Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intention Based Semantics | Schiffer Vs Intention Based Semantics | I 258 SchifferVsIntention-based semantics/SchifferVsIBS: much worse: from normal speakers too much knowledge is required. For example, that he knows the function that maps sentences to propositions. Solution/Lewis: (Lewis 1975): Actual speech ratio / population / Lewis (Lewis 1975): L is a language in G only if it's common knowledge in G that members of G "never attempt to express a proposition of L, which is not true in L "(p 167). Then Lewis would respond to the above objections: I 259 Lewis: the normal human being does not need a term of L to expect that his fellows are truthful. He just needs proper expectations about how they should behave. He expects them to act in accordance with a regularity of truthfulness. But we would - and not he - describe this as regularity. He might have an internally represented grammar, and being able to have the potentially infinite number of expectations, but this is not critical. (p. 180f). Schiffer: Problem: it is not entirely clear how this is to avert the above objection: to know that a fellow human being will never say a false sentence, a member of the population must know the function. And in addition he needs a manner of givenness (givenness, "concept"). And that is too much for the knowledge that can be attributed to normal people. Lewis: seems to want to attribute the following knowledge: For all s, p, if L(s) = p, then it is common knowledge, in G, that members of G would not express s, if p is not true. Schiffer: I do not know whether that's adequate for Lewis, it does not help the IBS: the idea is to redraft IBS definitions in a way so that all references to L are outside of that-propositions. ((s) so that the speaker does not affect the language itself.). Pointe: then the individual speakers must know only sentences and individual propositions. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Lewis, D. | Verschiedene Vs Lewis, D. | Metz II 274 Nida-RümelinVsLewis: this objection is off the table here after we have shown that on the 1st level (Marianna finds a colorfully furnished room with partly wrongly colored prints) the alternatives come into view, which are then excluded on the 2nd level. Real phenomenal knowledge. Lewis I 9 ShafferVsIdentity Theory: it cannot be true because experiences with analytical necessity are not spatial while neural events take place in the nervous system. LewisVsShaffer: this is not analytical or otherwise necessary. And neural events are also abstract. Whatever results from considerations about experiences as an argument for nonspatiality should also apply to neural events. - VsLewis: it is nonsense to consider a mere sound chain or character string as a possible carrier of a meaning or a truth value. Meaning/Carrier: Carriers of meaning are only single speech acts! II 213 LewisVsVs: my assertion is not that sounds and characters are carriers of meaning, but that they carry meaning and truth relatively to a language or population. A single speech act can be the bearer of meaning because in most cases it unambiguously determines the language used in its particular enforcement situation. - VsLewis: A meaning theory recurred to a possible world is circular. - Def Possible World/VsLewis): The concept of a possible world can itself be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds are models of the analytical propositions of a language or diagrams or theories of such models. -LewisVs: Possible world cannot be explained by recourse to semantic terms. Possible worlds exist and should not be replaced by their linguistic representations. 1. Such a substitution does not work properly: two worlds which are not different in the representing language get (wrongly) assigned to one and the same representation. II 214 ++ 2. Such a replacement would also be completely unnecessary: the concept of possible worlds is perfectly understandable in itself. II 216 Hypostatization of meaning - VsLewis: not just words, things exist! - VsVs: we can form a grammar II 221 VsLewis: maybe internal representation? VsVs: that does not help! II 222 Convention is more than agreement: the others must believe in it! II 223 VsLewis:Language conventions are no better than our infamous obscure old friends, the language rules. VsVs: A convention of truthfulness and trust could be called a rule. II 224 VsLewis: Language is not conventional. LewisVs: There may be less conventionality than we originally thought. However, there are conventions of language. II 225 VsLewis: Only those who are also set theorists can expect others to adhere to regularity. LewisVs: An ordinary person does not need to possess a concept of L in order to be able to expect that the others are truthful and trusting in L. He only needs to have expectations about action. II 226 VsLewis: Using language is almost never a rational matter. LewisVs: An action can be rational and explainable even if it is done out of habit and without thought. II 227 VsLewis: Language cannot possibly be traced back to conventions. It is impossible to agree on everything at any time. LewisVs: Admittedly, the first language cannot possibly go back to a convention. II 227 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose a lifelong isolated person could one day spontaneously start using a language due to his ingenious talent. LewisVs: Even people living in isolation always adhere to a certain regularity. II 228 VsLewis: It is circular to define the meaning in P of sentences using the assumptions made by the members of P. LewisVs: It may be so, but it does not follow that making an assumption should be analyzed as accepting sentences. II 229 VsLewis: E.g. Suppose population of notorious liars. LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population! II 229 E.g. Ironist: these people are actually true in L! But they are not literally true in L! I.e. they are truly in another language, connected with L, which we can call "literal-L". II 232 VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. LewisVs: The convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust par excellence. It is in a certain language! Its alternatives are regularities in other languages! II 233 + VsLewis: Even truthfulness and trust in L cannot be a convention. Moral obligation/Lewis: a convention continues to exist because everyone has reason to abide by it, if others do, that is the obligation. VsLewis: Why communication when people can draw completely different conclusions from a statement? II 234 VsVs is quite compatible with my theory. But these are not independent conventions but by-products. II 235 VsLewis: not only one language, but an infinite number of fragments (e.g. interest in communication etc.) VsVs: this is indeed the case, the language is inhomogeneous e.g. educated/uneducated. II 237 VsLewis: silence is not untruthful. VsVs: Right expectation of truthfulness, but no trust! II 238/239 VsLewis: either analytical or not, no smooth transition! VsVs: fuzzy analyticity with the help of gradual conventionality: regarding the strength of assumptions or the frequency of exceptions, or uncertainty as to whether certain worlds are actually possible. II 240 VsLewis: thesis and anti-thesis refer to different objects: a) semantic (artificial) languages, b) language as part of natural history - VsVs: no, there is only one philosophy of language, language and languages are complementary! |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Lewis, D. | Cresswell Vs Lewis, D. | I 23 Performance/Competence/Semantic/Cresswell: what relationships are there between the two of them? Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust: in L: thesis: most language use is based on it. --- I 24 We assume that the speakers are trying to express true sentences and we expect the same from others. Important argument/CresswellVsLewis: this may be the case, but to me it seems to be more a matter of empirical investigation than a definition that it should be so. And therefore: --- I 33 Language/Bigelow/Cresswell: John Bigelow tells me, thesis: that one of the earliest functions of language was storytelling. Then it is more about imagination than everyday communication! ((s)VsCresswell: 1) How does Bigelow know that? 2) Why should one draw such far-reaching conclusions from that). CresswellVsLewis: even if it should turn out that there was a logical link between the convention and the use of language, it seems better to me not to include this in a theory of semantics from the start. Anyway, we do not need a connection of competence and performance. --- II 142 Fiction/Belief de re/Lewis/Cresswell: (Lewis 1981, 288): E.g. In France, children believe that Papa Noel brings gifts to all children; in England, Father Christmas only brings them to the good children (and these get twice as many gifts, as Pierre calculates). De re/Fiction/Lewis: this cannot be an attitude de re, because there is no such res in both cases. Fiction/CresswellVsLewis: here you can also have a reference de re, even if the causal connection is not direct. Solution/Devitt: storytelling. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Convention | Lewis, D. | Cresswell I 23 Lewis: Convention of truthfulness and trust in language L: this is the basis of most language use. I 24 We assume that the speakers try to express true sentences and expect the same from the others. Lew II 206 Lewis's thesis: such conventions (of truthfulness and trust) provide us with the desired connection of languages on the one hand and language-using populations on the other. V 345 "Conventions" (1969) Social Conventions/Lewis: Regularities to solve ongoing coordination problems. Situations of mutually dependent decisions in which common interests prevail. Conventions/Lewis: are compared with other types of regularities: on communication: can be described as a convention to be true in relation to certain attribution of truth conditions to sentences. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 |
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