Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Brandom | I 152 Concept/Brandom: One must have many concepts in order to get an idea. I 948 Definition concept/Frege: the concept is the semantic correlate of predicates, namely their "meaning" not their "sense". So concept defined by reference. >Predicates, >Meaning, >Sense, cf. >Fregean sense. I 599f Concept: mere distinctive reactivity is not enough to recognize the application of concepts. I 601 Rationalist addition: the inferential role of reaction is critical. >Inferential role. I 852 Concept/BrandomVsKant: should not be separated dualistically from the non-conceptual. I 853 Concept/Conception/Kant/Brandom: B relates to A as 1) form to matter - 2) general to particular - 3) spontaneity (activity of the intellect) to receptivity. BrandomVsKant: these are orthogonal and independent - no contrast to the non-conceptual - Content of the judgment also conceptual - Brandom: ad 1: if the mind does not change its material, it is superfluous (> Hegel, Phenomenology) - ad 3) contrast between conceptual/causal order: Kant was unable to construct this as a contrast between concepts and causes. I 856 Definiton concept/Brandom: inferential role - it is about relations between concepts (e.g. East/West) not about relations between concept and object. >Inferential role. I 860 Conceptual structure/Brandom/(s): by repetition (anaphora) - necessary for cognitive purposes - conceptual content: by substitution? - ((s) or, more precisely: exchange of frames?). I 862 Inferential structure: ideally allows costruing thinking and the world as represented with an identical structure - conceptual structure of assertions: about E. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Brandom Vs Descartes, R. | Brandom I 40 BrandomVsDescartes: failed to show what it means to grasp or understand such contents as representations. He does not explain what makes a rabbit thought to a thought, which is about rabbits or anything at all. He also does not explain what it means that someone understands a thought as a thought. I 131 BrandomVsDescartes: has burdened the tradition of representation: the privileging of knowledge and therefore the successful representation against the understanding and the intended representation. For Descartes representational intention is "as if about" intrinsic and characteristic property of thoughts. He does not explain the importance of understanding. II 13 Kant and Descartes: mind primary, secondary language - BrandomVsKant and BrandomVsDescartes. II 17 BrandomVsDescartes: expression rather than representation (Sellars ditto). II 69 Content / representation / BrandomVsDescartes: possession of representational content as unexplained explainer. II 213 Mind / Brandom: the conceptual ability to understand rules. KantVsDescartes: normative rather than descriptive. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Dogmas (Quine) | Davidson Vs Dogmas (Quine) | Brandom I 854 DavidsonVsDualism scheme/Content. The problem is that the mind, if it is not to be superfluous, must change its material in applying the concepts somehow. (>Hegel’s phenomenology). (See also >BrandomVsKant). >Scheme/Content ("Third dogma"). I 85 The idea of a really alien scheme is inconceivable for us. If others are in a state which cannot be determined with our methods, this cannot be because our methods fail (with which we determine the states of consciousness), but because such states are not referred to as states of consciousness. These are not desires, beliefs or intentions. The futility of imagining conceptual scheme that is forever unreachable for our understanding is not owed to our inability to understand such a scheme, but is simply due to what we mean by such a scheme. We cannot remove the conceptual layers sentence by sentence. Nevertheless, according to Quine a distinction is to be made betw. the invariant content and the changing layers. "Between report and invention, content and style, cue and conceptualization." "...by subtracting these indications from the worldview of man we get as a difference what he contributes to this worldview. This marks the extent of the conceptual sovereignty of man, the area in which one can change theories, without changing the data." I 89 Davidson: That is precisely the distinction between scheme and content. I 91 If now the last evidence is subjective in the manner described, this also applies to our beliefs, desires, etc., and everything we mean by words. Although they are fruit of our worldview, they maintain their Cartesian independence from that what they are about. They could be different, without anything changing in the world. One could say that modern philosophy has been dominated by the dualism scheme/content or equally by the dualism subjective/objective. DavidsonVs we need a radically changed view of the relationship between mind and world. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kant | Brandom Vs Kant | I 852 Kant: dualistic character of his distinction of the conceptual and non-conceptual (BrandomVs). I 853 Kant: 1) Judgments are the basic form of consciousness. 2) Recognition and action are determined by normative assessments in conscious beings as opposed to non-conscious beings. 3) Dualism spontaneity and receptivity. I 855 Brandom: For Kant, concepts relate to views 1) like shape to matter - 2) like the general to the specific - 3) like the work of spontaneity or intellectual activity to that of receptivity Brandom: these are real differences, but they are independent and orthogonal to one another. None of the above differences is understood between the conceptual and something non-conceptual in the judgment. That which a judgment expresses, its content, is conceptual through and through. So Kant threw together the second and the third point, by systematically not distinguishing between representations of the individual and individual representations. (see BrandomVsKripke) II 13 Kant and Descartes: Mind primary, language secondary - BrandomVsKant and Descartes. II 123 Law/action/BrandomVsKant: Proposal to replace "image of a law" with "recognition of a determination". |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Brandom Vs Kripke, S. A. | I 805/806 The legitimacy of a chain of name tokenings depends on how the reference is passed on, just like in an anaphoric chain. Caution: According to Kripke, different beliefs of the users of proper names do not change the reference of those Tokenings as long as the user "specifies that it is used in the name of references common in the community." (> Kripke). I 965 BrandomVsKripke: That sounds as if one would need to have the concept of reference in order to use an expression in an anaphorically tranferring way. Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! The "Cicero" E.g. shows that not all need to belong to the same chain, but that there is also no need for quasi-names which would play a role that corresponds to quasi-indexical expressions in de-dicto attributions of strong de-re attributions. Any belief, be it strong or be it weak, can be attributed de-re or de-dicto. I 807 The fact that the anaphoric analysis does not come into play at Kripke is due to his "Millian" theory of the semantics of proper names. BrandomVsKripke: his front position between Millian and Fregean principle makes it unclear whether (Millian): direct attribution, direct reference, i.e. that it is not permitted to refer back to anything other than the reference. It also does not seem reasonable to treat other cases like this. "This" and other demonstratives are not really "directly referential" but require implicit sortals. I 855 BrandomVsKripke: difference descriptive/causally historical is alright, but it gets dark when he is alleged to have shown that these are two ways of looking at the relation of language and consciousness to the world. Because that is not applicable to predicates. Never was a descriptive theory of meaning drawn up by predicates. At least the basal predicates get their reference through connection with the properties. (see BrandomVsKant). |
Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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