Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Indeterminacy Quine Rorty I 227
McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation.
ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations.
((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done.
Quine I 257
Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). >Singular Terms/Quine.
I 283
Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .."
I 285
Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy).
II 33
Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - it is only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. >Translation/Quine.
VI 69
Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax.
XII 60
Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers (>shifted ostension).
XII 62
Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence).
XII 97
Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he/she unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.)

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


Rorty I
Richard Rorty
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979
German Edition:
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Rorty II
Richard Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Rorty II (b)
Richard Rorty
"Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (c)
Richard Rorty
Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (d)
Richard Rorty
Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (e)
Richard Rorty
Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (f)
Richard Rorty
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty II (g)
Richard Rorty
"Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993
In
Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000

Rorty III
Richard Rorty
Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989
German Edition:
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Rorty IV (a)
Richard Rorty
"is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (b)
Richard Rorty
"Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (c)
Richard Rorty
"Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty IV (d)
Richard Rorty
"Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106
In
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993

Rorty V (a)
R. Rorty
"Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998

Rorty V (b)
Richard Rorty
"Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty V (c)
Richard Rorty
The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992)
In
Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988

Rorty VI
Richard Rorty
Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Ostension Quine Quine VII (d) 67
Ostension/Pointing/Quine: is always ambiguous because of temporal vastness. Our setting of the object does not show us yet which summation of current objects (stadiums or totality) is intended. Problem: adding "this river" presumes the concept of river. Problem: "This" must also refer to something else, which is the same in the different cases. Problem: we only know that a and b belong to the constituents. Solution: learning through induction. Problem: spatial expansion cannot be separated from temporal, because we need time when pointing. Pointing becomes superfluous in the course of science - which leads to the question of how much depends on the language.
>Pointing/Quine.
XII 56f
Ostension/Direct/Pointing/Quine: Problem: 1) how much of the environment counts? 2) how may an absent thing differ from the one that is shown to still fall under the stated term. Shifted ostension: E.g. pointing to the fuel gauge. E.g. pointing to grass to explain green. E.g. to an inscription to explain a letter. Shifted twice: Goedel number for an expression.
1) inscription of formula
2) Goedel number as a proxy for it
>Goedel Numbers/Quine.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

Pointing Quine V 70f
Pointing/indicative/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: how do we know which part of the area is meant, how do we recognize pointing as such. Solution: Sorting out the irrelevant by induction. Also amplification without a pointing finger or deletions with pointing finger.
X 24
Indicative Pointing/Ostension/Language Learning/Quine: both the learner and the teacher must understand the appropriateness of the situation. This leads to a uniformity of response to certain stimuli. This uniformity is a behavioural criterion for what should become an observation sentence. It also makes it possible for different scientists to check the evidence for each other.
>Language Learning/Quine, >Stimuli/Quine, >Observation Sentences/Quine.
XI 182
Note: Pointing/indicative/Ostension/Quine/Lauener: difference: between direct and shifted ostension:
Def shifted Ostension/Quine/Lauener: if we refer to a green leaf to explain the abstract singular term "green", we do not mean the perceptible green thing, because the word does not denote a concrete entity.
>Ostension/Quine.
XII 47
Pointing/Ostension/Color Words/Gavagai/Wittgenstein/Quine: Problem: for example the color word "sepia": can be learned by conditioning or induction. It does not even need to be said that sepia is a color and not a form, a material or a commodity. However, it may be that many lessons are necessary. >Colour/Quine.
XII 56
Def Direct Ostension/Pointing/Quine: the point shown is at the end of a straight line on an opaque surface. Problem: how much of the environment should count?
Problem: how far may an absent thing differ from the object shown to fall under the term declared ostensively?
XII 57
Def Shifted Ostension/Pointing/Quine: For example, pointing to the fuel gauge instead of the fuel itself to indicate how much is still there. ((s) But not that the fuel gauge is still there). Example shifted: if we point to an event (token) and mean the type.
E.g. pointing to grass to explain green.
For example, point to an inscription to explain a letter.
Double shifted: e.g. Goedel number for an expression. (1st inscription of the formula (of the expression), 2nd Goedel number as proxy for it).
XII 58
The shifted ostension does not cause any problems that are not already present in the direct version.
VII (d) 67
Pointing/indicating definition/Ostension/Identity/Quine: is always ambiguous because of the temporal extension! Our setting of an object does not tell us yet which summation of current objects is intended! When pointing again either the river or river stages can be meant!
Therefore, pointing is usually accompanied by pronouncing the words "this river". But this presupposes a concept of river.
"This river" means: "the river-like summation of momentary objects that this momentary object contains".
VII (d) 68
Pointing/Ostension/Quine: the spatial extension cannot be separated from the temporal extension when pointing, because we ourselves need time for pointing at different places.
VII (d) 74
Ostension/Pointing/objects/universals/Quine: how does pointing to space-time objects differ from pointing to universals like square and triangle?
VII (d) 75
Square: each time we point to different objects and do not assume an identity from one opportunity to another. The river, on the other hand, assumes this identity. Attribute/Quine: the "squareness" is divided by the shown objects.
But you do not need to assume entities like "attributes". Neither the "squareness" is pointed to, nor is it needed for a reference to the word "square".
The expression "is square" is also not necessary if the listener learns when to use it and when not to use it. The expression does not need to be a name for any detached object.
VII (d) 76
Pointing/concrete/abstract/Quine: general terms like "square" are very similar to concrete singular terms like "Cayster" (the name of the river) concerning the east version. With "red" you do not need to make a distinction at all!
VII (d) 77
In everyday language, a general term is often used like a proper name. >General Terms/Quine.
V 70
Pointing/Quine: is useful to introduce the anomaly. Conspicuousness/Quine/(s): should explain why from the multitude of stimuli certain stimuli are overweighted or how shapes are recognized against a background.
V 89
Identity/Pointing/Quine: Problem: there is no point in showing twice and saying, "This is the same as that". Then you could still ask. "The same what?
V 102
Pointing/General Terms/Quine: Problem: unique showing requires special care in some situations. Example "this body is an animal": here the outline must be carefully traced, otherwise it could be that only the hull is perceived as an animal.
V 103
At the beginning we did not talk about sentences like "This body is Mama", because we have to assume a general mastery of the "is" in the predication of duration. This requires a stock of individually learned examples.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987



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