Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abduction | Abduction: (Charles S. Peirce) procedure of inference, which - unlike induction and deduction - expands knowledge. See also Inference to the Best Explanation. |
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| Abduction | Armstrong | III 104 Abduction/Peirce: conclusion to the best explanation. - E.g. on >hidden parameters - e.g. velocity faster than light, etc. - HolismVsAbduction. >Best explanation, >Holism. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogy | Chisholm Vs Analogy | II 37 Other minds/Rutte: abduction, analogy: I realize that my behavior is caused by my experiences, II 38 and then I extrapolate accordingly to similar experiences as the cause for the other person’s behavior. VsAbduction/VsAnalogy: We cannot show with any empirical instance (experience) that such analogies are correct. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Best Explanation | Schiffer Vs Best Explanation | I 198 Natural language/E.g. Harvey/Analogy to us/Best explanation/Schiffer: I have an analogy to the sensory perception in mind: E.g. a quick look at a typical collie will have us believe that this being is a dog. Nevertheless, I do not believe at the same that a dog-like appearance is sufficient that something is a dog. I would not think that this animal is a dog, if it turns out to be mutant turtles. Problem: now one might assume that there is something like a conclusion to the best explanation here. Vs: does not work anyway with children. (SchifferVsPeirce, SchifferVsAbduction. Solution/Schiffer: you should trust your perceptions, as long as you do not already have contrary beliefs. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Best Explanation | Cartwright Vs Best Explanation | I 4 VsBest Explanation/BE/Cartwright: the falsity of the fundamental laws is a direct consequence of their explanatory power. And that is precisely what speaks against the conclusion regarding the best explanation (CartwrightVsAbduction/CartwrightVsPeirce, CartwrightVsBest Explanation). Tradition by BE: skepticism, idealism, positivism. I 89 Theoretical entities/Best explanation/BE/Cartwright: arguments VsBE have no effect on the assumption of theoretical entities, for explanations which assume theoretical entities are causal explanations. BE: are not causal explanations, but theoretical explanations. I 90 Redundancy/Explanation/Truth/Duhem: (see above) because there are always alternative explanations, truth must be independent from the satisfaction through explanations. Duhem/Cartwright: his argument is sometimes read epistemically: we cannot know which ones of several alternative laws are true, yet they are ultimately incompatible. CartwrightVs: this is a misreading. Because this is a general characteristic of our knowledge and does not reflect the specialty in Duhem’s attack DuhemVsBest Explanation. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Putnam, H. | Block Vs Putnam, H. | I 179 Pain/Functionalism/Putnam: Thesis: pain is a functional state. Thesis: no organism that can feel pain, allows a decomposition into parts that have separate descriptions. E.g. a swarm of bees as a whole cannot be a single pain feeler. BlockVsPutnam: 1) that could be modified in a way that the parts may not all have one organization that are characteristic of sentient beings. This would not exclude a system with homunculi!. E.g. sense organs have also insentient parts!. 2) Also vice versa it should not be said that no real part may feel: E.g. otherwise, pregnant women and organisms infested with parasites would not be considered as pain feeling beings. Block: what is important is that the sentient beings play a crucial role in giving the thing its functional organization. I 192 Best explanation/Abduction/Block: E.g. Psycho functionalism: you could say: "What else could mental states be, if not psycho-functional states?" (Putnam per psycho functionalism, 1967). "Better explanation than behaviorism or materialism. BlockVsPutnam: this is a dubious use of the inference to the best explanation. Because what guarantees us that an answer to the question "What are mental states?" exists at all?. In addition, the conclusion about the best explanation is not applicable if there are no acceptable explanations. ((s) If nothing is useful, what is available?) |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Various Authors | Fraassen Vs Various Authors | Hacking I 93 Best explanation/Fraassen: should be rejected, even if one accepted theories! Theories can clarify something and explain it, but they are not literally true. Hacking I 95 Def best explanation/Peirce: "conclusion to the best explanation". Method of hypothesis or abduction. When there is an explanation that makes otherwise unintelligible things understandable, this should probably be right. Peirce later took refrain. Fraassen I 110 Explanation/James Greeno/Fraassen: makes a proposal in relation to statistical theories: A universal explanation is less problematic and more relevant than an assessment of knowledge with respect to individual cases (individual events). (FN 17). Greeno/Fraassen: adopts as a model of a theory one that assumes a single probability space Q as correct plus two partitions (or ranges of variables) of which one is the explanandum and the other is the explanans. I 111 E.g. sociology cannot explain why a particular rich kid stole a car in San Francisco, but it can claim factors such as income and residential area as explanatory factors. Explanatory force: its level is measured brilliantly in Greeno: I: measures the information that the theory supplies for M: variable for the explanandum on the basis of S: the explanans. Maximum: (of explanatory power) is reached when all related probabilities P (Mi I Sj) are 0 or 1 (the deductive nomological case) and Minimum: is reached if the related probabilities are 0, namely, when S and M are statistically independent of each other. FraassenVsGreeno: that encounters the same old problems: E.g. Suppose S and M describe the behavior of barometers and storms: Suppose the probability that the barometer falls (M1) is equal to the probability that there will be a storm (S1). Namely 0.2 and the probability that there will be a storm, given that the barometer falls is equal to the probability that the barometer falls, given that there will be a storm, namely = 1! In this case, the variable I (information) is at its maximum. Problem: it is also there if we swap storm and barometer!. Explanation: we have none for either case. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
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