Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Rorty | I 185 ff Concept/Rorty: Neither are there views that can be dissolved to terms (like Carnap), nor internal relations between concepts that enable "grammatical discoveries" (as in the Oxford philosophy). There is probably nothing left today that would be "analytic philosophy". I 192 RortyVsOxford: there are no grammatical discoveries alone between terms. I 326f RortyVsPutnam (internal realism): this means no more than that we should congratulate ourselves on the invention of the term lithium, so that something stands for lithium, for which all the time there had been nothing. The fact that based on our insights we are coping with the world very well is true, but trivial. That we adequately reflect it is "just an image". Cf. >Picture Theory. I 339f Platonic concepts: the trouble with them is not that they are "false", but that not much can be said about them. They cannot be naturalized or otherwise connected with our needs. Davidson: would probably say the good would not require verificationist arguments. >Platonism, >Ideas/Plato. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| de dicto | Logic Texts | Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Deep Structure | Chomsky | I 269f Surface Structure/Chomsky: Determination of a hierarchy of parts of sentences that belong to specific categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain that Bill will leave. John is certain to leave: - similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Surface structure. I 273 Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning. The contribution an expression makes to the sentence is defined by the deep structure. >Compositionality. ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions were to change their meaning after substitution, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. >Substitution, >Meaning, >Intensions. I 276f Deep Structure/Chomsky: plays a role in the mental representation of sentences. >Representation. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Experience | Tugendhat | I 202 Experience/analytic philosophy/Tugendhat: Tradition: linguistically structured sameness arises only through predicates. >Predicates, >Equality, >Identity. TugendhatVs: we experience linguistic signs in turn perceptively. >Signs, >Symbols, >Words. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| God | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 342 Theology/Religion/analytic philosophy/R. Swinburne: the problem of the existence of God would have to be supplied to a rational solution. A. Plantinga ditto, Mackie ditto. >Proofs of God. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Language | Nagel | I 57 NagelVsprimacy of language: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytic philosophy. >Linguistic turn, >Analytic philosophy. Rejection of Frege. Thinking is often not linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. >Thinking without language. I 57 If language reveals principles of thought, this is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar follows a logic. >Logic, >Grammar, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 61 That "and" has become the word for the conjunction by contingent circumstances has no concequences for the status of the true statement that p is implied by p and q. What a set of sentences means depends on conventions. What follows from a set of premises does not depend on them (formal). Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsDennett/Rorty: his "hetero-phenomenology" is not sufficient. >Heterophenomenology. Nagel thesis: the sources of philosophy are preverbal, their problems are not dependent on culture. Rorty VI 144 ff NagelVsWittgenstein: (according to Rorty): the limits of language are not the limits of thinking! "The content of some thoughts goes beyond any form that they may take in human consciousness." (Per distinction scheme/content). >Scheme/content. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Object | Tugendhat | I 37f Object/Tugendhat: Definition hypokeimenon/Aristotle: object of predications. - Everything is an object: we are unable to verify this by comparing many objects. - We do not learn by abstraction what an "object" is. I 86 Analytical philosophy/Tugendhat: Vsimagination: the main target of the Analytic Philosophy is the assumption of ideas. >Imagination, >Mental states, >Mental objects, >Mentalism. I 88 E.g. not: Who do you imagine under "Peter"? - but who do you mean by "Peter"?Objects/Tugendhat: we do not imagine them, we mean them. >Meaning (Intending). I 102 For that we need singular term instead of pictures. >Singular terms, >Pictures. I 131 Object/Tugendhat: instead of this offensive term we can also speak of "content", but too unclear. >Content. I 141 TugendhatVsHusserl: fails at the question of how predicates are to understand - because of his object-orientated approach. False: the sentence would correspond to a situation. >Edmund Husserl. I 246 Object theory/Tugendhat: Facts are conceived as objects. Object: using a sentence as a display or presentation of facts. >Sentences. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Philosophy of Consciousness | Habermas | IV 11 Philosophy of Consciousness/Subject-Object-Problem/Habermas: the subject-object model of philosophy of consciousness is attacked on two fronts at the beginning of the 20th century: on the part of analytic philosophy of language and psychological theory of behavior. Both do without direct access to consciousness phenomena and replace intuitive knowing-onself, reflection or intuition with procedures that do not rely on intuition. ((s) The representatives of Analytical Philosophy deny the existence of inner entities that could only be achieved through introspection or privileged access. Thus analytical philosophy behaves VsMentalism, VsIntrospection). >VsRelation Theory. See also Behaviorism, >Mentalism, >Introspection, >Self-knowledge, >Self-consciousness. Habermas: These efforts have their origin in the pragmatism of Ch. S. Peirce. One of the early representatives of the new direction is G. H. Mead, who is based among other things on observation methods and interpretation strategies of animal behaviour research.(1) >Pragmatism. 1.Siehe hierzu G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Subject-Object Problem | Habermas | IV 11 Subject-Object-Problem/Philosophy of Consciousness/Habermas: the subject-object model of philosophy of consciousness is attacked on two fronts at the beginning of the 20th century: on the part of analytic philosophy of language and psychological theory of behavior. >Analytic Philosophy, >Behaviorism. Both do without direct access to consciousness phenomena and replace intuitive knowing-onself, reflection or intuition with procedures that do not rely on intuition. ((s) The representatives of Analytical Philosophy deny the existence of inner entities that could only be achieved through introspection or privileged access. Thus analytical philosophy behaves VsMentalism, VsIntrospection, See also VsRelation theory, see also Behaviorism). Habermas: These efforts have their origin in the pragmatism of Ch. S. Peirce. One of the early representatives of the new direction is G. H. Mead, who is based among other things on observation methods and interpretation strategies of animal behaviour research.(1) >Pragmatism, >Ch.S. Peirce. 1.Siehe hierzu G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Ed) Ch. W. Morris (German) Frankfurt 1969. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Surface Structure | Chomsky | I 269F Surface Structure/Chomsky: finding a hierarchy of phrases that belong to certain categories: noun phrase, verb phrase, adjective phrase, etc. E.g. John is certain Bill wants to leave - John is certain to leave: similar surface structure, different deep structure. >Deep structure. I 273 Surface Structure/Chomsky: Assumption: it contributes nothing to the meaning - what contribution a term makes to the sentence, is adjusted by the deep structure >compositionality. ChomskyVsAnalytic Philosophy: if different intensions after substitution should change the meaning, there would have to be a corresponding difference in the deep structure, which is unlikely. >Analytic Philosophy, >Linguistic turn. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 |
| Thinking | Peacocke | Dum I 112 "Philosophy of thoughts"/Evans/Peacocke: Evans thesis: the language has no longer the basic position, - It deals with the problem of what it means to have a thought, and with the structure of thought and its components. What does it mean that a thought is about a subject of one kind or another? What does it mean to grasp a concept? What makes a term a component of a thought? >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Belief objects. I 115 DummettVsEvans: dangerous to reverse the priority of language over the idea (risk of psychologism, when thoughts are subjective and incommunicable). >Psychologism, >Analytic philosophy/Dummett, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language, cf. >Animal language, >Animals. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analytic Philosophy | Derrida Vs Analytic Philosophy | Rorty III 218 DerridaVsAnalytic Philosophy/Rorty: "I worship this Oxford subtlety as much as its unshakeable guilelessness. They will always trust the law of quotation marks." (DerridaVsSearle). |
Derrida I J. Derrida De la grammatologie, Paris 1967 German Edition: Grammatologie Frankfurt 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Analytic Philosophy | McGinn Vs Analytic Philosophy | I 198 McGinnVsAnalytic Philosophy: in his opinion, skepticism must be refuted from within our scheme of concepts of knowledge. McGinn: the more clarity we get about our concepts, the more merciless the skeptical problem looks. It looks as if we are unable to establish a theory that leaves the possibility of our knowledge simply by realizing that one remains within the conceptual set with which we approach our activities regarding knowledge. Transcendental naturalism (TN) counts this in its favor: TNvsSkepticism: the falsity of the skeptical position can be seen only from outside our system of concepts. It were to be explained rather psychologically, only this explanation is beyond our capabilities. McGinn: that does not mean that every epistemological problem need to be done in the style of the TN or even could, nor, that all forms of skepticism require that one must rely on transcendent facts to diagnose or defuse them. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Analytic Philosophy | Nagel Vs Analytic Philosophy | Frank I 127 NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy: declares many questions pointless. Nagel: that merely shows that these questions are inaccessible to a particular type of treatment which is required by the respectively favored method. We should rather rely on our intuition, which generates the problems than on the theories that want to explain away these intuitions. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 Nagel I 57 Language/NagelVsPrimacy of Language/NagelVsAnalytical Philosophy/Nagel: leads to the devaluation of reason, decay product of analytical philosophy. Turning from Frege. Thinking is often non-linguistical. The most common forms of thinking do not depend on any single language. I 59 We cannot explain reason through naturalistic description of the practical language methods. Because the respects in which language is a vehicle do not allow any naturalistic, psychological or sociological analysis. If language reveals principles of thought, it is not because logic is grammar, but because grammar obeys logic. E.g. there is no language in which the modus ponens is not a logical conclusion or identity is not transitive. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Analytic Philosophy | Mackie Vs Analytic Philosophy | Stegmüller IV 194 Universalization/ethics/Stegmüller: from the point of view of many philosophers moral judgements have to be universalizable or "capable of generalization". IV 195 MackieVsanalytic philosophy: it is not a question of metaethics but genuinely one of moral philosophy. Three stages of universalization: 1. numerical differences (between individuals) are irrelevant for the moral assessment. This is a determination of 2nd order, on moral imperatives of first order. (First time prescriptive principle of 2nd order: to preclude extreme selfishness). IV 196 According to some authors the cability of universalization is not only a necessary, but also a sufficient condition for morality. There are only formal but no substantive constraints. MackieVs: purely formal examinations cannot adequately analyze a moral judgement. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Brentano, Fr. | Chisholm Vs Brentano, Fr. | II 212 Psychology/Analytic philosophy/Marek: question: is the concept of the mental uniform? One can speak of things that are mental: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not mental. II 214 Question: Are there purely logical features that are characteristic of the mental? Brentano: yes, intentionality Other authors VsBrentano: the search for characteristics is in vain, since the mental is not further defined. E.g. as you cannot give specific characteristics for the concept of phenomenal color. You can only specify subspecies (for color as for the mental). I 217 Everyday language to quickly left behind. II 253 Science/Language/Brentano/Hedwig: Thesis: we may think with Copernicus, however, we speak with Ptolemy. E.g. rising of the sun. II 254 VsBrentano: this thesis could put him on the spot himself: it might turn out that in a daily statement, if it were thought in terms of his philosophy, something else would be thought than said. (> concept change, > translation, > meaning, > language/thinking). II 256 Brentano justifies the modern-thinking Copernican who speaks in the Ptolemaic language. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Davidson, D. | Wittgenstein Vs Davidson, D. | Davidson/Aristotle: practical syllogism causes are reasons - WittgensteinVs: Causes not empirical but recognizable through language skills. --- Davidson II 84 All such arguments assume that between reason and act exists such a tight logical-conceptual relation that reasons and actions cannot be understood as two distinct events. Only as numerically different, they could stand in a cause-effect relationship. This would, however, be prevented by the deductive relation. --- II 85 DavidsonVsWittgenstein ("Actions, Reason and Causes") This is false solution: Essential for the relationship is that the agent performs the action because he had reasons. One can also have a reason and not act according to that reason. What interests us is the reason for which the agent did x, not any arbitrary reason. As long as this "because" is not explained, the actual explanation performance of explanations of reasons is not exhausted. This deficit is only avoidable if we assume that "rationalization is a species of causal explanation". --- Dummett I 111 Turning to the language: Wittgenstein's Tractatus principle of analytic philosophy: the only way to the analysis of thought leads via the analysis of language. Davidson always presupposes a theory of meaning, WittgensteinVsDavidson: avoids in his later writings, the formation of a general theory of meaning, because he thinks that any attempt at a systematic explanation of language cannot help but to squeeze various phenomena in a single form of description: distortion. But also Wittgenstein believes that the goal of philosophy is to get us in a working order by overview of the functioning of language and thus on the structure of our thoughts to correctly recognize the world. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Hume, D. | Armstrong Vs Hume, D. | Arm III 120 Then all universals would only be substances in Hume’s sense: i.e. something that logically might have an independent existence. III 121 ArmstrongVsHume/ArmstronVsTooley: it is wrong to think of universals like that. Then there are problems regarding how universals are to relate to their particulars (P). E.g. If a rel between Pa and Pb is something that is able to have an independent existence without a and b and any other P, would there not have to be at least one other rel to relate it with a and b?. And if this rel itself can be uninstantiated (e.g. in a universe with monads!), then this rel is just as questionable, etc. ad infinitum (Bradley’s regress). This can only be avoided if universals are merely abstract factors of states (but real). Arm II (b) 46 Causality/Causation/ArmstrongVsHume: E.g. Inhaling a quantum of cyanide leads to the death of the person who inhales it. There seems to be a causal relation here, i.e. one between types: one type produces the other type. II (b) 47 Analytic philosophy/Armstrong: hastens to reassure that we are dealing only with the truth of a universal proposition. "Any person who inhales cyanide dies." Those who represent a singularistic theory of causation will say that each (unique event of) inhaling by a particular person causes their death. (Armstrong pro). But that’s not the whole truth!. Surface structure/Proposition/Armstrong: the proposition itself asserts a connection of universals on its surface, from which individual causal findings follow. Thesis: this surface structure reflects something more profound. If the connection exists, then regularity is included at the level of universals, of course. But this Entailment can probably not be grasped formally. Rather, it is something like Carnap’s "meaning postulate"!. Place II 64 Causality/Hume/Armstrong: ... From this follows that we can never have an empirical proof of the truth of a counterfactual conditional. Law statement/Place: (universal counterfactual conditional): what we can have, however, is empirical proof that supports the truth of a universal Counterfactual Conditional. Proof/Hume/Armstrong: but the proof consists in nothing more than the observation of either regular following or coinciding with Type B and Type A. (Regularity). Place II 65 Ceteris paribus/PlaceVsHume/PlaceVsArmstrong: Such regularities are no evidence of the truth of the counterfactual conditional if it is not ensured that all circumstances remain the same. C.p. must supplement regularity in order for it to become proof. But then Armstrong does not need to refute the regularity theory. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
| Mill, J. St. | Tugendhat Vs Mill, J. St. | I 349 Mill regards names as elementary. Distinguishes general and individual names. Individual names: "denotative". Only descriptions are also connotative. They refer to the object by means of the attribute. Proper names: not connotative, they are "attached to the object itself." TugendhatVsMill: Problem: it would have to be like in the fairy tale of Alibaba where the house is marked with a chalk mark to be able to recognize it. Mill sees this objection himself. His solution: we do not mark the object, but our image of the object. I 350 Presentation/Tradition/Tugendhat: irredeemable metaphor of traditional philosophy. Also for modern tradition. Problem: the fact that the image is supposed to be something like an internal image more problems than it solves. It is no coincidence, however, that philosophy came up with this concept, initially there was no alternative but to look towards something sensual for orientation if you did not want to use a language itself for orientation. I 352 Mill/Tugendhat: however, we can reformulate his theory such that it is not about an imagination, but about "standing for": namely for an imagined object. However, his theory implies that our relation to the objects is not a linguistic one. Object/Frege: Object: is not anything imaginable as a simple fact, but something to which showing itself in manifold ways of givenness belongs essentially. I 353 Image/Sign/Tugendhat: do signs not need to be conceivable at least? Tugendhat: yes: sign types are conceivable, i.e. in a non-metaphorical sense. I 354 TugendhatVsTradition/TugendhatVsMill: 1) The metaphor of a non-sensual, somehow intellectual image makes no sense. 2) Excessive tendency to think the object as a counterpart. I 355 However, it is not controversial between tradition and analytic philosophy that singular terms "stand for objects". (> Proxy/Tugendhat). I 356 3) images are not understood by tradition as intersubjective. (Humpty-Dumpty Theory). |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Wittgenstein | Rorty Vs Wittgenstein | II 176 Wittgenstein/Late/Rorty: helped analytic philosophy to realize that many of Locke's and Kant's problems need not be taken seriously. But Hegel and Nietzsche had long ago understood this. RortyVsWittgenstein: Neglecting Hegel and Nietzsche among the English helped Wittgenstein's success here. And he appeared more original than he was. Ryle/Rorty: has actually solved all the problems of Wittgenstein. II 177 RortyVsWittgenstein: Gadamer never needed a therapy by Wittgenstein. He never sat in a flytrap. There is nothing that Wittgenstein could teach him. He was never held hostage by the images that held the early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is not the titanic figure many considered him to be. He effectively did something that Dewey, the early Heidegger and many others have also done: freeing us of Descartes, Locke and Kant. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brentano: Irreducib. | Pro | Chisholm II 216 Psychology / Brentano / Marek: his theory can be regarded as analytic philosophy of psychology. (Conceptual analysis). The fact that he is committed to the Aristotelian metaphysics, may separate him from Ryle and Wittgenstein. II 217 Scholastic-sounding term system. Mentalistic vocabulary to investigate the psychic self and not the language about mental. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Nominalism | Pro | Frank I 12 analytic philosophy / Frank: three phases: 1 Frege, Carnap "Philosophy of Thought" 2nd lingustic turn: Quine, Wittgenstein Fra I 13 2 b. nominalist phase: Davidson (externalism) 3rd departure from nominalism: on the one hand "Re-Transzendentalisation" ("inner experience," the task of the primacy of language, Evans, DummettVs) on the other hand "renaturalisation of epistemology". |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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