Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Behavior Surowiecki I 97
Behavior/decision making/decision/Surowiecki: if you want to optimise the decision making of a company or an economy, you should ensure that decisions are made almost simultaneously and not one by one. ((Surowiecki I 93) >Information Cascades: If the behavior of others is merely imitated, the common good of the group suffers.)

Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

Collective Intelligence Surowiecki I 16
Collective Intelligence/Surowiecki: Conditions for masses to be made wise: 1. diversity, 2. independence, 3. a special kind of decentralization. ---
I 17
Communication/Surowiecki: exaggerated communication can lead to a decrease in collective intelligence. ---
I 98
Collective decisions are wise only if they contain many different kinds of information. (See Collective Intelligence/Sunstein). ---
I 99
Group decisions: are better when people listen less to each other. ((s) > Information Cascades).

Surowi I
James Surowiecki
Die Weisheit der Vielen: Warum Gruppen klüger sind als Einzelne und wie wir das kollektive Wissen für unser wirtschaftliches, soziales und politisches Handeln nutzen können München 2005

Information Sunstein I 15
Information/Markets/Sunstein: prediction markets are extraordinarily good at bringing information together. Examples of this are predictions about who will win the next Oscar or which products will be successful. In such prediction markets, people can "invest" and bet on the probability of an event occurring. (See Google/Sunstein). At the same time, there is a lot of knowledge in the game that becomes evident in this way. ---
I 81
Information/Group discussions/Communication/Democracy: the term "hidden profiles" has emerged (3) for the phenomenon that individual members who have information that the majority of their group (e. g. bodies) lacks, keep to themselves. There are things the group could have, but they do not have them. Hidden Profiles are an effect of what is called Common Knowledge. Common Knowledge/Sunstein: is information available to all members of a group as opposed to information that only some members have. (1)
---
I 82
Statistically, this can be explained simply by the fact that it is more likely that common knowledge will be communicated in the group. However, social effects also play a role. (...) Information that only individual members possess must be communicated at the very beginning, otherwise the jointly shared information prevails. ---
I 83
As a result, group decisions ultimately reflect the initial attitudes of some members, even if - withheld - deviating information would have led to a different outcome. (2), (3) ---
I 88
Information Cascades/Sunstein: the main feature of such a cascade is that the parties involved do not reveal the information they possess. ---
I 89
As a result, those involved can make a whole series of serious mistakes. ---
I 90
Members who join later withhold information because they are instructed by those who were there before them. The New England Journal of Medicine investigated imitation effects in doctors who behaved "like lemmings". (4)
1. Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, “The Common Knowledge Effect: Information Sharing and Group Judgments,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (1993): 971–73 (explaining hidden profiles by reference to common knowledge effect).
2. See Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling During Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48 (1985): p. 1476
3. Stasser and Titus, “Hidden Profiles,” 305.
4. David Hirshleifer, “The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades,” in The New Economics of Human Behavior, ed. Mariano Tommasi and Kathryn Ierulli (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 193–95, and on the discussion in Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 204.

Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017

Internet Shirky Morozov I 39
Internet/collaboration/Shirky/Morozov: Shirky bases his theses (1) mainly on two sources: 1. Susanne Lohmann's statement of the East German protests 1989 (2)
---
Morozov I 40
2. And Ronald Coase's theory of the emergence of companies (3) from which Shirky takes over the concept of transaction costs. MorozovVsShirky: both sources are not suitable or neutral enough to explain digital technologies.
Susanne Lohmann/Morozov: her approach is context-independent and views people as one-dimensional ahistorical characters in order to establish a theory of information cascades that works in Calcutta as well as in Cairo. Thesis: when people see others who are already protesting on the street, they tend to join them, but only when the protests reach a certain level.
---
I 40/41
MorozovVsShirky: with his theory, which is inspired by Lohmann and Coase, he can explain everything, but through its generality the theory does not explain anything in the end. ---
I 43
Transaction costs/Coase/MorozovVsShirky: the term transaction cost is suitable to explain Californian start-up companies, but hardly to understand Iranian society if we do not know anything about Iranian culture, history and politics. Who are the relevant actors? What are the relevant transactions? Collaboration/MorozovVsShirky: does no one else but dissidents in these countries collaborate? Only the dissidents? Are all these dissidents united? Or do they pursue their own goals?

1. Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing without Organizations (New York: Penguin, 2009).
2. Susanne Lohmann, “The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989– 91,” World Politics 47, no. 1 (October 1, 1994): 42– 101.
3. Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4 (1937): 386– 405.

Shirky I
Clay Shirky
Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organizing Without Organizations New York 2009


Morozov I
Evgeny Morozov
To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism New York 2014
Markets Sunstein I 15
Markets/Information/Sunstein: prediction markets are extraordinarily good at bringing information together. Examples of this are predictions about who will win the next Oscar or which products will be successful. In such prediction markets, people can "invest" and bet on the probability of an event occurring. (See Google/Sunstein). At the same time, there is a lot of knowledge in the game that becomes evident in this way. (See Markets/Hayek, Prices/Sunstein). ---
I 127
Markets/Hayek/Sunstein: Markets contain information about products and consumers distributed over prices. Information about consumers includes taste. Tastes are very different. ---
I 128
It is not easy to empirically test whether people really buy the better and at the same time cheaper products. (1) Free markets/Sunstein: should, from a neoclassical point of view, come at the same marginal cost. It is an empirical question whether this happens - and in many contexts it does not happen. The simplest explanation is that people do not have all the information and the markets are not completely free. Governments restrict competition or consumers have limited opportunities for comparison. Therefore, we cannot simply say that prices are "correct".
Nevertheless, markets are better instruments for pricing than the fixing of prices by committees. Information cascades can also be found in markets: People buy things, not because they need them, but because others buy them.
Information cascades: also available in stock markets. Prices tripled between 1994 and 2000, but not the basic indicators. (2)
Psychology/Robert Shiller: the same psychological forces that drove the stock market also have the potential to operate in other markets. (3)
HayekVsShiller/Sunstein: nonetheless, many believe that Hayek's optimism about the accuracy of prices was correct.

1. See Richard Thaler, ed., Advances in Behavioral Finance, vol. 2 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).
2. Robert Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2d ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 2, 5.
3. ibid. p. 11.

Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017

Morals Hayek Sunstein I 123
Moral/Hayek/Sunstein: Hayek's thesis: Morality is itself a product of many minds that make many decisions over time, creating a set of principles that are unlikely to be embraced by any individual mind or theory. Hayek's thesis: "Our morality equips us with possibilities that are greater than those that reason could give us. (1)
Sunstein I 124
Sunstein: Hayek's conclusion is that many ghosts are responsible for ((s) the emergence of) morality over time. SunsteinVsHayek: he does not take into account the effects of group pressure on information retention (>Information Cascades). Precisely this can contribute to the fact that traditional moral concepts last longer than necessary. (See Politics/Sunstein, Communication/Sunstein).

1. Friedrich Hayek, “The Origins and Effects of Our Morals: A Problem for Science,” in The Essence of Hayek, 318, 330.

Hayek I
Friedrich A. Hayek
The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents--The Definitive Edition (The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Volume 2) Chicago 2007


Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017
Tradition Burke Sunstein I 121
Tradition/knowledge/E. Burke/Sunstein: According to Edmund Burke, judgments based on long-standing traditions are more reliable than judgments of individuals with conflicting interests. Sunstein: Burke's major contribution to the study of knowledge and information is that it shows that knowledge is distributed over time.
Sunstein I 122
Knowledge/Burke: is distributed by tradition in small fragments to many individuals and expands over time.
Sunstein I 124
SunsteinVsBurke, E.: he does not take into account the effects of group pressure on information retention (>Information Cascades). Precisely this can contribute to the fact that traditional moral concepts last longer than necessary.

BurkeE I
Edmund Burke
A Philosophical Enquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful 2nd Revised ed. Edition Oxford 2015


Sunstein I
Cass R. Sunstein
Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge Oxford 2008

Sunstein II
Cass R. Sunstein
#Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media Princeton 2017