Minimum/Maximum/Sorites/Gombocz: for some properties there is no unproblematic minimum - unproblematic: e.g. shortest duration, smallest speed. - But also: minimum of dentition: one tooth; of hair: one hair - no hair: categorical transition, other property than hairiness. Cf. >Sorites, >Minimum/Chisholm.
Wolfgang L. Gombocz. Maxima. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. chisholm Graz 1986
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
|Disputed term/author/ism||Author Vs Author
|Essentialism||Simons Vs Essentialism||I 272
Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: there is a disarmingly simple example by Chisholm (1976, 146): E.g. a table is formed out of a stub and a plate. It is only the same table, if both remain the same.
chisholm: so it should seem that a certain table is necessarily built of this plate and this stub.
Simons: this is the only example of "person and object".
As it stands, it is indeed convincing. a: stub, b: plate, c: the restulting table:
N(E!c > (t)[Ext c > a ≤≤t c u b ≤≤t c])
Everyday language translation/logical form/(s) : "(t)[E Ext a...": "at all times in which", "always if a c exists.. " – "N(E!c > …”:a c has to....”… - "N(E!c > (t)[Ext c ..." "a c always has to...".
Simons: this is different than the sum that also would exist if plate and stub would not be connected, the table can only exist if both are connected.
Superposition/Simons: so the parts do not guarantee the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum)!
SimonsVsEssentialism: that e.g. the engine of a car must be a specific engine is not so clear. Here there is room for vagueness and convention. Pro essentialism: clear case: e.g. an atom must have these particular protons, otherwise it is a different atom.
(...) Chisholm pro Essentialism: >Sorites, Sorites/Chisholm.
SimonsVschisholm/SimonsVsEssentialism: our everyday linguistic concept scheme provides no such identity conditions and living conditions for ordinary objects (things, objects) so that they could not continue to exist at the slightest change.
Most of the objects of science, e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole while mereologically variable so that there is a middle path. Middle path: there is a middle path between chisholm's extreme essentialism and the position that the parts of an object would be merely determined arbitrarily or conventionally.
Simons: thesis: one could assume a "naturally unified object". (see below: "normal style", "normal thing", "normal piece of music").
Connection/Whitehead: (see above WD5’) individuals are connected if they have a binary sum. Together with Tiles' definition then in Whitehead's system each individual is self-connected, which corresponds to his intentions. SimonsVsExtensionality: all this does not refute the arguments VsCEM: systems that limit the existence of sums and smallest upper bounds, but nevertheless remain extensional, are still too strong to be able to act as a general theory of part and whole. (However, they are still useful.)
Characteristic relation/whole/Simons: continuity is only one characteristic relationship among many. Some may not be important, but one should not exclude any a priori.
E.g. the political relations between Alaska and the rest of the United States outweigh the spatial continuity with Canada.
Continuity: continuity helps to exclude discontinuous sums, e.g. sums of chemicals of several organisms.
Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987