Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aspects | Searle | VI 169 Def Primary Aspect/Searle: if nothing fulfills the primary aspect, the speaker had nothing in mind (he/she just thought he/she had it), e.g. hallucination. The statement cannot be true. Def Secondary Aspect/Searle: a secondary aspect is any aspect expressed by the speaker to which the following applies: the speaker tries to talk to him/her about the object that fulfills his/her primary aspect, but is not himself/herself meant to be part of the truth conditions that the speaker wants to make. There must be a primary aspect to each secondary aspect. VI 169/170 Example: the man with the champagne in the glass over there. Even if it is water, the man is still standing over there. >Champagne example. The secondary aspect does not appear in the truth conditions. For example, we both look at the same man, even if he is not Smith's murderer. For example, even if Shakespeare did not exist at all, I can say: "Shakespeare did not design the figure of Ophelia as convincingly as the Hamlets." (Secondary aspect). Searle: this statement can also be true. II 75 Aspect/Searle: an aspect has no intermediate instance like sensory data. ((s) Therefore, there is also no risk of regress as with all intermediate instances.) Searle: there is a morning star aspect and an evening star aspect of Venus. If it is not a case of perception, the intentional object is always represented under some aspect, but what is represented is the object and not the aspect! II 76 ff Rabbit-Duck-Head: Wittgenstein: the rabbit-duck-head exhibits various uses of the word "see". SearleVsWittgenstein: we see not only objects but also aspects. We love people, but also aspects. III 185 Representation: each representation is bound to certain aspects, not to others. >Rabbit-Duck-Head. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Attributive/referential | Brandom | I 681 Attributive/Referential/Brandom: It is about the listener, not the speaker. - That is a matter of the significance which is assigned to a Tokening, not the significance based on its type. - Champagne e.g.: there must be an expression from the perspective of the listener, which the speaker might have used as well. - > de re / de dicto. --- II 52/53 Verb: e.g. "to march": semantic interpretant: Function of object on possible worlds - adverb: E.g. "slow" function of (functions of objects on possible worlds) to (functions of objects on possible worlds) - then attributive: here the inference from "aF!" to "aF slow" is alright - not attributive: not alright e.g. "in someone's imagination". |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Attributive/referential | Searle | IV 101 Attributive/Tradition/Grammar: attributive includes relative expressions such as "large" or "hot". Searle: we require background. All tall women are similar in terms of height. Attributive/Searle: what is meant and the sentence meaning are the same thing. IV 161 Referential/Donnellan/Searle: S talked about e, no matter if e is actually F. You can then also report with other expressions than "the F". Attributive: here there is no entity e, the speaker would not even have had in mind that they existed. Attributive: the statement can then not be true. IV 164 Donnellan: E.g. "The winner, whoever it is": here, in the attributive sense nothing is actually talked about. Referential/attributive: there is no distinction between beliefs. IV 165ff Referential/Attributive/SearleVsDonnellan: instead: aspects: you can choose the aspect under which you speak about an object. Primary A: if nothing satisfies it, the speaker had nothing in mind (hallucination). Secondary A: any aspect for which it is true that S tried to talk with it about the object, that fulfils its primary A, without being meant to belong to the truth conditions. >">Truth condition, >Aspects/Searle. The Champagne example even works if water is in the glass. Searle: then the statement may also be true. The meaning does not change if no other aspect could assume the role of the primary one. IV 175 Referential/Searle: the referential brings the secondary aspect. Attributive: brings the primary aspect. IV 176 Both readings can be intensional and extensional. >Intension, >Extension. IV 175 What is meant is decisive. Difference sentence/finding: finding is decided, a sentence is not (what was said literally). >Meaning(Intending), >Intention, >Speaker intention. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Behavior | Harlow | Slater I 16 Behavior/Harlow: The finding that rearing with age-mates could compensate for the effects of maternal deprivation on developing peer relationships was the most controversial and tentative finding in the 1962 paper(1). Working with small numbers of monkeys, Harlow observed few differences between mother-raised and peer-raised monkeys on play, defensive, or sexual behavior with peers during the juvenile period of development. This finding led Harlow to conclude that play with agemates was “more necessary than mothering to the development of effective social relations” (Harlow & Harlow, 1962(1), p. 495). However, Harlow remained tentative about his conclusions noting that they were limited to outcomes only up to two years of age. Follow-up studies of peer-reared monkeys by Harlow’s former graduate student, Steve Suomi, suggested a less sanguine view of peer-raised monkeys even during the juvenile period of development (Suomi, 2008)(2). When (…) peer-raised monkeys were grouped with mother-raised monkeys, they dropped to the bottom of the peer dominance hierarchies (Bastian, Sponberg, Sponberg, Suomi, & Higley, 2002)(3). Slater I 17 VsHarlow: Research has advanced from the social deprivation paradigms in several respects. 1) Researchers have examined more subtle variations in early caregiving environments by considering the effects of temporary separations from caregivers as well as variations in the quality of maternal care provided to offspring (Suomi & Levine, 1998)(4). 2) Researchers have begun to examine individual differences in offsprings’ susceptibility to environmental influences (Lyons, Parker, & Schatzberg, 2010)(5). 3) The trends toward examining a continuum of caregiving environments and individual differences in children’s susceptibility to caregiving environments have been advanced by efforts to identify the genetic, neural, and physiological mechanisms through which early experience affects later outcomes (Weaver et al., 2004)(6). Cf. >Affectional bonds/psychological theories. 1. Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. (1962). Social deprivation in monkeys. Scientific American, 207, 137–146. 2. Suomi, S. J. (2008). Attachment in rhesus monkeys. In J. Cassidy & P. Shaver (Eds), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research and clinical applications (pp. 173–191). New York: Guilford Press. 3. Bastian, M. L., Sponberg, A. C., Suomi, S. J., & Higley, J. D. (2002). Long-term effects of infant rearing condition on the acquisition of dominance rank in juvenile and adult rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Developmental Psychobiology, 42, 44–51. 4. Suomi, S., & Levine, S. (1998). Psychobiology of intergenerational effects of trauma: Evidence from animal studies. In Y. Daneli (Ed.), International handbook of multigenerational legacies of trauma (pp. 623–637). New York: Plenum Press. 5. Lyons, D. M., Parker, K. J., & Schatzberg, A. F. (2010). Animal models of early life stress: Implications for understanding resilience. Developmental Psychobiology, 52, 616–624. 6. Weaver, I. C. G., Cervoni, N., Champagne, F. A., D’Alessio, A. C., Sharma, S., Seckl, J. R., Dymov, S., et al. (2004). Epigenetic programming by maternal behavior. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 847–854. Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| de re | Brandom | I 695 Champagne - Example: > difference de re / de dicto. De re/de dicto-Example: In 2000, the President of the United States will be black. De dicto: The sentence "The President is Black" will be true in 2000. De re: Bill Clinton turns black. --- Rorty VI ~ 185 De re-attributions: express our nonrelativistic definitions in as far as that a certain way of speaking is better suited than others in order to talk about what there really is(!). E.g. "Ptolemy claimed that the orbits of the planets resulted from the movement of crystal balls" (according to Rorty). With de-re - attributions: he wants to re-introduce the old distinction between subjective/objective. >Subjectivity, >Objectivity. --- Brandom I 695 De re/Brandom: true: "he did not believe the inventor of the lightning rod to be the inventor of the ..." - de dicto: false: that the inventor of the lightning rod had not invented the lightning rod. I 689 Quine: Expressions in the de re part are "referentially transparent" - coreferential expressions may be exchanged salva veritate; this is not the case in the de dicto-part. >Opacity. I 700 Brandom: but not two kinds of beliefs but of attributions. >Beliefs, >Attributions. I 715 De re/Brandom: de re attribution distinguishes explicitly between the assigned doxastic definition and the substitutional definitions brought in by the attributor E.g. McCarthy believed the first sentence of the Communist Manifesto to be true (de re, not de dicto) - solution: "is true" is embedded here, so it is no truth assessment. I 731 De dicto/Attribution/Brandom: In conceptual terms, what is expressed by de-dicto attributions is locally superior to what is expressed by de-re attributions, but not globally - so de re attributions are true because of a true de dicto attribution - de dicto precedes over de re (in the case of attributions). I 753 De re attributions/Brandom: a) direct speech: square brackets S says [p] - b) indirect speech: S says that p - de-re attribution of assertional speech acts: S says of t that F(it). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Descriptions | Kripke | I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name. --- III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Descriptions | Prior | I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the non-existing. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there". - If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
| Parent-Child Relationship | Psychological Theories | Slater I 18 Parent-Child Relationship/psychological theories: A major advance in both human and animal models of early social experience was the recognition that there was naturally occurring variability in maternal caregiving behavior. In her observations of mothers and their infants in the home environment, Mary Ainsworth developed codes for discriminating between sensitive and insensitive caregiving behavior (Ainsworth et al., 1978)(1). >M. Ainsworth. Infants who experienced sensitive caregiving were subsequently classified as secure in laboratory tests using the Strange Situation paradigm at 12 and 18 months. >Situation/Ainsworth, >Strange Situation. Infants’ security in the Strange Situation, in turn, has predicted aspects of subsequent child adaptation in preschool, childhood, and adolescence (Sroufe et al., 2005)(2). The notion that individual differences in the quality of care received from the mother can have long-term effects on psychosocial outcomes has generally been supported in several major longitudinal studies (Belsky & Fearon, 2002)(3). A rodent model for studying early maternal care uses naturally occurring variations in maternal behavior over the first eight days after birth (Champagne & Meaney, 2007)(4). Direct observation of mother-pup interactions in normally-reared animals identified two forms of maternal behavior – those involving Licking/ grooming of pups (LG) and another characterized by arched-back nursing (ABN) in which a mother nurses her pups with her back conspicuously arched. Because the two types of maternal behavior tend to co-occur, mothers could be classified as either High or Low LG-ABN. The consequences for offspring of differential mothering were established by intergenerational stability of maternal behavior, with mothers who were high on LB-ABN showing similar maternal behavior to their offspring when they subsequently became mothers, and the offsprings’ increased exploratory activity and decreased startle responses as adults (Cameron, Champagne, & Parent, 2005)(5). >Animal model, >Animal studies, >Experiments, >Method. Cross-fostering of high LG mothers to rat pups served to rule out genetic transmission of intergenerational effects. Offspring of low LG mothers matched to high LG foster mothers showed high LG maternal behaviors. Early exposure to high LG mothers also has produced effects on subsequent sexual and reproductive behavior of female offspring (Cameron et al., 2005(5); Curley, Champagne, & Bateson, 2008)(6). >Environment/Developmental psychology. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Sroufe, L. A., Carlson, E., Egeland, B., & Collins, A. (2005). The development of the person: The Minnesota study of risk and adaptation from birth to adulthood. New York, NY: Guilford Press 3. Belsky, J., & Fearon, R. M. P. (2002). Early attachment security, subsequent maternal sensitivity, and later child development: Does continuity in development depend upon continuity of caregiving? Attachment & Human Development, 4, 361–387. 4. Champagne, F., & Meaney, M. (2007). Transgenerational effects of social environment on variations in maternal care and behavioral response to novelty. Behavioral Neuroscience, 121, 1353–1363. 5. Cameron, N., Champagne, F., & Parent, C. (2005). The programming of individual differences in defensive responses and reproductive strategies in the rat through variations in maternal care. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 29, 843–865 6. Curley, J., Champagne, F., & Bateson, P. (2008). Transgenerational effects of impaired maternal care on behaviour of offspring and grand offspring. Animal Behaviour, 75, 1551–1561 Roger Kobak, “Attachment and Early Social deprivation. Revisiting Harlow’s Monkey Studies”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Principle of Charity | Davidson | Glüer II 42 Def Principle of Charity: Consider the fact that the speakers of a language consider a sentence (under observed conditions) to be true as prima facie evidence that the sentence is true under those conditions. Glüer II 63f Principle of charity/Wilson/Quine: the identification of the logical constants: it must be translated so that the logical laws are not violated. Glüer II 72f Principle of charity/e.g. Champagne: (the person with the champagne is angry - but the person intended drinks only water) if a true statement is assumed, the principle is questionable. I 74 DavidsonVsBurge: 1. It is wrong that our intuitive notions would suggest that the linguistic utterances and thoughts of an actor would be in the sense of what others mean by the same words. I 75 Problem: which group should determine the standards? Another reason: we best understand the speaker as he or she intends to be interpreted (charity). 2 According to Burge, what the speaker means should be tied to the possibly unconscious use of an elite: Contradiction with the authority of the first person. >Meaning (intending), >Interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 |
| Reference | Brandom | I 442 Reference: two kinds: 1) word world (extralinguistic reference) E.g. "the author of Dreams of a Mind-Seer "who refers to a real person (namely Kant) - 2) word-word (intra-linguistic or anaphoric reference) E.g. "Wittgenstein wanted to .., so he traveled to Jena". I 457 Reference/necessity/Brandom: contingent: The expression "Leibniz" refers to Leibniz - Necessary: Leibniz is Leibniz. >Analyticity/syntheticity. I 458 Co-reference of types: asserted identity between indirect defined denominations. I 465 Reference/Expression/Brandom: our approach distinguishes sharply between expressions and their referents - E.g. The expressions "the expression Leibniz" and "The referent of the expression Leibniz" are used quite differently - "refers to" does not lead to a merger with extra-linguistic things. I 465 Reference/Brandom: no particular entity. I 651 Referring/Reference/Brandom: cannot be understood in terms of showing, rather the showing must be explained in concepts of reference. I 652 Anaphora: is necessary to generate the repeatable from the unrepeatable where co-typicity does not even bear a cancelable assumption of co-reference, and therefore not of (co-)recurrence, either. I 678 Brandom: e.g. Fred says to Wilma: "The man with the glass of champagne is very angry." This refers to Barney, but he has ginger ale in his glass. Nelson has champagne in the glass. But he is not angry. Speaker Reference: Barney, Semantic reference: Nelson. Cf. >Speaker meaning, >Meaning (Intending). I 678 Pronouns/Brandom: allow us to talk without knowing what we are talking about (reference) - e.g. if he did that, then he deserves whatever he has coming for him. >Pronouns. --- II 217 Reference/Quine: According to two dogmas, reference is more important than meaning. >Two dogmas, >Reference, >Meaning. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Satisfaction | Kripke | I 35 Description is satisfied: an object is the only one to satisfy the description. >Champagne example. I 123 It is generally not the case that the reference of a name is determined by identification of the specific characteristics, certain properties that are only satisfied by the reference and of which the speaker knows or believes that they are true. --- III 374 Satisfaction conditions: must be understood in order to understand open sentences. Therefore intentions are incomprehensible in open sentences. Def satisfaction/Kripke (m referential variables.): "(Exi) Rabbit(xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - satisfaction, > open sentence, > intension. III 380 Def satisfaction/Kripke: "(Exi) rabbit (xi)" iff there is an s" that differs at most from s at the i-th point that satisfies "Rabbit (xi)" - (purely formal). III 393 Truth/satisfaction/definability: truth can only be definable in a metalanguage (for a given referential object language), but satisfaction does not occur because the corresponding ontology cannot be reached in the meta language, e.g. the set of true sentences will be definable in different metalanguages whose ontology is that of the integers (e.g. metalanguage assumes the truth for the object language as a simple predicate). Satisfaction: will not be definable unless the ontology of the object language happens to be one of integers. III 403 Satisfaction: satisfaction is a relation between expressions and other objects: > Denotation/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Terminology | Kripke | I 125 Schmidentical/Schidentity: there is artificial identity between the subject and itself. Kripke: that is quite alright and useful. --- II 232f Russell Language/Kripke: the weak form of the Russell language: is like English. The only truth conditions by Russell are: the present king of France must exist in order for the sentence "The present king of France is bald" to be true. Medium form of Russell language: descriptions have Russell’s deep structure: there is exactly one... . Strong form of Russell language: has no descriptions, only there is exactly one... . Champagne e.g.: has the weak and medium form: here the speaker thinks (albeit erroneously) that the truth conditions are satisfied. Strong form: here the use could become the rule, because the definite article is prohibited. Since the phenomenon occurs in all three languages, there can be no argument that English is not a Russell language. --- Newen I 97 Russell Language/Kripke/Newen/Schrenk: the Russell language contains only the attributive reading. (~ Homophone truth conditions). Contrast: D Language/Kripke: the D language includes a referential and attributive reading. KripkeVsDonnellan: e.g. "her husband is kind to her": here you need the referential and the attributive reading at the same time (not alternating). "He is nice, but he is not her husband". |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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