Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Church, A. | Quine Vs Church, A. | I 368 QuineVsChurch: The subject does not need to speak the language of the object sentence. There is a German phrase of which is true that the mouse, which is afraid of the cat, fears it. But in a certain way they remain language relative (Church). Ex A sentence in a given concrete translation might have a slightly different meaning. For Church this is even likely, because he also accepts all sorts of artificial languages. So we improve: (7) Thomas true-believes in German "Cicero..." I 369 According to Church, we would then have to make all other possible translations as well (8) Thomas believes true in German "Cicero has denounced Catiline." But an Englishman who does not speak German would find other information in (8) than in a full translation. (9) Thomas believes that Cicero denounced Catiline (in English). However, since (8) reflects the meaning of (7), (9) must miss the meaning of (7). QuineVsChurch: not necessarily because a certain concept of meaning is required. Quine: (7) not satisfactory because of the dependence on a language. Such relations of a sentence, a person and a language cannot be linked with the propositional attitudes. I 370 Sheffler + about expressions and degrees XI 55 Identity/Necessity/Church: the values of the variables could be reduced to intensions and thereby make all the true identity statements necessary. QuineVsChurch: it is a mistake to think that the quantified modal logic can tolerate only intentions, but no classes or individuals. Proof: Specification/Quine: every thing x, even an intention is, if it can at all be specified, specifiable in random matching manner. ((s) >indeterminacy of translation, indefinite >reference, >inscrutability of reference). XI 56 Suppose x is determined as the only thing by the condition "φx", so it is also determined as the only one by the conjunction "p u φx". Now you select any truth for "p" that is not implied by "φx", and both specifications contingently turn out to be consistent. So you gain nothing by taking intentions as values of the variables. Should we try again with necessary identity? Identity/Necessary Identity/Necessity/Quine/Lauener: let us consider the following postulate (1) ((w)(Fx w = x) u (w)(Gw w = x))> N(w) (Fw Gw) The demands that if there are always two open sentences that determine the same thing x as the only thing, they should be necessarily equivalent. Although this would repeal the referential opacity of the rules - it would also repeal modal distinctions themselves at the same time! (... + ...) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Church, A. | Stalnaker Vs Church, A. | II 127 Belief attribution/belief ascription/foreign-language/foreign language/Stalnaker: if O'Leary speaks another language it makes no difference for the explanation as long as he is somehow familiar with Venus. O’Leary's belief is one about mars and hesperus, not about language. Diagonalization/Stalnaker: works here likewise. Against: Belief on language use/conviction about language/Church/Burge/Stalnaker: Church 1954, Burge 1978): e.g. Alfred believes that "a fortnight" is a period of 10 days. This is then true in all possible worlds with this semantic rule for English and wrong in others. translation/Church: problem: there is no translation test for it! (if an error is in play). E.g. a translation into German would not express the same because there is an equivalent for "a fortnight" in German. Stalnaker: Church seems to say with this that the proposition cannot express what it seems to express. Solution/Church: metalanguage. StalnakerVsChurch: we can explain the failure of translation tests without this conclusion: II 128 Solution/Stalnaker: diagonalization: translation into another language will change the possible contexts for propositions. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Churchland, P. | Fodor Vs Churchland, P. | IV 189 Mind/brain/Churchland: thesis: the brain represents different aspects of reality through a position in an appropriate state space. IV 191 FodorVsChurchland/LeporeVsChuchland: Churchland also seems to be guilty of the illusion, that there could ultimately be something empirical, so that conceptual relations could in the end be reduced to relations between observation concepts. Churchland: semantic identity goes back to the special place in the network of semantically relevant sentences (and that is of the whole language). translation: therefore, we can speak of the equality of sentences across languages! IV 192 Equivalent expressions occupy the same (corresponding) places in the corresponding network of the other language. Nevertheless, translation should always take observability into account. IV 193 Churchland/Fodor/Lepore: Churchland surprisingly begins with feelings, not with intentionality (e.g. with propositional attitudes or concepts). Thesis: if we had adequate access to feelings, it could be generalized to a general mental representation. Churchland: the qualitative nature of our sensations is generally considered as inaccessible for the neurobiological reduction. But even so, we find that a determined attempt to find an order here revealed a sizable chunk of expressible information, e.g. color cubes with frequencies. IV 194 Fodor/Lepore: Churchland actually assumes that this is an access to the sensations (through frequencies!), not only to the discrimination ability of the nervous system. Churchland: thus, the inexpressible can be expressed! The "unspeakable rose" can be grasped by indication of the frequency. This is perhaps a way to replace everyday language. IV 195 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: how plausible is this story in terms of sensations? Does it provide a robust notion of equality in general? Qualia/quality/sensation/exchanged spectra/Fodor/Lepore: it is conceptually possible that while you see something red, I see something green. If the exchange is systematic, there is nothing in the behavior that could uncover it. VsBehaviorism/VsFunctionalism: the exchanged spectra thus seem to indicate that behaviorism is wrong and functionalism, too (Block/Fodor, Shoemaker). One might think that a theory of qualitative content could solve the problem. But it is precisely the qualitative content that has been exchanged. And it is precisely the concept of the perceptual identity that becomes ambiguous because of that. VsChurchland: Churchland's approach does not help at all. The labels of the dots on the dice could be exactly reversed. IV 196 Why should a semantic space not be put beside it and the condition added that the dimensions of the semantic space must be semantic? They must designate content states through their contents. E.g. Perhaps we could then identify uncle, aunt, President, Cleopatra, etc. along these dimensions? IV 197 E.g. Cleopatra as a politician is closer to the president in terms of marriageability. Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: that is what we are really interested in: a robust theory of the equality of content rather than identity of content that has been lost with the analytic/synthetic distinction. Problem: equality presupposes identity and a corresponding theory. >State semantics: deals with the question of how the identity of the state spaces is fixed. IV 200 Representation/neurophysiological/mind/brain/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: colors are not represented as frequencies. IV 201 Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: two different interpretations of his diagrams would also interpret neighborhoods very differently. --- Metzinger II 466 "Eliminative Materialism"/Churchland: eliminative materialism means two things: 1) Materialism is most probably true. 2) Many traditional explanations of human behavior are not suitable for understanding the real causes. II 467 "Request"/"conviction"/Churchland: Paul and Patricia Churchland: we will probably have to drop these "categories" (FodorVsChurchland, SearleVsChurchland). |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Metz I Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.) Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996 |
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