality?) Fraassen: it may be unfair to formulate it like that. Some philosophical positions still affirm it.
Modality/Metaphysics/Fraassen: pro modality (modal interpretation of frequency), but that does not set me down on a metaphysical position. FraassenVsMetaphysics.
I 23
Explanatory Power/Criterion/Theory/Fraassen: how good a choice is explanatory power as a criterion for selecting a theory? In any case, it is a criterion at all. Fraassen: Thesis: the unlimited demand for explanation leads to the inevitable demand for hidden variables. (VsReichenbach/VsSmart/VsSalmon/VsSellars).
Science/Explanation/Sellars/Smart/Salmon/Reichenbach: Thesis: it is incomplete as long as any regularity remains unexplained (FraassenVs).

Fr I
B. van Fraassen
The Scientific Image Oxford 1980

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994
Carnap, R. Stroud Vs Carnap, R. I 182
External/internal/Carnap/Quine/Stroud: Quine seems to interpret Carnap this way. That the distinction between "category questions" and "subsets questions" corresponds to the distinction. External/QuineVsCarnap: this is nothing more than two ways of formalizing the language. If we have only one kind of bound variable for all things, it will be an external question: "Is there such and such?" if the variable goes over the whole range. (This is a question of category).
Internally: if there is a variable for every kind of thing, it will be a subset question. Then the question does not refer to all the things that can exist.
I 183
Philosophy/QuineVsCarnap: differs from the sciences only in the range of its categories. (Quine, Word and Object, p. 275). External/internal/QuineVsCarnap: Category questions differ from internal questions only in their generality from subset questions. We can get to the generality by letting some kind of variable go over all things.
I 191
StroudVsCarnap: this introduces a "we", and something that happens to us, called "experience". That we exist and have experience cannot simply be seen as an "internal" truth of the thing language.
One cannot then see the meaning of experience as the common goal of all "real alternatives", because then it is assumed that there are external things.
Problem: the question of the common goal of all genuine alternatives cannot be regarded as an external question of all reference systems either, because then it becomes meaningless.
But if it were "internal", what would be the difference if one were to switch from one reference system to another that does not even contain this goal?
Carnap does not answer that.
I 192
This makes it difficult to grasp his positive approach. CarnapVsSkepticism: misunderstands the relation between linguistic frame of expression about external objects and the truths expressed within this system of reference.
StroudVsCarnap: but what exactly is his own non-sceptical approach to this relation?
1. To which system does Carnap's thesis belong that assertions of existence in the language of things are neither true nor false?
2. What does the thesis express at all then?
Knowledge/internal/Carnap: for example the geometer in Africa really comes to knowledge about the mountain.
StroudVsCarnap: but what does it mean in addition to the fact that this is not a truth that is independent of a reference system?
Suppose for some reason we did not have the thing language and could freely choose another language. Does it follow from this that, for example, the sentence about the mountain in Africa would no longer be true?
Surely we would express something completely different in a completely different language without thing expressions. But would the sentence we can make now not be true in this other language?
I 193
And could it never be true if we had never accidentally adopted the thing language. Existence/Language/Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: that cannot be right and it leads to an extreme idealism that Carnap just rejects. It is absurd because we already know enough about mountains to see that they are not influenced by a chosen language.
Language/object/Stroud: things were there long before language came into being in the world. And that again is something we know "internally" in the thing language.
StroudVsCarnap: then his thesis, understood as "internal" to the language, is wrong. It contradicts what we already assume it as knowledge about ourselves and external things.
Empirically speaking, it leads to idealism that contradicts the known facts.
CarnapVsVs: would say that of course one must not understand his thesis "empirically" and not the thing language "internally".
StroudVsCarnap: but within some reference system it must be internal, otherwise it is meaningless.
Problem: but this is a statement about the relation between a chosen framework and the internal statements within that framework. And if that implies that these internal statements would have been neither true nor false, if a different frame of reference had been chosen, it is still idealism, whether empirical or non empirical idealism.
Truth Value/tr.v./Convention/StroudVsCarnap: the truth value of the internal sentences would depend on the choice of language (of the reference system).
I 194
StroudVsCarnap: it is important to see that if this did not follow, Carnap's thesis would not be different from traditional skepticism! There would then be room for the possibility that statements about things would remain true, even if we abandoned the thing language and truth would again be independent of language. Problem: that would again lead to our choice of a linguistic framework being necessary only to formulate or recognize something that would be true anyway ((s) > metaphysical realism) independently of that framework.
Theoretically: according to Carnap this would then be a "theoretical" question about the acceptability of the thing language as a whole. But in terms of objectivity, which we then presuppose.
CarnapVsTradition: it is precisely the incomprehensibility of such theoretical questions that is important in Carnap. Because
Problem: then it could be that even if we carefully apply our best procedures (> Best explanation), things could still be different from what we think they are. This is equivalent to skepticism.
"Conditional Correctness"/Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: Carnap accepts what I have called the "conditional correctness" of skepticism: if the skeptic could ask a meaningful question, he would prevail.
StroudVsCarnap: if he now would not deny that the "internal" sentences remain true or false when changing the reference system, his approach would be just as tolerant of skepticism as tradition. ((s) So both denial and non-denial would become a problem.)
Kant/Stroud: he also accepts the "conditional correctness" of skepticism. If Descartes' description of experience and its relation to external things were correct, we could never know anything about these things.
Carnap/Stroud: his thesis is a version of Kant's "Copernican Turn". And he obtains it for the same reasons as Kant: without it we would have no explanation, how is it possible that we know anything at all?
Reference system/frame/StroudVsCarnap: a gap opens up between the frame and what is true independently of it. ((s) If a choice between different frames is to be possible).
StroudVsCarnap: in this respect, Carnap's approach is entirely Kantian.
I 196
And he also inherits all the obscurity and idealism of Kant. There are parallels everywhere: for both there can be a kind of distancing from our belief. We can do a philosophical study of everyday life (as far as the conditions of knowledge are concerned).
I 197
Reference system/framework/StroudVsCarnap: to which framework does Carnap's thesis belong that no propositions about external objects are true or false regardless of the choice of a reference system (language)? And is this thesis - analytical or not - itself "internal" in any framework? And whether it is or not, is it not merely an expression of Kantian Transcendental Idealism? Skepticism/StroudVsCarnap: the basic mistake is to develop any competing theory at all to tradition.
I 198
A purely negative approach or deflationary use of the verification principle would simply eliminate skepticism as pointless. If that were possible, scepticism would no longer need to be undermined. But: Verification principle/StroudVsCarnap: Problem: the status of the verification principle itself, or its acceptability. We can only use it to refute Descartes if we have a good reason to accept it as necessary. But that depends on how it is introduced.
It should serve to prevent the excesses of senseless philosophical speculation.
StroudVsCarnap: 1. Then we can only watch and see how far the principle can lead to a distinction that we have already made before! The only test would be sentences, which we would have recognized as senseless before!
2. But even assuming that the principle would be adequately proven as extensional and descriptive, i.e. it would distinguish between meaningful and senseless, as we do,
I 199
it would not allow us to eliminate something as senseless that we had not already recognized as senseless by other means. Verification principle/StroudVsCarnap: was incorrectly introduced ((s) with the ulterior motive of producing a result that was already fully known). Early Carnap sketches show that general laws of nature were initially wrongly excluded.
Verification principle/VP/StroudVsCarnap: a correct introduction would provide a strong destructive tool that Kant was already looking for: it would have to explain why the verfication principle is correct. This would probably be identical to an explanation of how knowledge of external things is possible.
Verification principle/Hempel/Carnap/Stroud: the early representatives had in mind that
1. a sentence is meaningful only if it expresses an "actual content",
2. that understanding a sentence means knowing what would happen if the sentence were true.
Verificationism/Stroud: There is nothing particularly original about this approach. What gives it the verificationist twist is the idea that we cannot even understand anything that cannot be known as true or false, or
weaker: at least to believe as more rational than its opposite.
StroudVsCarnap: that failed, even as an attempt to extract empirically verifiable sentences.
I 205
SkepticismVsVerificationism/StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap: even if verificationism is true, we still need an explanation of how and why traditional philosophical ((s) non-empirical) inquiry fails. ((s) should correspond here to skepticism). (>Why-question).
I 207
StroudVsVerificationism/StroudVsCarnap/StroudVsHempel: it is more plausible to reject the verification principle ((s) > empiricist sense criterion) than to claim that Descartes never said anything meaningful. StroudVsVerification principle: it will remain implausible as long as it is not understood why the traditional distinction internal/external should not be correct.
I 214
Formal manner of speaking: ""Wombat" applies to (is true of) some living beings in Tasmania". QuineVsCarnap: misunderstands the semantic ascent when he speaks of external issues. But this does not reject Carnap's pragmatic approach to simplicity and fertility of theories.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984
Empiricism Quine Vs Empiricism IV 397
British Empiricism: based on ideas in the mind. These are of course not intersubjectively observable. That means the foundation is private, not public. QuineVsBritish Empiricism: VsMentalistic approach: in the Quine's eyes not consistent. One should stick to what openly observed is true to anyone. Language is nothing private, but something social.
IV 398
The language: a social skill that is acquired through the observation of the social use. The externalization of empiricism leads to behavioral access to meaning. (Behaviorism).
IV 402
QuineVsBritish Empiricism: Is based on the assumption of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical mentalism. Too simple picture of the experiential reference of languages ​​and theories.

VI 11
"Linguistic Turn"/Quine: that was good, but not good enough: the distinction between observation sentences and theoretical propositions was only made derivatively, no theoretical terms should appear. Therefore Reichenbach used "bridge sentences" to connect the two sentence types. (VsBritish Empiricism).
Observation/Quine: we do not start with objects (we eliminate them), but with sentences! This allows us to define the observation sentence, without bothering about whether it is theory-free or not!
We also no longer need to decide which objects the words should designate! (Without reification). Instead of objects stimulus meaning: the willingness to agree to a sentence.
VI 11/12
Singular Term/Singular Terms/Ontology/Existence/Quine: if we had assumed terms instead of sentences, we would have skipped the whole issue of objectification and always conceded object-relation from the hollow gut.
Meaning Theory/M.Th./Quine: must be empirical.
QuineVsLogical Empiricism: neither the analytical truths nor the observation base resists the skeptical attack.

V 189
Theory/Ontology/Quine: how should a scientific theory look like at best? We want as many as possible and good predictions. Guiding principles: simplicity and conservatism.
V 190
Both are in a dialectical relation! (To use an expression by my students). An strong oversimplification can justify a relatively large deviation. Between the two, we need a compromise.
Conservatism/Quine: among other things, caused by our lack of imagination. But also prudence when it comes to hypotheses.
simplicity/Conservativeness: both are already at work in language learning.
Language Learning/Quine: occurs in leaps and bounds. Is always based on similarities and analogies.
V 191
Short steps are conservative. They are guided by relative empiricism. Def Relative Empiricism/Quine: do not stray further from sense data than necessary. Quine pro: That keeps theory changes low.
QuineVsRadical Empiricism: we gave it up when we gave up hope to reduce talk of objects to talk of sense data.
Important argument: that requires us to stick with the substitutional quantification over abstract objects. This speaks to the nominalistic mind. It manifests itself in relative empiricism, for both are the same.
Nominalism: must not overestimate the ontological harmlessness of the variables of sQ. In general, we can say the values ​​of variables determine the whole ontology if we only have object variables, truth functions and predicates.

Stalnaker I 3
QuineVsEmpiricism/Two Dogmas/Stalnaker: when it comes to accepting or not accepting a whole language, along with a theory that is formulated in this language, then it is not certain that there is a base for a distinction which are the language rules (rules), and what are the judgments about the world. There is no theory-neutral way to separate factual questions from semantic ones.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Extensionalism Verschiedene Vs Extensionalism Lewis IV 256
Lewis: I really do not know what the Intensionalist (I) Vs Extensionalism (E) should say! I know several unsatisfactory arguments. ("I" in the English text also for "I, Lewis") (in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 1. one could say that the extensionalism is more complicated. It needs two more categories and one more lexicon object.
VsVs: this is bad for two reasons:
a) Extensionality itself is generally regarded as an important dimension of simplicity.
b) I agree with E that a complete approach must also take into account the speaker's pause  at the beginning of the sentence. E has already done this with its syntax and semantics! The intensionalist still has to find a place for it.
(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 2. One could object that it goes against our paradigm that extensions must be shared: Example "Boston" simply names Boston and not instead a function of indices.
Problem: this paradigm applies to English, Polish, German, etc. but not necessarily to unexplored indigenous languages.
Even if the intensionalist suspected that the language is very related to ours, one cannot expect E to agree that the paradigms are applicable! For E and I do not agree which language is theirs!
Tarski's convention W: does not help here: because the native language does not correspond by the way not uncontroversially to our metalanguage of their language. Therefore the only versions of these principles that are applicable are stated in translations of these terms.
Example E and I may agree that a meta-linguistic sentence of the form
"_____ designates ___ in their language" or
IV 256/257
"_____ is a name that has ____ as an extension in your language." should be true whenever the first blank space is filled with a name (in our language) with a name  of the native language and the second with a translation of  into our language.
But that does not lead us anywhere, because we do not agree at all about names and what their correct translations are!
(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 3. I could try to argue that native language cannot be extensional because in it some inference patterns are invalid that are valid in any extensional language.
For example, identity: inferences with Leibniz's identity (Leibniz' Law) or existential generalization lead from true premises to false conclusions in native language.
Extensionalist/VsLewis: should agree that Leibniz's law receives truth in every extensional language and that it is not preserved in my counter-examples (which?).
But he should not agree that such inferences are cases of Leibniz identity!
Identity/Leibniz/Lewis: an inference with Leibniz' law needs an identity premise and how to identify it? Not by looking at three or four horizontal lines!
Semantic: an expression with two gaps expresses identity, if and only if 1. the result of inserting names into the gaps is a sentence,
2. the sentence thus formed is true if the names are coextensive, otherwise false.
Def Identity Premise: is a sentence thus formed.
Problem: since E and I disagree on what the coextensive names are, they disagree on what the expressions are that express identity, which propositions are the identity premises, and which inferences are real instances of Leibniz's law.
We are ignoring the difference of opinion here about whether a phrase S must be introduced by a  pause to be a sentence at all. To be precise, if ",/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Li, then " ,/so " is a non truth-preserving inference in Le. The original version without  is no inference at all in Le, because its "premises" and "conclusions" are S names and not sentences.
((s) Extensional Language/(s): how is it possible at all, if no predicates (properties) are allowed - then is not the form subject predicate at all?)
Vs: the form is then: a is an element of the set B.
(in vain) VsExtensionalism: 4. I could argue ad hominem that E has not really escaped intentionality because the things he takes as extensions are intensional entities.
Functions of indices to truth values are usually identified with propositions (especially if the indices consist of possible worlds and little more).
And these functions are identified equally with individual terms. How can such intensional entities then be extensions?
LewisVsVs: this is just a mix-up! Intension is relational!
((s) It depends on the consideration whether something is an intension or an extension).
Intensions are things ((s) entities) that play a certain role in semantics and not things of a certain sort.
E and I agree that in a suitable language the same thing that is the intention of one expression is also the extension of another.
For example, when we speak technical English in a fragment that is suitable as the meta-meta-language of a smaller fragment, we agree that one and the same thing is both, the intention of expression in the object language "my hat"
IV 258
and the extension of the metaphorical expression "intension of "my hat"". ((s) The same thing, not the same expression).
Lewis: the thing itself is neither extension nor intension.
It is true that some entities can only serve as extensions, while other functions of indices can serve as both.
But there is no thing that would be unsuitable to be an extension.
Ontology/(in vain) Vs Extensionalism: 5. one might think that the extensionalist attributes an extravagant ontology to the natives:
For example, if the intensionalist says that a word of the natives designates a concrete material mountain, then E says he designates something more esoteric: a set-theoretical object, formed from a realm of individuals that includes unrealized possibilities.
But also E and I believe in esoteric things if they do not want to contradict themselves. We have no doubt that we can name them.
We agree that the natives have names for even more far-fetched things like gods (according to the Intensionalist) or functions of indices to such gods (according to the Extensionalist).
Ontology/Vs Extensionalism: I should perhaps argue better that certain unesoteric things are missing!
Ontology/Kripke: (conversational, 1972): it is wrong to attribute to someone an ontology that contains sets without elements or functions without arguments and values, etc.
LewisVsVs: this is a plausible principle. But did E violate it by saying that the names of the natives are functions of indices and not names of concrete things? I do not think so.
The ascribed ontology is not the same as the ascribed set of name carriers. For example, if our language is attributed an ontology, it contains all natural numbers, not just the small minority of them that actually bear names!
It is not significant that the amount of name carriers violates Kripke's closure principle unless it can be shown that this is the totality of the attributed ontology. But it is difficult to say what ontology, if any, is attributed by the use of Le.
One should look at the range of quantifiers, but Le has no quantifiers at all!
Quantifiers: make sentences. But in Le only the predicate does that and that is not a quantifier.
The transformation Lp of Parsons is different: it has a range. The set D, so that we get intended truth conditions for the propositions of Lp that transform the propositions of Li, then and only when D is included in the range of bound variables.
(This assumes that the predicates of Lp have intended interpretations).
The set D is the same as the set of extensions of expressions in Le. It violates Kripke's closing principle ((s) that no empty sets should be attributed, see above), so it cannot be attributed to anyone as ontology. ((s) because there are no bound variables in Le.).
I.e. if an extensionalist claims that the native speaks Lp, veiled by transformations, we have a remedy against him.
But E himself does not represent that!
Perhaps one can show that if it is bad to attribute the use of Lp,
IV 259
that it is also bad to attribute the use of Le? But I do not see that yet.





Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Leibniz, G.W. Simons Vs Leibniz, G.W. Chisholm II 186
SimonsVsLeibniz: we do not have a trace of evidence for his Monads.
Simons I 319
Substance/Simons: we still do not know what substances are. Descartes' large rationalist successors differed in this as far as possible: Substance/Spinoza: there is only one substance that includes everything.
Substance/Leibniz: there are infinitely many substances, each is perfectly atomistic (monads).
Solution/Simons: actually the two already distinguished in the concept of dependence:
Dependence/Spinoza: strong rigid dependence (notation here: "7").
Dependence/Leibniz: weak rigid dependence: ("7").
This has severe consequences:
Monads/evidence/Leibniz: (Monadology §2): there must be simple substances because there is composite (masses). A mass is nothing more than an aggregate of simplicity.
Simons: problem: is the mass then an individual with the monads as parts or a class with the monads as elements?
If they are considered a class the monads are essential elements. Fortunately, we do not need to decide it because Leibniz accepted mereological essentialism for individuals:
Whole/Leibniz: cease to exist if a part is lost.
Weak rigid dependence/Simons: everything depends on its essential parts. Together with the essentialism of Leibniz this means that every thing depends on all real parts.
Part/Leibniz/terminology/Simons: with him always means "real part".
Foundedness/ontology/Leibniz/Simons: the second assumption is that everything that is dependent from everything else, depends on something that is itself independently.
That means that the chain of dependencies x 7 y 7 z ... has a last (first?) member.
Monad/Leibniz/Simons: with that we can reconstruct Leibniz's argument like this
(1) there are composites (that means objects with real parts)
(2) every part is essential
(3) therefore each composite depends on its parts
(4) if every object has real parts, then it is the beginning of an unfounded chain of parts.
(5) But each chain of dependencies is founded
(6) Therefore; if something is a composite, it has simple parts
(7) Therefore, there is simple (monads, atoms).
SimonsVsLeibniz: 1. Vs mereological essentialism:
2. VsFoundedness-principle: why should we believe it?
Atomism: we find it in Leibniz and in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Continualism: we find it in Aristotle's theory of prima materia.

Simons I
P. Simons
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

In
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Principia Mathematica Wittgenstein Vs Principia Mathematica II 338
Identity/Relation/Notation/WittgensteinVsRussell: Russell's notation triggers confusion, because it gives the impression that the identity is a relationship between two things. This use of the equal sign, we have to differentiate from its use in arithmetics, where we may think of it as part of a replacement rule. WittgensteinVsRussell: its spelling gives erroneously the impression that there is a sentence like x = y or x = x. But one can abolish the signs of identity.
---
II 352
Definition number/Russell/Wittgenstein: Russell's definition of number as a property of a class is not unnecessary, because it states a method on how to find out if a set of objects had the same number as the paradigm. Now Russell has said, however, that they are associated with the paradigm, not that they can be assigned.
---
II 353
The finding that two classes are associated with one another, means, that it makes sense to say so. WittgensteinVsRussell: But how do you know that they are associated with one another? One cannot know and hence, one cannot know, if they are assigned to the same number, unless you carry out the assignment, that is, to write it down.
---
II 402
Acquaintance/description/WittgensteinVsRussell: misleading claim that, although we have no direct acquaintance with an infinite series, but knowledge by description. ---
II 415
Number/definition/WittgensteinVsRussell: the definition of the number as the predicate of a predicate: there are all sorts of predicates, and two is not an attribute of a physical complex, but a predicate. What Russell says about the number, is inadequate because no criteria of identity are named in Principia and because the spelling of generality is confusing.
The "x" in "(Ex)fx" stands for a thing, a substrate.
Number/Russell/Wittgenstein: has claimed, 3 is the property that is common to all triads.
WittgensteinVsRussell: what is meant by the claim that the number is a property of a class?
---
II 416
It makes no sense to say that ABC was three; this is a tautology and says nothing when the class is given extensionally. By contrast, it makes sense to claim that in this room there are three people. Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: the number is an attribute of a function which defines a class, not a property of the extension.
WittgensteinVsRussell: he wanted to get ,next to the list, another "entity", so he provided a function that uses the identity to define this entity.
---
II 418
Definition number/WittgensteinVsRussell: a difficulty in Russell's definition is the concept of the clear correspondence. Equal sign/Russell/Wittgenstein: in Principia Mathematica, there are two meanings of identity. 1. by definition as 1 + 1 = 2 Df. ("Primary equations")
2. the formula "a = a" uses the "=" in a special way, because one would not say that a can be replaced by a.
The use of "=" is limited to cases in which a bound variable occurs.
WittgensteinVsRussell: instead of (Ex):fx . (y).fy > (x=y), one writes (Ex)fx: ~ (Ex,y).fx.fy, (sic) which states that there are no two things, but only one.
---
IV 47/48
So you cannot introduce objects of a formal concept and the formal concept itself, as primitive concepts. WittgensteinVsRussell: one cannot introduce the concept of function and special functions as primitive concepts, or e.g. the concept of number and definite numbers.
---
IV 73
WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.452 in Principia Mathematica (PM) definitions and basic laws occur in words. Why suddenly words here? There is no justification, and it is also forbidden. Logic/Tractatus: 5.453 All numbers in logic must be capable of justification. Or rather, it must prove that there are no numbers in logic.
5.454 In logic there is no side by side and there can be no classification. There can be nothing more universal and more special here.
5.4541 The solutions of logical problems must be simple, because they set the standard of simplicity.
People have always guessed that there must be a field of questions whose answers are - a priori - symmetrical, and
---
IV 74
lie combined in a closed, regular structure. In an area in which the following applies: simplex sigillum veri. ((s) simplicity is the mark (seal) of the truth).
Primitive signs/Tractatus: 5:46 the real primitive signs are not "pvq" or "(Ex).fx", etc. but the most general form of their combinations.
---
IV 84
Axiom of infinity/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5.534 would be expressed in the language by the fact that there are infinitely many names with different meanings. Apparant sentences/Tractatus: 5.5351 There are certain cases where there is a temptation to use expressions of the form
"a = a" or "p > p": this happens when one wants to talk of archetype, sentence, or thing.
WittgensteinVsRussell: (Principia Mathematica, PM) nonsense "p is a sentence" is to be reproduced in symbols by "p > p"
and to put as a hypothesis before certain sentences, so that their places for arguments could only be occupied by sentences.
That alone is enough nonsense, because it does not get wrong for a non-sentence as an argument, but nonsensical.
5.5352 identity/WittgensteinVsRussell: likewise, one wanted to express "there are no things" by "~ (Ex).x = x" But even if this was a sentence, it would not be true if there
IV 85
would be things but these were not identical with themselves? ---
IV 85/86
Judgment/sense/Tractatus: 5.5422 the correct explanation of the sentence "A judges p" must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense. (WittgensteinVsRussell: his theory does not exclude this). ---
IV 87
Relations/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 5.553 he said there were simple relations between different numbers of particulars (ED, individuals). But between what numbers? How should this be decided? Through the experience? There is no marked number.
---
IV 98
Type theory/principle of contradiction/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: 6.123 there is not for every "type" a special law of contradiction, but one is enough, since it is applied to itself. ---
IV 99
Reducibility axiom/WittgensteinVsRussell/Tractatus: (61232) no logical sentence, if true, then only accidentally true. 6.1233 One can think of a possible world in which it does not apply. But the logic has nothing to do with that. (It is a condition of the world).

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Gavagai Quine, W.V.O. IV 425
The Gavagai-Example serves just to refute the myth of the museum, the legend of somewhere fixed meanings (descriptions). The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation does not mean that there are no points of view at all: there are the principles of simplicity, brevity and the principle of indulgence. (However, they are not empirically verifiable).
VI 73
Quine: Ironically, at the time I had not yet meant the indeterminacy of translation in the strong sense: it was not intended to illustrate this, because "Gavagai" is an observation sentence whose translation with "Look, a rabbit" is perfectly assured. What this translation cannot succeed in doing, however, is the determination of the reference! This thesis was the real punch line of the example. Only the term here was identical with the whole sentence, so that there was no possibility of compensation.