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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Experiments | Duhem | I XIII Experiment/Duhem: The experimenter does not merely read the instruments, he uses the instruments. The following are required: 1.Theory about the domain in which measurements are made. 2.Theory of used measuring instruments. In every device there are systematic errors, the experimenter knows that. Duhem: the Ex works constantly with two devices: the concrete measuring device and an ideal structure for which the physical laws "exactly" apply. Between the phenomena ascertained in the experiment and the result of the experiment formulated by the physicist is a complex translation process. The facts which the experimenter determines are already "theoretical facts". The experimenter must always use theories for his work. The results are only useful for other physicists, if it is know which theories he has used. And whether corrections were already made. >Method. I XII An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism). I XXVI VsExperimentum crucis: (for example, by Quine, 1951, as the main attack against logical empiricism: Holistic view of science.) No experiment can show where the fault is located in the system. The examination of a particular hypothesis is only possible by using a whole group of further laws, ultimately the whole theory. Since Bacon, hope was linked to an experimentum crucis: a decision-making experiment between competing theories. E.g. Foucault's attempt to decide between Newton's theory of emission of light and Huygens' undulation theory sees Duhem as an experiment of the experimentum crucis. Foucault was able to show that light actually spreads slower in water, which made Newton look refuted. Duhem shows that this conclusion is not valid. The error could be in a secondary hypothesis. I 189 Experiment/Duhem: disintegrates into two parts. I 190 1. Observation of certain facts. For this, the knowledge of physics is not necessary at all. 2. Interpretation of the observed facts. For this you have to know the physics. The physicist does not write in his protocol that the instrument has indicated a certain stroke, he notes that the gas has reached a certain volume. What are the size of the volume, the temperature, the pressure? Three concrete objects? No, there are three abstract symbols that connect physical theory with facts. I 192 Definition experiment: accurate observation of a group of phenomena, plus interpretation of them. This interpretation replaces the concrete given with the help of the observation of actual ones obtained by abstract and symbolic representations which agree with them on the basis of the theories which the observer accepts as permissible. I 193 Experiment: The result is the establishment of a relationship between different concrete facts. A certain fact was artificially produced, another stems from it. I 210 Experiment/Duhem: We must know the theories that the physicist considers valid. During the experiment, the physicist continued to operate two apparatuses side by side: the actual measuring apparatus and the ideal one defined by mathematical formulas and symbols. I 215 The result of a physical experiment has not a security of the same level as a fact, established by non-scientific methods, from a healthy person by simple observation. The experiment is less direct and more dependent on a whole group of theories. I 273 Experiment/Duhem: The experiment is not the basis of theory, but the highlight. The totality of the theorems gives an ever more similar picture of the totality of the experimental facts. >Theories, >Facts. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Experiments | Feyerabend | I 366 Experiment/Feyerabend: why should there be a terminology in which it is possible to say that the same experiment confirms one theory and refutes the other? >Meaning change, >Incommensurability, >Vocabulary, >Confirmation, >Verification, >experimentum crucis, >Observation language. |
Feyerabend I Paul Feyerabend Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, London/New York 1971 German Edition: Wider den Methodenzwang Frankfurt 1997 Feyerabend II P. Feyerabend Science in a Free Society, London/New York 1982 German Edition: Erkenntnis für freie Menschen Frankfurt 1979 |
| Experiments | Hacking | I 287 Experiment/HackingVsLakatos/HackingVsFeyerabend: an experiment is neither a statement nor a report but an action, which is not about mere words. >P. Feyerabend. I 293 E.g. Herschel’s theory of thermal radiation was (falsely) aligned with Newton, but that did not affect his observation. He noted that infrared had to be included in the white light. A previously existing theory would have prevented him from this finding out. HackingVsTheory Ladenness of observation. >Theory ladenness, >Observation, >Method, >Discoveries. I 299 Observing is a skill (HackingVsHanson). I 380f Experiment/Hacking: an experiment is never repeated but always improved. An experiment usually does not work, therefore observation is not so important. I 418 Crucial experiment/experimentum crucis/Hacking: e.g. Michelson-Morley. >experimentum crucis. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Experiments | Lakatos | Hacking I 32 Experimentum crucis/Kuhn: the experimentum crucis is not impossible. LakatosVs: always only afterwards (and much later). >Experimentum crucis, >Experiment/Duhem. |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Facts | Duhem | I XII Fact/Duhem: The concept of facts has lost its independence because facts are always impregnated in theory. Duhem seeks to control between Skylla of inductivism and the Charybdis of apriorism. The concept of the experimental law serves as a steering wheel. Symbols cannot be called true or false, at best appropriate. This also applies to theories as purely symbolic representations. Duhem, however, assigns empirical content to empirical laws, which purely theoretical laws cannot claim. An experimentum crucis (whose failure would disprove the whole theory) is rejected. (> Holism). I 180 By increasing the accuracy of measurement, we have reduced the set of theoretical facts. E.g. Geodetic lines on an infinite surface (I 182). There are those who return in themselves, and those who do not, although they do not move away infinitely (surface: infinitely extended ~ bullhorn) Nevertheless, theoretically, the initial conditions can be determined accurately without obtaining ambiguities, for example when a sphere is to move on a geodetic line. I 183 However, it is quite different when, instead of the theoretical, practical initial conditions are given. Unlimited set of different initial conditions. I 184 If the initial conditions are not mathematically known, but determined by physical methods, and even if they are exact, the question posed will remain unanswerable. I 199 Facts/Duhem: Concrete, very different facts can be confounded when interpreted by the theory that they are only form a single experiment and are represented by a single symbolic expression. One and the same theoretical fact can correspond to an infinite number of practical facts. But also the same practical fact can correspond to an infinite number of theoretical facts, which are logically incompatible with each other. (> Quine,> Quine-Duhem thesis). An experimenter might say: E.g. An increase of the pressure by 100 atmospheres increases the electromotive force by 0.085 volts. He could have said with the same authority: by 0.0844 or 0.0846 volts. For the mathematician the statements are contradictory. For the physicist, whose possibility of differentiation is limited because of the measurement accuracy, they have the same meaning. Difference between mathematics and physics: deviating measurement results are no formal contradiction. > distinction analytic/synthetic/Quine. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Method | Duhem | I 250 Method/Duhem: The method of ad absurdum guiding can become an evidence. In order to prove that a theorem is correct, it is sufficient to drive the exactly opposite theorem into an absurd consequence. The Greek mathematicians had made extended use of this method. Those who equate the experimental contradiction with the ad absurdum guiding mean that one makes equal use in physics as in geometry. That's not right. The name experimentum Crucis refers to a crossroad of the decision. E.g. there are two hypotheses about the nature of the light. I 251 For Newton, Laplace, and Biot light consists of projectiles. For Huygens, Fresnel et al. it consists of vibrations. According to the first, light moves faster in water than in the air. Foucault's experiment with rotating mirrors proves that the greenish strip ... appears at a certain point. The dispute is decided, light is not a body, but a vibration propagating in the ether. DuhemVs: The experiment of Foucault does not decide between two hypotheses of emission and undulation, but between two theoretical groups, which must be taken as a whole, between two complete systems of Newton's optics and Huygens' optics. >Hypotheses, >Theories. I 252 But let us assume that both are correct. In addition to two theorems of geometry that contradict each other, there is no place for a third. This is different in physics. I 253 Experiment/Method/Duhem: One cannot reconstruct the form of ad absurdum guiding with the experimental method. The geometry, however, also has the direct proof, but it cannot be comprehended in the experiment either. >Experiments, >Observation. I 260 E.g. the theoretician cannot only use the Kepler laws for justification, since these are determined solely by the concrete individual objects. He must show that the observed disturbances coincide with the previously calculated ones. --- I 278 Method/Duhem: Interlocutor: The discussion that leads to a theory is a link, it is not justified to seek in it a physical sense. The demand that every mathematical operation used in the course is given a physical sense would inhibit the progress. One has also tried to ban the differential calculus for physics. >Calculus. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Principles | Duhem | 285 Principles/Poincaré: asserts with regard to the principles of mechanics: never will a new experiment lead to abandon them. The operation which it is to compare with the facts has no meaning. E.g. principle of inertia. You can only give it a meaning if you consider a certain relationship point to be chosen. Disregarding this definition would deprive the expression of its meaning. There are as many laws as different relationship points! If the principle of inertia were wrong in relation to a certain point, it would become true when another one was chosen. And it would always be free to choose this latter. It is impossible to close this backdoor. >Laws, >Laws of Nature. I 286 E.g. Principle of equality of action and reaction: (also Poincaré): "The focus of an isolated system can only have a straight and uniform motion." Can this be verified by an experiment? No, the only isolated system is the universe. So the question makes no sense. "We are always free to accept that our principle is correct." I 287 E.g. Chemistry: The Law of multiple proportions: Whatever the results of the analysis may be, it is always certain to find three integers, by virtue of which the law is verifiable with more accuracy than the experiments have. I 288 E.g. Law of the rational indices: crystallography. There are always certain errors during measurements. The crystalographer, who wants to correct the law experimentally, certainly did not understand the meaning of the words he uses. Here as in the case of the multiple proportions, these are purely mathematical expressions, which lack any physical sense. >Physics. I 289 Duhem: It would only lead to public places, if one were to say that the conditions were almost commensurable: for everything in the world is almost commensurable. Any kind of incommensurable relationship is always nearly commensurable. It would be absurd to want to subject certain principles of mechanics to the direct control of the experiment. Does it follow that these hypotheses cannot be achieved by experimental contradictions? No! Isolated, these hypotheses have no experimental significance. It cannot be a question of confirming or refuting the experiments. But these hypotheses are used as essential foundations in the construction of theories. These theories (crystallography, mechanics, chemistry) are representations designed to be compared with the facts. The experimental contradiction then always concerns a group as a whole. So it disappears what could have appeared paradoxical in the assertion that certain physical theories are based on hypotheses which cannot be interpreted physically. >Systems, >Models, >Interpretation. Principles/Poincaré: "The experiment can build the principles of mechanics, but not destroy them". I 290 HadamardVs: "Duhem has shown that it is not about isolated hypotheses, but the totality of the hypotheses of mechanics, whose experimental verification can be attempted. I 290 It is up to the physicist's instinct to look for the fault from which the whole system suffers. No absolute principle leads this investigation. If there is a struggle between hypotheses, the healthy commen sense decides after some time. I 292 E.g. According to Foucault's experiment, Biot abandoned the emission hypothesis. Pure logic would not have been enough for this waiver. It was not an experimentum crucis. >Experimentum crucis. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Quine Duhem Thesis | Duhem | I XXVI Quine-Duhem thesis/DuhemVsExperimentum crucis: (for example, by Quine, 1951)(1) as the main attack against the logical empiricism: Holistic conception of science. No experiment can show where the fault is located in the system. The examination of a particular hypothesis is only possible by using a whole group of further laws, ultimately the whole theory. >Holism, >Empiricism, cf. >Two Dogmas. Since Bacon, hope was linked to an experimentum crucis: a decision-making experiment between competing theories. E.g. Foucault's attempt to decide between Newton's theory of emission of light and Huygens' undulation theory sees Duhem as an attempt of the experimentum crucis. Foucault was able to show that light actually spreads slower in water, which makes Newton's thesis refuted. Duhem shows that this conclusion is not valid. The error could be in a secondary hypothesis. >Hypotheses. I XXVII In the concrete everyday scientific situation the pragmatist will be inclined to reject the one or the other hypothesis by his "experience" or "healthy common sense". "True" or "false" has thus become a pragmatic question. Quine: any proposition can be defended as true if one puts drastic revisions elsewhere in the system. Quine has directed the Duhem thesis against the distinction between analytic/synthetic, thus undermining a basic pillar of logical empiricism. Though Popper was a devotee of the experimentum crucis, his school came closest to Duhem: Agassi and Lakatos. The holistic approach by Feyerabend, Kuhn, and Sneed is rather strengthened than withdrawn. >Experimentum crucis. 1. W. V. O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 1951: pp.20-43. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kuhn, Th. | Lakatos Vs Kuhn, Th. | Hacking I 32 Crucial Experiment/experimentum crucis/Kuhn: is not impossible - LakatosVs always only in retrospect (much later). I 191 LakatosVsKuhn: "mob psychology." Vs recycling the history of science to sociology. This leaves no room left for the sacrosanct values truth, objectivity, rationality and reason. Rorty IV 16 LakatosVsKuhn/Rorty: degraded science to the "psychology of the mob". |
Laka I I. Lakatos The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) Cambridge 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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