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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Graeser | Grae I 52 Analyticity/Syntheticity/Graeser: the distinction analytic/synthetic comes from the distinction between reason and truths of fact. >G.W. Leibniz, >Reason, >Truth, >Facts, >Truth of reason, >Truth of facts. |
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Augustine | Medieval Philosophy | Höffe I 116 Augustine/Medieval Philosophy/Höffe: In the Christian Middle Ages, Augustine outranks all other church fathers for centuries; he is the supreme authority according to Holy Scripture in all matters of faith and theology. A document is provided by the Höffe I 117 Basic work of the training of theologians in the High Middle Ages: In the aphorisms of Petrus Lombardus (1095-1160) ninety percent of all quotations come from Augustine. >Augustine. For three areas Augustine exerts a significant influence. A. In "ethical-theological Augustinism" his doctrine of grace, which restricts human freedom, prevails. B. In the knowledge-theoretical or "philosophical Augustinism", connected with the "anthropological Augustinism", for more than half a millennium the rejection of a faith independent reason dominated. Christian Aristotelism: Essentially only in the "Christian Aristotelism" of Albert the Great (1200-1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1275) does reason regain its full inherent right within the framework of the distinction between the truth of reason and the truth of revelation. >Reason, >Thomas Aquinas. BonaventuraVsThomas: Thomas' opponent Bonaventura (1221-1274) will, however, revive Augustinism in the philosophy of knowledge. C. Finally, "political Augustinism", the doctrine of two diametrically opposed empires, together with the devaluation of worldly things and their conception of justice oriented towards this world, is essential for legal and state thinking. >Justice. |
Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Completeness | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Cf. >Concept/Hegel. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid: for him, everything is a truth of reason, or just as well one can say, everything is for him a factual truth! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one includes its opposite. "the overarching general". |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Forms of Thinking | Leibniz | Holz I 68 "Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. At the same time he comprehends both of them as analytic. Holz: in fact, the relationship is not formal, but dialectical. > Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Justification | Leibniz | Holz I 68 Truths of facts/Leibniz: here, too, the proposition of the sufficient reason should apply, although truths of reason do not come into play here. Here the "also" is important: it states something about the logical status of truths of facts as a kind of truth of reason. Truths of facts/Leibniz: are now distinguished from truths of reason as their opposite! (Namely, as not logically justifiable). >Sufficiency/Leibniz, -> Reasons/Leibniz,> Truth/Leibniz,> Principles/Leibniz. Holz I 69 Definition "Golden Chain" of the links/Holz: metaphor of the baroque. "Aura catena": if one is defined by its relation to another, then the totality of the elements is the reason of this one. Chain/Leibniz: more than temporal: one is respectively more determined by its closer neighbor. Sufficient justification/Leibniz: something can be adequately justified by its connection with its nearest neighbors, but not completely. Holz I 70 Complete justification/reason/determination/Leibniz: only through the whole chain. (infinite, only to be seen by God). The individual terms would have to be given by identical sentences. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Reason | Rorty | V 84 Facts/reason/truth/Davidson/Quine/Rorty: the distinction between timeless truths of reason and truths of fact that are time-bound is no longer clear. >Truth of fact, >Truth of reason, >Facts/Rorty. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Truth | Leibniz | Holz I 44 Truth of reason/Truth of facts/Leibniz: Truth of reason: certain simple and original ideas, such as those of identity, are immediately seen as modes or forms of our sense-perception as categories of the givenness of beings. They are not mediated by perception, but are the determinateness of perception itself. >Perception/Leibniz. I 54 Def Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth appears as a statement relation, in which the identity of different things is determined against each other. Def Experience/Leibniz/Holz: experience is the return of something different to their connection in such a relation. Discovery of the truth of different things, namely subject and predicate in synthetic sentences of experience. Truth/Leibniz/Holz: truth is not really in the identity of the subject A = A, but in the return of the predication to the identity of a certain predicate with a certain subject in which it is contained, thereby distinguishing the subject from other subjects. The truth of a proposition states that it can be traced back to an identical proposition (axiom). I 57 Truth/Leibniz: truth appears only mediated, in the medium of its opposite, of appearance (> Appearance/Hegel). Truth of facts/truth of reason/Leibniz: I gain the certainty of the facts, the vérités de fait only by means of their representation on the level of reason - the vérités de raison. This can show me the material truth but only as the not wrong. ((s) Double negation: is weaker.) In the reversal of the method of proof in truths of facts, the variety of experience and the unity of reason stand opposite to each other like a mirror image. I 63 Truth of facts/Leibniz: the truth of facts must exist, if anything should be said at all about the infinite manifoldness, and knowledge should thus be gained. Truth of reasons/Leibniz: truth of reasons is necessary, their opposite is impossible. Truth of facts/Leibniz: truth of facts is contingent, their opposite is possible. Holz: the difference between the two must not be misunderstood, otherwise Russell would be right: I 64/65 Russell: It is nonsense to say of a true proposition that it is not true in the sense of another, apotictically true proposition. ((s), for example, that a truth of reason contradicts a truth of facts). Holz: the difference lies in the argument. For the proof of truth of facts, we must examine the preceding chain of connections and because of the infinite divisibility of the bodies an infinite number of sentences. This can only do the infinite mind of God. >Order/Leibniz. Truth of reason/Leibniz: is the generic term for truths of reasons and truths of facts! The truth attribute of both lies in the fact that in the subject concept all its possible predicates are contained. "Praedicatum inest subiecto". Inclusion of the predicate in the subject: A is contained in Ax or Ax = A + B + ... X. I 66 This inclusion of the predicate is the foundation of truth. This is, according to structure, a reason of reason. >Predicate/Leibniz. Def truth/Leibniz/Holz: is then the constitution of that state in which identity comes to a being or a fact when it enters into a distinction between subject/predicate/definiendum/definiens. This state is where the fact appears as the concept of the fact. Truth is a reflexion relationship. I 68 "Overarching general"/Leibniz/Holz: the truth of reason is the genre which comprises two (and only two) species, namely the truth of reason itself and its opposite, the truths of facts. For the formal logician, this remains a systematic contradiction: Leibniz makes a distinction between necessary and contingent truths. Nevertheless, he comprehends both of them analytically! Holz: in fact, the relationship is not a formal logical one, but a dialectical one. > Josef König: "The Overarching General" as the basic logical figure of Leibniz's metaphysics, is necessary for the inexpressable multiplicity of the world, which can nevertheless be subjected to an order of reason. I 73 Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. Only perceptible to an infinite mind. Overarching general: for the infinite mind, the distinction between truths of reason and truths of facts is again invalid. For him, everything is a truth of reason, or, one can say as well, everything is a truth of facts for him! For the finite mind, however, the truth of reason is the opposite of the truth of facts. Overarching general: the one involves its opposite. Truth/Cognition/Metaphysics/Leibniz/Holz: This again has the astounding consequence that Leibniz can only speak sensibly of two kinds of truth (truths of facts/truths of reason) when he comprehends the idea of the infinite mind (for which the two coincide) only as a metaphysical auxiliary construction. >Truth of reason, >Truth of facts. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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