Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Epiphenomenalism | Vollmer Vs Epiphenomenalism | I 110 VsEpiphenomenalism/Vollmer: if mental phenomena were only by-products of physical processes, they would be dispensable for evolution. Zombie argument: Humans and animals would then behave exactly as they behave without pain and consciousness. Identity Theory/Vollmer: the argument VsEpiphenomenalism, however, does not meet the identity theory! Here, processes of consciousness are not epiphenomena! Physical processes with an inner aspect differ rather physically from those without an inner aspect! ((s) See also Two aspects theory/Fechner). II 96 EpistemologyVsEpiphenomenalism/Vollmer: if consciousness were only a by-product of physical processes, it would be dispensable for evolution. The phylogeny would not have been different if epiphenomena did not exist. Humans and animals would behave in the same way due to physical chemical reactions. (>Zombie problem). The entire internal aspect remains unexplained in epiphenomenalism. The theory of evolution does not do anything for this. But the argument does not meet the identity theory, then here consciousness is not a by-product. Consciousness/Identity Theory/Vollmer: here physical processes with internal aspect differ from those without internal aspect! The argument VsEpiphenomenalism shows that evolution could have been different. However, it does not show that consciousness as we know it is superfluous. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Fechner, G. Th. | Chisholm Vs Fechner, G. Th. | II 193 Two aspects-teaching/Fechner/Stubenberg: Thesis: people have an "internal" and an "external" aspect; the inner one is "mental". The theory is not merely another name for the identity theory. fechnerVsMonism: only makes sense if the world is also perceived as uniform; as a self-appearance everything is ultimately spirit. II 195 Fechner: Thesis: mind and body or the material and ideal are not ultimately reason and essence, but only different according to position and view or perception. What appears to itself as mental from an inner position, can appear physical to an external person. Diversity of appearance depends on the position. Stubenberg: this is a protagorean position (Man is the measure of all things). II 196 Stubenberg: most interpretations of Fechner’s theory are wrong because they are based on the analogy of two sides of a coin, etc. fechner: the two aspects of perception are firmly anchored in common sense. II 197 Fechner: there is no need to undermine the mental or material properties, respectively, with essence. 1. "mental" is, what appears to itself. "physically" what appears to someone else. 2. we "have" ourselves in two ways. 3. the identity of the underlying essence. StubenbergVsfechner: "mind" as an internal point of view is only of interest if a sense can be associated with the concept "inner view". II 198 FeiglVsFechner: Problem: All examples only have a clear meaning in the discourse about physical or geometrical objects. E.g. Also the interior of the body is physical. ((s) Thus, the difference at the decisive point does not exist.) II 200 Inner/VsFechner: that has no specific spatial sense. II 202 VsFechner: one could say that at the level of appearance a duality of mind and body arises again. II 204 VsFechner: he does not know himself what the "underlying essence" is. Poor metaphysics. II 206 ChisholmVsFechner: in his thinking there is no place for people. II 209 VsFechner: every part of the body that can be represented cannot be the seat of the soul. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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