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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.

Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
---|---|---|---|

Bayesianism | Nozick | II 259
Bayes-Theorem/NozickVsBayes: high initial prblty can not fix belief in the absence of evidence.
>Probability, >Conditional probability, >Belief, >Subjective probability, >Evidence, >Hypotheses. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |

Bayesianism | Putnam | V 252f
Bayes-Theorem/Putnam: the Bayes-Theorem implies the acceptance of a certain number of reliable observation records in an observation language.
>Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence, >Conditional probability, >Probability. MethodsVsFetishism: the Bayes-Theorem suggests that division into formal and non-formal part is possible. PutnamVsBayes: differences in the functions of the output probability lead to irrational large differences in the actual confirmation degrees of theorems. PutnamVsSeparation: the definition of the formal part of the scientific method guarantees no rationality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 InVon einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 InKünstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 InTruth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |

Likelihood | Schurz | I 160
Likelihood/Likelihood Intuition/L Intuition/Schurz: according to this intuition, the inverse likelihood p(E : H) is the basic criterion for assessing the plausibility of a hypothesis H given outcome E.
Terminology: sometimes this is called inverse likelihood: p(E : H). Likelihood Intuition/Schurz: is not to be confused with the likelihood method, but it is much more basic. Method of likelihood maximization: here it is assumed that the higher the likelihood of E given H, the greater the support of a hypothesis H by an evidence E. Likelihood expectation method: here it is assumed that the support of a hypothesis by an evidence E is greater, the closer E is to the expected value of E formed with the likelihoods of E given H. Point method/Interval method/Likelihood/Schurz: can be further distinguished. Statistics/Philosophy/Schurz: the philosophical problem is much deeper: one can consider statistical inference and testing methods as justified only if one considers the likelihood intuition as justified. >Review/Schurz. I 161
Why should inverse probability be considered as a measure of the plausibility of a hypothesis? There is no answer to this within statistical theory. Because plausibility is a subjective epistemic probability w(H I E) about which statistical theory makes no statements.
Likelihood intuition/subjective probability/Schurz: within subjective probability theory, the likelihood intuition is explained by the Principal Principle (correspondence of subjective with objective probability, if the latter is known). >Principal Principle. >Bayes-theorem, >Probability, >Probability theory, >Propensity, >Subjective probability. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |

Modal Realism | Bigelow | I 165
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: should accept a correspondence theory for modal language.
Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: Possible worlds exist. But we have not yet said anything about what they are made of and what they are. Different kinds of realisms will assume different kinds of possible worlds. >Possible worlds. Truthmaker/Bigelow/Pargetter: we have not said anything yet about how modal sentences are made true. >Truthmakers. Realism/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: all realisms will say that it is possible that there is a world that represents the actual world as being represented as being in a certain way. ((s) >Stalnaker). Of course, all but one of them represent it wrong. >Realism. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore representations of the actual world. "Representation" is only a technical term,... I 166
... and not exploratory.
>Representation. Possible worlds: represent not only the actual world, but also other possible worlds! >Actual world, >Actualism, >Actuality. Modal realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: in this way of speaking, we can then differentiate between what they see as possible worlds. Modal Realism/Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: three varieties: 1. book theories = maximally consistent sets of truthmakers - "books". 2. replica theories = thesis: worlds are not carriers of truth but replicas ((s) i.e. objects). Substitutes: David Lewis. >David Lewis. 3. property theories: = thesis: worlds cannot be understood as books, they are a multitude of books. This means that there is a multitude of truths ((s) within a possible world. There are three sets of truthmakers here: (a) set of sentences (b) set of propositions (c) sets of beliefs. Cf. >Ersatz worlds. I 173
Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: modal realism must be able to explain possible worlds without using any modal basic concepts. And that is harder than it looks at first glance.
There is a thesis that this is not possible at all: modalism.Definition Modalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: the thesis that it is not possible to define modal terms in a non-modal way. Representatives: Lycan 1979 ^{(1)}, Plantinga 1974^{(2)}, 1976^{(3)}, 1987^{(4)}, van Inwagen (1984^{(5)}: some modalities do not need to be defined in more fundamental terms.)BigelowVsModalism.
Modalism: according to Hume's critique of the naturalistic fallacy (avant la lettre) one could express it with the slogan thesis "No must from the is". That is to say, moral desires cannot be deduced logically and entirely from outer-moral facts.
Bigelow/Pargetter: from this we can gain two attitudes:a) there are no moral truths, (moral nihilism) or b) some moral truths we must take as undefined basic facts. Modal logic/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problems with the moral "must" are reflected in the metaphysical "must". >Modal logic. Correspondence theory: is the theory which brings the problems, because without it modal basic concepts would be no problem. But since we want to keep the correspondence theory, we need better access to possible worlds. >Correspondence theory. I 174
Possible solution: cannot we just say that some things cannot be described without modal terms? Analogue:
For example, name: a fantasy name like "Gough" could refer to something non-linguistic that is not a carrier of truth. In any case, we have to assume an individual. We are assuming correspondence with this. If we tried a description instead, it would reintroduce a name again. >Descriptions, >Names. Therefore, we would have to accept some names as undefined basic terms. But that would not yet be a threat to the correspondence theory. (Question/s): many basic terms would make a correspondence relationship superfluous, because something undefined does not have to be shown?) Modal Basic Term/Correspondence/Bigelow/Pargetter: analogously, we can assume that modal basic terms are not a threat to correspondence: e.g. Conchita can play guitar is true by correspondence between this statement and things in the world. >Basic concepts. The property of being able to play the guitar is assumed. (Bigelow/Pargetter pro). Modal terms/Bigelow/Pargetter: their threat comes not only from the correspondence theory, but also from their supervenience of non-modal properties. >Supervenience, >Humean Supervenience/Lewis. I 175
Supervenience/Definability/Definition/Bigelow/Pargetter: a supervenience would guarantee the definition of modal properties in non-modal terms!
>Definition, >Definability.Problem: to do so, we would have to allow an infinite number of complex definitions. This would at least allow a characterization of modal terms. Possible worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: in the following we will consider attempts to characterize possible worlds in non-modal terms. Characterization/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): less than a definition, from many individual cases. Method/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: whenever a theory leads to modal basic concepts, we will put this theory aside. This is because it cannot then play an explanatory role within the Humean Supervenience. Not because the corresponding possible worlds did not exist. >Humean supervenience. I 187
Modal Realism/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: his extremely concrete modal realism has the advantage that it would explain many things if it were true. And most people agree on that. Then why has the unbelieving gaze not disappeared? His theory has nothing irrational either.
>D. Lewis, >Counterpart theory.VsLewis: to disprove him, you would have to adopt one of two strategies: 1. the initial probability is 0 (instead of something above) 2. even if the probability increases in the course of time, the increase would be infinitesimal. Ad 1.: the probability cannot increase from zero. Nevertheless, the question remains whether it is ever rational to attribute a probability of 0. Especially not Lewis' theory. LewisVsVs: that would lead to a trilemma: (1) the opponents might realize that a greater intelligence has thought longer about it than they did and therefore the probability is > 0 and that he means what he says. (2) they could assume that he does not mean what he says (3) they could say that sometimes it is rational,... I 188
... to assign a chance of zero to something, which a serious and intelligent authority has said.
Rationality/Bigelow/Pargetter: from Lewis' Trilemma there would only be (3) left, and thus the question of rationality. Rationality should not lead us to the acceptance of (3). But it also remains, however, even if Lewis's position is only considered to be very unlikely.>Rationality. Problem: to deny someone rationality in an area to which, in principle, one has no better epistemic access than the critizised. Ad 2. (the probability remains infinitesimal): i.e. it does not matter how much evidence we teach. BayesVs: this could only happen after the Bayes-theorem,... I 189
...if the required probability for each future document should be practically 1. And that is unacceptable.
>Bayes-Theorem, >Bayesianism.1. Lycan, W.G. (1979). The trouble with possible worlds. In: The possible and the actual. (ed. M.J. Loux), pp. 274-316. Ithaca, NY., Cornell University Press. 2. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. Plantinga, A. (1976). Actualism and possible worlds. Theoria 42, pp. 139-60. 4. Plantinga, A. (1987). Two concepts of modality. Modal realism and modal reductionism. Philosophical Perspectives Vol I: Metaphysics (ed. J. E. Tomberlin). pp.189-231. Atascadero, Calif., Ridgeview. 5. van Inwagen, P. (1985). Two concepts of possible worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp.185-92. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |

Probability Theory | Schurz | I 110
Probability theory/theorems/Schurz:
a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ _{1≤i≤n} p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ _{1≤i≤n} p(B I Ai) times p(Ai).(PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110
Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions).
>Probability.I 112
Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems:
(a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113
Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1.
StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115
Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling.
I 115
Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them.
Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116
Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt).
Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |

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