Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Justification Wright I 92
History/past/Wright: It is a peculiarity of evidence for the past, which can nothing guarantee, that the currently available evidence could not be misleading due to some unfortunate circumstances. Consequently, it applies to statements about objects and events in the present tense (present), that their justification may not be in general a reason for accepting that this will not be their fate.
Justification/Super-assertibility/Wright: the justification is therefore no unlimited reason to regard a statement as super-assertible.
Permission/Wright: thesis: the permission to state something requires the permission to look at something as super-assertible.
I 96
Justification/Wright: the belief that all evidence is not misleading, is not something for which a justification/permission must be acquired. It is an indispensable default assumption (> Default: Absence (of evidence)):   If that is correct, the following conditional applies:
If P, then there is a favorable balance of available evidence relating to P, as long as it is finite.
Although not a priori true, but a priori justified.
  (s) Vs: something might be easily true, and all indications show the contrary. This case would not even be unusual. (E.g. Skillfully performed murder).
  Wright: that reaffirms the super-assertibility.
I 211f
Definition default relationship of the confirmation between experiences and statements. (Default: non-appearance in court, absence). E.g. "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification, insofar as it relates to the color. An appropriate justification by experience is revocable in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but otherwise presumably valid. ((s) Unless nothing different "appears").   Question: can one assume now cognitive deficiency with that?
  A theorist who accepts on-1, can do this either because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or dispute the probative force while being biased.
  If there is now no other support for Hn, the adoption of Hn by the first theorists remains unjustified, and the denial in the right.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Nonfactualism Cavell I (c) 234
Fact/Nonfactualism/Meaning/Rule/Wittgenstein/Cavell: there is no fact concerning me that can justify what I say and do beyond what the other, perhaps a child, says and does. But I do not wish to draw a skeptical conclusion from this.
I (c) 239
Fact/Nonfactualism/CavellVsKripke: if I said (in the early writings) "there is no reason to share these things with each other (e.g., sense of humor, morality), then that is different than when Kripke says there is "no fact", Cavell: otherwise it would look too much like cognitive deficiency.
I (c) 240
In addition, there is no room for the idea of reasons that "run out".

Cavell I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

Cavell I (a)
Stanley Cavell
"Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (b)
Stanley Cavell
"Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell I (c)
Stanley Cavell
"The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002

Cavell II
Stanley Cavell
"Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958)
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Lewis, C.I. Schwarz Vs Lewis, C.I. Schwarz I 31
Personal identity/SchwarzVsLewis: his criterion is not accurate and provides in interesting cases no answer. E.g. continuity after brain surgery, etc. But Lewis does not want that. Our (vague) everyday term should only be made explicitly. Beaming/Teleportation/Doubling/Lewis: all this is allowed by his theory.
Schwarz I 60
Identity/Lewis/Centered world/Possible world/Schwarz: my desire to be someone else, does not refer to the whole world, but only to my position in the world. E.g. Twin Earth/Schwarz: one of the two planets is blown tomorrow, the two options (that we are on the one or the other) do however not correspond to two possible worlds! Detailed knowledge would not help out where we are, because they are equal. ((s) so no "centered world"). Actually, we want to know where we ourselves are in the world. (1979a(1),1983b(2),1986e(3):231 233).
SchwarzVsLewis: says too little about these perspective possibilities. It is not enough here to allow multiple counterparts (c.p.) in a world. It should not just be possible that Humphrey is exactly as the actual Nixon, he should also to be allowed to be different. Humphrey may not be a GS of himself. (> Irreflexive counterpart relation,> see below Section 9.2. "Doxastic counterparts".
Similarity relation. No matter what aspects you emphasize: Nixon will never be more similar to Humphrey than to himself.
Schwarz I 100
Fundamental properties/SchwarzVsLewis: this seems to waver whether he should form the fE to the conceptual basis for the reduction of all predicates and ultimately all truths, or only a metaphysical basis, on which all truths supervene. (>Supervenience, >Reduction).
Schwarz I 102
Naturalness/Natural/Property/Content/Lewis: the actual content is then the most natural candidate that matches the behavior. "Toxic" is not a perfectly natural property (p.n.p.), but more natural than "more than 3.78 light years away" and healthy and less removed and toxic". Naturalness/Degree/Lewis: (1986e(3):, 61,63,67 1984b(4):66): the naturalness of a property is determined by the complexity or length of their definition by perfectly natural properties.
PnE: are always intrinsically and all their Boolean combinations remain there.
Problem: extrinsic own sheep threaten to look unnatural. Also would e.g. "Red or breakfast" be much more complicated to explain than e.g. "has charge -1 or a mass, whose value is a prime number in kg. (Although it seems to be unnatural by definition).
Naturalness/Property/Lewis: (1983c(5), 49): a property is, the more natural the more it belongs to surrounding things. Vs: then e.g. "cloud" less natural than e.g. "table in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant or clock showing 7:23".
Schw I 103
Naturalness/Properties/Lewis: (1983c(5): 13f): naturalness could be attributed to similarity between characteristics: E.g. a class is more natural, the more the properties of its elements resemble each other. Similarity: Lewis refers to Armstrong: similarity between universals 1978b(6),§16.2,§21, 1989b(7): §5.111997 §4.1). Ultimately LewisVs.
Naturalness/Lewis/Schwarz: (2001a(8):§4,§6): proposing test for naturalness, based on similarity between individual things: coordinate system: "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" axis. A property is then the more natural, the more dense and more compact the appropriate region is.
Problem: 1. that presupposes gradual similarity and therefore cannot be well used to define gradual naturalness.
2. the pnE come out quite unnatural, because the instances often do not strongly resemble each other. E.g. if a certain mass property is perfect, of course, then all things with this mass build a perfectly natural class, no matter how dissimilar they are today.
SchwarzVsLewis: it shows distinctions between natural and less natural properties in different areas, but does not show that the distinction is always the same.
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: could also depend on interests and biological expression. And yet, can in various ways the different types of natural - be determined by perfect naturalness. That is not much, because at Lewis all, by definition, by the distribution of p.n.p. is determined. ((s)>Mosaic).
Schwarz I 122
Naturalness/SchwarzVsLewis: not reasonable to assume that it was objectively, regardless of how naturally it appears to us. Lewis introduced objective naturalness as a metaphysical basis for qualitative, intrinsic similarity and difference, as some things resemble each other like eggs and others do not. (see above 5.2). Intrinsic Similarity: also qualitative character and duplication: these terms are intended to be our familiar terms by Lewis.
SchwarzVsLewis: but if objective naturalness is to explain the distinction of our opinions about similarity, one cannot ask with sense the question whether the distinction serves exactly this.
So although there are possible beings (or worlds) whose predicates express relatively unnatural properties and therefore are wrong about natural laws, without being able to discover the error. But we can be sure a priori that we do not belong to them.
Problem: the other beings may themselves believe a priori to be sure that their physical predicates are relatively natural.
Solution: but they (and not we) were subject to this mistake, provided "natural" means in their mouth the same as with us. ((s) but we also could just believe that they are not subject to error. Respectively, we do not know whether we are "we" or "they").
Schwarz: here is a tension in our concept of natural law (NL):
a) on the one hand it is clear that we can recognize them empirically.
b) on the other hand they should be objective in a strong sense, regardless of our standards and terms.
Problem: Being with other standards can come up with the same empirical data to all other judgments of NL.
Schwarz I 134
Event/SchwarzVsLewis: perhaps better: events but as the regions themselves or the things in the regions: then we can distinguish e.g. the flight from the rotation of the ball. Lewis appears to be later also inclined to this. (2004d)(9). Lewis: E.g. the death of a man who is thrown into a completely empty space is not caused by something that happens in this room, because there is nothing. But when events are classes of RZ regions, an event could also include an empty region.
Def Qua thing/Lewis/Schwarz: later theory: “Qua-things” (2003)(10): E.g. „Russell qua Philosoph“: (1986d(9a),247): classes of counterpieces – versus:
LewisVsLewis: (2003)(10) Russell qua Philosoph and Russell qua Politician and Russell are identical. Then the difference in counterfactual contexts is due to the determined by the respective description counterpart relation. These are then intensional contexts. (Similar to 1971(11)). counterfactual asymmetry/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis' analysis assumes similarity between possible worlds.
HorwichVsLewis: (1987(15),172) should explain why he is interested in this baroque dependence.
Problem/SchwarzVsLewis: so far, the analysis still delivers incorrect results E.g. causation later by earlier events.
Schwarz I 139
Conjunctive events/SchwarzVsLewis: he does not see that the same is true for conjunctive events. Examples A, B, C, D are arbitrary events, so that A caused B and C caused D. If there is an event B&C, which exactly occurs when both B and C happen, then A is the cause of D: without A, B would not have happened, neither B&C. Likewise D would not have happened without B&C. Because causation is transitive, thus any cause causes any effect. Note: according to requirement D would not happen without C, but maybe the next possible world, in which B&C are missing, is one in which C is still taking place? According to Lewis the next possible world should however be one where the lack of cause is completely extinguished.
Schwarz: you cannot exclude any conjunctive events safely. E.g. a conversation or e.g. a war is made up of many events and may still be as a whole a cause or effect. Lewis (2000a(13), 193) even used quite unnatural conjunctions of events in order to avoid objections: E.g. conjunction from the state of brain of a person and a decision of another person.
Absence/Lewis/Schwarz: because Lewis finds no harmless entities that are in line as absences, he denies their existence: they are no events, they are nothing at all, since there is nothing relevant. (200a, 195).
SchwarzVsLewis: But how does that fit together with the Moore's facts? How can a relationship be instantiated whose referents do not exist?.
Moore's facts/Schwarz: E.g. that absences often are causes and effects. Something to deny that only philosopher comes to mind.
I 142
Influence/SchwarzVsLewis: Problem: influence of past events by future. Example had I drunk from the cup already half a minute ago, then now a little less tea would be in the cup, and depending on how much tea I had drunk half a minute ago, how warm the tea was then, where I then had put the cup, depending on it the current situation would be a little different. After Lewis' analysis my future tea drinking is therefore a cause of how the tea now stands before me. (? Because Ai and Bi?). Since the drinking incidents are each likely to be similar, the impact is greater. But he is not the cause, in contrast to the moon.
Schwarz I 160
Know how/SchwarzVsLewis: it is not entirely correct, that the phenomenal character must be causal effect if the Mary and Zombie pass arguments. For causal efficacy, it is sufficient if Mary would react differently to a phenomenally different experience ((s) >Counterfactual conditional). Dualism/Schwarz: which can be accepted as a dualist. Then you can understand phenomenal properties like fundamental physical properties. That it then (as above Example charge 1 and charge 1 switch roles in possible worlds: is possible that in different possible worlds the phenomenal properties have their roles changed, does not mean that they are causally irrelevant! On the contrary, a particle with exchanged charge would behave differently.
Solution: because a possible world, in which the particle has a different charge and this charge plays a different role, is very unlike to our real world! Because there prevail other laws of nature. ((s) is essential here that besides the amended charge also additionally the roles were reversed? See above: >Quidditism).
SchwarzVsLewis: this must only accept that differences in fundamental characteristics do not always find themselves in causal differences. More one must not also accept to concede Mary the acquisition of new information.
Schwarz I 178
Content/Individuation/Solution/LewisVsStalnaker: (1983b(2), 375, Fn2, 1986e(3), 34f), a person may sometimes have several different opinion systems! E.g. split brain patients: For an explanation of hand movements to an object which the patient denies to see. Then you can understand arithmetic and logical inference as merging separate conviction fragments.
Knowledge/Belief/Necessary truth/Omniscience/SchwarzVsLewis/SchwarzVsFragmentation: Problem: even within Lewis' theory fragmentation is not so easy to get, because the folk psychology does not prefer it.
Schwarz I 179
E.g. at inconsequent behavior or lie we do not accept a fragmented system of beliefs. We assume rather that someone changes his beliefs or someone wants to mislead intentionally. E.g. if someone does not make their best move, it must not be the result of fragmentation. One would assume real ignorance contingent truths instead of seeming ignorance of necessary truths. Fragmentation does not help with mathematical truths that must be true in each fragment: Frieda learns nothing new when she finally finds out that 34 is the root of the 1156. That they denied the corresponding proposition previously, was due to a limitation of their cognitive architecture.
Knowledge/Schwarz: in whatever way our brain works, whether in the form of cards, records or neural networks - it sometimes requires some extra effort to retrieve the stored information.
Omniscience/Vs possible world/Content/VsLewis/Schwarz: the objection of logical omniscience is the most common objection to the modeling mental and linguistic content by possible worlds or possible situations.
SchwarzVsVs: here only a problem arises particularly, applicable to all other approaches as well.
Schwarz I 186
Value/Moral/Ethics/VsLewis/Schwarz: The biggest disadvantage of his theory: its latent relativism. What people want in circumstances is contingent. There are possible beings who do not want happiness. Many authors have the intuition that value judgments should be more objective. Solution/Lewis: not only we, but all sorts of people should value under ideal conditions the same. E.g. then if anyone approves of slavery, it should be because the matter is not really clear in mind. Moral disagreements would then in principle be always solvable. ((s)>Cognitive deficiency/Wright).
LewisVsLewis: that meets our intuitions better, but unfortunately there is no such defined values. People with other dispositions are possible.
Analogy with the situation at objective probability (see above 6.5): There is nothing that meets all of our assumptions about real values, but there is something close to that, and that's good enough. (1989b(7), 90 94).
Value/Actual world/Act.wrld./Lewis: it is completely unclear whether there are people in the actual world with completely different value are dispositions. But that does not mean that we could not convince them.
Relativism/Values/Morals/Ethics/Lewis/Schwarz: Lewis however welcomes a different kind of relativism: desired content can be in perspective. The fate of my neighbor can be more important to me than the fate of a strangers. (1989b(14), 73f).
Schwarz I 232
Truthmaker principle/SchwarzVsLewis: here is something rotten, the truth maker principle has a syntax error from the outset: we do not want "the world as it is", as truth-makers, because that is not an explanation, we want to explain how the world makes the truth such as the present makes propositions about the past true.
Schwarz I 233
Explanation/Schwarz: should distinguish necessary implication and analysis. For reductive metaphysics necessary implication is of limited interest. SchwarzVsLewis: he overlooks this when he wrote: "A supervenience thesis is in the broader sense reductionist". (1983,29).
Elsewhere he sees the difference: E.g. LewisVsArmstrong: this has an unusual concept of analysis: for him it is not looking for definitions, but for truth-makers ".

1. David Lewis [1979a]: “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se”. Philosophical Review, 88: 513–543.
2. David Lewis [1983b]: “Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation”. Philosophical Review, 92:
3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell
4. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377
5. David Lewis [1983c]: “New Work for a Theory of Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
61: 343–377.
6. David M. Armstrong [1978b]: Universals and Scientific Realism II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 7. David M. Armstrong [1989b]: Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press
8. David Lewis [2001a]: “Redefining ‘Intrinsic’ ”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 63: 381-398
9. David Lewis [2004d]: “Void and Object”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 277–291
9a. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269
10. David Lewis [2003]: “Things qua Truthmakers”. Mit einem Postscript von David Lewis und Gideon
Rosen. In Hallvard Lillehammer und Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (Hg.), Real Metaphysics:
Essays in Honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge, 25–38.
11. David Lewis [1971]: “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies”. Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211.
12. David Lewis [1987]: “The Punishment that Leaves Something to Chance”. Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 12: 81–97.
13. David Lewis [2000a]: “Causation as Influence”. Journal of Philosophy, 97: 182–197. Gekürzte Fassung von [Lewis 2004a]
14. David Lewis [1989b]: “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 63: 113-137.
15. Paul Horwich [1987]: Asymmetries in Time. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Theory Ladenness Wright Vs Theory Ladenness I 204
Fashionable Thought/Realism/Theory/Science/WrightVs: every observation is "theory laden". Perception/Theory:
1. Observation equals perception, and perception is to be distinguished from mere sensory perception, because it is conceptually coined. (McDowell pro).
This now provides a good basis for the view that the conceptual equipment of the subjects is different.
I 205
2. Every pre-philosophical utterance about the material world reaches beyond experience in an infinite number of ways. 3. The coverage of terms does not consist merely in classifying. They contain the possession of beliefs. (e.g. that things form a species at all).
WrightVs: that is certainly all right. The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not, however, be to question the opposition between data and theory.
I 206
Concept/Wright: a) Beliefs should not be assumed a priori for the concepts. This is not appropriate. Concepts are constantly in danger of being refuted by experience. b) The everyday content of experience is not an obstacle for pre-theoretical data. It can always happen that one agrees to an experience pattern against his background beliefs, even if this can be cancelled later again.
Theoreticity of Contemplation/Theory/Wright:
4. The kind of theory ladenness needed to get the distinction data/theory into difficulties is rather the following(see above):
It must be shown that the conditions for assertion (assertibility) are necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experiences, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs.
I 207
WrightVsTheoreticity of Observation/VsTheory Ladenness/Wright: if all observation theory is laden, there are no statements to which any subject is obliged to agree. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). Wright: the justified assertiveness is rather a four-digit relation between:
Statement - Subject - Course of Experience - Background Assumptions.
I 208
Theory/Observation: Example A and B disagree on the stature of a theory Ho based on the observation Oo. B evaluates the same observations under a theory H1.
A agrees that if H1 is accepted, his experience does not give enough reasons to accept Oo.
Then it is not about vagueness, it is about status. This status question continues now, if it is about H1 instead of Ho: B accepts H1 because of O1, but A represents a theory H2...(I 209+) about O1.
I 209
The other agrees that, if the other theory applies, the reaction of the other is appropriate. Divergence on each point, but agreement on conditional acceptability.
I 210
We determine that the respective observation reports are correct in terms of experience and background theory. If everyone works with incorrect data, the result is that they create their reports in the context of an incorrect background theory.
If he works with materially incomplete data, he necessarily works with a true background theory, which he does not agree with!
Problem: can it be certainly considered a priori that there are nevertheless cognitive deficits regarding the theoretical background obligations? (Can only mean that one accepts a wrong theory).
Evidence: whether a theory is erroneous or flawless must now (see above) at least in principle be recognizable!
Such a confirmation, however, could ultimately only be provided by independently credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation).
I 211
However, the example shows the possibility that this remains undecidable. Vs: the relationship between experience and observation reports can plausibly be described as that of a "positive presumption". I.e. it is not as if experience tends to confirm or refute a report only in the context of appropriate empirical background beliefs, there is rather a
Def default relation of confirmation between experiences and statements.
Example "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification insofar as it concerns the color. An appropriate justification by experience can be overridden in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but is otherwise presumably valid.
((s) As long as nothing else "appears").
Question: can one now assume cognitive deficiency after all?
A theorist who accepts O n 1 may either do so because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or he may prejudice the validity of the evidence.
If now there is no other support for Hn, the assumption of Hn by the first theorist remains unjustified, and the denial in law.
I 212
VsVs: this does not take into account that the regress of theories can interlock backwards. Therefore, one cannot claim that both theorists are to blame either for defending unsupported theories or for being cognitively deficient. Problem:
Evidence/Theory/Observation: if the truth is limited by evidence and all observation is theory laden, then differences of opinion cannot certainly be traced back to cognitive deficiencies.

WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008