Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Knowledge Tye Chalmers I 141
Knowledge/Colour Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986)(1): There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H2O". >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Reference.
In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known.
Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world).
>Primary Intensions, >Secondary Intensions, >Color researcher Mary,

1. Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.

Tye I
M. Tye
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Naturalized Epistemology Stroud I 209
Skepticism/naturalized epistemology/Stroud: Skepticism gets more inevitable, the more we take the external (distanced) position and look at evidence. >Epistemology, >Empiricism, >Evidence.
There is no independent information about the world - E.g. room with monitors.
Cf. >Colour researcher Mary.
Brains in a vat/Descartes/Kant: such a distinction between sensory experience and other knowledge would cut us off from the world.
>Brains in a vat.
I 211
QuineVs: only applies to the traditional epistemology theory. Solution: we must only avoid a "distanced" position.
Cf. >Naturalism, >Naturalized Epistemology.
QuineVsKant: so works the examination of general human knowledge.
I 211
Naturalized epistemology/QuineVsCarnap/Stroud: denies the need for an external position - thus avoided interior/exterior problem. >Interior/exterior.
I 214
QuineVsKant: no a priori knowledge. >a priori, >a priori/Quine.
I 250
Naturalized epistemology/knowledge/underdetermination/skepticism/ StroudVsQuine: naturalized epistemology: must explain: how distant events cause closer events? - How is our exuberant belief caused? But that would not explain them - (how the "gap" between data and knowledge is bridged.) >"Meager input"/Quine.
Stroud: because it makes no sense to say that here there is a gap in a causal chain. - Then you cannot speak of underdetermination - that an event "underdetermines" another. -((s), there is no reason that would not be sufficient.)
Underdetermination/Quine: E.g. truths about molecules are underdetermined by truths about everyday things.
Gap/Stroud: Quine has to do with a gap, because he talkes about information ((s) content), not about mere events.
I 251
Input/Stroud: the individual input is not small - ((s) only as a mass term) - not small when it is conceived as an event - so we cannot speak of indeterminacy as events. >Indeterminacy, >Events.
StroudVsQuine: Problem: if the input is too small, the transition to the over flowing output requires consciousness.
I 253
Naturalized Epistemology/KantVsQuine/StroudVsQuine: we cannot see all our beliefs as "projections". And we must not accept epistemic priority ((s) that sensations are closer to us than the external objects). >Beliefs, >Knowledge, >World/thinking, >Perception, >Evidence, >W.V.O. Quine.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Phenomena Stalnaker I 269
Def phenomenal information/terminology/Lewis/Stalnaker: phenomenal information is - beyond physical information - an irreducible other type of information. The two are independent. Stalnaker: it is the kind of information that Jackson's color researcher Mary acquires. It is compatible with the modest view. >Colour researcher Mary, >Colours/Jackson, >Knowledge/Jackson, >Knowledge how.
Lewis: thesis: Mary is not missing phenomenal information.
I 271ff
Phenomenal information/self/subjectivity/Stalnaker: e.g. Mary knows in her room, that the treasure lies at a huge military cemetery in the 143rd row in the southerly direction and in the 57th row in the westerly direction. Problem: they still do not know that the treasure is "here". Problem: even if she stands in front of it, then she may have miscounted.
((s) Then she does not know what proposition the sentence expresses.) In the room: she cannot be fooled. Objective content: objective content is already in the room and possible to learn. Subjective content: subjective content cannot be expressed as a timeless proposition with "here".
>Localization, >Index words, >Indexicality.
I 274
Phenomenal indistinguishability, is possible in relation to colors, but not in relation to possible worlds. >Indistinguishability, >Possible worlds.
Phenomenal information/self-identification/Stalnaker: e.g. person with memory loss: Rudolf Lingens does not know whether he is Lingens or Gustav Lauben.
Error: it is false to assume that there will be a possible world, that is just like the actual world, except that the experiences of Lingens were reversed with those of Lauben. Even if such an interpersonal comparison between worlds is understandable, it would not be compatible with the fact that self-localization is an irreducible information.
>Centered worlds.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

Qualia Jackson Pauen I 179
Colour researcher Mary/Jackson/Pauen: JacksonVsMonism! Unlike Nagel. E.g. Fred can see two completely different colours within the red spectrum.
E.g.: Colour researcher Mary: she learns "how it is" when she leaves her black and white space.
Thesis 1. Neurobiological knowledge is, in principle, incomplete with regard to phenomenal experiences.
2. The monism is false, phenomenal properties cannot be identical with neural properties! Phenomenal properties are causally ineffective side effects of mental states. (Epiphenomenalism).
>Epiphenomenalism, >Mary-example, >Monism, >Knowing how.
I 180
Jackson: Two Different Theses 1. Epistemological Theory: according to this theory neurobiological knowledge does not imply phenomenal knowledge (like Nagel). LewisVsJackson/Pauen: Mary does not acquire new knowledge, but only the ability to imagine colors from now on. She already had the relevant knowledge beforehand.
JacksonVsLewis/Pauen: the knowledge goes beyond the ability: Mary can think about whether she has the same colour perceptions as other people.
What is decisive here is the object of the consideration: the question whether their ideas of the phenomenal states of others apply or not.
Nida Rümelin/Jackson/Pauen: (pro): the phenomenal knowledge here is a real knowledge: it allows the decision between previously open possibilities.
I 181
LycanVsJackson/Pauen: does not give any argument VsMonism: knowledge does not have to refer to new facts outside of physics, it can simply be a new approach. Mary knew "all the facts" before her liberation, but she had only limited access to them. This is again an epistemic, not an ontological argument. Therefore no objection to monism is to be expected.
A physical duplicate of Mary would have to have the same feelings. In any case, this is not excluded by Jackson.
I 182
Thus, Jackson shows only the weaker variant of the distinction between neurobiological and phenomenal knowledge: they show that the gap exists, but not that it is not unbridgeable. Missing Qualia/Pauen: For example, two otherwise physically identical organisms differ completely from one another: one has no phenomenal sensations at all.
N.B.: if this is possible, physiological knowledge can give no information about the mental states.
LenzenVs: it is not clear in what sense this case is "possible": there are probably people whose entire behavior is without consciousness, others, where they are at least aware of some activities.
Fallacy every/all/Pauen: now one can perhaps say that every single action could also be executed without consciousness, but not all actions!
I 183
This is not possible because many actions require learning. We could never have learned them in this way! VsVs: the representative of the missing Qualia does not have to react to Lenzen, he can easily claim that the performance is "intuitively plausible".
Thus the argument of the presupposition presupposes certain scenarios.
In any case, one cannot (should not) deduce the possibility from the conceptuality. But only one such real possibility would provide a serious objection to the VsTheory of identity.
VsMissing Qualia: mental states are degraded de facto into epiphenomena.
   1. Dualistic distinction between mental and physical properties.
I 184
2. It is assumed that the mental properties are not causally effective, otherwise their absence would be noticeable. >Qualia/Chalmers.

Jackson I
Frank C. Jackson
From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
Reductionism Lewis Schwarz I 158
Reductionism/colors researcher Mary/Lewis/Jackson: with newly acquired terms no true propositions can be formulated that do not analytically follow from truths in the old vocabulary. >Colour researcher Mary.
Anti-Reductionism/non-reductive physicalism/Lycan, Horgan/Tye/Loar: they do follow.

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Theories Chalmers I 165
Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons.
I 166
B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience.
>Materialism, >Supervenience, >Physical/psychic.
A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism.
Cf. >Colour researcher Mary/Frank Jackson, >Elimination, >Behaviorism,
>Reductionism, >Functionalism.
1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable.
2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time.
3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally.
Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4).
Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10),
B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive.
>Metaphysical necessity.
1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible.
2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically).
>B. Loar.
3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical.
Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13).
Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21).
C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible.
1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible.
2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts.
3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws.
Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27).
I 167
The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest.
I 213
Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. >Laws, >Laws of nature.
I 216
First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >First person, >Solipsism, >Panpsychism.
I 218
If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot. >Consciousness/Chalmers.

1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968
2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991
3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25
4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949
5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995
6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982
7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996
8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56
9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68
10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43
11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61
12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993.
13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108
14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993
15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992
16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991
17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83
18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995.
19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993
20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995
21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992
22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970
23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303
24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36
25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982
26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988
27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70

Cha I
D. Chalmers
The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996

Cha II
D. Chalmers
Constructing the World Oxford 2014

Two Omniscient Gods Stalnaker I 275
Gods-Example/Example Two Omniscient Gods/Lewis/Stalnaker: version: one version of the gods example is the one with inverted spectra. Castor: Castor has the experience ph-red. Knowledge/Castor: Castor knows that red things look ph-red for Castor. And he knows, because of the inversion, that the same things look ph-green for Pollux.
>Inverted spectra.
Pollux: Pollux has the experience ph-green ((s) with the same object). Experience/problem: Castor does not know if this experience is for him ph-red or ph-green, because he does not know whether red things look for him ph-red or ph-green. If this is supposed to be omniscience, then it does not imply phenomenal distinguishability.
Variant: assuming there is nothing green in the world - then both are in the same situation as Mary and each will remain in this position, even if all came to know which God they are. They do not know what it is like to have this experience.
>Two omniscient Gods/Lewis, >Colour researcher Mary, >Phenomena/Stalnaker.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003

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