Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analyticity/Syntheticity | Lewis | II 238 f Analyticity, blurred: a better explanation: that our language conventions, as previously assumed here, are not a precise convention of truth and trust in one language. It is, rather, for an arbitrarily selected language from a whole bunch of similar languages. >Convention/Lewis. II 239f Of a bundle of similar languages that contain more or less the same sentences that have more or less the same truth values in the worlds that are close to our real world. We can eliminate the uncertainties that arise here as we want. Analyticity is then sharp in each language of our bundle. II 239 Blurred analyticity/Lewis: thesis: our language is selected at random from a bunch of similar languages that contain more or less the same sentences. They have more or less the same truth value in similar possible worlds. Then we have a space of languages. Analyticity is then sharp in each language. If different languages do not match regarding the analyticity, the sentence is not just analytical. --- Schwarz I 220 Analytical/analyticity/Lewis/Schwarz: neither theories nor their individual sentences are analytic, but rather their >Carnap Conditional. Analyticity: you could try further to explain blurred analyticity by the fact that it reminds us that we do not know whether certain worlds are indeed possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Carnap-Sentence | Lewis | I (b) 29 Carnap Sentence/Carnap conditional/Lewis: states that in case of realization of the theory T the theoretical terms name the elements of a realization of T: (Note: Carnap has cases in mind where the A terms belong to an observation language). E.g. T(x)>T(t) - Ramsey sentence: has the same content as the theory in traditional terminology. --- Schwarz I 220 Theory/Lewis/Schwarz: in order to refute the Carnap conditional one would have to find that there are things that fulfil the theory, but that these are not electrons - this cannot turn out to be true - e.g. that it was not Homer who wrote the Odyssey, but another Greek man of the same name - ((s) yes, but not: "not the author of the Iliad") - no discovery about DNA, causal chains, prototypes or usage may rebut the Carnap conditional - but Carnap conditional is not suitable for definitions, because it specifies only sufficient conditions. Cf. >Ramsey sentence. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Carnap-Sentence | Schurz | I 214 Carnap-sentence/CS/C (T)/Schurz: (Carnap 1963(1), 965) had the idea to supplement the Ramsey-sentence by the following analytic theorem: ((s) elsewhere: "Carnap conditional"): C(T): R(T) > T Everyday language/(s): the Carnap-sentence states: if the Ramsey-sentence is true (i.e. if the theoretical entities exist), the theory follows from it. Carnap-sentence/(s): the meaning characterization of the theoretical terms that C(T) provides says: the n-tuple of TT (τ1,...τn) I 215 denotes an n-tuple (X1,...Xn) of entities satisfying the theoretical assertion T(X1,...Xn), provided there is such an n-tuple of entities. Theoretical Terms/meaning/Theory/Carnap/Schurz: This brings the thesis that the meaning of theoretical terms is determined by the theory itself to its logical concept. Ramsey-sentence/Carnap-sentence/Schurz: The conjunction of the two is L-equivalent with the theory itself. I.e. II- R(T) u C(T) <> T Carnap-sentence/Schurz: C(T) L-implies no non-tautological empirical theorem! I.e. E(C(T)) = E(0). Therefore the Carnap theorem is analytic. Analytic/Synthetic/Carnap/Schurz: Thus Carnap has divided global theories into a synthetic part (Ramsey-sentence) and an analytic part (Carnap-sentence). But this is still not possible with respect to the individual axioms and theorems. >Ramsey-sentence. Carnap-sentence: does not provide a meaning characterization for individual Theoretical terms, but only one for all of them together. And it provides only a partial meaning characterization of Theoretical terms. Definition/Theoretical terms/Carnap-sentence/Schurz: For a full meaning characterization in the sense of an explicit definition, the extension of the Definiendum in all Possible Worlds would have to be uniquely determined by the extension of the Definiens Terms. However, the Carnap Theorem fixes the extension only in those Possible Worlds in which there is exactly one n-tuple of entities (X1,...Xn) satisfying T(X1,...Xn). If there are more than one, the reference is ambiguous, if there is no such n-tuple at all, the Theoretical terms are denotational. Then the theory is wrong. >Theoretical terms. 1. Carnap, R. (1963) "Carl G. Hempel on Scientific Theories". In: Schilpp, P. A. (ed.) The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle, pp. 958-965. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Ramsey Sentence | Lewis | IV 78 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: eliminates theoretical terms in favor of bound variables. >Theoretical term/Lewis, >Bound variable. Carnap conditional: then divides the theory into two parts: a) analytical part of the theory: partial interpretation of the theoretical terms b) synthetic part: the theoretical terms are eliminated here. >Carnap-conditional. IV 81 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: says nothing more than that the theory is implemented. - Carnap sentence: is neutral as to whether it is implemented. Carnap sentence is a conditional of the Ramsey sentence and of the postulate of the theory 1) the postulate: is logically equivalent to the conjunction of Ramsey and Carnap sentence 2) the Ramsey sentence and the postulate imply exactly the same sentences in old theory 3) Carnap sentence implies no sentences of the old theory except logical truths. Ramsey sentence: could simply replace the postulate (the new theory in a sentence). Carnap: proposes to take the Ramsey sentence as synthetic postulate of T and the Carnap sentence as an analytical postulate of T - They share the work of the original postulate. Postulate/Carnap: systematized the O sentences (old theory) and partially interpreted the theoretical terms. IV 89 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: states that a theory has at least one implementation - this is weaker than our extended postulate/Lewis: this implies that the theory has been implemented once. IV 259 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis: wipes out the difference between intensional and extensional language - at the same time it eliminates technical vocabulary by existential quantification. >Extension, >Intension, >Existential quantification. "Ramsification" neutral level: there is a system of categories, S, N, X/Y, there are three relationships of expressions to things: A-tension, B-tension, C-tension. --- Schwarz I 218 Ramsey-sentence/Lewis/Schwarz: E.g. banana theory: there are things that are long-ish yellow fruits (can turn out to be wrong) - Carnap-conditional: if there are things that are long-ish ..., then bananas are long-ish ...- cannot turn out to be wrong (is analytical). >Analyticity/syntheticity. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ramsey, F. P. | Fraassen Vs Ramsey, F. P. | I 54 FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: all this was a mistake: the empirical meaning (set of observation consequences) of a theory cannot be isolated in this syntactic way. If that were possible, T/E would say the same as T about what is observable and how the observed behaves, and nothing else. Unobservable/Fraassen: Will naturally differ from the observable in that it systematically lacks the characteristics of the observed. Unobservability/Fraassen: unless we ban the negation, we can express in a language of observation that something is unobservable. And to a certain degree even how these unobserved entities are. E.g. unobservable/Copenhagen Interpretation/Observation Language: says that there are things that sometimes have a particular position, and sometimes don’t. Important argument/Fraassen: I have just expressed this conclusion, without using a single TT. I 55 PhilosophyVsSyntaktical Approach: philosophers thought it to be rather too wide: many theories T are such that T/E is tautological. Such theories probably derive their empirical meaning from the observation consequences along with other theories or empirical hypotheses. I 56 Syntactical/FraassenVsSyntactical Approach: the syntactically defined relations are simply the wrong ones! The biggest mistake of the syntactical approach was to focus on irrelevant technical questions: FraassenVsRamsey/FraassenVsCarnap/FraassenVsCraig: things like the Ramsey sentence, Carnap Conditional, Craig’s Theorem, "reduction sentence", "empirical language", theoretical terms (TT) "axiomatization in limited vocabulary" were all self-inflicted problems! They are philosophically not important!. FraassenVsRamsey Sentence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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