Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comparisons | Lewis | V 5f Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences. Analysis 1: only one most similar world. LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds. Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. V 21 Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i). >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Comparability. Explanation/(s): E.g., The Bizet/Verdi case: They could have been compatriots if a) Bizet had been Italian or b) Verdi had been French. Problem: Which world is closer to our world? Therefore a similarity metric for possible worlds is not achievable. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Fraassen | I 13 Counterfactual conditional/Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false. I 115f Counterfactual conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there: 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there. Contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction. Material conditional: "either B or not A". Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional. >Everyday language. Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: E. g. Bizet/Verdi, Similarity Metrics. I 118 FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent. Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals. - Therefore they are a criterion for laws. FraassenVsGoodman, E.: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent. >Context. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Lewis | V 5 Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones. >Possible world/Lewis. V 5f Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent. V 10 Counterfactual conditionals: Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __". Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one. A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world. "Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds. V 8 Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part - E.g. ~(A were>>would C) ↔ A were>>could ~C. ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok. V 14 Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones. V 18 Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing: a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C, b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because". Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid. Centering assumption: if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world). Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true. Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds. >Truth value, >Impossible world/Lewis. V 25 Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB > were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable. Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent. V 95/96 Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world. V 179 Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive. - Therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain. V 284 Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else". V 288 Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Wessel | I 308 Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: can always be replaced by conjunctions of real conditionals - Counter-position: leads out of unreal conditional clauses Bizet/Verdi/Wessel: is due to the ambiguous predicate "compatriots": might both be Japanese. Solution: E.g. "if someone is a compatriot of Bizet's, he is a Frenchman". ((s) Explanation/(s): E.g. Bizet/Verdi: in what world would they have been compatriots? - In a world in which Verdi would have been French or Bizet Italian. - Problem: which of the two worlds is closer to our world? - This shows that you can't give a similarity metric for worlds). >Similarity metrics, >Possible worlds. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Counterpart Theory | Lewis | IV 26f Counterpart theory/Lewis: alternative to modal logic with modal operators - then we have no non-eliminable singular term. IV 27 Four basic predicates: Wx (x is a possible world) - ((s)> quantity) Ixy (x is inside the poossible world y) - ((s)> containment, element relation) Ax (x is actual) - ((s)> existence) Cxy (x is a counterpart of y) - ((s)> correspondence, bearer of possibilities, >cross world identity) Eight postulates/logical form: P1: (x)(y)(Ixy>Wy) - everyday language translation: (Nothing is in something other than a world) - P2: (x)(y)(z)(Ixy & Ixz. > y = z) - (Nothing is in two worlds) P3: (x)(y)(Cxy > E zIxz) - (whatever is a counterpart, is always in a world) P4: (x)(y)(Cxy> E zlyz)- (Whatever has a counterpart, is in a world) P5: (x)(y)(z)(Ixy&Izy&Cxz. > x = z) - (Nothing is a counterpart of something in the same world) P6: (x)(y)(Ixy>Cxx) - (Every thing in a world is a counterpart of itself) P7: (Ex)(Wx&(y)(Iyx ↔ (Ay)) - (A World contains all and only actual things) P8: ExAx - (Something s actual) - The world mentioned in P7 is unique because of P2 and P8 World/logical form/Actual world/Lewis: - @ = def ix(y)(Iyx ↔ Ay) (the actual world). IV 28 Counterpart relation: is generally not an equivalence relation - i.e. It does not apply between the pairs with the same first term (as Carnap would say. Lewis: no thing is in several worlds) - no matter how you tried to identify them - it is not transitive either, because similarity is not transitive - it is not symmetrical either: E.g. assuming x3 in w3 is a mixture of you and your brother and resembles you more than anything else in w3, so x3 is your counterpart. IV 29 But assuming the similarity of x3 with your brother is much greater, then you are not the counterpart IV 42 Counterpart theory/CPT/Lewis: we need counterpart relations in order to be able to determine the essence of something - Problem CPR are not very secured - problem:> similarity. IV 44f Counterpart theory/Lewis: Problem: e.g. two pairs of twins in different possible worlds - they are more similar to the two than any other thing - Question: (double de-re) could the first twins not have lived on two different planets as relatives? - simply de re: Originally the two could simply not have be related (in the same world)? - If that is counterintuitive depends on how the question is asked - Lewis: Double de-re questions should be avoided - they result in duplicate counterpart relations - pairs of counterparts should not be construed as counterparts of pairs. ((s)> Bizet/Verdi: The example is intended to prove that there is no measure for the similarity of worlds. In which world are Bizet and Verdi compatriots? ). IV 54 Referentially transparent/De re/Modal/Normal CPT/Lewis: in my CPT all modal de re predications are referentially transparent - i.e. something has the same counterparts, no matter how we refer to them. --- V 20 Counterpart theory/Lewis: from it follows that the real imperator is not free to cross the Rubicon or not - only his counterpart could refrain - counterpart relations (CPR) and proximity to possible worlds are equally a matter of similarity, but they are independent of one another. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Excluded Middle | Logic Texts | Read III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the conditionally excluded middle: one or the other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. - That equals the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - Stalnaker pro - LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi: all combinations are wrong - Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar - LewisVs: The amount of the possible worlds in the Lewis 2 m + e is large, whereby e decreases suitably; it has no limit. - Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: he proposes that "if A, then B" is then true in w if there is either no "A or non-B" world, or some "A" and "B" world that is more similar than any "A and non-B" world. >Similarity metrics. --- III 110 Verdi-Example: where there is no unique, most similar world, the "would" condition sentences are false because there is no similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are fellow country men, in which Bizet has a different nationality. - Example: if you get an A, you will receive a scholarship: will be true if there is a more similar world in which you get both for each world in which you get an A and not a scholarship. - ((s) without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). >Similarity. --- III 263 Law of the excluded middle/constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the excluded middle - if a is a real number, "a = 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical to zero or not. - But this is more of a question of representation. >Constructivism, >Presentation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Similarity Metrics | Logic Texts | Read III 104ff Similarity Metrics/Stalnaker: smallest possible revision - i.e. the most similar world. Selection function: f(A, w) - "If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship" is true if the world in which you receive a scholarship is most similar to the world in which you are getting a one. Possible world view: deviates from the probability function if the fore-link is wrong". - Because all combinations can be realized in a possible world. >Possible world, >Similarity. III 105 Similarity Metrics/possible world/conditional sentence/Read: some classical logical principles fail here: e.g. contraposition that "if B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not B" - the similar world in which it rains, can be very well one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world in which it rains violently cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. >Conditional. III 106 Another principle that fails: the reinforcement of the if-sentence: "If A, then B. So if A and C, then B." - For example, when I put sugar in my tea, it will taste good. So when I put sugar and diesel oil in my tea, it will taste good. In the most similar world in which I put diesel oil like sugar in my tea, it tastes horrible - further: the results of the conditionality principle are invalid: - If A, then B. So if A and C, then B - and if A, then B. If B, then C. So if A, then C - Reason: the conditional sentence has become a modal connection. We must know that these statements are strong enough in any appropriate modal sense - to ensure that the most similar A and C world is the most similar A-world, we must know that C is true everywhere. III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the sentence of the conditionally excluded middle: one or other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. This corresponds to the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - (Stalnaker pro). >Conditionally excluded middle. LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi - All combinations are false. Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar world. LewisVs: the set of possible world in which Lewis is 2 m + e tall, whereby e decreases appropriately, this has no boundary. Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: Lewis proposes, that "if A then B" is true in w if there is either no "A or non-B"-world, or any "A and B"-world that is more similar than any "A and not-B"-World. III 110 Bizet/Verdi-example: where there is no unique most similar world, the "would" conditional sentences are wrong because there is no most similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are compartiots, where Bizet has a different nationality. >Bizet/Verdi case. E.g. If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship: will be true, if there is for every world in which you get a one and do not receive scholarship, is a more similar world in which you get both (without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). III 115 Similarity metrics/similarity analysis/possible world/ReadVsLewis: problem: e.g. (assuming John is in Alaska) If John is not in Turkey, then he is not in Paris. - This conditional sentence is true according to the "similarity statement", because it only asks, whether the then-sentence is true in the most similar world. >Conditional, >Counterfactual conditional. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Supervaluation | Lewis | IV 70 Supervaluation/Fraassen/Lewis: idea: when we are faced with an arbitrary decision, we do not have to make a choice, but look what is common to all choices. --- V 8 Supervaluation/van Fraassen/Lewis: true, no matter what arbitrary choice between worlds is taken. - E.g. Bizet/Verdi: French and not French (and I u ~ I) both without truth value. - (F v I) and (C ~ v ~ I): super-true. - (F u I) super-wrong. Problem: truth value gaps. >Truth value, >Truth value gap, >Similarity metrics. --- Schwarz I 204 Supervaluation/Lewis: an utterance of a vague sentence is true iff nearly all his clarifications are true. Problem: in borderline cases, both "it is raining" and "it is not raining" both are wrong. - But it is precisely that what avoids paradoxes. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Vagueness | Williamson | Field II 283 Vagueness/Williamson Puzzles/WilliamsonVsNonfactualism/Field: (Williamson 1994): thesis: for any question there is a simple argument for the conclusion that it has a specific, objective, factual answer. - E.g. Joe is rich or Joe is not rich. - Then there is in each case a fact if he is rich or if he is not rich. Then E.g. Verdi/Bizet is pointless for Williamson. ((s) Bizet/Verdi/Explanation/(s): in what world would Bizet and Verdi have been countrymen? - In a world in which Verdi would have been French or Bizet Italian. - Problem: which of the two worlds is closer to our world? - This shows that you can't specify a similarity metric.) >Similarity metrics. FieldVsWilliamson: E.g. then there must be an inaccessible fact which decides whether the pre-Newtonians mean mass or weight: implausible. >Theory change, >Meaning change. II 284 Quantum mechanics: here the Nonfactualism is different. >Facts, >Non-factualism, >Quantum mechanics. |
EconWillO Oliver E. Williamson Peak-load pricing and optimal capacity under indivisibility constraints 1966 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Lewis, D. | Wessel Vs Lewis, D. | I 304/305 Unreal conditional sentences/Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: the claim to be a general condition theory is generally not fulfilled. Example (1) If Peter had not come, Paul and Peter would not have come. (2) If now a current would flow through the coil... (3) Even if the shaman danced the rain dance, it wouldn't rain. (4) If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did. (5) If .....hadn't shot, ... would have... (6) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. (7) ...Verdi would be French. (1) Is dependent on the system of the logical subsequent relationship (here FK). (2) Hypothetical state of affairs: Such statements are used to explicate the term "empirical law". Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law if it corresponds to true unreal conditional statements. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong). In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects. Laws like that of the coil also apply to copies brought to earth from extraterrestrials during the Stone Age. I 306 It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional sentence depends on the real statement. Law statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa! ad (3) "even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "anyway true". Everyday translation: Example: "It is not the case that it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain". I 307 Unreal conditional sentences/Wessel: E.g. Oswald/Kennedy (4) is undoubtedly true and (5) undoubtedly false. How can this be explained? Possible worlds/many authors: one must put oneself in a context that is as close as possible to the current course of history. The similar context (next possible world) is the one in which another one shot Kennedy. ad (5): here the most similar world is the one in which, if Oswald didn't shoot, nobody shot and Kennedy is still alive. Therefore, (5) be wrong. WesselVsPossible World/WesselVsLewis: Disadvantage: the choice of the most similar world must be justified! I 307 Unreal Conditional Sentences/Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Similarity Metrics/Wessel: (5) is a hidden "even if" statement: "Even if Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, Kennedy would have been shot. The truth of such statements, which are common in political and historical contexts, is difficult to establish. (6)/(7): Bizet/Verdi-Example/Wessel: Solution: the reason for the emergence of the paradox lies in the uncontrolled use of the predicate "compatriots", and not in conditional logic. If both were compatriots, nothing would follow about the concrete nationality of both, except: it is the same. With the same right both could be Japanese! Instead of the two-digit predicate "compatriots" one should use the one-digit predicates "compatriot of Verdi" and "compatriot of Bizet". ((s) Then unambiguous: Bizet as a compatriot of Verdi should be Italian.) I 308 "Whenever someone is compatriot of Bizet, he is French." That is no longer a problem. Unreal conditional sentences/conditional/conjunction/Wessel: every occurrence of an unreal conditional sentence can be replaced by conjunctions in which real conditionals occur. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
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