Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Correspondence Theory | Davidson Vs Correspondence Theory | I (e) 96 So we get rid of the correspondence theory of truth at the same time. It is the belief in it, which gives rise to relativistic thought. Representations are relative to a scheme. E.g. Something can be a map of Mexico, but only in relation to the Mercator projection, or just a different projection. Horwich I 443 Truth/Truth theory/tr.th./DavidsonVsCorrespondence theory: a truth theory presents no entities that could be compared with sentences. (A Coherence Theory of Thruth and Knowledge.): Thesis: "correspondence without confrontation." Davidson/Rorty: this is in line with his rejection of the "dualism of scheme and content". (= Thesis, that something like "mind" or "language" had a relation like "fit" or "organize" to the world). Rorty: such theories are a remnant of pragmatism. pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: because of the strong connection between Dewey Quine Davidson one can assume that Davidson is part of the tradition of American pragmatism. Nevertheless, Davidson explicitly denied that his break with empiricism made him a pragmatist. Def pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson thinks that pragmatism identifies truth with assertibility. Then DavidsonVsPragmatism. truth/Davidson: should not be identified with anything. Truthmaker/Make true/DavidsonVsTruth makers: do not exist. Horwich I 553 Correspondence/Fulfillment/Tarski/truth theory/Davidson/Rorty: the correspondence that should be described in terms of "true of" and is supposedly revealed by "philosophical analysis" in a truth theory is not what is covered by Tarski’s fulfillment relation. The relation between words and objects, which is covered by fulfillment is irrelevant for this philosophical truth. ((s) of "Correspondence"). "true"/Explanation/Rorty: "true" does not provide material for analysis. truth/Davidson: is nice and transparent as opposed to belief and coherence. Therefore, I take it as a basic concept. Horwich I 454 Truth/DavidsonVsTarski/Rorty: can therefore not be defined in terms of fulfillment or something else. We can only say that the truth of a statement depends on the meaning of the words and the arrangement of the world. DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory/Rorty: with that we get rid of them. Intermediate/Intermediary/Davidson/Rorty: ("tertium", "Tertia") E.g. "perspective", E.g. conceptual scheme, E.g. "point of view", E.g. language, E.g. cultural tradition. We do not need to worry about these things anymore if we drop correspondence (VsCorrespondence theory). DavidsonVsSkepticism: is triggered just by the assumption of such "tertia". "Less is more": we no longer need to worry about the details of the correspondence relation. Correspondence/Davidson/Rorty: we can regard it as trivial, without the need for an analysis. It has been reduced to a "stylistic variant" of "true". DavidsonVsSkepticism/Rorty: arises because of these intentionalist concepts that build imaginary barriers between you and the world. RortyVsDavidson: has still not shown how coherence yields correspondence. He has not really refuted the skeptics, but rather keeps them from the question. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994 Quine II 56 DavidsonVsCorrespondence Theory: the conception of the fact coincidence which corresponds to the whole of the experience adds nothing relevant to the simple concept of being true. No thing makes sentences and theories true, not experience, not surface irritation, not the world. (> make true). |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Donagan, A. | Rorty Vs Donagan, A. | Horwich I 452 Explanation/Truth/Causality/Donagan/Rorty: Although it could be said that the fact that most of the beliefs of the natives and field linguists are true is an explanation for the fact that they can communicate. RortyVsDonagan: but that is not an explanation that requires a causally effective property. Explanation/Rorty: this is like an explanation of communication by the fact that, e.g., people populate the same spacetime region. Problem: we do not know what it would be like for these people if it were not like this, just as we do not know, e.g., what it would be like if most beliefs were wrong. Causal Explanation/Rorty: the only candidates for causally effective properties are such properties that we can think away! ((s) >it must be possible to abstract from properties). >Causal explanation. Important argument: therefore "truth" ("true") has no explanatory use. truth/DavidsonVspragmatism/VsJames: but besides the normative use it also has disquotational use. truth/RortyVsTradition: it mixes disquotational and normative use and tries to explain both through the use of "true" to designate a non-causal relation of "correspondence". This is a false attempt to have "inside" and "outside" of the language game at the same time. Rorty I 120 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Donagan/Rorty: Wittgenstein clarified the situation by conceding "that sensations are private, non-dispositional concomitants of the behavior, which is their natural expression", but refusing "to subsume processes under these concomitants, which can be explored regardless of the circumstances that produced them." I 121 RortyVsDonagan: that is correct, but you have to go one step further: a "private, non-material medium" is obscure. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| James, W. | Russell Vs James, W. | Brendel I 132 Pragmatism/RussellVsPragmatism/RussellVsJames/Brendel: with the usefulness-definition of truth, it may be that "Santa Claus exists" is true, although it does not exist, simply because it is useful. James/Brendel: but does not want to claim that refuted statements are true, but wants to show that there is inextricable interdependence between values and facts. Truth/James/Brendel: also for James truth is influenced by our perceptions and causal relationships to the environment. >Pragmatism. --- Rescher I 349 RussellVsJames: grotesquely unfair with respect to the pragmatism: accused him, his pragmatic formula does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". E.g. "it is true that other people exist", and "it is useful to think that other people exist" when the two sentences would have the same meaning, then that does not comply with the colloquial meaning of "true". Russell himself pointed to a solution: better distinction between definition and criterion. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Resch I Nicholas Rescher The Criteriology of Truth; Fundamental Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth, in: The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford 1973 - dt. Auszug: Die Kriterien der Wahrheit In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Resch II N. Rescher Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’ s Theory of Rational Systematization Cambridge 2010 |
| Pragmatism | Brandom Vs Pragmatism | I 196 BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences). Horwich I 444 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. truth/pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth. BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals. Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions. Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property). Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Pragmatism | Dennett Vs Pragmatism | Rorty II 116 Truth/DennettVsPragmatism/Rorty: Can pragmatism love the truth if there can be no accurate representation of it? |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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