Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 23 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Concepts | Jackson | Black I 234 Conceptual analysis/Lewis/Schwarz: While for most authors the conceptual analysis is separated from philosophy, it is connected to it for Lewis and also for Jackson. SchwarzVs: Vs both positions: as, for example, Panprotopychism and the world as it is show, there are indeed metaphysical supervenience relations which are not associated with analytic reducibility. N.B.: this shows that they do not deserve the philosophical status: panprotopsychism is not a real physical position, the supervenience of all truths in the "world as it is" is an irrelevant formal curiosity. >Panprotopsychism, >Conceptual analysis, >Supervenience. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Entailment | Geach | I 174 Entailment/Quine/Geach: Quine used "implies" instead of "entails". >Implication. Geach: Entailment requires nouns. Quotes are nevertheless noun-similar. >Quote. Entailment requires quotes to include sentences. >Quotation marks. GeachVsPropositions: "entails": is an artificial word; instead you can also use "an if". Example: "A. if Russell is a brother, Russell is male" That avoids looking at partial sentences as a blackening of the paper (letters). - (Otherwise "The proposition that Russell is a Brother ..."). >Blackening of the paper, >Proposition. I 180 Entailment/Geach: truth conditions: thesis: "p entails q" if and only if there is an a priori possibility to know that Cpq, which is not to find out whether either p or q is true. >Truth conditions. Problem: that implies a possibility that we have: "p" is false and "it is possible to find out that p" is true. One can know necessary things without facts and without conceptual analysis. >Necessity. Lewy's First Paradox: Entailment cannot be fully transitive. >Transitivity. I 183 Entailment/Lewy's 1. Paradox: Summary: 1. One can know a priori that Cpq without knowing p v q. 2. one can know a priori that Cqr without knowing p v r. We can conclude from these premises: Conclusion: one can know a priori that Cpr. N.B.: but we cannot add safely: without knowing ("which is not a way to find out") whether p v r. We have the a priori way of finding out that Cpr, derived from our a priori knowledge that Cpq and that Cqr. But that does not allow to answer if p, and figure out that Cqr allows not to figure out whether r. If the truth table provides the same truth values anyway, you cannot speak of a link. There is no reason to believe that we have any knowledge a priori that both Cp(Kpq) and C(Kpq)r, and such that Cpr, with the exception of a priori knowledge, that r. Therefore, there is no reason to believe p entails r. I 184 Transitivity/Geach: Entailment is not transitive, but validity of evidence is transitive. >Validity, >Evidence. FitchVs: Evidence is not transitively valid in order to solve paradoxes of set theory. >Paradoxes, >Set theory. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Grice | Avramides | I 26 Grice/Avramidis: Grice view should be understood as a conceptual analysis, not as reductionism. - Not as physicalism. - Grice wants a reconciliation with Frege and Davidson. >Philosophy of mind, >Gottlob Frege, >Donald Davidson, >Paul Grice. I 42f Grice/Avramides: Thesis: the problem of sentence meaning (meaning of the whole utterance) takes precedence over the meaning of partial statements. >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Clauses, >Compositionality, >Frege-Principle, >Subsententials. Statement/Grice: is understood broadly, also signals etc. Important argument: thus, the analysis ranges in a situation meaning before the timeless meaning (the standard meaning). >Situation, >Situation/Psychology, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. Only so can he equate"x means something" with "S means something (in a situation) with x". 1st Version; ... A response from the listener is induced ... 2nd Version: ... in addition: the listener must recognize the intention of the speaker. I 44 3rd Version: in addition: the recognition of the speaker's intention must act as a reason for the belief of the listener. Vs: there are still many counterexamples. I 45 GriceVsGrice: counter-E.g. it is a difference whether I spontaneously frown in a situation or in order to express my displeasure to a person. Important argument: exactly the same information is transmitted, no matter if the speaker has the intention to communicate or not. Then there is no reason to distinguish between natural and non-natural meaning. >Natural meaning/non-natural meaning. The difference has to do with what the frowning person can expect the listener to believe - but without intention no meaning - non-natural meaning (without intention) never sufficient for response. I 46 E.g. thumbscrews mean nothing. I 67 Grice/Avramides: so far, the analysis is not sufficient for timeless (linguistic meaning. - Only for speaker-meaning. Meaning/Grice: meaning is to be found both outside language and within. I 68 Timeless meaning/Grice: disjunction of findings and about what people want to achieve with x. - This is also an effect etc. but not a practice. It is not sufficient (because it may have a second meaning), and not necessary (it may have alternatives). - But it is a "procedure in the repertoire". >Practise, >Language behavior, >Language community, >Convention. I 111 Reductionist Gricean/Loar: This position risks to accept thinking without language. >Thinking without language. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Metaphysics | Inwagen | Schwarz I 27 Metaphysics/being/essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing about contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. >Necessity, >a posteriori necessity, >necessity de re. Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2). A posteriori necessity/metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. You can learn e.g. that Blair is premier or e.g. that the evening star corresponds to the morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: other cases (which cannot be empirically found) do not exist. LewisVsStrong Necessity: strong necessity has no place in his modal logic. >LewisVsTelescope Theory: worlds are not like distant planets of which one can learn which ones exist. >Possible worlds. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Metaphysics | Jackson | Stalnaker I 201 Metaphysics/Episteme/Kripke/Stalnaker: the separation of metaphysical and epistemological distinctions made it possible to agree with the empiricists that substantial truths about the world are knowable only on the basis of empirical evidence, while one allows at the same time nontrivial metaphysical truths about the essential nature of the things. Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial, what Kripke actually showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989(1), Jackson 1998(2), Chalmers 1996(3)) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with this,... I 202 ...that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. >Necessity, >Necessity de re. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth which is knowable a priori by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. >Necessity a posteriori, >Two-dimensional semantics. I 203 Metaphysics/metaphysical laws/logic/analysis/Stalnaker: conceptual analysis and deduction (logic) are sufficient to show what is conceptually necessary. But they cannot reveal any metaphysical laws that exclude possibilities that are conceptually coherent, but metaphysically impossible. Metaphysical possibility/Jackson/Chalmers: ditto, no different terms of necessity (Jackson 1998(2), 67-84, Chalmers 1996(3), 136-8). I 204 Metaphysical necessity/Jackson/Chalmers/Kripke/Lewis/Stalnaker: metaphysical necessity is therefore necessity in the broadest sense. E.g. It is not exactly the case that there are no metaphysical laws that might have excluded gold from being something else, but if there are such metaphysical laws, there is no such possibility for them to exclude it. Namely, in the light of empirical facts. >Facts. 1. Alan Sidelle. [1989] Necessity, Essence, and Individuation: A Defense of Conventionalism. Cornell University Press 2. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 3. David J. Chalmers [1996]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Midlife Crisis | Psychological Theories | Upton I 145 Midlife Crisis/Psychological theories/Upton: There is much less evidence to support Levinson’s suggestion of a midlife crisis [than evidence for other theses of Levinson] >Levinson (1986(1), 1996(2)). >Stages of development/Levinson. Many studies support the idea that midlife is a time of self-reflection, and even a time when goals may change (Hermans and 0les, 1999(3). However, the image of the adult experiencing a crisis during midlife remains largely unsubstantiated (Hedlund and Ebersole, 1983)(4). As they age, many people show increased satisfaction with their jobs, are more involved in their work and are less interested in seeking out new jobs (Rhodes, 1983)(5). This is in complete contrast to the image that many people have that, as adults age, they become less able to work. Indeed, the evidence suggests that older adults are as capable as their younger co-workers (Hansson et al., 1997)(6). It is thought that this may well reflect the expertise acquired through ‘on-the-job’ experience (Hansson et al., 1997)(6). 1. Levinson, DJ (1986) The Seasons of a Man’s Life. New York: Alfred Knopf. 2. Levinson, DJ (1996) The Seasons of a Woman’s Life. New York Alfred Knopf. 3. Hermans, H and 0les, p (1999) Midlife crisis in men: affective organization of personal meanings. Human Relations, 52: 1403-26. 4. Hedlund, B and Ebersole, P (1983) A test of Levinson’s mid-life re-evaluation Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143: 189-92. 5. Rhodes, SR (1983) Age-related differences in work attitudes and behaviour: a review and conceptual analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 93: 328-67. 6. Hansson, RO, De Koekkoek, PD, Neece, WM and Patterson, DW (1997) Successful aging at work: annual review, 1992—1996: the older worker and transitions to retirement. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 51: 202-33. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
| Necessity | Chalmers | Schwarz I 27 Definition strong necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: In addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: For example, Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999(2)). >Modality, >Modal truth, >Possible worlds, >Essentialism, >Pain, >Identity, >Identity theory, >Contingency. Schwarz I 208 A posteriori/Necessity/Lewis/Schwarz: here the secondary truth conditions are generally fulfilled, but not the primary ones! The first circumstance makes the sentences necessary - secondary truths reflect the behavior in modal embeddings - the second makes them a posteriori. But not because primary conditions of truth would be determined by embedding in epistemic operators (as in (Chalmers, 2003)(3)), but because, according to our language conventions, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star" may not always be expressed, but only when certain conditions are available about which we must first inform ourselves. >Truth conditions. Schwarz I 209 E.g. if the astronomers announce tomorrow that the Morning Star is not the Evening Star, then they have real news, but they do not violate our language conventions. This has something to do with Lewis' description theory of the reference. >Reference/Lewis, >Conventions/Lewis, >Language use, >Morning star/Evening star. 1. [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. In [van Inwagen 2001] 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46 3. [2003]: “The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics”. Manuskript. Online verf¨ugbar unter http://www.consc.net/papers/foundations.html --- Chalmers I 63 Necessary Truth/Gareth Evans/Chalmers: (Evans 1979 (1)): Definition "superficial necessity"/Evans: E..g "Water is H2O" when the modal operator is "actually fixed", i.e. related to the actual world (The world of the speaker). (Davies and Humberstone, 1980 (2)). It may turn out that the reference is different. (I.e., that it was different all the time). >Reference, >Actuality, >Actual World. Def "deep necessity"/Evans: this is not influenced by a posteriori considerations. These types of necessity and possibility refer to statements, not to worlds. Truths conditions/Evans/Chalmers: Thus, two sets of truth conditions are associated with each statement (primary and secondary,> Intensions/Chalmers). I 13 Strong metaphysical necessity/Chalmers: would be one that assumes that it would be metaphysically impossible for a world to be identical with ours in regard to the physical facts, but not for all positive facts. I 137 This is stronger than Kripke's metaphysical necessity, which we may call weak metaphysical necessity. >Metaphysical necessity. Conceivability/Chalmers: then worlds are conceivable that are not possible at all. Strong metaphysical necessity goes beyond the limitations we have described as "wrongly described worlds". Then "Zombie world" could correctly describe a world that we imagine, even with regard to a secondary intension. It is only the case that such a world would not be metaphysically possible. >Zombies, >Secondary Intension/Chalmers, >Intensions, >Terminology/Chalmers. 1. Vs: there is no reason to believe that there is such a modality of metaphysical necessity. There are no analogies to this of how they are provided by examples such as water/H2O or Hesperus/Phosphorus, since they require only one possible world. A posteriori Information: always affects only our own world! This can help to locate our world in the space of possible worlds. 2. Vs: If we allow this kind of metaphysical necessity, we open the door for further ad hoc modalities. I 138 Zombie World: someone who believes that a zombie world is logically possible but metaphysically impossible, cannot answer the key question: Why could not God have created a Zombie world? If he had created it, it would still be metaphysically impossible. This is too arbitrary. >Metaphysics. 1. G. Evans, Reference and contingency. The Monist 62, 1979: pp. 161-89. 2. M. K. Davies and I. L. Humberstone, Two notions of necessity. Philosophical Studies 38, 1980: pp. 1-30. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Necessity | Jackson | Schwarz I 226 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson/Schwarz: follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (Lewis 1994b(1),296f,2002b(2), Jackson 1998a(3): 56 86). --- Stalnaker I 18 Necessity a posteriori/Jackson: necessity a posteriori is a result of relatively superficial linguistic facts. It comes from an optional descriptive semantics which randomly characterizes natural languages: a mechanism to determine speakers. Thesis: there could also be languages without a fixed reference, which even tells to a certain extent how things are, namely without necessary truths a posteriori. >Necessity a posteriori, >Reference, cf. >Reference semantics. StalnakerVsJackson: however, if the reference-defining mechanisms are part of the meta-semantic history, they are not optional. They are part of the representation of what makes the fact that our utterances and internal states can have any representative properties at all. Necessary a posteriori truths are a feature of our intentionality. Two-dimensional semantics/Stalnaker: two-dimensional semantics can show how the possible and the truth interact, i.e. to separate semantic from factual questions in the context. >Two-dimensional semantics. I 19 But it does not provide a context-free canonical language, in which we can give a neutral representation of the possibility space. >Context. 1. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 2. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 3. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Necessity | Sidelle | Stalnaker I 201/2 Necessity/Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: one can still assume that necessity has its root in the language. Solution: two-dimensional semantics: shares e.g. necessary a posteriori on in necessary truth that is a priori knowable (through conceptual analysis) and a part which is only a posteriori knowable. >Two-dimensional semantics, >Semantics, >Knowledge, >a priori, >a posteriori, >Analysis, >Concepts, >Language, >Meaning, >Word Meaning. Metaphysical necessity/all authors: Metaphysical necessity is in any case no special kind of necessity. >Metaphysical necessity. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Neurophilosophy | Churchland | II 463 Neurophilosophy/Churchland thesis: Neuroscience can reveal the mechanisms underlying psychological functions. I emphasize the empirical character. These are not problems of conceptual analysis. Reduction is the most promising strategy. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Picture Theory | Armstrong | II (b) 34 Picture theory/Armstrong: There are problems with truthmakers: e.g. surface structure of "Jack is a father," ascribes a property, not a relation! But the situation that makes the sentence true, involves several relations to different people! - E.g. The man is healthy, the urine is healty, eating is healthy: here the conceptual analysis shows, what is not shown by the picture theory. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Possible Worlds | Jackson | Schwarz I 72f Possible worlds/Jackson/Schwarz: the obligation to possible worlds is also there, when one speaks in the everyday language about possible options. But, like one counts his change money, one does not need a sophisticated metaphysics for it. (Jackson, 1998a(1), 11). >Modal realism, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Possible Worlds/Kripke, >Possible worlds/Stalnaker, >Metaphysics. 1. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Pragmatics | Carnap | VII 16 Extension: semantic concept - intension: pragmatic concept. Habermas III 373 Pragmatics/Carnap/Habermas: With his logical syntax, Carnap opens the way from reference semantics to formal analysis of the representation functions of language. However, Carnap regards the functions of expression as part of pragmatics. According to Carnap, this is not determined by a general system of reconstructable rules in such a way that it could close similarly to the syntax and semantics of a conceptual analysis. >Semantics, >Syntax, >Reference, >Presentation, >Language, >Concepts. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Proofs | Chalmers | 93/94 Proof/Argument/Chalmers: to argue against something, one can proceed on three levels: 1. The Unimaginability 2. The lack of recognizability (epistemic) 3. The conceptual analysis. For the irreducibility of conscious experience, I will argue on all three levels. >Experience, >Conceivability, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Concepts, >Analysis/Chalmers. This will be about an a priori version of the logical necessity with regard to primary intensions. >Intensions. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Propositions | Chalmers | Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] --- Chalmers I 64 Propositions/Chalmers: there are primary and secondary propositions corresponding to the primary and secondary intensions shown here. >Two-dimensional semantics, See Kaplan's distinction >content / >character). |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Propositions | Jackson | Schwarz I 207 (Note) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. >Two-dimensional semantics. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. Cf >Intensions/Stalnaker. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Reference Semantics | Carnap | Habermas III 373 Reference Semantics/Carnap/Habermas: with his logical syntax, Carnap opens the way from reference semantics to formal analysis of the representation functions of language. However, Carnap regards the functions of expression as part of pragmatics. According to Carnap, this is not determined by a general system of reconstructable rules in such a way that it could close similarly to the syntax and semantics of a conceptual analysis. >Semantics, >Syntax, >Reference, >Language, >Concepts, >Expressions, >Rules, Reference. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Reference Semantics | Habermas | III 373 Reference Semantics/Carnap/Habermas: with his logical syntax, Carnap opens the way from reference semantics to formal analysis of the representation functions of language. >R. Carnap, >Language/Carnap, >Semantics, >Logic/Carnap, >Syntax/Carnap. However, Carnap regards the functions of expression as part of pragmatics. >Pragmatics. According to Carnap, this is not determined by a general system of reconstructable rules in such a way that it could close similarly to the syntax and semantics of a conceptual analysis. >Syntax. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Supervenience | Blackburn | Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), (Horgan 1993)(2): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: for logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the finding that the reference is preserved over possible worlds (is rigid). >Rigidity, >Intensions, >Primary Intension. The supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. >Conditional, >a priori. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). >Secondary Intension. Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/Chapter 2) >Contingency. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, therefore we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Supervenience/Chalmers 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. Terence Horgan (1993). On What There Isn’t. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):693-700. |
Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Supervenience | Chalmers | I 33 Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties: B properties: higher-level properties A properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Basic pattern: Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties. For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical. Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds. Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual. I 34 E.g. form supervenes on physical properties. Definition Global Supervenience/Chalmers: when A facts about the world determine B facts about the world. That is, there are no two possible worlds which are identical with respect to A, which are not also identical with regard to B. For example biological properties supervene globally on physical properties. Definition local supervenience implies global supervenience, but not vice versa. E.g. two physical organisms can differ in certain biological characteristics, one individual can be fitter than the other, triggered by environmental conditions. >Extrinsic properties,> Niches. Chalmers: For example, one could imagine that two physically identical organisms might belong to different species, if they had different evolutionary stories. Consciousness: here it will be more about local supervenience. I 35 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: logical supervenience is conceptual and stronger than natural supervenience. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: this term is used to distinguish between logical supervenience. I 38 A situation would be conceivable in which laws that automatically produce B facts might not produce these for once. (Kripke 1972, 1980)(1). I 39 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: Problem: There could be a possible world which is identical to our actual world, but not additionally with non-physical elements such as angels and ghosts. These could be physically identical with us, but biologically different from us. This has led some authors (Haugeland 1982(2), Petrie 1987(3)) to say that the logical possibility and logical necessity are too strong terms for our supervenience relations. Solution/Chalmers: we must explicitly refer to our actual world or specified possible worlds. I 40 Other problems have to do with negative existence statements about what does not exist in our world, or does not exist in other possible worlds. Such problems can never be determined by local facts or local characteristics. Supervenience should always be determined by reference to positive facts and characteristics. I 84 Name/Supervenience/Explanation/Chalmers: E.g. according to Kaplan (1989)(4) the name "Rolf Harris" simply picks out its speaker directly. Does that mean that the property to be Rolf Harris does not logically supervene on physical facts? >Names, >Reference, >Identification, >Vivid name/Kaplan. Secondary intension of the name: what resulted from a certain egg and sperm in all possible worlds. This supervenes logically on facts. Primary intension of the name: is that what results from the linguistic usage, of those who have, or had assiociate with Rolf Harris, or heard of Rolf Harris. The primary intension may be absent, which is a problem for the supervenience >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. I 87 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: apart from conscious experience, indexicality, and negative existence theorems everything supervenes logically on physical facts, including physical laws. >Indexicality, >Experience, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(5), Horgan (1993)(6): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference over possible worlds remains preserved (is rigid). Thereby, the supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept picks out a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (See Horgan and Timmons 1992b.(7)) Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the ussual case. I 124 Supervenience/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical facts, but not that it does not supervene at all! 1. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 2. J. Haugeland, Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982: pp. 93-103 3. B. Petrie, Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 119-30 4. D. Kaplan, Demonstratives. In: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (Eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York 1989 5. S. Blackburn, Supervenience revisited. In: I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essay by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge 1985 6. T. Horgan, From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102, 1993: pp. 555-86 7. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Supervenience | Horgan | Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), Horgan (1993)(2): How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference about possible worlds is preserved (or is rigid). The supervenience conditional is thus an a priori conceptual truth. >Intensions, >Primary Intension, >Rigidity, >Reference. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/C 2) >Secondary Intension. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: is - as opposed to the logical - contingent for its part. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Contingency, >Ontology. 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. T. Horgan (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102 (408):555-86 |
Horgan I T. Horgan Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Horgan II T. Horgan The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Terminology | Chalmers | I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)(1) distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Use Theory | Habermas | III 374 Use Theory/Habermas: goes beyond the limitation to assertoric sentences and also makes the pragmatic aspects of a linguistic expression accessible to conceptual analysis. >Analysis, >Assertions, >Language behavior, >Pragmatics, >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chalmers, D. | Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D. | I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has? |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Fictionalism | Schwarz Vs Fictionalism | Schwarz I 72 Fictionalism/Possible worlds/Poss.w./Lewis/Black: Thesis: propositions of possibilities and possible worlds function as propositions on absences, the average citizen or Holmes. That means they may be true, although the objects do not exist. Question: Can you rephrase propositions about possible world, so the modal words (MO) are eliminated? Yes: E.g. "possibly donkeys can speak": Problem: the modality here is still provided. Problem: much of what we want to know about possible worlds, cannot be translated in the language with rhombus and square: E.g. whether there are two worlds which differ only in that fundamental properties that play roles. Fictionalism: propositions about possible worlds analogue to propositions about Holmes: because Holmes is indeed a possible thing itself. (simple form: Rose, 1990(1), Sider 2002(2) nested: Armstrong 1989a(3), intermediate forms: Fine 1976(4), 2003b(5)). Thesis: propositions of the form: there is a world in which ... "interpreted as "it is possible that there is a world ... "((s) Solves the quantification in favor of modal operators). Fiction/Rosen: then Lewis' tales of possible worlds along with a description of the actual world. Then there is "according to Lewis" a possible world in which donkeys can speak. ((s) but not: "The actual world is such that speaking donkey may exist in a possible world. That would be a property of the actual world and not the possible world, and the actual world may not have as many properties as they is at least in parts exclude themselves). Vs: Lewis provides no full description of all possible worlds. He consciously leaves many open. Pointe: after Rose then propositions, which Lewis does not specifically agree to, would be wrong!. Problem: because Lewis says nothing about 17 dimensional possible world, the proposition that there is at least one and the proposition that there is none are both wrong. Schwarz I 73 VsVs: you could try to assign more work the fiction operator "according to Lewis': from his texts it is clear that he believed that there possible worlds with 17 dimensions (he also says nothing about possible worlds with 17 cows). But the operator then becomes mysterious e.g. "From Lewis' texts follows logically ..." Vs: why should Lewis decide about possible world and not another author?. Fiction/Schwarz: it is better to idealize. That is then an only fiction of many possible worlds.. Then we should have a "lagadonical" language again. Then we could distinguish worlds with strange things and properties: E.g. fiction can say that a strange property A in a possible world 1 plays exactly the same role as another, B, in a possible world 2. (Sider 2002)(2). Vs: Problem: the supposed modality remains ((s) And fictionalism and ersatzism were just going to replace it). Solution: the correct fiction would be one that accurately covers all possibilities. ((s) Vs: that would be meaningless, and would not make any distinctions, the distinctions have to be made within the fiction and would demand a meta-level). Vs Fictionalism: further problems: e.g. the use of possible worlds for analyzing information or meaning: Def information content of a proposition/SchwarzVsFictionalism: a class of possible worlds.. But not "in accordance with this and that fiction". Not even when the fiction in question contained a theory of information. We want our own theory, not the theory of a fiction!. VsFictionalism: should not leave too much to fiction. If all becomes fiction (e.g. all Abstracts) the concept loses contour. Possible world/Schwarz: you also have the obligation to possible worlds, when you talk in everyday language about possible options. But, as if you count your change, you do not need sophisticated metaphysics for this. (Jackson 1998a(6),11). Schwarz I 93 Vs fictionalism: Problem: when properties are classes of possibilia, statements about properties must also be analyzed away in a fictional way. 1. Gideon Rosen [1990]: “Modal Fictionalism”. Mind, 99: 327–354 2. Theodore Sider [2002]: “The Ersatz Pluriverse”. Journal of Philosophy, 99: 279–315 3. D. M. Armstrong [1989a]: A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 4. Kit Fine [1975]: “Review of Lewis, Counterfactuals”. Mind, 84: 451–458 5. Kit Fine [2003b]: “The Problem of Possibilia”. In [Loux und Zimmerman 2003], 161–179 6. F. Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke, S. A. | Lewis Vs Kripke, S. A. | V 251/252 Event/Description/describe/naming/Lewis: is usually specified by accidental properties. Even though it's clear what it meant to specify by its nature. An event applies, for example, to a description, but could also have occurred without applying to the description. Def Event/Lewis: is a class consisting of a region of this world together with different regions of other possible worlds in which the event could have occurred. (because events are always contingent). What corresponds to the description in one region does not correspond to it in another region (another possible world). You can never reach a complete inventory of the possible descriptions of an event. 1. artificial description: e.g. "the event that exists in the Big Bang when Essendon wins the final, but the birth of Calvin Coolidge, if not". "p > q, otherwise r". 2. partly by cause or effect 3. by reference to the place in a system of conventions such as signing the check 4. mixing of essential and accidental elements: singing while Rome burns. Example triple property, time, individual, (see above). 5. specification by a point of time, although the event could have occurred sooner or later 6. although individuals can be significantly involved, accidentially associated individuals can be highlighted. 7. it may be that a rich being of an event consists of strolling, but a less fragile (description-dependent) event could only be an accidental strolling. (s) And it may remain unclear whether the event is now essentially characterized by strolls. 8. an event that involves one individual in a significant way may at the same time accidentally involve another: For example, a particular soldier who happens to belong to a particular army, the corresponding event cannot occur in regions where there is no counterpart to this soldier, but if there is a counterpart of the soldier, this belongs to another army. V 253 Then the army gets involved on an accidental basis through its soldier's way. 9. heat: non-rigid designator: (LewisVsKripke): Non-rigid: whatever this role has: whatever this or that manifestation brings forth. Example: heat could also have been something other than molecular movement. Lewis: in a possible world, where heat flow produces the corresponding manifestations, hot things are those that have a lot of heat flow. Schwarz I 55 Being/Context Dependency/LewisVsKripke/SchwarzVsKripke: in certain contexts we can certainly ask e.g. what it would be like if we had had other parents or belonged to another kind. Example statue/clay: assuming, statue and clay both exist exactly for the same time. Should we say that, despite their material nature, they always manage to be in the same place at the same time? Shall we say that both weigh the same, but together they don't double it? Problem: if you say that the two are identical, you get in trouble with the modal properties: For example, the piece of clay could have been shaped completely differently, but not the statue - vice versa: Schwarz I 56 For example, the statue could have been made of gold, but the clay could not have been made of gold. Counterpart theory/Identity: Solution: the relevant similarity relation depends on how we refer to the thing, as a statue or as clay. Counterpart relation: Can (other than identity) not only be vague and variable, but also asymmetric and intransitive. (1968(1),28f): this is the solution for Def Chisholm's Paradox/Schwarz: (Chisholm, 1967(2)): Suppose Kripke could not possibly be scrambled eggs. But surely it could be a little more scrambly if it were a little smaller and yellower! And if he were a little more like that, he could be more like that. And it would be strange if he couldn't be at least a little bit smaller and yellower in that possible world. Counterpart Theory/Solution: because the counterpart relation is intransitive, it does not follow at all that at the end Kripke is scrambled egg. A counterpart of a counterpart from Kripke does not have to be a counterpart of Kripke. (1986e(3),246) I 57 KripkeVsCounterpart Theory/KripkeVsLewis: For example, if we say "Humphrey could have won the election", according to Lewis we are not talking about Humphrey, but about someone else. And nothing could be more indifferent to him ("he couldn't care less"). (Kripke 1980(4): 44f). Counterpart/SchwarzVsKripke/SchwarzVsPlantinga: the two objections misunderstand Lewis: Lewis does not claim that Humphrey could not have won the election, on the contrary: "he could have won the election" stands for the very property that someone has if one of his counterparts wins the election. That's a trait Humphrey has, by virtue of his character. (1983d(5),42). The real problem: how does Humphrey do it that he wins the election in this or that possible world? Plantinga: Humphrey would have won if the corresponding possible world (the facts) had the quality of existence. Lewis/Schwarz: this question has nothing to do with Kripke and Plantinga's intuitions. Schwarz I 223 Name/Description/Reference/Kripke/Putnam/Schwarz: (Kripke 1980(4), Putnam 1975(6)): Thesis: for names and expressions for kinds there is no generally known description that determines what the expression refers to. Thesis: descriptions are completely irrelevant for the reference. Description theory/LewisVsKripke/LewisVsPutnam/Schwarz: this only disproves the naive description theory, according to which biographical acts are listed, which are to be given to the speaker necessarily. Solution/Lewis: his description theory of names allows that e.g. "Gödel" has only one central component: namely that Gödel is at the beginning of the causal chain. Thus, theory no longer contradicts the causal theory of the reference. (1984b(7),59,1994b(8),313,1997(9)c,353f,Fn22). ((s)Vs: but not the description "stands at the beginning of the causal chain", because that does not distinguish one name from any other. On the other hand: "at the beginning of the Gödel causal chain" would be meaningless. Reference/LewisVsMagic theory of reference: according to which reference is a primitive, irreducible relationship (cf. Kripke 1980(4),88 Fn 38), so that even if we knew all non-semantic facts about ourselves and the world, we still do not know what our words refer to, according to which we would need special reference o meters to bring fundamental semantic facts to light. If the magic theory of reference is wrong, then semantic information is not sufficient in principle to tell us what we are referring to with e.g. "Gödel": "if things are this way and that way, "Gödel" refers to this and that". From this we can then construct a description from which we know a priori that it takes Gödel out. This description will often contain indexical or demonstrative elements, references to the real world. I 224 Reference/Theory/Name/Description/Description Theory/LewisVsPutnam/LewisVsKripke/Schwarz: For example, our banana theory does not say that bananas are sold at all times and in all possible worlds in the supermarket. For example, our Gödel theory does not say that Gödel in all possible worlds means Gödel. ((s) >Descriptivism). (KripkeVsLewis: but: names are rigid designators). LewisVsKripke: when evaluating names in the area of temporal and modal operators, you have to consider what fulfills the description in the utterance situation, not in the possible world or in the time that is currently under discussion. (1970c(12),87,1984b(8),59,1997c(9),356f) I 225 A posteriori Necessity/Kripke/Schwarz: could it not be that truths about pain supervene on physically biological facts and thus necessarily follow from these, but that this relationship is not accessible to us a priori or through conceptual analysis? After all, the reduction of water to H2O is not philosophical, but scientific. Schwarz: if this is true, Lewis makes his work unnecessarily difficult. As a physicist, he would only have to claim that phenomenal terms can be analyzed in non-phenomenal vocabulary. One could also save the analysis of natural laws and causality. He could simply claim these phenomena followed necessarily a posteriori from the distribution of local physical properties. A posteriori necessary/LewisVsKripke: this is incoherent: that a sentence is a posteriori means that one needs information about the current situation to find out if it is true. For example, that Blair is the actual prime minister (in fact an a posteriori necessity) one needs to know that he is prime minister in the current situation, Schwarz I 226 which is in turn a contingent fact. If we have enough information about the whole world, we could in principle a priori conclude that Blair is the real Prime Minister. A posteriori necessities follow a priori from contingent truths about the current situation. (1994b(8),296f,2002b(10), Jackson 1998a(11): 56 86), see above 8.2) 1. David Lewis [1968]: “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic”. Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. 2. Roderick Chisholm [1967]: “Identity through Possible Worlds: Some Questions”. Noˆus, 1: 1–8 3. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 4. Saul A. Kripke [1980]: Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell 5. David Lewis [1983d]: Philosophical Papers I . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. Hilary Putnam [1975]: “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’ ”. In [Gunderson 1975], 131–193 7. David Lewis [1984b]: “Putnam’s Paradox”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–377 8. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (Hg.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431 9. David Lewis [1997c]: “Naming the Colours”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 75: 325–342 10. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 11. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 12. David Lewis [1970c]: “How to Define Theoretical Terms”. Journal of Philosophy, 67: 427–446. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Inwagen, Vs Lewis, D. | Schwarz I 227 Metaphysics/being/essential/van InwagenVsLewis/StalnakerVsLewis: knowing contingent facts about the current situation would in principle not be sufficient to know all a posteriori necessities: Def strong necessity/Chalmers: thesis: in addition to substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: e.g. that Kripke is essentially a human being, e.g. that pain is essentially identical to XY. Important argument: knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot do this (van Inwagen 1998)(1) or only hypothetically through methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(2). 1. Peter van Inwagen [1998]: “Modal Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. 2. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Moore, G.E. | Verschiedene Vs Moore, G.E. | Grice I 266ff Hungerland Thesis Vs "inductive conception" of the paradigm of context implication: p claim to imply believing that p. Hungerland: instead: thesis Explanation model, if an assertion is normal, everything is implied that can be inferred from it. This depends on three different things: 1. Context of the assertion 2. Assumptions about what is considered normal 3. Rules for the correct use of expressions Example (Moore) "He went out, but I don't believe it." Hungerland: that is no contradiction! No logical isolation in the community. Brendel I 14 Term Analysis/Moore/Brendel: necessary condition: synonymy of the terms. Epistemological criterion/Synonymy/Moore: "Nobody can know, I 15 that the analytical standard applies to an object without knowing that the analytical standard applies to it. (Moore 1942, 663). Synonymy/Cooper LangfordVsMoore/Brendel: if the terms are then synonymous (i.e. the analysis is considered correct), it is trivial. ("Paradox of Analysis"). Synonymy/KünneVsMoore: is not at all a necessary condition for a correct conceptual analysis. I 16 Def Co-Implication/Künne/Brendel: Solution: "Co-Implication" = necessary extensional equality. (Künne 1990. 37). Logical form: "x is A" and "x is BC" imply each other in all possible worlds. Problem: this is not always obvious even for competent speakers. Intension Equality/Brendel: condition for it is necessary extension equality: if two expressions have the same intension, then they have the same extension in all possible world. Intension/Extension/some authors: but this does not apply vice versa. Example Kirkham: "2+2=4" and "36+7=29" and example "This object has a form" and "This object has a size" are extensionally equivalent by having the same truth value in all possible worlds, but they are not intensionally equivalent (not synonymous). I 17 Concept Analysis/Kirkham/Brendel: sometimes it is only about extension equality in the real world. Extension Equivalence/Equal Scope/stronger/weaker/Brendel: also in all possible worlds it is still somewhat weaker than synonymy. Putnam I 195 BurnyeatVsMoore: "he philosophises as if Kant never existed". (a propos "Moore's hands"). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Putnam, H. | Brendel Vs Putnam, H. | I 70 Truth-Definition/WT/PutnamVsTarski/Putnam/Brendel: Tarski's theory is contraintuitive from the start: this also applies to the model-theoretical variants. They do not do justice to our intuitive concept of "true". I 71 His truth concept is not even "semantic". BrendelVsPutnam: his concept of "intuitive truth" is itself quite unclear. I 105 Disquotation Theory/Disquotation Theory/Disquotationalism/Putnam/Brendel: Thesis: is only a variant of redundancy theory. BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: this is an error: because redundancy theory assumes an operator and a concept of truth based on disquotation theory cannot be a propositional operator and thus not a redundancy theory. I 278 Brains in a vat/BIV/PutnamVsSkepticism/Putnam: Thesis: the statement that we are brains in a vat cannot turn out to be true because representations have no intrinsic connection to their representatives ("magic reference") - is independent of causation. I 279 SkepticismVsPutnam/Brendel: Skepticism does not have to be impressed. It can classify Putnam's argument as a transcendental argument: it refers to the premises of the possibility of formulating the sentence "We are brains in a vat". StroudVsPutnam/Brendel: such transcendental arguments already presuppose certain verificationist assumptions. I 280 Problem: one cannot yet conclude from this that the world actually exists. One would also have to assume that principles constituting knowledge necessarily describe the world as it actually is. StroudVsTranscendental Argument/Brendel: petitio principii. I 281 BrendelVsStroud: Solution: Semantic Truth/Brendel: the skeptical hypothesis is not a meaningful truthful statement in the sense of semantic truth. Brains in a vat/BIV/Putnam/Brendel: Putnam himself admits that brains in a vat is physically possible. But what does that mean, except that there is such a possible description? I 282 BrendelVsPutnam: no physical possibility is shown at all, only a black box. (David WardVsPutnam Ward, 1995, 191f). He should show the possibility or impossibility of thinking. ((s) Because he himself ultimately proceeds from an argument of the impossibility of thinking (impossibility of reference). Thought experiment/Brendel: that something is physically possible is not yet an argument for the legitimacy of thougt experiment either. I 283 Conceptual Analysis/Brendel: can only be confirmed or refuted by conceptual possibilities. I 284 BrendelVsPutnam: the world of brains in a vat is not so closed to us, we have an idea of what it would be like. I 285 Understanding/Skepticism/BrendelVsPutnam/Brendel: therefore the skeptical hypothesis is not incomprehensible to us at all. And then also truthful. "Everything different"/Brendel: but this is where the limits of our imagination come in. |
Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Ryle, G. | Schiffer Vs Ryle, G. | I 266 Meaning Theory/M.th./Schiffer: some of them offer a reductive analysis of semantic terms, but that does not work. I 267 We learn more about our cognitive apparatus, if we ask why our m.th. fail. We also learn something if we only try a concept analysis. E.g. if we try to complete the following scheme, which is impossible: "x presents in y gdw ..." But:. SchifferVsRyle: "Analytical" connections between concepts do not bring us much further. It would be nice if we knew everything about the conceptual roles of our semantic and mental terms, but I do not see how we could find out more. M.th./Schiffer: some philosophers see it here just as their task to give an "explanation" rather than a conceptual analysis or meaning analysis of semantic concepts. E.g. M.th./Semantics/Devitt: (Devitt 1981,68): the problem of semantics is given in part by human speech behavior. The main problem of semantics is to explain the semantic terms that occur in the semantic theory. What is it for an inscription to have meaning? Why is this sound sequence true?. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Pro/Versus |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brentano: Irreducib. | Pro | Chisholm II 216 Psychology / Brentano / Marek: his theory can be regarded as analytic philosophy of psychology. (Conceptual analysis). The fact that he is committed to the Aristotelian metaphysics, may separate him from Ryle and Wittgenstein. II 217 Scholastic-sounding term system. Mentalistic vocabulary to investigate the psychic self and not the language about mental. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kripke | Chalmers, D. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: Kripke's theses can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Necessity | Chalmers, D. | Schwarz I 227 Def Strong Necessity/Chalmers: Thesis: Besides substantial contingent truths, there are also substantial modal truths: for example, that Kripke is essentially a human being, that pain is essentially identical to XY. N.B.: Knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. How do we recognize them, perhaps we cannot (van Inwagen 1998) or only hypothetically by methodological considerations (Block/Stalnaker 1999)(1). Schw I 227 Strong Necessity/Chalmers/Schwarz: Thesis: there are substantial modal truths. - For example Kripke is essentially human. - E.g. pain essentially identical with XY. - N.B.: Knowledge of contingent facts is not sufficient to recognize these modal facts. LewisVs: what is a possibility is not contingent. >Metaphysically possible. 1. Ned Block und Robert Stalnaker [1999]: “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”. The Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Kripke | Jackson, F. | Staln I 201 Kripke/Stalnaker: it remains controversial what it actually is that Kripke showed. Kripke/Alan Sidelle/Jackson/Chalmers/Stalnaker: (Sidelle 1989, Jackson 1998, Chalmers 1996) Thesis: theses of Kripke can be reconciled with them, I 202 that all necessity has its root in language and our ideas. However, in a more complex way than empiricism assumed. Then there is no irreducible necessity a posteriori. Necessary a posteriori: is then divisible into necessary truth that is a priori knowable by conceptual analysis, and a part that is only a posteriori knowable, but this is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
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